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Shame is the semivirtue of the learner.
Myles Burnyeat

Shame is not a word in my vocabulary.
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ABSTRACT
AN ANALYSIS OF MORAL SHAME:
IMPLICATIONS FOR CURRICULUM REFORM
SEPTEMBER 1999
JAY JOSEPH CONWAY, B. A., MARLBORO COLLEGE
M. ED., KEENE STATE COLLEGE
Ed. D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by. Professor Robert Sinclair

An appealing notion is that the emotions make a significant contribution
to a flourishing fife. The self-regarding emotions of self-respect, self-esteem,
and pride are undeniably things of great value; Aristotle proposed that a
justified sense of honor was the crown of the virtues. Many public schools
actively incorporate self-esteem initiatives in their curricula in the belief that
positive self-evaluations enhance learning and good citizenship.
One can maintain without contradiction that the self-regarding emotions
with negative properties detract from a happy life. Various attempts have
been made to suggest that shame, humiliation, guilt, and remorse are
intrinsically bad. Many proponents from within the two leading moral
education approaches - the cognitive developmentalists and the traditionalists
- subscribe to this view. According to these theorists, the aforementioned
emotions are viewed as counter-productive and unmotivational. I examine
their positions and find them flawed.
This dissertation proposes that moral shame can be conditionally good.
To justify this claim requires a plausible account of what an emotion is, the
formulation of a clear and precise definition of moral shame, an explication
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of how shame differs from other emotions of self-assessment, and an
argument that shame has moral significance. Following that, the two leading
educational theories of moral development will be examined to assess how they
value and accommodate the emotions of self-assessment.
Interviews are conducted with principals, teachers, students, law
enforcement and district court personnel, members of the clergy, and social
workers to support the claim that a sense of shame contributes to moral
progress. In that this view might be overlooked in many of the current moral
education programs, I conclude the study with suggestions for the necessary
curriculum reform.
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CHAPTER 1

NATURE OF THE STUDY

Introduction

Most educators, psychologists, and philosophers agree that the primary
purpose of moral education is to encourage children to develop good and strong
characters (Kupperman, 1991). There is little disagreement among these
professionals that the present world our school children inhabit is riddled with
negative influences. By now the list of these influences is well known.
Candidates that contend for a high rank in many surveys include broken
families, teenage pregnancies, substance abuse, illiteracy, egocentrism, and
dishonesty (Benninga, 1991; Bennett, 1993; Huffman, 1994). How one orders
this list will, of course, depend in large part on what one values.
Schools feel the weight of these disorders. Devised in many instances by
default, school-based programs attempt to rectify negative behaviors.
Strategies include intervention services, remediation / rehabilitation, and
various sorts of punishments. This study is not another attempt along those
lines. In what follows, the focus will be identifying and defining a contributing
cause to the escalation of these behaviors; and that is, it is proposed,
shamelessness. One hypothesis of this study is that a sense of shame might
prohibit some of these disorders from ever occurring. Were this true, it seems
to follow that our efforts would be more productively channeled in an attempt
to instill a sense of shame in young children rather than to focus on the
oftentimes ineffectual and disappointing efforts at rehabilitation.
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Statement of the Problem

I first became interested in the notion of shame in a graduate course on
Aristotle’s ethics. Suitable paper topics in philosophy often concern attempts
to sort out conceptual puzzles or apparent contradictions in a philosopher’s
work. In this regard, Aristotle’s work is rich in opportunity. The complexity of
Aristotle’s thought and the suggestive nature of his writing account for an
enormous body of secondary literature of widely divergent interpretations.
An interpretation of Aristotle’s view of shame seemed a suitable paper topic
because I simply could not understand how his various comments were
intended to fit together without conflict.
While Aristotle’s writing on shame is characteristically suggestive, there
is a limited amount of critical commentary. As with many other Aristotelian
topics, what interpretive literature exists does not amount to a consensus.
One explanation for the differing views is that it is not immediately apparent
whether Aristotle considers shame to be of moral significance. In the
Nicomanchean Ethics (NE), he explicitly states:

Shame is not the emotion of a good man, if it is felt for doing bad
actions, because such actions ought not to be done...so the
emotion ought not to be felt (1953,1128b20).

A few lines later there appears to be a puzzling contradiction. “But
shame may be said to be conditionally good; if a good man does such actions,
he will feel disgraced” (1128b29). Regarding children, he writes:
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The passion is not becoming to every age, but only to youth. For
we think young people should be prone to shame because they
live by passion and therefore commit many errors, but are
restrained by shame (1128b 16).

It seems then that Aristotle believes that shame - for adults - can
function as a corrective measure, while shame - for the young - serving the
developmental^ beneficial function of restraint, is “becoming”. According to
Myles Bumyeat, this power to restrain the young affords shame a “semi¬
virtue” classification (1980). This interpretation is not universally accepted.
In “Shame and Moral Progress”, John Kekes understands there to be a
fundamental disagreement between Plato and Aristotle over the moral
significance of shame. According to Kekes, Plato considers shame to be “one
of the important safeguards of morality (1988, p. 282). Kekes claims
Aristotle clearly disagrees with Plato. He cites this presumably straight¬
forward sentence from the same passage of the NE as textual support. “And
if shamelessness - not to be ashamed of doing base actions - is bad, that does
not make it good to be ashamed of doing such actions” (1128b33).
When Aristotle says that shame may be said to be a conditionally good thing,
Kekes apparently understands him to be referring to a prevailing opinion with
which Aristotle disagrees.
Contemporary literature on shame contains similar disagreements.
Kekes, himself, considers shame to be debilitating. He encourages us to
entertain other responses to moral failings since shame weakens our resolve
to reform and threatens our self-respect (1988, p. 291). On the other hand,
Gabriele Taylor maintains that a sense of shame fortifies one’s commitment
to those values and standards that justify our self-respect (1985).

One

account for disagreements of this sort is the view that an emotion is “passive”
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or “active”. Kekes considers shame to be “backward-looking”. As such,
shame cannot deter future wrongdoing, precisely because the wrong is in the
future: there is, as yet, nothing to be ashamed about. Colleague Arnold
Isenberg concurs. “Shame and regret are literally helpless, for they are
concentrated upon what we can do nothing about, on the past. Hence, they
are “passive”, incompatible with action” (1980, p. 375). Taylor counters that
a “forward-looking” component of shame is that it strengthens one’s
commitment to values. We maintain our self-respect by avoiding disgraceful
conduct.

Avoidance of shame is one way of losing self-respect, for it is one
way of blurring the values the person is committed to. From this
point of view, genuine shame is always justified (1985, p. 85).

Many psychologists render a blanket condemnation on most shame
experiences; some feel it is an emotionally primitive (Erikson, 1950;
Borysenko, 1990) and “toxic” experience (Bradshaw, 1988). Prior to any
claims about the alleged significance of shame, what immediately strikes a
reader who reviews the various positions is the profound lack of clarity on
what exactly shame is. One writer will claim it is an external, social
experience (Benedict, 1934), another believes it to be primarily internal. As
we saw above, writers disagree over the passive/active distinction. Additional
differences will be presented in what follows. But what these initial
controversies alert us to is that there is great confusion at more basic levels.
These are: exactly what is an emotion, and, how do individual emotions differ
from one another.
Another problem centers on the implementation of moral curricula.
Proponents of school prayer claim a direct connection between the Supreme
Courts ruling (Engel v. Vitale, 1976) that state-sponsored public school prayer
4

violates the Constitution with the escalation of crime, racial conflict, drug
abuse and sexual promiscuity (Eastland, 1995). Opponents of school prayer
view any connection as mere coincidence. Few in either group, however,
dispute the worrisome rise in crime statistics since the ruling in 1976. One
indisputable fact that resulted from the ban on school prayer is that it left
school leaders perplexed about how one distinguishes religious observances
from moral education. In response, many simply did nothing (Lickona, 1991;
Kilpatrick, 1992; Eastland, 1995).
Years ago, schools focused on socializing students and preparing them
for citizenship both through the formal curriculum and through the “hidden”
curriculum. The hidden curriculum refers to implicit expectations, structural
arrangements and the behavior patterns of the school staff (Sinclair and
Ghory, 1987). Unwritten standards of behavior applied to all members of the
school community. The formal curriculum contained clearly articulated
mission statements, the school’s philosophy, and lesson material which
included indoctrinative readings in moral education. Reading lessons, gleaned
from the McGuffey Reader - the largest circulated book in the early 1900’s contained lessons promoting the moral virtues of honesty, charity, courage
and respectfulness (Lickona, 1991).
In light of recent trends, many schools felt compelled to actively
reincorporate moral education into their formal curriculum. Recent efforts
have included Values Clarification, Sex Education, Conflict Resolution, Peer
Mediation, Drug Awareness Resistance Education (DARE), The “Just
Community” School Model, Character Education programs and “self-esteem”
initiatives. Many of these efforts have met with justifiable opposition. Among
the charges leveled by parents and community members have been the use of
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inappropriate materials, subversive ideologies, time management problems,
social engineering and usurping parental authority.
Some of these programs are clearly better than others. Negotiating a
compromise over a playground dispute with a peer mediator, being forewarned
about the hazards of narcotics, and learning about sexual biology ought not
qualify as comprehensive moral education curricula. Of the remaining, all
follow one of two general approaches: character development or cognitivedevelopmental. These two approaches differ both conceptually and
practically. Theoretically, character education holds that virtue can be
taught, that good models are essential for moral development and that the
young are not appropriate candidates for Socratic dialogues. Practically,
teachers must “impose” specific values to ensure the development of proper
habits. Virtually every leading theorist in character education takes his or her
lead from Aristotle by stressing the importance of developing settled
dispositions or good habits. This school of thought believes dispositions are to
begin development prior to, not necessarily concurrent with, intellectual
rationalizations. This indoctrinative approach is dismissed as misguided by
the cognitive-developmentalists. Often characterized as the indirect approach,
the various cognitive-development models share a common distrust for the
development of habits through “indoctrination” or imposing upon the young a
“bag of virtues”.
Cognitive-developmentalists often contend that ‘habituation’ is the
transmission of values that are not applicable in modern times while others
object that indoctrination usurps autonomous self-direction. Socratic
dialogues, therefore, are enthusiastically endorsed. These dialogues often
center on resolving ethical dilemmas. Characterized by a certain
“intellectualism”, - by virtue of its democratic, open-ended dialogue structure -
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teachers are instructed to accept each student’s decision nonjudgmentally.
Even virtuous traits such as honesty, responsibility, and fairness become
suspect by virtue of their conservatism; empathy and skepticism are higher
goals than is conformity for advocates of “constructivism”.

Children must be invited to reflect on complex issues, to recast
them in light of their own experiences and question, to figure out
for themselves...which traditions are worth keeping, and how to
proceed when two basic values conflict (Kohn, 1997, p. 435).
“Character educators”, suspicious that children have neither the experience
nor the intellectual machinery to evaluate value conflicts, oppose questioning
tradition.
Programs from both approaches have been the subject of criticism from
education boards, international academic journals, and local school
committees (Kirkpatrick, 1992; Kohn, 1997; Lockwood 1976; Sommers,
1984). Coupled with the litigious nature of modern times, many schools
responded to the critical press and community objections with a second period
of inactivity. With little confidence in the effectiveness of available programs
and perceiving an adversarial relationship with a segment of the parent
population, school administrators offered only the most innocuous of
instructional offerings and adopted a zero tolerance stance for school
infractions. Unfortunately, this reactive posture does little for character
development while resulting in many frivolous suspensions.
The majority of thoughtful observers from either approach agree that
troubling behaviors and the severity of the transgressions are escalating
among America’s youth. These admissions, however, do not translate into an
agreement on how schools can best assist parents and communities to
address these problems. The sheer number and variety of models attests to
7

substantive philosophical disagreements over the means to the same goal namely, helping children to develop good and strong characters.
A problem is this: many disputes arise over the means toward a goal
that is itself unclear. Over the last few decades several forces have
undermined the view that ‘good character’ is a concept that is amenable to
objective and precise formulation. A short list of these forces might include
the popularity of ethical relativism and nonjudgmental self-help psychologies;
the difficulty to understand and to implement a character program; and,
school personnel who have historically claimed to have neither the time, the
desire, a consensus, nor an abundance of literature to guide an action plan to
help children develop good character.
Those contemporary educational methods that reintroduce the affective
dimension - feelings and emotions - (e.g., Values Clarification, Peer Mediation,
Conflict Resolution, etc.) tend to replace the objective aspiration toward good
character with subjective assessments of self-esteem.
Evidence in this study will be introduced which suggests that high self¬
esteem can co-exist with both ethical illiteracy and offensive behavior. Self¬
esteem, the common goal for many school programs, may have no necessary
connection with good character. Proponents of “self-esteem” initiatives
routinely dismiss shame - an index of one’s serious commitment to values and
to the standards of the community, as passe’. Some believe shame
contributes to low self-esteem and is, therefore, a danger to one’s general well¬
being (Isenberg, 1988; Kekes, 1993). As such, it is considered intrinsically evil.
This view creates another problem.
Accompanying the worrisome rise in crime statistics is an equally
troubling parallel development: more and more offenders appear to display
shamelessness for their crimes (Alter and Wingert, 1995). To lack shame for

serious transgressions may signal a disposition that is resistant to change. As
bad behavior and high self-esteem are not mutually exclusive, this suggests
the question whether one can have genuine pride and self-respect without a
sense of shame.
Another problem, suggested in the introduction, is that by under¬
estimating the positive aspect of shame, we might miss an important
opportunity. It seems intuitively correct that many of our reactive efforts
(rehabilitation, cognitive-therapies, elaborate external methods of deterrence,
etc.) would never be needed if a sense of shame prohibited certain behaviors
from ever occurring.
Simply put, the most significant problem appears to be that of having
things the wrong way around. Self-esteem is considered to be achievable
independently from that which ought to justify its existence - that being good
character. High self-esteem is attractive in the ease with which it is promoted
and in its supposedly painless acquisition. But, without an understanding of
the proper development of good character and an appreciation for the early
work it requires, however difficult and sometimes painful, subsequent reactive
measures are required due to its absence.

Statement of Purpose

One purpose of the study will be to propose a clear and useful analysis of
the concept of moral shame. It is hoped that from such a study a significant
contribution will be made to future attempts in public school moral education
initiatives for promoting the acquisition of virtuous dispositions, genuine selfrespect, and reflective temperaments in children. All these appear to be
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threatened by popular psychology’s privatization and trivialization of “selfesteem”.
Every educational method cited above is, in some degree, guilty either of
an incoherent psychological view of self-esteem as a self-referential emotion
that can be “caused” by others or of neglecting or underestimating the
reformative potential of shame. In the introduction to Self-Esteem, author
Matthew McKay promises the therapist: “You can increase a client’s self¬
esteem more rapidly...using the cognitive restructuring techniques presented
here (McKay and Fanning, 1987, p. 5). Many methods over-estimate the
value of self-esteem with weak philosophical arguments. The issue of genuine
self-respect is further complicated by ethical theorists who consider it to be
synonymous with self-esteem (Rawls, 1971), locate it as a subset of
self-esteem (Branden, 1993), or believe self-respect and self-esteem precede
good character (Rogers, 1965).
If it is true that genuine self-respect results from, and does not precede,
good character, this, then, seems to merit a reinvestigation into the nature of
the emotions of shame and self-esteem. A review of the literature and
interviews with children and adults might suggest that shame plays a
. conditionally good role in the formation of a virtuous character. This may
support the view that those strategies intended to elevate self-esteem while
disparaging a sense of shame may be non-starters. Evidence for this
contention constitutes the second aim of this study, while suggestions for the
required refinements to our schools moral education programs is the third aim.
Three mqjor research questions will guide this study. These are:
1) What is the emotion of moral shame?
2) What impact might moral shame have on character development?
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3) What implications for the reform of school curriculum are suggested by the
findings of this study?

Definition of Terms

Several key terms are central to this study. As one objective of the
study is to clearly define these concepts, the following proposed definitions or
descriptions should be considered tentative.

Character: a person’s normal pattern of thought and action, especially
with respect to concerns and commitments in matters affecting the happiness
of others and of himself, and most especially in relation to moral choices
(Kupperman, 1995).

Embarrassment: the awareness of the involvement in something
unfortunate and awkward and the judgment that one is incapable of
responding appropriately (Solomon, 1992).

Emotion: a dynamically related complex of cognition, affect and desire
(Oakley, 1992).

Regret: a sad feeling toward a state of affairs that had negative
consequences (e.g. S, a teacher, lost her job).
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Agent-regret: a sad feeling toward a state of affairs that had negative
consequences in which one was a participant (e.g. S, a teacher in my
department, lost her job) (Barron, 1988).

Remorse: a sad feeling toward a state of affairs that had negative
consequences that one was a participant in and which one could have and
should have averted (e.g., S, a teacher in my department, lost her job because
I bed on her evaluation) (Barron, 1988).

Repentance: “the remorseful acceptance of responsibility for one’s
wrongful and harmful actions, the repudiation of the aspects of one’s character
that generated the actions, the resolve to do one’s best to expiate those
aspects of one’s character, and the resolve to atone or make amends for the
harm that one has done” (Murphy, 1995).

Self-esteem: The emotional response of a person to the self-evaluation
of the ratio of personal aspirations to personal successes (William James,
1890) or “the disposition to experience oneself as competent to cope with the
basic challenges of life and as worthy of happiness” (Branden, 1994).

Self-Respect: “a complex and multifaceted phenomenon
involving...aspects of cognition, valuation, orientation, affect, expectation,
motivation, action, and reaction that bear on one’s worth as a person - that is,
on one’s dignity as a person as such, the value and significance of one’s life
(and) the quality of one’s character and manner of living” (Dillon, 1995).
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Moral Development: The view, according to cognitive developmentalists,
that individuals necessarily move through stages of concept displacement of
increasingly adequate or sophisticated rationalizations (e. g., Kohlberg’s
Preconventional, Conventional and Autonomous levels). This view
concentrates almost entirely on the adjudication of conflicting moral claims.
By contrast, character educators stress the importance of acquiring
proper habits and emotional states as necessary components of development.
In this view character development is considered to be the process of forming
virtuous habits by exposure to role models, the practice of right behavior and
the acquisition and development of proper emotional reactions and feelings.
A third view - a synthesis of the above positions - proposes five distinct
dimensions of development: paradigms, defining characteristics, the range of
cases, adjudicating conflicting moral claims and moral imagination (see
Matthews’ The Philosophy of Childhood, pp. 54 -67).

Moral Shame: a painful, self-directed feeling and cognitive realization
that one has fallen short of what one considers to be a worthy and valid
standard to which one does or should aspire; a self-accusatory social emotion
elicited by wrongful action.

Guilt: self-reproach; a painful, self-directed feeling and cognitive
realization that one has transgressed a boundary or limit set by an authority
figure; an awareness of harm brought upon others by one’s action or inaction.

Humiliation: a deflation, often with comic overtones, of one’s

pretentiousness.
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Significance of Study

Herbert Morris, editor of Guilt and Shame, charges that analytic
philosophers have given “offhand attention” to the concept of guilt. With
shame, these same philosophers displayed “almost a total lack of philosophic
interest” (Morris, 1971, p. 2). They are not alone. Philosopher Robin Dillon
claims psychologists talk almost exclusively about self-esteem (Dillion, ed.,
1994), while psychiatrist Daniel Nathanson laments the fact that nothing in
his training or that of his colleagues, “had anything to do with shame” (Karen,
1992, p. 46)

One contribution of this study will be the attempt at a greater

definitional precision of these concepts. It is hoped that with this clarity
comes an understanding of the proper place in moral education of shame and
other emotions of self-assessment.
It has been proposed that children with high self-esteem are better able
to withstand negative pressures (Kirkpatrick, 1992). Psychologist Nathaniel
Branden considers self-esteem “the single most important psychological
subject in the world” and defines self-esteem as: “the disposition to experience
oneself as competent to cope with the basic challenges of life and as worthy of
happiness” (1995, p. 27). This definition (and similar variants) is found in
many school manuals on self-esteem. It has difficulties. It offers no
explanation of what constitutes happiness. A “disposition” of competence and
the range of challenges one entertains can be highly subjective. As noted
above, many popular “therapies” are considered successful if, as Carl Rogers
proclaims, the proportion of positively framed self-references increase (1965).
In these approaches it is not clear that merit be reassessed or that changes in
conduct or conscientious effort require modification. If happiness is achievable
14

merely by increasing the ratio of positive self-references, children or therapy
clients need only adjust their field of challenges. Not only is this condescending
to children, it also sets the stage for what some school counselors fear the
most - facing humiliation.

This style of cultivating self-esteem patronizes children, yielding
cynicism in the smart ones and deceiving the others, ultimately
producing an ignorance not as easily corrigible as more innocent
ignorances. Because this ignorance is eventually maintained by
self-deception it often produces an effrontery that insists (often
rather aggressively) on the excellence of its own mediocrity
(Miller, 1993, p. 135).
For many children it seems to be only a matter of time for the
unfortunate but inevitable deflation of this pretentiousness. External forces
are not the only threat. E. D. Hirsh, Jr. foresees internal emotional dangers.
Lavish, unmerited praise to bolster self-esteem, in his view, “breeds
complacency, or skepticism, or both, and, ultimately, a decline in self esteem”
(“Education Review”, 27 Oct. 96). These authors agree that many
educational programs have a confused notion of the goal. High self-esteem
may not promote good character; high self-esteem ought to be in recognition
of an existing and stable good character.
If we view virtue as an excellence of character, then it follows - as with
any developed excellence - it is preceded by hard work, it presupposes skilled
teachers, it requires practical wisdom and emotional control. It, by necessity,
must also honestly acknowledge occasional failures. How one views failure
gives us insight into that person’s motivation, standards and goals.
To define and to clarify what an emotion is, and to explicate the
conceptual links between the emotions of shame and guilt and self-respect and
self-esteem will be of benefit in assessing moral education programs. This aim
will allow the study to proceed to formulate and defend suggestions of
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curriculum reform for moral education programs whereby these emotional
states have a newfound clarity and utility.
Lastly, it is hoped that what will follow from a clarity of these concepts
is support for the argument that the reorientation of the goal to be that of good
character. And as the concept of the goal changes, so must the strategies to
achieve that goal undergo refinement.

Delimitations of the Study

This is a conceptual study with practical applications. It concentrates
on formulating and defending an analytic definition of moral shame. It will
attempt to explain the conditionally good influence this emotion may have on
character development. Shame, however, is an emotion of perplexing
variability in both degree and form (Taylor, 1985; Kekes, 1988; Karen, 1992;
Dillon, 1995). Among the many forms it may take are: a “universal shame”, a
globalized feeling of worthlessness; an “existential” shame, a feeling of
alienation or meaninglessness; a “class” shame, a crippling self-hatred; a
“narcisstic” shame, a globally negative self-portrait and a “situational” shame,
a passing shame experience that may arise from a personal rejection or
humiliation. In short, one can feel shame about virtually anything (Karen,
1992). As rich as these topics may be, it is not the aim of this study to
examine personal reactions to one’s gender, sexual orientation, social or
economic position, or intellectual and physical endowments. The study will not
attempt to describe, or prescribe for, shame-prone individuals or dysfunctional
family systems. These issues are the domain of psychiatry and counseling
psychology.

16

Since one aim of the paper is to support the view that a particular form
of shame can be a morally significant emotion, it will be necessary to argue for
a logical and necessary connection with a specific view of virtue and with the
notion of living a good life. For moral shame to be rational the transgression,
the standard, and proper aspirations must be afforded a reasoned argument.
The position in this paper on the end that constitutes a good life and the
necessity of moral virtue in the pursuit of that end, in large part, will be
Aristotelian. The literature on Aristotle’s ethics is enormous, so clearly it will
not be possible to address every puzzle in or argument with Aristotle’s ethics
and neither will it be possible to examine all of the work that concerns this and
related topics of interest.
One aspect of Aristotle’s ethics that recommends it is that it does not
look for precise, finely grained prescriptions for specific circumstances. This is
to say that there is room for individual and cultural elasticity. Therefore, the
view of moral shame and other related emotions in this paper will attempt to
have a nature of universal applicability in their relation to living a flourishing
life. It will, then, enjoy a certain cultural neutrality. Obviously different
cultures express different views concerning one and the same concrete act.
This problem has been and can be expressed in numerous arguments and
scenarios. This paper will offer one explanation how we might sort out this
puzzle without reverting to ethical or cultural relativism.
A further limitation concerns the infinitely complex nature of human
agency. Moral shame ushers in the related topics of responsibility, choice,
involuntary actions, a good will, theories of punishment and motivation. These
topics are worthy of dissertations in their own right, as are the ethical theories
that differ from Aristotle’s. Although the tension these opposing theories
introduce - and how they accommodate the above topics - will, hopefully, be
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substantive, it is conceded at the outset that the treatment here can in no
way will be exhaustive.

Review of the Literature

The literature review will consist of four major parts. In order to have a
credible account of the moral significance of the specific emotion of shame, it is
necessary to have an account of what an emotion is. This will be the focus of
the first part. I will support the view that an emotion is comprised of
cognition, affect, and desire. These three elements offer a variety of
combinations; different writers propose different combinations. For example,
William James, Carl Lange and David Hume propose that an emotion is a
bodily or ‘psychic’ feeling following a mental impression. According to these
writers, an emotion is merely affect. Cognitive theorists, on the other hand,
such as Robert Solomon claim the affective dimension is quite superfluous.
Solomon proposes that emotions are ‘judgments’.

I cannot be angry if I do not believe that someone has wronged or
offended me. Accordingly, we might say that anger involves a
moral judgment...an appeal to moral standards and not merely
personal evaluations. My anger is that set of judgments (Cited in
Oakley, 1992, p. 24).
Arguments in support of the view of an emotion as comprised of the
three elements conclude the first part of the literature review. Some of the
supporters of this view include Aristotle, Justin Oakley, Michael Stocker, and,
possibly, Descartes.
The second section of the literature review will canvas the most
plausible accounts on specific emotions. Many authors define shame by
appeal to guilt, while another’s definition of shame (Heller) is a third writer’s
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definition of guilt (Miller). With the components of an emotion in place, a
tentative definition of shame can be proposed. This will allow us to contrast
moral shame with other emotions of self-assessment and, it is hoped, begin a
defense against those theories that render a blanket condemnation on the
emotion. One reason for this mistaken move is that a definitional precision for
moral shame is extremely difficult.

It shades into embarrassment, humiliation, chagrin, guilt,
dishonor, remorse,prudishness,disgrace,etc.. Another sign of the
imprecision and complexity of shame is that it has many
antonyms referring to feelings incompatible with it: pride, honor,
self-respect, propriety, modesty, and self-esteem are some
(Kekes, 1990, p. 270).
/

Once we have established the necessary properties of a specific
emotion, disagreement may still arise as to the moral significance of that
emotion. The third part, therefore, centers on examining attitudes toward the
value in moral psychology and character development of moral shame.
Clearly, opinions are mixed. Positions might be said to fall into one of three
categories: the negative, the neutral and the positive. Particular attention will
be given to Aristotle’s suggestive remarks on shame. One can find
commentaries on shame that refer to Aristotle’s view in support of each of the
three interpretations.
Many developmental-psychologists suggest that shame has no
redeeming value: it is a negative and incapacitating emotion that undermines
one’s self-esteem (Dyer, 1977; Borysenko, 1990).
The position of neutrality finds one expression in philosopher J. O.
Urmson’s article “Aristotle’s Doctrine of the Mean”. There he maintains that
shame is a “mere passive reaction involving no desire”; it is a physical and
inconsequential reaction not a cognitive and meaningful act.
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Finally, there are those that believe shame has positive attributes
(Rawls, 1971; Bumyeat, 1980; Nussbaum, 1980; Damon, 1988; Anderson,
1992; Karen, 1992; Bennett, 1992,1993; Taylor, 1995; Tefler,1995). Many of
these authors cite Aristotle in support of their position and claim that an
honest self-assessment is an essential step toward moral reform.
The fourth part of the literature review (Chapter 4) will examine position
papers of the two most influential approaches to moral education programs
that are implemented in the schools. These are: the cognitive-developmental
(or indirect) approach, and the traditional (or direct) approach. Advocates of
the indirect approach (Piaget, Kohlberg, Simon, Raths) prescribe a democratic
orientation to moral education. Students are encouraged to engage in openended discussions and to question the validity of authoritarian prescriptions
and rigid rules. A common practice in the various indirect models is to discuss
possible resolutions to ethical dilemmas. In the direct approach, by contrast,
values and virtues are not debated; teachers ‘transmit’ certain views that
students are encouraged to emulate thereby making the virtues eventually
their own. Offering a persuasive verbal resolution to a thorny ethical dilemma,
they often point out, has little bearing on developing the virtues.
This fourth section will conclude with a examination of how both
approaches incorporate or neglect the self-regarding emotions.

Research Design

The design of this study is organized around each of the research
questions. Each research question is stated and subquestions are listed.
Specific steps that will be taken to answer all questions are explained.
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To formulate, present and defend a definition of moral shame, two steps
will be taken. First, there will be a review of philosophical and psychological
texts, articles, and papers. Second, interviews will be conducted with school
children, police and detention officers, District Court judges, counselors and
teachers. Questionnaires and an interview consent form are attached in the
Appendices.

* Research Question #1: What is the emotion of moral shame?

For an analysis to be successful the components of a topic must be
properly understood and logically assembled. Philosopher Fred Feldman
illustrates this idea by calling our attention to the mechanical diagrams of
engines that picture “exploded views” of the parts (1992, pg. 12). Following
this procedural scheme, the study will precede with a literature review of the
properties of an emotion. Next will be a review of the self-regarding emotions.
This section will conclude with how moral shame might be distinguished from
these other emotions.
This section of the literature review can be outlined as follows:
A. What is an emotion?
1. Emotion as affect
2. Emotion as cognition
3. Emotion as desire
4. Emotion as a complex of affect, cognition, and desire

B. What is the emotion of moral shame?
1. How is shame related to and distinguishable from:
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a. Regret
b. Agent-regret
c. Remorse
d. Repentance
e. Guilt
f.

Embarrassment

g. Humiliation
h. Self-esteem
i. Pride
j. Self-Respect
r

* Research Question #2. What impact might moral shame have
on character development?

The approach to the second research question will have two parts.
These are: 1) a summary of the views in the literature on the moral
significance of shame and its impact on character; and, 2) surveys and
interviews.
Interviews will be conducted with a number of participants from
different vocations and with school children from a variety of grade levels.

It

is hoped that it can be determined to what extent shame contributed to
resolving a particular difficulty. These interviews will be open-ended to
accommodate individual circumstance.
Interviews will also be conducted with various correction officers and
people incarcerated in local facilities. District court judges, police chiefs and
jail guards will be questioned.
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The focus of the interviews with the judges will be to determine if
sentencing an offender is affected by a display of repentance or shame. A few
judges adapt sentences to shame offenders or take measures to assess the
emotional state of the individuals before them in court. The effectiveness of
these approaches will be studied.
A priest and a rabbi will be interviewed to discuss the religious
community’s position on absolution. Moral shame appears to be an essential
ingredient in character reformation and a necessary emotion that must be
expressed in order to receive absolution for sins. The Council of Trent (1551)
seems to refer to shame as an “affliction of spirit”, a reforming pain and
sadness that is a component of repentance. It is hypothesized that Church
teachings may offer insights into the dynamic nature of the emotion of moral
shame.
Interviews will be requested of inmates presently incarcerated in
Greenfield’s Elm Street facility. The purpose of these interviews will be: 1) to
determine if punishment promotes repentance, or has the reverse effect of
anger and resentment; 2) to determine the emotional reaction of the inmates
to their transgression; and, 3) to try to correlate emotional disposition with
reformation of character.
Counselors in correctional facilities, public schools, and private practice
will be interviewed. If, as hypothesized, many counselors have a negative view
of shame, then the cognitive restructuring techniques employed might result
in an increase in positive self-reports among their clients. But, the change in
internal restraints may be, in turn, minimal or nonexistent. It would seem
that unless the “remedy” treats the “cause”, any positive change seen in
therapy might be short-lived.
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Lastly, veteran school teachers will be interviewed. This series of
interviews will center around issues of changes in: approaches to discipline,
operating philosophies, mission statements, parental modeling and
involvement, and the attitudes and values of students over the course of their
tenure.
Permission to tape-record and transcribe all of the interviews is
requested.

* Research Question #3. What implications for the reform of school
curriculum are suggested by the findings of this study?

The approach to the third research question will have four parts. The
first part will review the literature on the two most influential approaches to
moral education that are utilized in the schools: the cognitive-developmental
model and the character education model. This section will also review several
programs that are derivatives of one of these two approaches (e.g., Values
Clarification, Peer Mediation, Conflict Resolution, “self-esteem” initiatives,
etc.).
The second part will outline how the self-regarding emotions are either
accommodated or neglected by these moral education programs.
The third part of this research question will be an interview survey of
several area elementary and secondary school principals, counselors, and
school committee members. The purpose of the interviews and the
examination of each school’s operating philosophy and mission statement will
be to assess each schools approach to moral education.
The fourth part of this research question will consider data from the
above to offer suggestions for the necessary curriculum reform.
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Outline of Subsequent Chapters

Chapter Two: This chapter will discuss the methodology involved in the design
of the study. It will discuss the data collection and analysis.

Chapter Three: This chapter will review the literature on emotion, moral
shame, related emotions of self-assessment, and the moral significance of
shame. This chapter will formulate, present, and defend a definition of moral
shame.

Chapter Four: This chapter will review the literature on the two main
approaches to moral education in public schools. These are: the cognitivedevelopmental (or the indirect) approach and the traditional (or the direct)
approach. How these moral education theories and programs value and
accommodate the emotions of self-assessment will be examined. A proposal
on how moral shame contributes to character development will be advanced.

Chapter Five: This chapter will introduce the participants in this study, will
contain relevant excerpts that relate to each of the interview questions, and
will advance an answer to the third research question.

Chapter Six: This chapter will summarize the study and propose
recommendations for curriculum reform and advance ideas for further
research.
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CHAPTER 2

RESEARCH DESIGN AND PROCEDURES

Introduction

This chapter outlines the activities of the study and the methodologies
used to study the problem. Participants in the study are presented, the
instruments used to collect data are described, and the techniques for data
collection and analysis are explained.

Description of the Study

This is a study of the self-regarding emotion of moral shame. The
purpose of the study is to propose and defend a precise definition of moral
shame and to investigate how shame might affect one’s character
development. Findings from these investigations are examined to determine if
they suggest recommendations for curriculum reform in American public
schools.

Research Methodology

This is a conceptual inquiry which focuses on philosophical,
psychological, and educational literature as well as material provided by
interviews and surveys.
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Given the purpose and the questions of this study an extensive review of
the pertinent literature was required. In addition, both qualitative and
quantitative methods were employed. A qualitative method refers to a
research procedure “which produces descriptive data: people’s own written or
spoken words and observable behavior” (Bogdon and Taylor, 1975, p. 4). This
study employs the in-depth interview as a qualitative instrument. In
Interviewing as Qualitative Research. I. E. Seidman describes the purpose of
interviewing as:

not to get answers to questions, nor to test hypotheses, and not to
“evaluate” as the term is normally used. At root of in-depth
interviewing is an interest in understanding the experience of
other people and the meaning they make of that experience
(1991, p. 3).
The method of an open-ended, in-depth interview seemed suited to
achieve the aim of allowing participants to reflect, from their particular
vantage points, upon the emotions, generally, and moral shame, specifically,
as elements of positive or negative influence in a child’s development. An
interview guide (Appendix B) offered a semi-structure to each interview.
Personal circumstance, vocations, and experiences accounted for the unique
direction of each interview. Various clarifying or new questions arose
accordingly.
Quantitative measurement relies on instruments that “provide a
standardized framework in order to limit data collection to certain
predetermined responses or analysis categories” (Patton, 1980, p. 22). In this
study, the quantitative measurements involved a survey form to ascertain
elementary and high school age student’s level of respect for fifteen
professions (Appendix E). From this survey five professions that might be
classified as authority figures (priest, mother, school teacher, police officer,
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and judge) are separated in order to examine if these professions appear to
gain or loss a child’s respect as these children mature. As is proposed in an
earlier chapter, recognition respect and moral shame are assumed to have a
necessary connection.
A second survey inquired about elementary school children’s perception
of the purpose, the effectiveness, and the emotional impact of in-school
detentions (Appendix C). Detentions were specifically selected as a focus to
engage students in reflecting upon their emotional reaction to a presumed or
real violation of school rules and to initiate dialogue regarding a child’s response
to an act of behavior which violates institutional policy and/or an individual
value.

Participants in the Study

The subjects sampled for the research study were selected by virtue of
their involvement with some aspect of child development, welfare, or education
or who are public school children themselves. All adult participants were
initially contacted by phone or a personal visit to be informed of the research
topic. Of those who agreed to an interview, a letter of consent and a
personalized interview guide were then mailed or delivered [See Appendices (A)
and (B) for the text of these forms].

Permission to tape-record the interview

was requested at this time and each participant was informed that the letter
of consent must be read and signed prior to beginning the interview.
Those individuals who agreed to interviews were: two District Court
judges, eight elementary school teachers, two elementary school principals,
two guidance counselors, one high-school English teacher, one elementary
health teacher, a state trooper, a retired Catholic priest, a rabbi, a Director of
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Social Services, a juvenile probation officer, a fifteen year-old female highschool potential drop-out, a fifteen year-old high school honor student and
distinguished athlete, and a sixteen year-old ten-grade high school repeat
criminal offender. All but three elementary school teachers allowed the
researcher to tape-record the interviews.
Repeated attempts to receive permission to interview people
incarcerated in Franklin County went unanswered.
Five hundred and seventy six elementary school children (Grades K - 6)
completed the detention survey. Four hundred and nine elementary students
(Grades 3-6) completed the level of respect for professions survey. Forty-two
elementary school teachers and aides completed this same survey.
Permission to administer this survey at the Mahar Regional High School
in Orange, Massachusetts was denied the researcher by principal Frank Zak.
Citing school committee members fear of “social engineering”, as of
September 1998, apparently all requests for surveys at Mahar are denied.
The researcher then contacted principal Paul Danielovich of the
Greenfield High School and was kindly granted permission to conduct the
survey. Sixty-four ninth graders and seventy-four twelfth graders completed
the survey. This brought the total number of participants in the level of
respect survey to six hundred and fifty seven.

Data Collection and Analysis

Three main research objectives guided the design for data collection and
analysis. An explanation of the procedure in achieving each research objective
is outlined below.
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The data needed to answer Research Objective #1 - “What is the
emotion of moral shame?” were obtained almost exclusively from the research
literature. The data collected for this portion of the objectives were important
for three reasons. First, a review of the philosophical, psychological, and
educational literature explicitly shows that there is no consensus on what an
emotion is. Disagreements obviously translate into varying opinions on
specific self-regarding emotions as well as the possible moral significance of
these emotions. Second, a review of the literature has determined that there
is widespread disagreement on how particular emotions can be distinguished
from one another. Precise definitions are often obscured by a author
attributing properties to a particular emotion that does not withstand logical
scrutiny. Third, confusion surrounding what an emotion is or the proper
attributes of a specific emotion oftentimes leads to a faulty conclusion as to
whether that emotion has a conditionally good status. One hypotheses of this
research study is that moral shame is particularly plagued by all these logical
errors.
The data needed to answer Research Objective #2 - “What impact
might moral shame have on character development?” - were obtained from
research literature, surveys, and in-depth interviews. The data collected for
this portion of the objective are important for two reasons. First, the two
theories of character development that are widely utilized in public schools has
been discussed and subjected to critical analysis in Chapter 3. There support
for the argument that the emotion of moral shame is profoundly neglected in
all the various character development initiatives is advanced. This neglect, in
some cases, is enough to charge that a particular theory is defective. Second,
an obvious implication for curriculum reform arises with a proposal to remedy
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this omission. If moral shame is viewed as a self-protective emotion with a
conditionally good status and character education is a legitimate educational
priority, then curriculum designs that neglect these notion will require revision.
The data needed to answer Research Objective #3 - “What implications
for the reform of school curriculum are suggested by the findings of this
study?” - are obtained from interviews, surveys, and from conclusions drawn
from the first two objectives. The importance of this portion of the objective is
the recommendations that will be proposed might help public
school operate more effectively and, in some small measure, help children to
develop into happier, healthier adults.

Chapter Summary

Data needed to achieve the three objectives were obtained from surveys
of school children, from interviews with a variety of people in education,
various human service professions, and in law enforcement as well as from an
extensive review of the literature.
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CHAPTER 3

REVIEW OF THE SELF-REGARDING EMOTIONS

Introduction

One difficulty in an analysis of moral shame is what many authors refer
to as shame’s confounding variability (Karen, 1992; Dillion, 1995; Goleman,
1995). It is not always evident what type of shame some writers have in
mind. Shame can take many forms and a person can feel ashamed about
virtually anything (Karen, 1990). In Point Counter Point. Aldous Huxley
observed that in certain situations people can be “agonizingly ashamed of
wearing brown boots with a black coat, or speaking with the wrong accent
(Cited in Bonhoffer, 1945, fh. p. 21). But clearly there is an important
difference between being ashamed of crooked teeth and being ashamed of a
crooked scheme that has bankrupted elderly citizens.
John Rawls, in his A Theory of Justice, has a helpful and general
distinction: certain features of an experience occasion a natural shame as
opposed to a moral shame. Rawls claims an agent ought not to be morally
blameworthy for a physical disability or a speech impediment (1971). Prior to
sorting out the widely divergent views on the unique characteristics of moral
shame, or the attempt to establish its moral significance, we need an account
of what an emotion is. A review of the literature will show that many writers
propose several different interpretations of what constitutes an emotion.
Possible candidates include: 1). an affect; 2). a cognition; 3). a desire; 4). an
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affect and cognition; 5). cognition and desire; or, 6). affect, cognition and
desire.
In the first section I will review the literature on the possible
candidates. I will argue for the account of emotion as containing cognition,
affect and desire. I propose that those authors who maintain that an emotion
is a dynamic relationship of all three elements have things essentially right.
Arguments will be offered to support the contention that a theory is flawed by
virtue of neglecting one or more of these elements.
Next, having proposed one view for the necessary and sufficient
properties of an emotion, I will review the literature that attempts to
distinguish moral shame from other emotions of self-assessment. These will
include regret, agent-regret, remorse, repentance, humiliation,
embarrassment, guilt, self-esteem, pride, and self-respect. The literature
contains substantial disagreements as to the nature of these emotions.
Representative arguments for the most plausible views will be considered.
Definitions that accord with the complex view of an emotion will be formulated.
This will set the stage to answer the first research question: What is the
emotion of moral shame?
Finally, in the last section, I will review some of the most significant and
plausible definitions of shame and theories that attribute either positive or
negative value to the emotion. Having the correct view on the proper
constituents and their interplay in an emotion does not secure a guarantee
that one recognizes the moral significance of that emotion. The review of the
literature has discovered that a group of authors agree upon the view of
emotions as a complex phenomena, but they disagree as to the moral
significance of certain emotions. This is particularly true of moral shame. For
example, although Kekes (1988,1993,1995), Isenberg (1980), and Urmson
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(1980) recognize elements of cognition and affectivity in moral shame, it
remains for them a “passive” emotion. As such, they consider moral shame to
be unproductive and unmotivational. In this section I will argue this approach
is mistaken. My argument will propose that a theory is rendered incoherent
with the suggestion that self-regarding emotions are “passive”.
This claim is independent of an explication of the necessary constituents
of an emotion. Let us proceed with a review of the proposed definitions of an
emotion.

Components of an Emotion

In Book II of the Rhetoric. Aristotle begins his discussion of the
emotions with a procedural arrangement. In order that we know how to elicit
an emotion from someone - so as to be an effective, persuasive speaker - we
must know three general requirements of an emotional state. Using anger as
an example, Aristotle labels these categories as: knowing the state of mind of
an angry person; knowing who or what will anger the agent; and, knowing the
grounds for the agent’s anger (1378a24-26). By virtue of these categories,
some writers attribute cognition and affect to Aristotle’s view of emotion.1
As Aristotle continues with a formal definition of anger, a more complex
view of an emotion emerges. His definition reads:

Anger may be defined as an impulse, accompanied by pain, to a
conspicuous revenge for a conspicuous slight directed without
justification towards what concerns oneself or towards what
concerns one’s friends (1378a31-33, p. 1380).

1 See, for example, Solomon (1980). Emotions and Choice. Appendix, pg. 271.
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Anstotle qualifies the ‘slight’ as unjustified and from a specific,
identifiable source. Emotions, therefore, have an object. We can say both,
“ The agent is angry because...” and, “The agent is angry at...”. The ‘because’
logically implies that the emotion of anger contains the belief or judgment that
the agent has been wronged. The ‘at’ logically implies that the emotion has an
object; a specific individual has wronged the agent. Unlike hatred,
which may be directed at groups of people, anger, Aristotle tells us, is “always
concerned with individuals - a Callias or a Socrates” (1382a5). Furthermore,
this definition entitles us to include desire in the necessary components of
emotion. The contemplation of revenge is characterized as pleasurable
(1378b3) and logically requires emotions to entail goal directed behavior. An
agent who does not contemplate how to avenge the individual who has slighted
him can not be considered angry, had the slight been justified, the agent might
be regretful or repentant (Fortenbaugh, 1969).
In Aristotle’s view, then, the emotion of anger entails: cognition, the
identification of a specific and unjustified harm; desire, the intention to
retaliate and the wish for the pleasure that accompanies retaliation; and
affect, the pain at having been unjustly slighted.
Conditions are proposed in NE for how emotions or “passions”
contribute to virtue. Moral virtue, Aristotle tells us at 1106bl6, is “concerned
with passions and actions”. For an act to be virtuous, activity and emotions
must contribute to it “at the right times, with reference to the right objects,
toward the right people, with the right motive, and in the right way” (1106b2021). These conditions on Aristotle’s characterization of an emotion’s role in
virtue allow us to ascribe intentionality, - one must have the right motive - as
well as the capacity to apprehend and evaluate the situation correctly.
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The good tempered man, then, is the man that apprehends and
evaluates correctly and so becomes angry on the grounds he
ought, at whom he ought, as he ought, when and for as long as he
ought (Fortenbaugh, 1969, p. 168).
In Aristotle’s theory it logically follows that one can go wrong regarding
emotional states and emotional reactions in a number of ways.
Misapprehensions, poor timing, improper objects, the wrong motive or
audience can account for an emotion to be considered ‘wrong’.
It may be assumed that to claim emotions can be ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ is a
controversial, if not an outlandish, statement. But, the claim is one that has
attracted a great deal of interest; it is an indirect, but obvious, implication in
/

the recent work in attention deficit - hyperactivity disorder (Phelan, 1996;
Barkley; 1997) and of direct implication in the recent and popular work in
emotional intelligence (Goleman, 1996). Here the interest has largely centered
on the alleged neurological causes of inappropriate emotional reactions and
their potential detrimental effects. A more relevant and primary
consideration was proposed by Franz Brentano. With evident Aristotelian
overtones, Brentano writes: “One loves or hates correctly provided that one’s
feelings are adequate to their object - adequate in the sense of being
appropriate, suitable or fitting” (cited in Chisholm, 1986, p. 52). The
significance of this claim will be developed in the section on shame.
Few people would dispute the notion that emotions contribute in a
significant way to the richness of a person’s life; most would agree that an
individual is considered indeed fortunate to lookback on a life that has included
frequent episodes ofjoy, pride and love. But this does not give us insight into
the nature of these emotions nor does it suggest we are obliged to endorse a
complex view of emotion.
36.

Psychologists have relied on examining subjective reports of feelings,
overt behavior, and physiological responses in the attempt to measure and
establish distinctions between these different experiences. Oftentimes we can
accurately infer from overt behavior which emotion an individual is
experiencing. We can assume with some confidence that a woman is worried if
she wrings her hands and furrows her brow, or that she is angry if she clenches
her fists and teeth. With equal confidence we can infer she is ashamed if she
blushes and hides her face. Self-reports of her feelings can verify our
impressions.
It is customary in these self-reports for an agent to refer to physiological
impressions. Internal or physiological changes seem to be inextricably and
undeniably connected with emotion. The agent who grimaces and clenches his
fist (overt behavior) might report his “blood boils” and his stomach “feels in
knots” (physiological changes). A polygraph or “lie-detector” measures these
physiological changes exclusively. It is designed to register guilt or anxiety in
an alleged criminal by monitoring changes in blood pressure, respiration and
heart rates, and galvanic skin response (GSR) (Braun and Linder, 1979). In
other physiological examinations, scientists have measured bodily changes in
patients that experience fear. Among the physical changes they note are:
constrictions in the gastrointestinal areas, the stimulation of the liver by the
endocrine glands to release sugar, and increases in the supply of oxygen to the
bloodstream (Lang, et.al., 1972).
These studies do not resolve a basic and long-standing question among
psychologists as to the nature of an emotion. That question is this: is the
feeling of fear the cognition of a dangerous or harmful situation which is then
followed by physiological changes or is fear the recognition that our heart is
racing and we are breathing rapidly? William James took the latter position.
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In 1890, James proposed that we identify and label our emotions based
on our ability to interpret bodily changes. An opposing view contends that the
cognition of an event in the environment is then followed by physical reactions.
A third proposal is that emotions are a complex phenomena that entail
cognition, physiological affect, and desire. Let us review each of these views in
turn.

Emotions as Affects

William James considers “affect” sufficient for an emotion. In “What is
an Emotion”, James writes:

My thesis ...is that the bodily changes follow directly the
PERCEPTION of the exciting fact, and that our feeling of the
same changes as they occur IS the emotion...Without the bodily
states following on the perception, the latter would be purely
cognitive in form (cited in Oakley, 1992, p. 17).
Presumably, following the recognition of a slight, I attend to the facts
that my voice trembles and my stomach tightens. For James, this affective
experience is the emotion of anger. In 1890, Carl Lange independently
proposed a similar theory based on his research on blood pressure (Honderich,
ed., 1995) In recognition of Lange’s contribution, this view is commonly
referred to as the James-Lange Theory. The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy,
characterizes this notion as:

An emotion is the experience of an appropriate physical response
to external stimuli. Sadness and anger don’t make us cry and
strike, rather they are the feeling of doing so (1995, p. 426).
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To construe an emotion as merely affect might be to say that someone
notices or attends to an impression of a feeling. This affective impression may
be noticing a physical or bodily change or it may be a “psychic” feeling. A
bodily impression - in the case of shame - would be to attend to that fact, blood
having rushed to the face, that one is blushing as the result of some mental
distress. In the case of fear, the agent recognizes her throat has gone dry,
her heart is racing, adrenaline is flowing, and she is inclined to flee.
One justification for the physiological, affective view is found in James’
The Principles of Psychology. It reads:

If we fancy some strong emotion and then try to abstract from
our consciousness of it all the feelings of its bodily symptoms, we
find we have nothing left behind, no “mind-stufT out of which the
emotion can be constituted, and that a cold and neutral state of
intellectual perception is all that remains (1950 p. 52).
Presumably, without bodily changes all perceptions of events would
merely be detached observations, not emotions. This view implies that
emotions may follow from cognition but that they are not constituted by these
cognitive operations. Contemporary psychologist James Harper holds a
James-Lange type view of shame. “Shame”, Harper writes, “is an emotion in
response to a negative evaluation of one’s self.” (1990, p. 3) Harper refers to a
shame experience as an “innate affect” (p. 7).

Self-esteem and shame are conceptually different in that shame
is an affect, and shame-prone identity describes the affective
experience of a person with such an identity. Self-esteem is not
an affect but more of a cognitive evaluation of the self (p. 143).
An affective theorist might also recognize psychic or non-bodily feelings. Psychic feelings can be said to be emotional feelings one has that
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cannot be related to or localized in the body; one does not notice a specific
bodily change. The general, unlocalized agitation I might feel before a job
interview, the buoyancy in my step if all goes well, or the general mood of
dejection if not, are examples of psychic states. These feelings need not be
specifically identifiable by bodily changes such as an increased heart rate or
dryness in one’s throat.
Psychic feelings may also be illustrated by those emotions a person
experiences over an extended period of time. The love for one’s spouse,
children, or parents is an emotion most all people share. Here one does not
experience this love as constant bodily agitation or continuous feelings, but
rather as involving an interest in their projects, warming in their company,
desiring to be with them, and so on (Oakley. 1992). Similarly, the lasting grief
over losing a loved one is not characterized by constant bodily turmoil and
mental distress, but it may color the way we perceive the world and our
projects. Antonio Damasio refers to these particular psychic experiences as
“background feelings” or bodily states that prevail between instances of
clearly recognizable feelings (1994). By way of illustration, a woman may be
in a general mood of despondency having lost her husband of forty years. She
goes about her business in a quiet but unattached way. Every day may seem
to her to be generally overcast. Her general disposition is one of sad
resignation. However, when a neighbor inquires as to her condition, the
background feelings or emotions of sadness and despair emerge to the
forefront of her consciousness. She now “experiences” vivid remembrances of
happier times, her eyes well up with tears. According to this version of the
affective theory, the despondent “background” disposition is an emotion.
James contends, however, only when this background feeling is physically
manifested in the act of crying does the widow experience an emotion.
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Allowing an affective theory of emotion to entail attending to bodily
changes, long-term dispositional states, and psychic feelings seems to be a
plausible view. Versions of this view have been attributed to philosopher
David Hume.
Many writers interpret Hume to hold a view of emotions as psychic
feelings or non-bodily impressions (Kenny, 1963; Foot, 1978, Oakley, 1992).
Much like Harper’s treatment of shame, Hume classifies emotions as
“impressions of reflexion”. In Book II of the Treatise of Human Nature. Hume
gives this account:

The passions of PRIDE and HUMILITY being simple and
uniform impressions, ‘tis impossible we can ever, by a multitude
of words, give a just definition of them, or indeed of any of the
passions. The utmost we can pretend to is a description of them
by an enumeration of such circumstances, as attend them (1967,
Bk. H, Pt. I, p. 277).
Oakley interprets Hume to understand emotions as ‘simple’ reactions
formed in response to circumstance. A valid and influential objection to this
proposition was advanced by Anthony Kenny (1963). Conceding that Hume
recognized emotions to have objects and causes, Kenny understands Hume to
contend that an object is only contingently related to an emotion and therefore
not constitutive of that emotion. But as both Kenny and Phillia Foot argue in
order to feel pride there must be thought about a specific object from which
one derives their pride (Lind, 1990). And in defining pride, Hume appears to
say just this when he writes “Everything related to us, which produces
pleasure or pain, produces likewise pride or humility” (1967, p. 291). Here an
agent feels a secondary pleasure which distinguishes pride from joy. Hume
illustrates this as the difference between pleasure one feels attending a feast
contrasted with the pleasure the host feels: a guest is not connected with the
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event in the same way as the host. Relevant conditions Hume imposes on
feeling pride are that the object that one derives pleasure from connected with
the agent in a “close” relation, that it is relatively rare, fairly constant, and
discernible to others (Taylor, 1985).
While it might be argued that Hume is misrepresented as an “affective
theorists”, the James - Lange theory remains an accurate portrayal of this
view. Following the general lead of James, many psychologists have modified
the theory to propose more plausible originating sources for the locus of
emotion. Whereas James proposed emotions originate in the intestinal area,
more recent research suggests the locus to be facial expressions (Tompkins,
1962: Zajonc, 1985) and the sympathetic nervous system (Frankenhauser,
1975).
Some of the most persuasive arguments against the James-Lange
theory of emotions were proposed by Walter Cannon in 1927. Physiological
change is not a sufficient cause for an emotion since intense physical exertion
or an injection of adrenaline will produce the same physical effect as some
emotions. The person that has exercised or received an injection may not feel
any specific emotion. Secondly, Cannon reasoned many emotions assail us
almost instantaneously. At the sight of a poisonous snake, we feel immediate
panic; to register a physiological change could not transpire so rapidly. Third,
Cannon demonstrated that the emotional states of fear and anger as well as
the non-emotional states of chilliness, hypoglycemia, and fever produce the
same reactions from the sympathetic nervous system (Solomon, 1977).
The James-Lange theory has been further discredited by studies that
have suggested that the same emotional response (e.g., fear, anger) can vary
within the same individual according to changing circumstances as well as
varying from individual to individual (Lang, Rice, and Sternbach, 1972).
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While physiological change is an important component in an emotion, it
is an untenable position to claim it is the sole constituent of emotion.

Emotion as Cognition

A leading proponent of the cognitive theory of emotion is Robert C.
Solomon. In direct opposition to the affective theory, Solomon explicitly
states, “ Emotion is neither sensation nor a physiological occurrence, nor an
occurrence of any kind” (Solomom, 1980, p. 251). Emotions, he claims, may
involve feelings, but feelings are neither sufficient to differentiate nor sufficient
to identify a specific emotion. Solomon suggests that emotions can be
rational, purposeful and intentional.
An emotion is intentional in the sense that it must be about something.
To claim that “I am angry” or “I feel angry” is incomplete. Solomon recognizes
that an intentional object that angers us must exist; the “object of the emotion
is simply ‘what the emotion is about”’ (1980, p. 257)

I cannot be angry if I do not believe that someone has wronged or
offended me, Accordingly, we might say that anger involves a
moral judgment..., an appeal to moral standards and not merely
personal evaluations. My anger is that set of judgments (1977, p.
187).
Emotions, then, share a conceptual similarity to beliefs. Being angry
“about...” is structurally similar to “believing that...”. Another component of
intentionality that Solomon explicitly recognizes is the feature of desire in a
set of judgments.

Most importantly, emotions include intentions for the future, to
act, to change the world and change our Selves, to revenge
ourselves in anger, to punish ourselves in guilt, to redeem
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ourselves in shame, to restore our dignity in embarrassment
(1977, p. 189).
Gabriele Taylor maintains that beliefs play a prominent, essential role
in emotion in two ways: identification and explanation (1985). A belief (or
beliefs) identifies an emotion for what it is as well as distinguishing it from
other emotions. Anger is not envy by virtue of the belief in anger is expressed
as, “I believe Smith has slighted me”. Envy, by contrast, is, “I believe Smith
has personal qualities or material property that I covet”. Taylor suggests
these identificatory assertions are two-part. In envy, I must judge or believe:
1) Smith has certain qualities I lack, and 2) those qualities constitute an
important or an unfair advantage. The structural arrangement of
identificatory beliefs is that reason 1 is justified by reason 2. Since I believe
certain qualities constitute an unfair advantage, I am inclined to be envious of
someone possessing them.
This two-part identification is the basis for the explanatory element in
an emotion. I can give specific reasons (1 and 2) for being envious. In and of
themselves, these reasons make no appeal to rationality. Consider a simple
example of fear as irrational. As a young child, Sarah was bitten by an
English bulldog. As a result of the attack, Sarah has some permanent scars.
Now, as a young adult, Sarah is visibly shaken and flees whenever she
encounters a bulldog. The form of the identificatory belief is: Sarah is afraid of
bulldogs because 1). she believes all bulldogs pose a threat; and the threat is 2)
their bite is painful and disfiguring. The pain and the disfigurement of dog bites
(2) justify believing all bulldogs are threatening (1). Both (1) and (2) are what
make Sarah’s state of fear intelligible. Either reason, however, need not be
rational. Sarah may know that bulldogs - although frightfully ugly - are
characteristically a gentle, non-aggressive breed. She may also clearly
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remember the youthful indiscretion of provoking one particular dog
mercilessly. All other bulldogs she has encountered seem to fit their
reputation for gentleness. If we substituted poisonous snake for the bulldog,
few would find the reasoning irrational.
The account of emotion as constituted by identificatory and explanatory
beliefs gives us an insight into how Solomon justifies his claim of
purposefulness. Sarah’s fear of poisonous snakes serves to keep her safe.
She avoids snakes to avoid serious injury.
Self-regarding emotions (or emotions of self-assessment) require certain
beliefs. As “self-regarding” obviously implies these beliefs take the self as the
object.
In experiencing any of these emotions the person concerned
believes of herself that she has deviated from some norm and that
in doing so she has altered her standing in the world. The self is
the object of these emotions, and what is believed amounts to an
assessment of that self (Taylor, 1985, p. 3).
In Morality and the Emotions. Justin Oakley proposes that beliefs may
be too strong a characterization. To believe some proposition p seems to
require that we give our assent to p or that we are convinced that p is true or
justified by the evidence. This is a much stronger claim than to say S
entertains p or imagines p. In emotions, imagining p is often the case. The
structure of the cognitive belief, whether rational or irrational, can follow along
the identical lines proposed by Solomon and Taylor regardless of the
justificatory evidence. Oakley suggests that our set of judgments in emotions
be given wide range encompassing a variety of ways of apprehending the
world, ranging over beliefs, construals, thoughts, and imagings (1992).
Even still, to construe emotions as desireless cognition presents a
problem similar to that by the affective theorists. Is anger comprehensible
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without the component of desire of retaliation? Let us consider the role of
desire in emotion.

Emotions as Desiro

Alternative accounts could maintain that an emotion is solely desire. A
review of the literature finds no subscribers to this position. Emotion as an
affectless desire would have to maintain that an emotion is simply an
inclination or aim. Anger would be merely the desire to injure. There are
straightforward objections to this view. Presumably, the attainment of the
respective goals would not elicit any bodily or “psychic” response. Being
“affected” clearly seems to be requirement of an emotion. Secondly, as with
an objection to the “affect-only” view of emotions, one would be unable to
distinguish one emotion from another on the “desire-only view”. Fear, shame,
humiliation, or guilt may motivate someone to flee and take cover. Righteous
indignation, anger or jealously might motivate us to desire that the offending
person suffer. The omission of the cognitive element makes these decidedly
different situations indistinguishable. Jealous husbands, impartial judges, and
robbery victims might wish to inflict punishment; the cognitive component of
these desires, when articulated, clearly distinguishes the justification and the
object. The judge hopes to rehabilitate, deter others, and/or to protect society
while the robbery victim seeks retribution and the recovery of his goods.
Emotion as affective desire is open to the same objections. Although
now the view could maintain that an emotion is a desire imbued with feelings,
one is still unable to make particular distinctions. Again, both fear and shame
may motivate an individual to flee a scene. The cognitive component
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differentiates between the avoidance of imminent physical danger in the
former, and, in the latter, the avoidance of exposure or disrepute.
The importance of desire in emotion can be seen in an objection to the
“cognitive-only” view that maintains emotions are merely a set of judgments.
Consider a variation on a frequently used illustration involving two store
owners.2 A customer makes purchases in two stores. The proprietors, A and
B, make the sale and give the correct change. Proprietor A gives the exact
change because he believes that if he were to cheat his customers it would
lead to the eventual ruin of his business. Proprietor B gives the correct
change because he understands that that is what morality requires.
Regardless of the eventual effect on revenue, agent B believes that stealing is
wrong; people deserve to be treated honestly.
One feature of the above example is that the intentional object of the
desire distinguishes the emotions of the two store owners. One is motivated by
fear and possibly greed, the other by upholding his integrity and recognizing
the dignity of others. This introduces the idea of desire as ‘will’. Franz
Brentano, writing about willing, describes it as an “endeavor to bring about, or
preserve, a given state of affairs; or it may be the endeavor to prevent a given
state of affairs or to cause it to cease to obtain” (Cited in Chishom, 1986, pp.
23-24). This implies that to will something to happen requires that that thing
be within our power to bring it about. This distinction is also made clear in
Aristotle’s discussion of‘choice’.
There is no choice of impossibilities...but one can wish for what is
impossible, e. g. immortality. Also one can wish for results which
could not possibly bring about oneself, e.g, the success of a
particular actor or athlete, but nobody chooses things like that only what he thinks could be achieved by his own efforts...a choice
is more properly praised for choosing the right object than for
being correct in itself (llllb22-25 - 1112a8).
2 This case has been used to discuss Kant’s view of moral motivation and his theory of
maxims. See, for example, Feldman, (1976) pp. 100-101.
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Anstotle, in a later passage, discusses the importance of choosing and
acting from the right desires. The outward manifestation of the two store
owners actions may appear to the customer as indistinguishable; on both
occasions he receives the proper change. But, for a choice to be morally right,
the component of desire must have a proper target. That target must be
capable of being realized by our own endeavors and recognized as the
praiseworthy alternative. Here we get a sense of desire as the pursuit of that
which we believe to be good.
Pursuit and avoidance in the sphere of appetition correspond
exactly to affirmation and negation in the sphere of intellect; so
that, since moral virtue is a state involving choice, and choice is
deliberate appetition, it follows that if the choice is to be a good
one, both the reasoning must be true and the desire right...(T)he
function of the practical intellect is to arrive at the truth that
corresponds to right (desire) (NE, 1139a20-25).
This feature - the desire to pursue or avoid certain states of affairs allows us to see emotions as motives for action, something that might be
inexplicable on the “cognitive-only* or “affect-only” views. Proprietor B takes
pride in his honesty. We may now be in a better position to consider an
emotion as a complex phenomena.

Emotions as a Complex of Cognition. Affect, and Desire

In the previous sections we have seen both the importance of cognition,
affect, and desire in explaining and in the having of emotions as well as the
difficulties we encounter in various attempts to exclude any of these
components from an explanation of an emotional experience. To claim that an
emotion is a complex of cognition, affect, and desire is to say more than these
three elements co-exist: the stronger claim is that these elements are
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conceptually linked (Oakley, 1992). The emotion of anger can again illustrate
this claim.
An individual, S, has spoken disparagingly about me to my supervisor.
In this instance, it is obvious to both my supervisor and to me that the
allegation is transparently false. It is equally obvious to both of us that S is
widely considered to be a meddlesome and ill-tempered malcontent. The
charges by S actually amuse me. But, I, at the same time, may feel agitated
on the job because of overwork and I may believe that another individual, S’,
deserves to suffer some harm for making similar comments of my co-workers.
I may also believe correctly that I am not the appropriate person to
determine or administer punishment to S’. Therefore, although I
simultaneously experience a set of judgments, feel agitation, and desire a
certain result, I cannot characterize my emotion as anger simply because
these elements are not dynamically related in a specific way to one object or
one specific state of affairs.
In order to answer the first research question the analysis of moral
shame must, then, explicate the elements of cognition, affect, and desire as
interrelated.
Secondly, this view of emotions as a complex experience helps to
distinguish different emotions. A frequent claim in the literature is that the
emotions “shade into” or “overlap” one another (Taylor, 1985; Kekes, 1988;
Dillion, 1995). It is not always clear what writers have in mind when they
make this claim; in what follows it will be argued it sometimes leads to
mistakes. However, the view of emotions as entailing cognition, affect, and
desire permits some clear distinctions. For example, in pride and shame we
have the cognition that our standing has been altered, it is elevated and
diminished, respectively. The affective reactions are clearly different; pleasure
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and pain again respectively. The desire in pride, recalling Brentano, is
preservation, whereas in shame it will be some action toward reinstatement
so as to have the current state of affairs “cease to obtain”.
With the view of emotions in mind, let us turn to the specific emotions.

The Self-Regarding Emotions

“Shame”, an article by Robert Karen, begins with this paragraph:

A mathematics professor in his fifties, who likes to think of
himself as dynamic and rakish but who is at the moment
“between lovers,” stands on the subway platform eyeing an
undergraduate. He sees that his gaze is making her
uncomfortable. He feels a twinge of shame over this intrusion,
but not enough to stop. He files his behavior under “manly
aggression” and keeps staring. Then a searing thought enters...his
mind. Feeling inexplicably crestfallen, he looks away from the
young woman, buries his head in his paper, and seeks out a
separate car when the train comes in. He doesn’t want people
near him.. .The idea that scorched him was the image of himself,
all too believable, as a hungry, unhappy loner, a man...incapable
of lasting attachments, staring forlornly at a woman who could
not possibly be interested in him. The shame that that image
evoked was too hot to handle (Karen, 1992, p. 40).
In this example, some features of what is normally thought to constitute
the emotion of shame are present: a transgression, the disapproving gaze of
another, the desire to flee and hide, and the painful realization that a man is
not all that he had thought himself to be. But are these sufficient conditions
to confidently identify this particular experience as one of shame?
Embarrassment, humiliation, remorse, and guilt may share these same
features.
In this same 1992 article, Karen notes that ‘guilt’ has so dominated the
attention of contemporary psychologists that many of these same
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professionals would be “hard pressed” to distinguish it from shame (p. 47).
Might Karen have made a similar error by confusing shame with humiliation?
The professor’s only transgression in Karen’s example seems to be one of
etiquette: it is in bad taste to stare. To evoke a shame “too hot to handle”
seems an overly severe reaction for a breach of decorum. Shame seems
reserved for darker times, more serious transgressions.
What actually transpired on the subway platform might be this - the
professor has presented himself as something he is not: happy, magnetic, and
self-confident. In response, the undergraduate wordlessly deflates his
pretentious presentation. His invitational “gaze” is rejected with incredulous
“discomfort”. He has been vain and vanity invites humiliation, not shame.
Shame and humiliation share structural similarities (Taylor, 1985).
Both involve an adverse self-directed judgment and require the notion of an
audience. But, as Gabriele Taylor points out, humiliation is primarily
concerned with an audience’s assessment that an agent merits a fall from a
higher to a lower status.

She will think of herself as appearing contemptible or ludicrous
just because she is not, in the audience’s view, the sort of person
she gave herself out to be...It is that she aspired to the high
position when she had no business to do so, or appeared to others
to do so, and it is this thought, that she is regarded as
presumptuous, which is essential to humiliation as it is not to
shame (Taylor, 1985, pp. 67-68).
To be “crestfallen” signifies feelings of dejection and a lack of
spiritedness. To stare forlornly suggests the professor is in a condition of
dreadful loneliness, not the image one wishes to communicate with “manly
aggression”. As William Miller recognizes, those individuals that put on airs
quite often are unaware of their own shortcomings and inattentive to their
self-presentation. “They seek deference from others, and in doing so they
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presume on others: those others will get even.” It is precisely this
presumption, Miller writes, “that enables the humiliation and justifies it”
(Miller, 1993, p. 137).
Kekes correctly observes that shame “shades into” humiliation as well
as other self-regarding emotions (1988). These two emotions share similar
cognitive moves, desires, and, as we saw, affects. But it is not an auspicious
start for any study on shame to begin the discussion with an example of
humiliation. Whether the professor experiences shame or humiliation, the
more important point is that his assessment of himself has changed. This is
what I take “self-regarding* to imply. In an emotion classified as selfregarding, the agent takes himself as the subject and the object. He is the one
experiencing the emotion and he is experiencing that emotion because
of some action or inaction of his. My claim is, then, that the affects, the
nature and complexity of the set of cognitive beliefs, and the desires will have
unique properties. In the experience of self-assessment, as Taylor points out,
the self, as the object, has a new standing.

In experiencing any one of these (self-regarding) emotions the
person concerned believes of herself that she has deviated from
some norm and that in doing so she has altered her standing in
the world. The self is the ‘object’ of these emotions, and what is
believed amounts to an assessment of that self (1985, p. 1).
Shame is a remarkably complex self-regarding emotion. It is conceded
that it does indeed “shade into” other emotions. In one sense, it does so by
requiring and entailing these other emotions (e.g. regret, remorse, guilt), but,
however complex, clarity about distinguishing features increases clarity about
the significance of the individual emotions. To substantiate these claims, let
us begin the survey of the self-regarding emotions.
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Regret

A reasonable starting point in an analysis of the self-regarding emotions
would be with regret. There are several varieties and, unlike many of the other
emotions of self-assessment, some of its forms are relatively simple.
Secondly, an element of regret is a feature of other self-regarding emotions (e.
g. remorse, guilt, shame).
In “Remorse and Agent-Regret”, Marcia Baron proposes that the
objects of regret can be a state of affairs, one’s own actions, or a state of
affairs and one’s own actions. A constitutive thought in all forms is “how
much better if it had been otherwise” (Williams, 1985).
The forms of regret can be thought of in terms of occupying a place on a
graduated scale. One feature that establishes its particular place on the scale
is the level of one’s participation in a regrettable state of affairs. Simple regret
(SR) involves no participation on the part of the agent. I play no role in the
passage of time, as when seasons change, nor do I participate directly in the
fortunes or misfortunes of, say, the Boston Red Sox. But I can regret the
passing of summer, the end of baseball season, and yet again another last
place finish for Boston.
An example often used in the literature to illustrate different forms of
regret is that of a taxi cab driver who hits and seriously injures a small child
(Nagel, 1979; Rorty, 1980, Williams, 1985; Baron, 1988). Simple regret is
merely to learn of the incident. Taxi driver, X3, hits and injures child, Y. Z
regrets to learn of this unfortunate occurrence and the state of affairs that
a Following conventions in much of the literature, these designations will be used
throughout this paper: S = an agent; X = some specific, concrete act (an act token), or one
of multiple agents (as in X, Y,and Z); E = an event or a state of affairs; E’ = an alternative
to E; and, tl, t2, t3, etc. = specific times at which an event occurs.
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there is one more seriously injured child in the world. But, Z played no part in
this tragedy and shares none of the assignable blame. We might propose
simple regret is:

SR: S regrets E = S feels a sadness over a state of affairs, E, that was
brought about without S’s direct or indirect involvement.
We can propose that the emotional components of SR would be that an
agent must believe that some other state of affairs, E’, is preferable to E, and
that the agent is sadden that E exists. The component of desire in SR would
seem to be confined to a desire or wish that the world were different than it is.
By virtue of the fact that some event contains a bad, harmful or undesirable
J

feature, an agent feels SR. In that it transpired without the agent’s input, SR
contains the agenf s correct belief that nothing he or she has done or could or
should have done could change things.
Agent-regret (AR), on the other hand, involves participation. Whereas
the appropriate response to simple regret might be, “if only it had been
otherwise”, agent regret elicits a response that acknowledges the action
happened with some level of the agent’s participation. The agent is no longer
merely a spectator. The cognitive component of agent-regret recognizes the
agent himself as part of the object. AR also differs from SR in the affective
dimension; it pains the agent differently. In that the agent participated, he is
pained by what he has done, not simply at what has transpired. The level of
involvement accounts for several distinct varieties of agent-regret. The
cognitive component of AR, as Williams writes, includes the constitutive
thought, “ if only it had been otherwise, and it happened thru me” (cited in
Barron, 1988, p. 267).
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A basic form of AR is suggested by Descartes (1985) and Solomon
(1977). Descartes defines regret as “a kind of sadness...joined to memory of a
pleasure that gave us joy. We regret only the good things which...are so
completely lost that we have no hope of recovering them” (Trans.
Cottiingham, Stoffhoff, Murduch, Vol 1,1985, p. 402).4 This type of regret
need not have an ethical dimension. Unlike SR, in Descartes’s view an agent
simply reflects upon happier times in which he participated. Examples might
include looking back on high school or college days, one’s first love, the
outgrown membership in the girl’s club or little league, or family outings to
museums or Fenway Park when the children were young.
One worry about Descartes’s definition is that it does not capture an
essential feature of agent-regret. Although the agent participated in the
events that he now longs for, the salient feature of this state of affairs is
simply that time has transpired, not that the agent has done something
specifically regrettable.
A proposed definition of Descartes’s view of simple agent-regret is:

SAR: S regrets E = S, at t2, is sadden that E does not contain particular
goods and opportunities that were available to S at tl.
Solomon has a similarly restricted view of agent-regret. He claims
regret is distinguishable from remorse by virtue of the level of one’s
responsibility. In regret, the cognition, he claims, is that one does not take
responsibility, “blaming whatever disappointment is involved on
‘circumstances beyond one’s control”5 (1977, p. 347). The element of affect,
then, is a sad resignation that life oftentimes subjects us to inevitable
disappointments, as in “one regrets not having finished high school because of
the war” (p. 350). Solomon’s account introduces a feature that illustrates a
4 Hereafter CSM.
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second restriction in Descartes’s definition. Descartes confines regret to the
loss of a good that one once had. Solomon allows for opportunities missed,
things we might have had. This version allow us to simplify SAR to eliminate
the condition of prior possession. We might say.

SAR’: S regrets E = S is saddened that E does not contain, for S,
particular goods and opportunities.
Descartes and Solomon have proposed legitimate forms of agent-regret,
but they are far too simplistic to range over all the possible cases.
Both Baron (1988) and Amelie O. Rorty (1980) recognize, but do not
make explicit, several variations of AR that the accounts of Descartes and
Solomon cannot accommodate. Several distinct cases of AR, on a graduated
scale, seemed to be implied by their work. Rorty establishes this condition for
agent-regret:

If an agent S regrets having done something, having brought
about a state of affairs E, then he believes that he has
contributed to the occurrence of E, and characteristically, he
judges that E is harmful, bad, or undesirable (1980, p. 489).
There are many things to notice about this view of AR. First, S may
have brought about E involuntarily, as in some person or element coerced S to
bring about E. Second, S may regret doing something to bring about E - but
not regret E . Here some feature of E is regrettable, not E seen as a whole.
Third, S might regret E in that S could have averted E coming to be. Under
one description of this third variation, ‘could’ implies ‘should’. The cognitive
component of this variation would work something like the following. At least
two acts, X and Y, were available to S. Performing act X, S is responsible for
E. By virtue ofX, some part of E is undesirable, bad, or harmful. Had S
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performed Y, E would: 1) not contain this bad part; and, 2) be less bad,
harmful, or undesirable. Therefore, S should have performed Y. This
interpretation of regret directly contradicts Solomon’s general claim of
responsibility. Taking each of these variations in turn will help make explicit
the variations of agent-regret. We can begin by considering the condition of
involuntary action in regret.
In his discussion of regret and assigning praise and blame according to
features of actions, Aristotle recognizes that force and ignorance can, in
certain circumstances, absolve an agent.

Those things...are thought involuntary, which take place by force
owing to ignorance; and that is compulsory of which the moving
principle is outside, being a principle in which nothing is
contributed by the person who acts - or, rather is acted upon
(1109a2-4).
To illustrate regret through coercion, Aristotle’s offers an example of a
ruler forcing someone to perform some repugnant act, X, in order to protect a
family member (1110a2).5 X is regretted, would not have been considered
without external force, but is performed to avoid the more objectionable
alternative. Since, roughly, praise and blame are reserved for voluntary acts,
S can regret having performed X while remaining supposedly blameless.
We might define this AR type as:

AR1: S regrets E = S is saddened to have to perform X, in light of no
viable alternative, in order to bring about E.

6 Sophie's Choice is a contemporary example. Briefly, that case involves Sophie, her two
children and a sadistic German soldier. Sophie and her two children are hoping to board a
train to flee Germany during World War II when they are approached by the soldier. He
gives Sophie a choice: she can hand over one of her children for execution or, if she is unable
or she refuses, he will kill them both.
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There are also types of regret that are occasioned by things that happen
to us and do not involve deliberation and choice at the time they happen.
These cases constitute, as Aristotle characterizes, examples of agents being
“acted upon”. While coercion is characterized by AR1, involuntary activities
are exemplified by one case of the taxi driver. These facts are known about
this case. A child darts into the street from between two parked cars. The
taxi cab driver slams on his brakes and swerves, but to no avail. The child is
struck by the cab and seriously injured.
Simple regret and simple agent-regret would be inappropriate reactions
from the driver. Clearly, he was a participant and for him to assume a
spectator role (SR) or to simply feel life was less complicated up to the point of
the accident (SAR) signals a morally deficient character. The affective
dimension of the driver’s agent-regret ought to pain him in a significant and
personal way. Unlike Solomon’s view, the agent clearly bears some
responsibility although culpability will be established by other factors.
Providing many conditions obtain, S’s agent-regret need not be remorse.
Had he been sober, attentive, observing all the relevant laws, his car in
excellent working order, and so on, he might curse his tragic misfortune for
being at the wrong place at the wrong time, but he would not feel he ‘could’ or
‘should’ have averted the tragedy. Nor was he coerced to choose between two
objectionable alternatives, as in AR1. The taxi driver was an involuntary
participant. We might formulate this version of AR that inadvertently occurs
through an agent as:

AR2: S regrets E = S is saddened that X occurred involuntarily through
him which brings about E.
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A variation on AR2 is also recognized by Aristotle. Here the action by S
is “mixed”: in consideration of a greater harm by doing Y, S reluctantly, but
voluntarily, performs X. He illustrates this possibility with a scenario of a
man throwing cargo overboard during a storm in order to save his crew,
himself, and his ship (1110a 8-10).

Such actions...are mixed but more like voluntary actions; for they
are worthy of choice at the time when they are done, and the end
of an action is relative to the occasion (1110all-12).
This variation of a regrettable act is one that is performed voluntarily,
but contains an undesirable feature. The state of affairs that results is, on
balance - or considered in its entirety - the best possible whole although it
contains a bad part. Although the bad part is regretted, it is voluntarily
chosen and it is accepted as inextricably contained in E.
In “Remorse and Agent-Regret”, Baron recognizes this variation and its
unique emotional components.

They chose the deed toward which they now feel agent-regret, but
they have agent-regret without wishing that they had acted
differently or believing that they should have acted differently.
Still, they are pained at what they did and wish that they had not
had to act as they did (Barron, 1988, p. 264).
According to Baron, the cognitive element is the recognition of X as the
best alternative. It is the judgment that: 1) to act in this way is acceptable,
and, 2) in the future, if presented with identical circumstances, the agent
would condone similar action by himself and by others. S can, at the same
time, desire that these circumstances do not arise again. The affective
element is the pain from performing the necessary bad part.
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Baron illustrates this AR type as the unfortunate situation of an
employer firing a trusted, loyal employee during times of cut-backs. For the
sake of the company, in dire economic times, down-sizing requires certain
individuals must be sacrificed. The employer regrets the obvious hardships
this presents the employee, but, all things considered, he judges this to be the
right act to perform. Rorty (1980) also explicitly recognizes this variety of
regret.

Conceptually, but not analytically, agent-regret presupposes
event regret; but the event that the agent brings about need not
be regarded by him as wholly undesirable, or even undesirable as
a whole. Characteristically, there is some aspect or feature of E
that S considers in a negative light (Rorty, 1980, p. 493).
This type of agent-regret requires a different formulation of the
definition. In that E, considered as a whole, might be desirable, we can
consider:

AR3: S regrets X of E = S is saddened to choose X, in light of no viable
alternative, in order to bring about E.
The coerced / voluntary “mixture” in AR1 and AR3 can be the source of
some controversy. It might be argued both Sophie - in Sophie’s Choice - and
the Captain had a choice. One attempt at a partial resolution to this
controversy would be to suggest that in AR1 an agent is forced into a choice
between alternatives neither of which she would normally entertain (as in, “to
have to perform X”). The Captain and the Employer, in AR3, are forewarned,
because of their station, that regrettable circumstances could arise whereby
they must make difficult decisions (e.g., all things considered it would be best
to choose X).
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There is the additional condition wherein an agent unintentionally
causes a tragedy for which the agent is blameworthy. S might have been
driving under the influence of alcohol or knowingly have been negligent in
keeping his cab in good repair. These cases will occasion reactions of “if only
I...and I could and should have”. Baron, Rorty, and Taylor imply, or explicitly
assert, that the inclusion of‘should’ in the cognitive move requires us to move
on to the emotion of remorse. They claim that one feature of agent-regret is
the acceptance of the chosen alternative. Rorty says explicitly: “It is not a
condition of regret that the agent would undo the action if he could” (1980, p.
495). Baron recognizes two types of agent regret. That of the taxi-driver
under the blameless and under the culpable descriptions, and those that
“chose the deed...without wishing they had acted differently (1988, p. 264).
Taylor writes:

Not surprising that the person who feels remorse and the person
who feels regret should view differently the relevant past event. If
she feels remorse then she wants to undo the action and its
consequences which cause the remorse, but when feeling regret
she need not think that she would undo the action if she could...It
is possible to regret an action but accept it as the thing to do
(Taylor, 1985, pp. 98-99).
This might seem clear in AR3. To accept these claims would require us
to move on to consider remorse. But this seems hasty. Clearly, in AR1, if one
is coerced into hurting a child to avert a greater tragedy, the agent would
certainly wish to “undo” that unfortunate circumstance. In a like manner, the
taxi-driver, in AR2, curses his misfortune. It would be perfectly
understandable to imagine him concocting any number of scenarios that would
have put him away from the scene of the accident, as in, “If only I had that
second cup of coffee...”. These are certainly futile attempts, but nonetheless
representative of desires to undo the harm. But the futility of the desire does
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not rule it out under Rort/s description; her claim is simply ‘if she could’.
Clearly, if Sophie could, she would. This claim is not analogous to the feature
of moral obligation that posits ‘ought implies can’, or roughly, the idea that we
can only be obligated to do those things that we are capable of doing. There
are many instances of remorse and regret that are beyond repair or, shall we
say, undoable. The point here is only that wishing to undo an act can apply to
regret as well as remorse.
Another objection to the “undo” claim is that, under a certain
description, AR3 might carry with it a moral requirement to bring about E\
Act X in E is not, therefore, in and of itself, the thing to do. S may consider X
unacceptable as it stands. Technically, something more is needed to undo the
present circumstance, as in the present employer feels obligated to assist the
trusted employee in finding suitable alternative employment. Likewise, if the
Captain was commissioned to deliver the cargo, then we would expect him to
ponder how he could replace the client’s goods. This is not to say these
individuals would “undo” X; but it is to say that both X and E are unacceptable
as they stand. Therefore, the individual wishes to undo E by a subsequent act,
Y. With Y, E’ obtains.
Both Williams and W.D. Ross recognize this complication, one that
affects theories of agent-regret - not exclusively remorse - and the emotional
acceptance of the result of our actions. Speaking of conflicting moral
obligations, W. D. Ross refers to the compunction we feel when confronted by
dilemmas.

When we think ourselves justified in breaking, and indeed morally
obliged to break, a promise in order to relieve someone’s distress,
we do not for a moment cease to recognize a prima facie duty to
keep our promise, and this leads us to feel, not indeed shame or
repentance, but certainly compunction, for behaving as we do
(Cited in Pojman, p. 256)
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I take compunction to be an uneasy feeling and remorse to be more than
that. In “Ethical Consistency”, Williams points out:

A fundamental criticism of many ethical theories (is) that their
accounts of moral conflict and its resolution do not do justice to
the facts of regret and related considerations: basically because
they eliminate from the scene the ought that is not acted on
(cited in Baron, 1988, p. 265, underlining added).
In the case of the Captain, the conflict might be: If one contracts to
deliver goods to S, then one ought to keep one’s contractual promise. This
agreement may be superseded, but that does not absolve the Captain of his
commitment. The Captain may regret he was unable to honor the contract in
a timely manner. He offers the storm and the dangers to his crew as
justification. The original promise still carries with it certain obligations.
Therefore, none of the previous versions of regret and agent regret can
accommodate all regrettable experiences. This new consideration is
accommodated in AR4. It reads:

AR4: S regrets X of E = S is saddened to voluntarily choose X that
brought about E and S feels obligated to do Y in order to bring about E\
In conclusion, the feature of not wishing to undo an action is insufficient
grounds to distinguish agent-regret from remorse. In complex cases, agentregret can entail a moral imperative to “undo” E in the sense that more is
required of the participating agent. In simpler cases of coercion and
involuntary participation, the desire to “undo” E seems self-evident.
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Remorse

Remorse can be distinguished from the various forms of regret and
agent-regret in significant ways. A primary distinction is that remorse never
implies acceptance of what has been done (Taylor, 1985; Baron, 1988). The
constitutive thought in remorse contains from agent-regret the antecedent “if
only...” which is necessarily followed by the consequent “and I could and should
have done otherwise” (Williams, 1985).

The move from regret to agent-regret to remorse involves no
discarding of notions, but only the addition of layers. One goes
from “If only it had been otherwise” (general regret) to “ And it
happened through me” (agent-regret) to “And I could have
averted it” - and if at this stage the ‘could’ implicitly involves a
‘should’, we reach remorse (Baron, 1988, pp. 267-268).
In remorse, then, S sees himself as the origin of the conduct unlike the
spectator in SR or as an agent reflecting on transpired events in SAR.
“Regret”, Taylor remarks “but not remorse can be felt about an event for
which the agent does not take herself to be even just causally responsible
(1985, p. 98). The agent’s recognition that he could have acted differently
distinguishes remorse from AR1 and AR2. In remorse S does not believe he
had to perform X nor did X happen involuntarily through him.
How the agent is responsibly tied to a particular deed further
distinguishes remorse from agent-regret. In AR3, the agent regrettably
chooses the lesser of two evils in order to bring about, as he sees it, the best
available alternative. In AR4, by virtue of choosing X which brings about E,
the agent is obligated to perform Y, in order to bring about E\ By contrast,
the feature of responsibility in remorse is that the agent chose incorrectly; he
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recognizes that something should have gone differently and, through him, it
could have.
Several authors, at this point, recognize an internal difficulty. Agentregret can also contain the cognition that one could have acted differently.
Baron suggests that the “seriousness” of the act distinguishes the agentregret from remorse. She illustrates this point with the regret we feel when we
are abrupt with someone. In a footnote, she proposes if X (as in a
momentarily unkindness) were “more serious, (it) would occasion remorse in
us” (Baron, 1988, p. 279). Taylor makes a similar claim. “Remorse is felt
about a sin or moral wrong whereas regret is felt about what is in some way
undesirable, but not particularly morally so” (Taylor, 1985, p.98)
These attempts to distinguish these emotions seem unpersuasive.
Remorse, as has been claimed, never implies acceptance. A past deed has
been committed and the agent recognizes, at the time when it was performed,
that a viable alternative was open to him. This is not the case with regret.
Even in AR4, X is acceptable by virtue of Y. Although regret entails an
undesirable, bad, or harmful feature, the agent chooses that act from among
the field of possible alternatives that minimizes the harmfulness. But, to
“minimize” harmfulness need not have any relationship to the“seriousness” of
the state of affairs that an agent may find him or herself in. The mistake here
may be to assume remorse requires an intense reaction, whereas regret
occasions milder responses. But, I see no reason to assign a mild reaction to
Sophie: one of her children died. She and the taxi driver are entitled to feel, and
indeed we expect them to feel, a profound regret. For even though regret may
entail the idea that, all things considered, X was the right thing to do, both
alternatives, X and Y, may be very bad. Recall William’s implication that the
lesser of two evils is still an evil. Regardless of a viable alternative, I see no
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reason to take any evil - in and of itself - lightly. Remorse, on the other hand,
looks back on the possible alternatives and concedes that the agent could and
should have done otherwise. As Taylor goes on to note “the aspect of the
action which causes remorse...is regarded (as) outweighing any possible good
that may come from it...It is impossible to feel remorse and yet believe that
overall it was the right thing to do” (1985, p. 99). Looking back, the cognitive
component in regret is different. This fact seems sufficient to distinguish the
emotions. The appeal to a calculation of “seriousness” ought to be rejected.
The recognition of a more desirable alternative and the acceptance of
the responsibility for a wrong choice has led some writers to consider remorse
as a constructive emotion. Taylor cites Max Scheler’s view of remorse as
“necessary for the guilty to be reestablished” and “an emotion of salvation” (p.

101).

In remorse...the agent takes a positive attitude toward the
situation and himself. It constitutes a “change of heart”, or a
totally new attitude, and through it the agent can regain his
powers and rebuild himself (p.101).
Taylor reflects a similar sentiment.

No action need follow from regret, or even be expected to follow.
This is not surprising if the agent may think that all things
considered she did the right thing, or did what had to be done. But
we do expect some sort of action from her who feels remorse...She
wants to undo what she has done...(and) she would normally be
expected to try and do something towards repairing the damage
(p. 99).
For many of the same reasons, these comments also seem wrong. One
of the difficulties at arriving a precise definitions of emotions is that many
authors tend to attribute too many features to an emotion. By doing so, one
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emotion overlaps or “shades into” another and lines of demarcation blur. With
emotions overlap does occur; it is important, however, that the overlap is
legitimate. Remorse is one such emotion with a blurry perimeter.
Scheler and Taylor might be mistaken for these reasons. Even if we
were to grant that remorse differs from regret in that in the former the agent
would undo that action if he could, this does not commit us to accept any
future predictions of behavior or are we committed to propositions that future
intentions are required by remorsefulness. Consider this example. S has a
history of multiple arrests for driving under the influence. Last night he
borrowed the family car, drove to a bar, had too much to drink, and crashed
the car on the way home. His family is now burdened emotionally and
financially as well as inconvenienced. S reports that he feels remorseful. Had
he to do it over, S would do things differently. But, as I see it, remorsefulness
alone need not entail “a change of heart”. More than remorse is needed to
attribute considerations of remediated future conduct. We can verify this
claim in two ways.
First, if we can supply identificatory and explanatory reasons which
satisfy the requirements of the definition of remorsefulness without a change
of heart, it would then appear Scheler’s claim fails. These plausible and
relatively commonplace reactions seem to suffice: S is remorseful he crashed
the family car because 1) he may, as a result, be incarcerated (which will
interfere with his drinking); or, 2) his family will be reluctant to let him borrow
the car again; or, 3) he had intended to enlist the support of a designated driver
and had he, he could have had a number of more drinks.
Second, there seems nothing incompatible with the idea that an agent
will be, can be, or is remorseful about past conduct while being well aware indeed expecting - that the future will contain the same type of activity. The
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despair and the hopelessness heard in the self-reports of many individuals
addicted to various substances is precisely because of this connection between
genuine and heartfelt remorse and their acknowledgment of anticipated
substance-abusing future conduct The report of remorse alone is not enough
to assuage the counselor’s skepticism. A counselor can believe the client is
truly remorseful while still lacking the required elements of motivation,
responsibility, and/or atonement necessary for remediation. Therefore, it
seems to be an invalid deduction to claim that if someone would undo an action
if they could, then we are entitled to make predictions of that agent’s future
behavior. It is in a very literal sense that we can understand Descartes when
he writes: “remorse does not concern the time to come, but rather the present
or past” (CSM, 1988, p.351, underlining added).
These points would indicate that a suitable definition of remorse be
restricted to the past or present tense, free of future intentions, and devoid of
any comparative calculations regarding ‘seriousness’. We might consider:

S is remorseful about X = S is saddened to have performed X, desires X
could be undone, and recognizes that he could and should have acted
differently.
As we continue on the graduated scale, repentance supplies the
legitimate additional components in cognition, affect and desire.

Repentance

Descartes draws a distinction between remorse and repentance in terms
of cognitive certainty. Remorse requires doubt. Its function is a prompting
toward inquiry to ascertain “whether the object of our doubt is good or not
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(Sec. 177, p. 392). Repentance, on the other hand, entails the belief that what
we have done is wrong.

Repentance is...a kind of sadness, which results from our
believing that we have done some evil deed; and it is very bitter
because the cause lies in ourselves alone. But this does not
prevent it from being very useful...because our repentance
prompts us to do better on another occasion (Sec. 191, p. 396)
All the elements of an emotion are here. The agent has the cognition
that he is responsible for a wrong act. The affect is a notably intense sadness.
It is clearly an active emotion; one desires to conduct oneself differently on
future occasions. It could be that Descartes is making a similar linear move
that is analogous to that of regret to agent-regret to remorse: remorse “shades
into” repentance as doubt clears away. But it seems intuitively correct that
repentance entail remorse, not supplant it. To repent a person must first
believe - with a remorseful certainty - that a wrong was committed.
In his unpublished manuscript, “Repentance and Criminal Punishment”,
Jeffrie Murphy offers a definition of repentance that explicitly requires
remorse as a component. It reads:

Repentance is the remorseful acceptance of responsibility for
one’s wrongful and harmful actions, the repudiation of the aspects
of one’s character that generated the actions, the resolve to do
one’s best to extirpate those aspects of one’s character, and the
resolve to atone or make amends for the harm that one has done
(Murphy, unpublished manuscript, p. 3).
This is a complex description. If we were to combine atonement with
making amends, there will be four necessary conditions an emotion must
satisfy in order to qualify as repentance. These are: [A] responsibility with
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remorse; [B] an honest review of an undesirable character trait; [C] the
resolve to reform; and, [D] the resolve to atone.
Repentance is a concept that occupies considerable interest in
theological literature. In the sections on repentance in the Catechism of the
Catholic Church. (CCC) all the requirements of Murphy’s definition
(designated as [A], [B], etc.) are accounted for. The remorseful acceptance of
responsibility is covered in the discussion of confession.

The confession (or disclosure) of sins...facilitates our reconciliation
....[A] Though such an admission man looks squarely at the sins he
is guilty of, takes responsibility for and thereby opens himself
again to God (Ed. Ratzinger, 1994, Sec. 1455, p. 365).
t

Following confession, if an agent is repentant, he will do penance.
Penance is a testimony that one is willing to reorder one’s life and attempt to
sin no more.

Absolution takes away sin, but it does not remedy all the
disorders sin has caused. Raised up from sin, the sinner must still
recover his full spiritual health by doing something more to make
amends for the sin: he must “make satisfaction for” or “expiate”
his sins. This satisfaction is also called “penance” (Ratzinger,
1994, Sec. 1459, p. 366).
Repudiation of a character trait and the resolve to reform are covered in
the definition of interior repentance and contrition. Interior repentance is:

[B] A radical reorientation of our whole life, a return,...an end of
sin, a turning away from evil, [C] with repugnance toward the evil
actions we have committed...it entails the desire and resolution to
change one’s life (Sec. 1431, p. 360).
The CCC considers contrition to be of the utmost importance. It is
defined as the “sorrow of the soul and [B] detestation for the sin committed,
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[C] together with the resolution not to sin again” (Sec. 1451, p. 364).
Atonement [D] is expressed and achieved in various ways. Common ways are
through fasting, prayer and almsgiving; these acts make amends in relation to
oneself, to God and to others, respectively.
Murphy observes that repentance means “not merely a resolution not
to commit wrong again, but a resolution that includes a desire to make
amends” (p. 7). And for Murphy, the component of making amends entails
remorse over what has been done.
Murphy s analysis of repentance seems correct. His definition seems
acceptable.

Guilt

Much of the literature on the emotion of guilt concentrates on an
analysis of the objective state of “being guilty” and not on the emotive state of
“feeling guilty”. This focus can be attributed, in part, to the fact that, unlike
shame, guilt has direct legal connotations. For some act, X, to be wrong, there
must be some source of authority that prohibits X. Here right and wrong can
be defined in terms of permissibility. If some authority with jurisdiction over
an agent permits certain conduct, it is ‘right’. Conversely, if this same
authority prohibits certain conduct, it is ‘wrong’; acts of this sort are not
permissible as they constitute a violation of the prohibition. As Gabriele
Taylor observes violations are punishable.

Guilt, unlike shame, is a legal concept. A person is guilty if he
breaks a law, which may be of human or divine origin. As a
consequence of this action he has put himself into a position
where he is liable to punishment...Given only that he is under the
legislation of the authority in question, violation of the law is
sufficient for guilt (Taylor, 1985, p. 85).
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In a legal situation, then, guilt involves the notions of breaking a law
established by an authority under whom one lives and, thereby, deserving of
punishment (OTIear, 1976). Nothing in this analysis attempts to explain an
agent’s feelings of guilt. It is plausible that an agent can acknowledge the
objective state of his being guilty and his liability for punishment while, at the
same time, he can feel guiltless. One justification for this emotive stance can
be that the agent considers the law that he has violated to be a bad one.
Examples might include resisting a military draft, violating laws requiring
segregation, or obstructing access to an abortion clinic. In these instances the
agent recognizes the law as binding but considers the law itself to be incorrect
or immoral. This insight seems to be overlooked in many influential views on
guilt and shame.
Psychoanalysts Gerhart Piers and Milton Singer advanced theories of
guilt and shame which focus primarily on the objective state of being guilty.
Almost fifty years ago Piers and Singer formulated a distinction between guilt
and shame that continues to influence psychologists and philosophers. Using
Freudian terminology, Piers and Singer claim that an agent experiences guilt
when one transgresses a boundary set by the “Super-Ego” (or an authority
figure), whereas shame is felt when a goal set by the “Ego-Ideal” (or one’s selfconception) has not been reached (Piers and Singer, 1951). Summing up
Piers’s view, John Deigh writes “ Shame is felt over shortcomings, guilt over
wrongdoings” (1995, p. 133). But Piers’s view fails to clearly distinguish the
objective state of “being guilty” with the emotional experience of “feeling
guilty”. Clearly, it is possible for an agent to do wrong yet feel guiltless as well
as for an agent to feel guilty but to be innocent.
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Frequently the emotive aspect of guilt is overlooked because various
theorists attempt to define guilt by contrasting it with shame in terms of
internal or external sanctions or guides. Presumably laws are external guides
while standards are internal. Piers’ view clearly classifies guilt as external,
shame internal. A scientist in general agreement with Piers is sociologist,
Helen Block Lewis. She has written:

Shame is about the self. We say, I am ashamed of myself. I am
guilty for something. Guilt is out there in the real world,
something you did or something you thought that you shouldn’t
have thought. Shame is only about the self (Cited in Karen,
p. 47).
In Helen Merrell Lynd’s On Shame and the Search for Identity, a
different picture emerges. For Lynd, guilt is internal while shame is primarily
a social, external experience.

Guilt, or self reproach, is based on the internalization of values,
notably parental values - in contrast to shame, which is based
upon disapproval coming from outside, from other persons...Ruth
Benedict makes a similar distinction...Guilt (is) a failure to live up
to one’s own picture of oneself (based upon parental values), with
shame, a reaction to criticism by other people...(so) shame is a
more external experience (1958, p. 21).
Another attempt at this distinction, as noted by Lynd, was made by
anthropologist Ruth Benedict in her study of Japanese culture. She concludes
a shame culture is one characterized by a fear of expulsion from the group.
One fears ostracism; this motivation to conform comes in part from a sense of
shared values - an external consideration. By contrast, a guilt culture is one
wherein individuals control their behavior by their own internal compasses
(Dizard, 1996, p. 22). Again, on this view, shame is external and construed to
result from recognized violations of social conventions or agreements. With
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guilt, pressure is exerted by reference to an ideal that maybe entirely of one’s
own private construction. We see then that Benedict’s view is just the
opposite of Piers. Benedict’s characterization has been credited with being the
most widely accepted definitions of these two emotions (Lynd, 1957). But on
her view guilt is merely a subjective realization that one has failed to meet an
internal standard. It is not clear why guilt would be the obvious emotional
reaction to this insight as opposed to shame, frustration, or discouragement.
Many current educational theorists, however, subscribe to Benedict’s
formulation. Brown University professor, William Damon proposes a similar
idea so as to distinguish guilt from shame:

In general...shame always remains to some extent otherorientated...in the eyes of others, one’s behavior is contemptible.
In this regard it differs from guilt, with relies more exclusively on
one’s own evaluations rather than on the real or imagined
evaluations of others (p. 22).
These formulations seem too sketchy. On Benedict’s and Damon’s view
an audience is required to shame a person; but this notion can not account for
the instances when one may feel shame when no one else is present. Feelings
of guilt, on the other hand, cannot exclusively rely on one’s own evaluation. As
mentioned in the case of the bad law, an agent can perform prohibited
behavior and feel guiltless. However, effective social reformers acknowledge
their legal violations and accept their punishment. Similarly, some criminals
will readily admit their guilt but remain emotional unaffected.

A bank-robber

may admit his guilt, but that confession may not tell us anything about his
cognitive operations or his emotional state.
So four general emotional responses to guilt seem possible. These are:
1) to be guilty and feel guilty, 2) to be guilty and feel guiltless, 3) to be guiltless
and feel guilty, and, 4) to be guiltless and feel guiltless.
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Various justifications for these emotional responses can be offered. To
feel guilty when one is and to feel innocent when one is guiltless are rational
reactions. Regarding feeling guiltless when one is in fact guilty is more
complicated. A variety of justifications might apply. One explanation might
be that the agent does not hold himself responsible for the act; he might
appeal to a presumed genetic predisposition, to a poor upbringing, or to an
ignorance of the law. As mentioned, another justification might be that the
agent considers the law that he has violated to be a bad law. Here he could
accept both responsibility and punishment while, at the same time, he
believes he acted properly. Other examples might be that of an agent who
simply lacks the cognitive / emotional sophistication to be negatively affected
by his conduct or of an agent who simply has no respect for legal and moral
principles.
Feelings of guilt are included in an alternative views to Taylor’s which
establish an additional requirement of guilt. In order “to be guilty”, S commits
some act X that an authority figure prohibits and which causes harm to
another person. The Oxford Companion to Philosophy (OCP) defines guilt, in
part, as:

The state imputed to a person who has done moral or legal
wrong...Full acceptance and realization of guilt involves remorse
and desire to expiate the wrong done...Yet guilt is not simply selfreproach; it is inseparable from awareness of the harm, or
neglect, brought about to the others affected by one’saction or
inaction (ed. Honderich, 1995, p. 329).
A number of necessary conditions emerge in the OCP definition. One
condition of guilt presupposes a specific relationship of an agent to an
authority figure. Under this description in order for an agent to feel guilty, an
authority’s prohibition must be viewed by the agent as both correct and
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binding. This requires several cognitive steps. For an agent to recognize and
accept that he is guilty, he must acknowledge that he has violated a
prohibition that has been established by an authority, he assents to that
authority as binding, and he accepts that the authority’s prohibition is, in fact,
correct (Taylor, 1985). This acceptance of the correctness of the prohibition is
an essential component to being and feeling guilty. The inclusion of this
condition seems to be an improvement on the earlier, less elaborate theories.
Furthermore, on the OCP analysis acceptance of guilt entails a
requirement to atone or make amends. On this view we see structural
similarities with repentance. Two conditions of repentance were: 1). the
remorseful acceptance of responsibility for a wrongful act; and, 2). the resolve
to make amends. Amends, in the case of guilt, is the making of restitution to
the offended party. To be legally guilty overlaps with a requirement of
remorse as defined in Rl. Legal guilt is incurred by doing what one knew (or
could have known) to be wrong when one could and should have done otherwise
(van der Haag, 1975). Therefore, to feel guilty the agent can not appeal to
ignorance of the prohibition.
As with the OCP view, several sources include the requirement of‘harm
to others’ as necessary to guilt (Deigh, 1995; Rawls, 1971; Taylor, 1985: van
der Haag, 1975). For example, in A Theory of Justice. John Rawls illustrates
a case of guilt with an example of a man who cheats an associate. In
transgressing the rights of others, an agent wrongly advances his own
interests (p. 482). In an obvious consideration of the harm to others clause,
Rawls claims guilt is reconciled by reparations and forgiveness. In the
acknowledgement and acceptance of reproofs and penalties, the desire an
agent has is for “reinstatement” (p. 483). In reaction to the same
transgression, moral shame, on the other hand, is the acknowledgement that,
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by cheating, one has not lived up to “a conception of moral worth he has set
himself to achieve” (p. 482).
Rawls makes an important distinction between the reactions one
expects in guilt and shame. An ashamed person will anticipate to be treated
with derision and contempt because he has fallen short of a standard and
shown himself to be “unworthy of association with others who share his ideals.
He is apprehensive lest he be cut off and dejected” (p. 483). A guilty person, on
the other hand, expects to engender anger and resentment from the injured
party. “Guilt is relieved by reparation and the forgiveness that permits
reconciliation; whereas shame is undone by proofs of defects made good, by a
renewed confidence in the excellence of ones person” (p. 484).
/

Bernard Williams makes much the same point in Shame and Necessity.
What arouses shame in an agent is the expectation of eliciting contempt,
avoidance, or derision from others; in guilt, the agent expects, because of some
act or omission to act, anger, resentment, and indignation (Williams, 1993).
Here shame is metaphorically tied to “sight’, the agent wishes to hide or
disappear, whereas in guilt the agent hears the sound of an internal,
disapproving judge. In disappearing, one hopes shame dissolves, but if one
were to disappear with guilt it is as though “it would come with me” (1993, p.
89). In that guilt requires reparations, it is intimately connected with others;
shame redounds only on the self.

We can feel both guilt and shame towards the same action. In a
moment of cowardice, we let someone down; we feel guilty because we
have let them down, ashamed because we have contemptibly fallen
short of what we might have hoped of our selves... What I have done
points...towards what has happened to others(and) in another
direction to what I am (p 93).
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And this analysis suggests that the cognitive operations for certain selfregarding emotions are multi-step. Michael Lewis, in “Self-Conscious
Emotions: Embarrassment, Pride, Shame, and Guilt”, advances a version of
this multi-step process with his Cognitive-Attributional Theory.
His cognitive-attributional model is as follows:

SELF-CONSCIOUS EVALUATIVE EMOTIONS
A. STANDARDS AND RULES
B. EVALUATION
C. ATTRIBUTION OF SELF
SUCCESS

FAILURE

HUBRIS

SHAME

GLOBAL

PRIDE

GUILT/

SPECIFIC

REGRET6

Lewis contends that the self-regarding emotions of pride, guilt, and
shame are elicited when “one makes a comparison or evaluates one’s behavior
vis-a-vis some standard, rule, or goal (SRGs) (Lewis, 1993, p. 563). Pride
occurs when one judges one’s behavior to have succeeded in maintaining or
achieving one’s SRG’s and shame or guilt is elicited when the agent concludes
he has failed (1993).
The first cognitive-evaluative step is what SRG’s the agent accepts as
binding on him. “All of us have beliefs about what is acceptable for others and
ourselves in regard to actions, thoughts, and feelings” (p. 567).
The second step is the the agent’s two-part evaluation of his particular
conduct in regard to the SRG’s. The first part is whether the agent accepts
responsibility for the act (internal attribution) or whether the agent attributes
* Lewis (1993) p. 566

78

responsibility to some other party or circumstance (external attribution). If
the agent assumes responsibility, the second aspect is how the agent assesses
a particular success or failure (1993). As discussed in the section on self¬
esteem, personal evaluations vary greatly. For example, a passing grade of B
may constitute success for one person and failure for another.
The last aspect of Lewis’s cognitive-evaluation model is the attribution
of the self. The emotional state of guilt, Lewis proposes:

is produced when individuals evaluate their behavior as a failure
but focus on the specific features or actions of the self that
led to the failure. Unlike the focus in shame on the global self, the
focus in guilt is on the seifs actions and behaviors that are likely
to repair the failure (1993, p. 569).
Lewis’s implication that the emotion of guilt is conditionally good in that
it might instigate reformative behavior is a controversial assertion. Equally
controversial is his claim that shame is necessarily and always a global
assessment of one’s character. However, Lewis does propose a plausible
account of the cognitive operations that must obtain in order to be and to feel
guilty. Combining Lewis’s account with those of OCP and Rawls, the
necessary and sufficient conditions of guilt will read:

An agent supposes and accepts that he:
1. is responsible for and has committed some act, X.
2. X is prohibited by an authority figure, A, and
3. that A has jurisdiction over him. And,
4. that A’s prohibition is correct and binding, and
5. by performing X, he has harmed others, he is, therefore,
6. deserving of punishment, and,
7. he believes he has an obligation to make amends.
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We might formulate a tentative definition of guilt as :
Gl: S is guilty = S merits punishment and feels an obligation to make
amends for having violated a correct and binding prohibition, mandated by a
legitimate authority, that has harmed others.
With the exception of the “harm to others” clause, there is general
agreement in the literature on the objective state of guilt (Rawls, 1971;
Solomon, 1977; Taylor, 1985; Dillion, 1995). “To be guilty”, an agent, under
the jurisdiction of an authority, violates a prohibition. However, substantial
disagreements arise in explanations of the “harm to others” clause and in the
content of “to feel guilty”.
r

Taylor suggests that Rawls has a needlessly restricted view of guilt that
cannot account for such (Kantian) notions as failed suicide attempts, laziness,
and ‘rusting talents’ (1985). All her examples display the crucial feature of
doing what maybe forbidden, while, conceivably, influencing only the agent in
question. Allowing for Taylor’s objections, the necessary and sufficient
conditions for guilt would now read:

An agent supposes and accepts that he :
1. is responsible for and has committed some act, X.
2. X is prohibited by an authority figure, A, and,
3. that A has jurisdiction over him. And,
4. since A’s prohibition is correct and binding, he is, therefore,
5. deserving of punishment, and,
6. he believes he has an obligation to make amends.
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G1 would be revised as:
G2: S is guilty = S merits punishment and feels an obligation to make
amends for having violated a correct and binding prohibition mandated by a
legitimate authority.

By virtue of the violation of a legitimate prohibition, G2 entails the
consideration that harm has, or might, result to oneself or to others. However,
it, unlike Gl, does not make harm to others a necessary condition.
The importance of the requirement for making amends, or atonement,
for a wrong done is a notion that is often overlooked in discussions which
center on extemal/intemal distinctions. An external view can easily dismiss
an important cognitive component to guilt; atonement and “reinstatement”
involve internal operations. Yet a solely internal view cannot account for
forgiveness from and restitution to some audience.
One point Williams seems to make - when he says that if a guilty agent
were to disappear, guilt would go with her - is that guilt is a burden. It is a pain
an agent feels about herself. Following Gl, we might say that in guilt a
number of cognitive operations have taken place. An agent, S, has done harm
by violating a prohibition as well as harming herself or another. Some type of
disfigurement has taken place. Repair can take the form of restitution or
repayment. In repayment, part of the harm is undone. But if this repayment
is entirely external, it is hard to see how any personal disfigurement is
repaired. Here imagine a entirely passive defendant standing before a judge.
She admits her guilt and accepts her sentence, but she feels unrepentant. No
internal conversion has occurred nor will it occur and this suggests we must
withhold forgiveness. For if we were, under these conditions, to reaccept the
unrepentant defendant, it would seem to imply we value the ‘right’ or
honorable conduct as lightly as she. This seems to be the sense in which we
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are to understand the religious directive that absolution must be withheld if it
is evident to the clergy that the confessor is unrepentant. Lacking
repentance, the prohibited act is implicitly condoned as well as the
acknowledgment of a possible “hardening of the heart” (Taylor, 1985).
Repayment, only in the sense of‘doing the time’, is one explanation for
recidivism. The (external) debt is erased while the disfigurement (internal)
remains.
An analysis of guilt therefore requires the inclusion of cognitive and
affective components. Among them are: the recognition of harm, a violation of
a correct and binding prohibition, the acceptance of responsibility, a
disfigurement, and repentance. The affective experience is one of pain. The
desire is to both rehabilitate oneself (the resolution to change) and to make
amends to others.
If it is true that these conditions constitute the emotion of guilt, it seems
clear the internal / external distinction will fail to be enlightening. More can be
said about guilt. This will be taken up in the section on shame. Let us now
turn to embarrassment and humiliation.

Embarrassment

Embarrassment, humiliation and shame share similar structures. All
three emotions are self-regarding and require a relation to the social world in
which one’s actions and one’s standing are subject to appraisal (Miller, 1993).
In all three an agent is self-consciously aware of how his position is seen or
may be seen by an audience; this objectified view reveals to the agent a status
that is inferior to what he had previously believed or hoped it to be (Taylor,
1985). One method to distinguish these three emotions can be accomplished
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with much the same strategy that was used with the linear development of
the various forms of regret. But here the distinction is not drawn by the level
of participation of the agent to the same object (e.g., one’s relation - as
spectator or driver - to an injured child); with the various individual forms of
embarrassment, humiliation, and shame the objects differ.
Unlike humiliation and shame, one can respond with embarrassment to
praise, to the recognition for doing good works, or for the sake of amusement.
An agent might relate a self-effacing anecdote to his colleagues to alleviate
tension or, for much the same purpose, his colleagues might intentionally
embarrass the agent knowing it will be received in the right spirit. Here the
motivation (or object) is amusement, not degradation (Miller, 1993).
Descartes considers those that willingly subject themselves to this “gentle
mockery” to be individuals who exhibit a cheerful temperament, a tranquil
soul, and a quick mind (1985). And, as will be seen, self-effacement can, at
times, be a protective tactic that makes one immune to humiliation.
Praise and public recognition of good-works can cause embarrassment.
An agent responds with an ineffectual and awkward dismissal of the praise: he
attempts to divert attention, to change the subject. Carrying an elderly
person’s groceries, helping one’s parents, or comforting a child that has lost
sight of her mother are not acts done for public recognition. An additional
feature of this type of embarrassment can include an empathic concern for
the person in need of assistance: the helping agent can be equally
embarrassed in the knowledge that those being helped might experience a
tinge of embarrassment to be seen as needing such assistance.
The feature of awkwardness is unique to embarrassment and it is an
element in all the various forms. Embarrassment entails the feeling that one
is unable to respond appropriately to a particular incident. Examples might
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be that I have arrived at the party overdressed, or underdressed, or with a
tear in my pants.

Others at the party might feel embarrassed for me.

Here the notion of an audience is essential to embarrassment as is not
the case with shame. I am embarrassed by my dress only because I am seen.
In shame, an agent’s final judgment concerns himself only. He is degraded not
relative to an audience, but absolutely: he believes he has been revealed to
merit - and to be truly represented - by this new lower status (Taylor, 1985).
In embarrassment, an agent is seen as awkward only in this particular
instance; the audience imposes a demand that the agent is unable to meet
(e.g., I can think of nothing to do or nowhere to go to change my inappropriate
dress).
Embarrassment, then, is localized to a particular incident. As such, it
rarely reflects on an agent as a whole as does shame and humiliation. By way
of illustration, my car may stall in traffic. After all the obvious gauges check
out and knowing little about mechanical things, I do not know whether to
check the fuel fine, the spark plug wires, the fuses, the carburetor, and so on.
My embarrassment stems from the fact that my associates in the car pool (or
the drivers behind me) are imposing a demand on me to respond to the
breakdown. This example brings out two other features of embarrassment:
tension and confusion. Tension arises from the imposition of a demand from
the audience for an agent to respond coupled with the knowledge that he or she
is unable to do so. This inability causes confusion: “What shall I do?” In
embarrassment, as soon as the agent resolves the conflict, the feeling
subsides. I might notice the distributor cap is loose or I call road assistance.
Having found my way around the obstacle, the incident passes. I am
reinstated with my associates and we move on to new matters. I probably
should know more about cars, but I have made no claims to be knowledgeable
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in this area. Had I, this incident could have been humiliating. We might
formulate a definition of embarrassment to be:

El: S is embarrassed = S is observed by an audience as unable to
respond in a timely manner to an awkward situation.

A distinguishing feature of embarrassment, then, is that of an adverse
judgment of an individual in a given situation, not of the individual as a whole
(Taylor, 1985). The next time it is my turn to drive my associates in the car
pool might subject me to embarrassing comments, but these remarks would
take the specific form: “If there is car trouble, then we will be in some difficulty
because...”. By contrast, humiliation and shame concern weightier matters
reflecting upon the individual as a whole.

Humiliation

Humiliation follows embarrassment along the linear structure by being
a darker emotion. Embarrassment oftentimes is a light, humorous emotion.
It can be self-imposed to alleviate tension. To humiliate oneself or to be
humiliated by others can involve comic overtones, but this is an emotion with
elements of brutality and ‘rough justice’ (Miller, 1993).
As with embarrassment and shame, humiliation requires an audience
under some description. Quite literally, an agent is embarrassed only when
seen. If I fumble about, alone on a deserted road, unable to locate the problem
with my stalled car, I might be frustrated, angry, and regret having allowed
my car to fall into disrepair but, without outside observers, I need not be
embarrassed. As in embarrassment, with humiliation, an audience plays an
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essential role. But, unlike embarrassment, humiliation requires a certain
posture from the agent.
Had I presented myself to my associates as a expert car mechanic, and
proved to be completely inept at restarting the stalled car, I would invite
humiliation. Here we see why the audience is essential to humiliation. It is
their view that I have been pretentious in the estimation of my skills. In their
view, I deserve a fall. The “object” of humiliation is the fall. To be humiliated,
then, is to be assessed by the audience as deserving of a lower status than the
agent previously held or assumes he merits. In humiliation the audience
informs the agent of his misjudgment concerning his place in the social world.
Unlike shame, it need not involve the breach of a norm or a moral wrong; to be
humiliated the audience merely rejects the agent’s self-assessment. They
communicate to the agent that he has over-valued his status or worth and
that he has attempted to elicit outside agreement for this inflated estimation.
To be humiliated is stronger stuff than the good-natured teasing of
embarrassment. Whereas one primary reason for intending embarrassment
is to provide amusement, in humiliation it is to degrade (Miller, 1993). This is
not to say ‘to be humiliated’ requires either a malevolent intention or correct
justificatory beliefs. What is essential in humiliation is that the agent now
believes that he looks foolish or contemptible in the audience’s view. (Taylor,
1985). The observer merely asserts that the agent aspires to or assumes he
inhabits a higher position than the one to which he is entitled. “If shame is the
consequence of not living up to what we ought to, then humiliation is the
consequence of trying to live up to what we have no right to” (Miller, 1993, p.
145).
Recalling the mathematics professor eyeing the undergraduate in
Karen’s example, we can assume she had no malicious intent nor did she
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derive any pleasure from the professor’s pain. Simply put, in response to his
unrelenting gaze, she needed to respond. In doing so, she made it evident there
was no attraction. The pain of humiliation was grounded in the professor’s
belief that he appeared ludicrous: he presented himself as something he was
not. But, the undergraduate need not know, or even assume, the professor
held any particular view of his irresistibility. Without knowledge of the
professor’s self-assessment, the undergraduate did not know if she was party
to humiliation.
Humiliation shares a necessary connection with an audience as does
embarrassment. In embarrassment the audience demands a response and
recognizes the agent’s awkwardness. In humiliation the audience assesses the
agent. This assessment need not be accurate and the agent need not agree
with the assessment. So a primary feature of humiliation is the fall from a
higher to a lower status, not that the agent accepts the new degraded status
as merited. It is simply that the agent is viewed by an audience as
presumptuous; he has assigned himself a position, or presented himself as a
person, above that that he appears to be entitled. By doing so, he appears
contemptible. It is possible the audience is wrong. The observers may be
unqualified to assess the agent’s true qualifications. Now an agent may feel
anger; he perceives this assessment as an unjustified slight. Whether he
deems it important to correct this impression relies on the importance he
attributes to his connection with the audience. And he still may feel
humiliation whether the fall is justified or not, for it is still a fall. A proposed
definition for humiliation is:

HI: X is humiliation = df. X is a feeling of presumptuousness and
deflation for regarding oneself more highly than an audience believes is
merited.
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Self-Esteem

It seems indisputable that a necessary requirement for a flourishing
life will be some sense of pride in oneself. Robin Dillion states empathically,
“Self-respect is undeniably something of great value” (1995, p. 10) and
philosopher John Rawls suggests without respect for oneself and for one’s life
plans, ”all desire and activity becomes vain and empty, and we sink into
apathy and cynicism” (1971, p. 440). Psychologist Nathaniel Branden
considers self-esteem to be “the single most important psychological subject in
the world” (1994, p. xii) while the California Task Force on Self-Esteem
proposes the lack of self-esteem to be the central cause of most personal and
social ills (cited in Kirkpatrick, 1992).
Presumably, people are entitled to respect simply by virtue of being
human. One formulation of Kant’s categorical imperative expresses this view.
It states respect for the moral law requires us to treat people as ends in
themselves (Kant, 1964, p. 96). This imperative expresses the intuitively selfevident principle that a person should never be treated merely as an animated
tool for the benefit of another. By appealing to this imperative, slavery and
segregation have been faulted and subsequently outlawed on the grounds of
violating the inherent dignity of the individual. Martin Luther King Jr.
frequently referred to Kantian imperatives. One such expression of the dignity
of all people comes from King’s “The Ethical Demands for Integration”.

Deeply rooted in our political and religious heritage is the
conviction that every man is an heir to a legacy of dignity and
worth...There is no graded scale of essential worth; there is no
divine right of one race...Every human being has etched in his
personality the indelible stamp of the Creator (1986, pp. 118-9).
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However, it seems equally self-evident that self-esteem can be excessive
or pride misplaced, that self-respect can rise and fall, and that others must
earn, can fail to earn, or can lose our respect. These notions imply that a
person ought to conduct him or herself in particular ways in order to merit our
respect: we might suggest he or she is obligated to adhere to certain objective
standards of conduct and decency. And what applies to others will also apply
to oneself, for if I am to respect myself, satisfying certain requirements must
somehow figure in my calculations as well. Yet it appears paradoxical to have
to earn something to which one is entitled by virtue of one’s personhood. How
can we lose - or fail to earn - a birth-right? Will these puzzles be resolved if we
can establish ‘self-esteem’, ‘self-respecf, and ‘pride’ as distinctly different
emotions with unique properties or are they, in fact, synonymous? In this
section these are some of the questions that will guide the attempt to arrive at
clear and precise definitions of these three terms.
The literature on these emotions is enormous. Pride and honor has
occupied the attention of philosophers long before Aristotle, while
contemporary psychologists devote their careers to defining the nature and
role of self-esteem. Views are widely divergent. Some writers believe selfrespect and self-esteem are synonymous (Rawls, 1971). Others clearly
distinguish them (Tefler, 1968; Darwall, 1977; Taylor, 1985) while a third
group proposes self-respect to be a component of self-esteem (Branden, 1995).
Various accounts characterize these emotions as feelings, beliefs, attitudes,
sources of motivation, or dispositions. A further complication is that there is
no consensus on whether these emotions are subjective (psychological) or
objective (moral) experiences.
Those writers who distinguish these emotions nevertheless agree that
the common thread that connects respect, esteem, and pride is their concern
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with worth. Esteem is presumed to be the appraisal of an object’s worth,
respect the recognition and the appropriate response to the worth of an object,
and pride and honor the reward due that object for its great worth (Dillion,
1995). Let us take these emotions in turn.
The earliest, and what many consider to be the definitive account of self¬
esteem was formulated by psychologist William James. In 1890, James
proposed:

I, who for the time have staked my all on being a psychologist, am
mortified if others know more psychology than I. But I am
contented to wallow in the greatest ignorance of Greek. My
deficiencies there give me no sense of personal humiliation at all.
Had I “pretensions” to be a linguist, it would have been the
reverse...With no attempt there can be no failure; with no failure
no humiliation. So our self-esteem in this world depends entirely on
what we back ourselves to be and do. It is determined by the ratio
of our actualities to our supposed potentialities; a fraction of
which our pretensions are the denominator and the numerator
our successes: thus,
Successes
Self-Esteem = _
Aspirations7
(cited in Branden, 1994, p. 305)
This view is a clear expression of self-esteem as a subjective, relative
concept. Not only do personal values and aspirations guide the evaluation, but
each person will calculate different personal qualities according to how central
they may be to their self conception. The sense of worth a person has thus
turns on his ability to interact with his environment as he constructs it and
only in those areas he deems important.

7 Psychologists normally refer to self-esteem in terms of one’s spirits as high or low. In
James’s formula 1 would signify the highest self-esteem possible while 0 would designate
the lowest or the unsuccessful attainment of all a person’s aspirations. This paper will
follow the current usage of the adjectives ‘high’ and low’ hereafter.
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Two points seem especially noteworthy in James’s influential formula.
First, on this account, self-esteem is perfectly neutral about ends. The
successful attainment of a goal to which I aspire is the sole concern in my
calculation, not judgments of its moral permissibility or of its social benefit.
Whether I aspire to be a theologian or a burglar is irrelevant.
Second, an inherent flaw presumably surfaces in a comparison of two
individuals with vastly different levels of aspirations. Consider X and Y, two
highly intelligent and talented individuals. X has only a few mundane and selfinterested aspirations at which he easily succeeds. Y has grander, altruistic
plans for which she studies and toils relentlessly. She succeeds at most but
not all. Although Xs fraction is mathematically greater than Y’s, even on a
subjective account it is difficult to agree X will, much less should, appraise
himself more highly than Y. Two concerns with James’ version are
then: 1) the neglect of the moral dimension or the social utility of one’s aims,
and 2) the stringency of one’s aspirations.
In 1971 when John Rawls published A Theory of Justice it contained
what some considered the ”most detailed examination of shame and selfrespect in recent moral philosophy” (Nussbaum, 1980, p. 397). For Rawls,
self-respect and self-esteem are synonymous. Self-esteem (or self-respect)
has two components. It is defined as “a person’s sense of his own value, his
secure conviction that his conception of his good, his plan of life, is worth
carrying out” (Rawls, 1971, p. 440). Secondly, self-esteem “implies a
confidence in one’s abilities...to fulfill one’s intentions” (p. 440).
The concept of a person’s ‘sense of worth’ is defined as “1) having a
rational plan of life, and in particular one that satisfies the Aristotelian
Principle; and, 2) finding our person and deeds appreciated and confirmed by
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others who are likewise esteemed and their associations enjoyed” (p. 440).
The Aristotelian Principle is defined as:

Other things being equal, human beings enjoy the exercise of their
realized capacities (their innate or trained abilities) and this
enjoyment increases the more the capacity is realized, or the
greater the complexity (p. 426).
The Aristotelian Principle asserts that a person will enjoy an activity to
a greater extent if it both taxes his capacities and if it continues to embody
new complexities even as the agent becomes increasingly familiar with the
activity. These are the components of desire in the emotion, the “principles of
motivation” (p. 427). By way of illustration, checkers gives way to chess, as
“the simpler things he enjoyed before are no longer sufficiently interesting or
attractive” (p. 428). Whereas one quickly encounters all possible game
options in checkers, chess contains endless variations and intriguing new
challenges. Similarly, a person rereads Aristotle’s Ethics or continues to
practice Bach because revisiting works of immense sophistication and
subtlety holds the possibility of new insights and heighten pleasures. Rawls
claims that when we cease to benefit from an activity - or if our associates
believe our time to be misspent - we will soon lose interest. And Rawls claims
that the support of associates enhances a person’s chance of succeeding at
difficult projects; without support and approval an individual cannot maintain
the belief that the activity is worthwhile (p. 440). In addition to one’s
associates confirming one’s sense of worth, they are also considered by Rawls
to be valuable by setting an example of excellence to which to aspire. The
“companion effect” to the Aristotelian Principle - another principle of
motivation - is defined as the arousal of desire in us to be like those of our
associates who exercise well-trained and developed talents (p. 428). Having a
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rational plan of life which satisfies the Aristotelian principle is, then, the
criteria for being appreciated by one’s associates.
On Rawls’ account, a person will have high self-esteem if: 1) she believes
her plan of life is worthwhile, 2) she is confident she can carry the plan out, 3)
the plan embodies complexities that continue to tax, but do not overwhelm,
her abilities, and, 4) she is appreciated for her efforts by associates in a
position of close proximity or connection. The emotional components cognition, the identification of and belief in a worthy pursuit; affect, the
pleasure from accomplishment, mastery, and approval; and desire, the
motivation to improve and develop - are all accounted for in this formulation.
Although more elaborate, Rawls’s notion of self-esteem shares
structural similarities with James’s version. Martha Nussbaum observes, on
Rawls account, the subjective conditions of believing a life plan to be worthy
and the confidence to carry it out are sufficient conditions for self-esteem.

Rawls thus implicitly denies that the objective (or
inter subjective) value of my pursuits and the truth of my beliefs
about them are at all relevant to the issue of self-(esteem) and
shame (1980, p. 398).
But Rawls’ denial seems more than implicit. As with James, there is a
subjective feature which introduces a neutrality that affects both activities
and ends. The application of the Aristotelian Principle, Rawls’ states, “is
always relative to the individual and therefore to his natural assets and
particular situation” (p. 441). And on Rawls’ account, an association is
afforded a remarkable insularity. Claiming associations are groups by virtue
of the match between the collective aspirations and ideals, he writes:
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The activities of many groups may not display a high degree of
excellence. But no matter. What counts is that the internal life of
these associations is suitably adjusted to the abilities and wants
belonging to them...The absolute level of achievement...is
irrelevant (1971, pp. 441-2).
So just as self-esteem can be calculated by the particular success one
experiences and is recognized for, likewise shame, as one might expect, is
“relative to our aspirations, to what we try to do and with whom we wish to
associate” (p. 444).
It can be inferred from this Rawlsian analysis that feelings of low self¬
esteem can originate from the subjective realization that one’s goals are
unimportant, morally suspect, viewed as insignificant by our associates, or
from the belief that one is ill-suited to achieve them. Presumably, all these
impressions require verification from the group. Although all others may
admire him, James, as well, implies that it is only the group well-versed in
psychology who are capable of an informed assessment of what he aspires to
be and has accomplished.
In the above quotation, ‘But no matter’ is a witty little sentence, but it
ought to give us pause. It simply is not true that associations are as insulated
as Rawls claims them to be, nor is it true that the aspirations of the members
of groups are appraised as distinct from and incommensurable with other
associations. Although a person maybe internally disconnected or
unassociated with a group of surgeons, philosophers, educators, or rocket
scientists, he is likely to be cognizant of the required intelligence, fortitude, and
talent necessary to maintain such lives. I see no reason, that in assessing his
own group, the talents and accomplishments of others should not figure into
his personal calculations.
The comments on shame indicate another area of concern. If I consider
both my aims and ideals worthy and that I am well-suited to pursue them, I
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am a candidate for high self-esteem. Those with whom I associate must verify
that my actions and aspirations are in accordance with my stated goals and
that these goals are worthy. However, my associates might be as misguided
as I am in what we consider to be worthy aims and honorable behavior. Street
gangs are a concrete example.8 ‘Admirable’ behavior often entails drug¬
running, assault, theft, and murder. Rawls’s treatment of associations offers
a feature of insulation to the gangs members as if to imply societal and legal
scrutiny will have a negligible effect on gang associates. It is, however,
indisputable that most criminals know there is strong outside disapproval for
their activities.
In many ways Rawls’s theory of self-esteem seems extensionally
equivalent to that of James: the same objections apply. So Rawls’s theory of
self-esteem has some difficulties that need to be avoided in the formulation of
a definition, and in the assumed significance, of self-esteem.
Considered by many to be the “father” of research on self-esteem,
psychologist Nathaniel Branden, has written extensively on this emotion.
Noting that people with low aspirations “are not conspicuous for their
psychological well-being”, Branden recognizes an inherent difficulty with
James’ version (1994, p. 306). Branden proposes self-esteem to be defined as
“the disposition to experience oneself as competent to cope with the basic
challenges of life and worthy of happiness” (1994, p. 27). This definition entails
two components: self-efficacy and self-respect.
Self-efficacy is described as the ability to master the challenges
“enacted by our values” (p. 34). Self-respect is the conviction that we are
worthwhile, valuable beings with an inalienable right “to live and be happy” (p.
36). Self-esteem, according to Branden, is, then, an attitude of entitlement
8 See, for example, Isaiah Anderson’s “Code of the Streets”, Atlantic Monthly.
February, 1992.
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and possibility, not an evaluation of achievement. Pride, Branden proposes,
contemplates what has been accomplished while self-esteem “contemplates
what needs to be done” (p. 40).
Branden’s version of self-esteem differs from James’ in that the latter
calculates the level of self-esteem based on accomplishments. Branden
diverges from a Rawlsian account with even stronger subjective claims.
Evaluative recognition from one’s associates plays less, if any, role in
Branden’s version. Self-esteem is “what I think and feel about myself, not
what someone else thinks or feels about me” (p. 52). Regarding the selfevaluation of my abilities and aspirations, “mine is the only judgment that
counts” (p. 146). When conflict arises between personal values and societal
prescriptions and prohibitions, Branden suggests an individual “challenge any
and all authorities” (p. 152).
Objecting that James’ version both lacks specificity and that is a
prescription for anxiety - by virtue of comparing oneself to others - Branden
advises individuals to assess their level of integrity. On his description,
integrity is the fit between one’s aspirations, beliefs, and ideals with one’s
behavior. Acting in accordance with our beliefs is ‘congruent’ behavior. People
of integrity act congruently and, therefore, merit high self-esteem. But
Branden’s appeal to ‘integrity’ hardly seems to constitute an improvement
either over James or Rawls. If one has only oneself to answer to, beliefs can
simply change so as to coincide with one’s present behavior.9 This technique is
explicitly advocated by therapist Matthew McKay. The very objective of the
cognitive behavioral therapist is to raise a client’s self-esteem by encouraged
that person to “change the way you interpret your life” (1987, p. 3). A

9 This is how a non-judgmental client-centered therapy operates. Its originator, Carl Rogers,
considered success of therapy was determined by the quantitative increase in a client’s
positive self-regarding statements (see Client-Centered Therapy. 1965, pp. 137-8).
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person’s internal critic is “constantly evaluating...by comparing you to an ideal
of perfection” (p. 100). The way to “beat the critic” is to repeat mantras of self
acceptance until a new attitude begins to emerge (p.13).
It seems to be a legitimate objection that Branden’s account lacks
specificity. Just a few of the concepts that remain undeveloped are: ‘basic
challenges’, ‘worthy’, ‘happiness’, and ‘integrity’. Still, many psychologists and
psychotherapists subscribe to the general theory of self-esteem advanced by
Branden. Variations on Branden’s version include defining self esteem as:
conscientious effort toward challenges regardless of outcome (Bednar and
Peterson, 1995), the courage to be ‘authentic’, or true to oneself, irrespective of
another’s opinion (May, 1983), to the extreme view of advocating a complete
disregard of external influences in the calculation of self-satisfaction (Dyer,
1977).
A fourth and influential account of self-esteem is from Stanley
Coopersmith. In The Antecedents to Self- Esteem, the result of an extensive
six-year research study, Coopersmith defines self-esteem as an approving or
disapproving subjective self evaluation that calculates a person’s beliefs of his
worthiness and significance.

In short, self-esteem is the personal judgment of worthiness that
is expressed in the attitudes the individual holds toward himself...
in which the individual examines his performance, capacities, and
attitudes to his personal standards and values”(1967, pp. 4-7).
Coopersmith claims that an individual’s personal values are objectively
influenced by the general social norms of one’s group (p. 244). Regardless of
their level of talent or capacities, his study participants reported a relatively
uniform acceptance of their particular social group’s values regarding
intelligence, achievement, and social success (p. 244). However, within social
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groups, Coopersmith discovered markedly different personal ideals and
aspirations (p. 245).
This second finding of Coopersmith’s research proposes individuals will
prioritize the accepted, “internalized” set of socially defined values differently
as well as to subjectively assign different weights to each specific feature
within that set (p. 245).
One example of the first instance could be this: in society A, academics,
social position, physical attractiveness, and athleticism are highly valued.
Success in academics and social interactions may constitute reason for
person A to esteem herself highly whereas person B may look only to his
physical attractiveness and athletic ability to measure his worth. An
illustration according to the second finding might be three people who regard,
say, academics highly in their calculations may assess similar
accomplishments differently. Reflecting on an end of the year grade point
average of 3.5 may please A, leave B indifferent, and distress C.
A third important finding in Coopersmith’s study was that those people
who scored highest on self-esteem inventories were those who set high
personal expectations for themselves (p. 246). Favorable self-assessments
have, then, no apparent connection with “lowered personal standards that
permit judgments of success at lower levels of performance but rather with
higher standards that are objectively attained” (p. 246). If this is in fact true,
it helps to rectify an apparent flaw with James’s formulation: a
mathematical equation that calculates low aspirations will not have a decided
advantage. We naturally resist the Jamesian equation model precisely
because it tends to favor fewer aspirations and this seems unjust. But, it is
not at all clear that this finding should be accepted uncritically. The only
evidence that Coopersmith offers to support this proposition appears to be:
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“Persons with high self-esteem generally conclude that they are closer to their
aspirations than are the individuals with low self-esteem who have set lower
goals” (p. 246). This merely expresses a trivial truth. Regardless of the
number or the stringency of aspirations, an agent who is ‘closer’ will always be
one with ‘higher’ self-esteem.
A second appealing finding is that general social norms tend to permeate
an individual’s field of aspirations. “The similarity of value preferences in spite
of manifest differences in capacity and achievement suggests that the value
preferences that people actually employ...are those that are generally
espoused by their group” (p. 244). This appears to offer further support to
question the “insulating value” Rawls attributes to associations. Coopersmith
proposes that people within social groups generally recognize the same
features to consider in their calculations, but the individual assessments of the
ultimate value of particular features, the satisfaction derived, and the
perceived level of personal accomplishments will vary and tend to override the
group norm. “Although shared standards make it likely that persons will
emphasize and value the same goals, they may differ in how they appraise
their attainment of those goals” (p. 245). This finding, on the other hand,
would seem to display a sympathy for Rawls’s speculation that as interests
and talents are fine-tuned by the Aristotelian Principle and the companion
effect, people will gravitate towards one another to form associations.
Coopersmith’s findings, then, suggest that even within a social group,
infinite variations affect the calculation of self-esteem. To illustrate, let us
suppose, a social group has four preferred values that individuals will, in some
form, internalize. Lets call these the set {A, B, C, D} where A = intellectual
achievements, B = economic security, C = moral behavior, and, D = social
position. Now Coopersmith’s findings say several things. One is that although
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members of the group generally recognize the same qualities, individuals will
prioritize them differently. So for three members, X, Y, and Z, we can have:
X favors {A, B, C, D>, Y favors {D, C, B, A}, while Z favors {A, D, B, C}.
The suggestion that different agents weigh the same feature differently,
adds an enormously complex variable. Here the sets for X, Y, and Z could
maintain the same ordering, as in (A, B, C, D} but the weights (adding up to
100 for simplicity) might be X = {30, 25, 24, 21}, Y = {50, 30,18, 2}, and Z =
{70,15,10, 5}. Variations multiply exponentially when we add different
priority orderings and more elements to the set.
The difficulty hardly stops there, for Coopersmith acknowledges that
different people will view their accomplishments differently, as we saw in the
grade point average example. To illustrate this, consider that X and Y favor
economic security as their highest priority and little else from the social set
matters to them. So for X and Y let us assume their sets are {B, D, A, C} with
the weights of {85,8, 4, 3}. Lets further suppose that X and Y have identical
holdings, assets, and responsibilities. Even in this implausible situation, it is
easy to imagine, as Coopersmith points out, that X and Y may very well
“appraise the attainment of (their) goal” differently. X may feel very secure
while Y, preoccupied as she is with money, is riddled with anxiety.
We might conclude that self-esteem is afforded little objective validity by
virtue of internalizing a general set of a group's values. It seems more
plausible, as Rawls suggests, that individuals do in fact form associations with
others who share the same prioritized ordering, similar assigned weights, and
recognize similar levels of accomplishment.
Coopersmith concludes that the ‘antecedent’ conditions that best foster
high self-esteem in the formative years are parental acceptance, clearly
defined rules, and respect. Published in 1967, at the beginning of a socially and
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psychologically liberal era in America, Coopersmith summaries his study with
a conservative warning.

We should restate...that higher levels of self-esteem are
associated with greater demands, firmer regulation, and parental
decisiveness rather than with a tension-free, permissive, and
otherwise idealized environment (p.261).

To summarize, these findings suggest that group norms are inclined to
influence the content of the field of aims for all members of the group although
individual aspirations, assessments of accomplishments, and weights assigned
within the field of aims tend to be subjectively determined. Calculations from
person to person will show great variations.
t

Although there exists fundamental disagreements, these four main
theories might agree on a formal definition of self-esteem to be:

SE1: x is self-esteem = df. x is the level of self-approval/disapproval in
reaction to the subjective appraisal of the worthiness of one’s chosen aims, of
one’s perceived suitability to pursue those aims, and one’s level of anticipated
and actual accomplishments.
The components of the emotion of self-esteem would be: cognition - the
evaluation of aims, accomplishments and anticipated accomplishments;
affect, the pleasure or displeasure from the perceived fit between aims and the
suitability of personal talents; and, desire, the motivation to realize, maintain,
or to reflect upon successes.
Self-esteem initiatives have fallen into disfavor, in large part, because
researchers have concluded that truly objectionable behavior can co-exist with
high self-esteem. William Kilpatrick notes that some of history’s worst
scoundrels “seem to be quite self-satisfied” (1992, p. 42). A1996 report in
“Psychology Review” studied the self-reports of individuals convicted of
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serious crimes, among them such people as neo-Nazis and spousal abusers.
The study reports that these individuals consistently expressed high levels of
self-approval (cited in Glencoe McGraw-Hill. 1997, pg. 3). These reviewers
claim that self-esteem ought to be in reaction to having “mastered something
significant” (p. 3). “Real self-esteem is a by-product of real learning and
achievement” (Kilpatrick, 1992, pg. 41). But, these objections restrict self¬
esteem to the past, to reflections on accomplishments. However, SE 1 and the
accounts of Rawls and Branden state that one can have high self-esteem if
one feels adequate to pursue one’s life plan. Branden’s requirement of being
competent to cope with life’s challenges is necessarily future-orientated. John
Deigh, in “Shame and Self-Esteem: A Critique” proposes that a person may
identify,

for purposes of self-assessment, with the person he believes he
will become, his present self having little bearing. Consequently,
he may even at the time be leading an all-together easygoing and
frivolous life while exuding self-esteem (1983, p. 136).
An adequate definition of self-esteem ought to entail the subjective
appraisal of potential and actual worth. These four theories do not exclude
anticipated accomplishments; even James’s version seems to imply he will be
recognized for his expertise.
The objections voiced against the individual theories may not, however,
offer counterexamples that require us to amend our definition of self-esteem.
The problem maybe in the alleged significance of the emotion.
One reason to resist the seemingly attractive psychological view of self¬
esteem is the fact that as moral agents we necessarily appraise the kind of
people we are as well as the kind of lives we lead. Moral agency is not within
our volitional control. A moral dimension is a necessary component of every
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human life and, therefore, it is essential in our calculations of that life. Critics
might want to insist upon self-esteem recognizing some objective verification
of the moral permissibility or social utility of one’s aims in self-calculations.
Others might argue self-esteem must be associated with activity, speculation
on what one might accomplish would not be adequate grounds for selfassessment. Presumably, on William James’s account he could be accurately
assessed only by himself or other psychologists since success at his profession
was what “he backed himself to be”. Recalling our definition of humiliation, we
can imagine his humiliation if he was discovered by his associates to be
ignorant of some fundamental principle of psychology. However, it is an
incoherent feature of his theory to attempt to apply the notion of “with no
attempt, no failure and no failure, no humiliation” to one’s character. Here
Kilpatrick’s objection to self-esteem initiatives is well taken. It is puzzling
that someone can be a scoundrel, know that he is a scoundrel, intend to
remain a scoundrel, and yet have high self-esteem.
Kilpatrick’s objections notwithstanding, nothing in the proposed
definition of self-esteem, nor in the separate theories reviewed, offers
assurance that the aspirations and qualities appraised are necessarily good
and praiseworthy. Nor need they be. The subjective nature of the appraisal
merely requires that someone hold a favorable view towards oneself on the
basis of certain aims or accomplishments. For just as the aspirations and
accomplishments can be misguided, so to can the judgment. Here the neo-nazi
helps illustrate the point. It would indeed be a monumental accomplishment
to stir up a previously harmonious community into a hotbed of racial
animosity and violence. Setting that objective is adventurous, achieving it, no
small feat. So to derive pleasure from that dubious accomplishment might be
understandable under one description. But we need only recall the Aristotelian
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insight that sweet things seem bitter to the man with a fever and “as different
things seem valuable to boys and men, so they should to bad men and to good”
(1176al5). We need not contest the validity of the neo-nazi’s report that he is
pleased with himself; he unquestionably is. But, we can question the
credibility of the reporter himself; we can object that his reasoning and
judgment are wrong and his aspirations misguided. But we cannot appeal to
self-esteem to sort out our difficulty. Any attempt to interject an objective
moral significance into self-esteem is, by definition, unjustified. It neither
requires nor necessarily entails an appeal to morally correct beliefs. One may,
of course, consider moral merit in their self-assessments. Most do. When this
occurs it is not by virtue of the demands of a subjective appraisal of personal
aims, but from the objective considerations required by self-respect and pride.
To substantiate this claim let us turn now to these emotions.

Pride

Various editions of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics (NE) translate the
virtue of megalopsuchia as ‘pride’, ‘greatness of soul’, ‘magnanimity’, and ‘selfrespect’ interchangeably (Trans. Ross, 1925; Thompson, 1953). The term
‘self-respect’ has become the popular choice in modem times. This may be
primarily because various historical accounts use ‘pride’ to denote a vice, a
virtuous disposition, a subjective attitude, or an objective fact. Modem writers
may tend to prefer ‘self-respect’ considering it to be immune from negative
connotations or theological overtones. As mentioned, there is overlap with the
emotions of self-assessment as well as a propensity by psychologists to
concern themselves with self-esteem, philosophers with self-respect, and the
historical accounts with pride. However, one feature of the historical accounts
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that recommends them is the discussion of “proper pride” as a correct
measure of self-regard for the right reasons. An understanding of this notion is
important to the general discussion of the self-regarding emotions as well as
self-respect and shame specifically.
In this section I will begin the discussion of pride by reviewing Aristotle’s
account of excessive and deficient beliefs of one’s worth. In the literature, his
accounts are generally considered to be accurate and uncontested. Aristotle’s
view, then, will help clarify the target of proper pride. Next, I will introduce
various comments by Aristotle, Descartes, Hobbes, and Isenberg on the
conditions and requirements for feeling proud. These comments pose some
curious puzzles for an analysis of shame. Last, with an emphasis on
comments by Hume and Taylor, I will discuss how pride is connected to some
other self-regarding emotions and review various definitions.
In his customary form of analysis of the virtues, Aristotle discusses
magnanimity, or pride, as a state of proper measure (or a mean) between two
extremes - one of excesses, the other a deficiency. A vice of excess - vanity - is
characterized by the man who thinks himself “worthy of great things, being
unworthy of them” (1123b8). The deficiency is to think oneself worthy of less
than one is properly entitled, to be unduly humble. The mean is for a man to
“estimate himself at his true worth” (1123bl4). If that worth is great, a man
is entitled to feel “magnanimous”.
Aristotle defines another excessive form as conceit - the over-estimation
of one’s worth and abilities. “Conceited people...being ignorant of their own
limitations...attempt honorable undertakings for which they are not qualified,
and...are exposed as incompetent” (1125a26-30). Conceit, therefore, invites
humiliation. Aristotle also refers to arrogance or “superciliousness” as
characterized by those people born with advantages but without virtue; for
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“without virtue it is not easy to bear the gifts of fortune inoffensively,...and
supposing themselves to be superior to everyone else, they despise other
people, and behave as fancy takes them” (1124a29-b2).
A contemporary explanation of excessive pride by Gabriele Taylor
follows Aristotle’s distinctions of vanity, conceit, and arrogance. Vanity is
commonly thought to be an excessive preoccupation with oneself and an
inordinate desire to be admired by others. Conceit connotes an exaggerated
sense of one’s abilities and the belief that all others pale by comparison.
Arrogance, on the other hand, seeks no comparison. An arrogant man takes
his superiority for granted, with no concern for evidence to support his claim of
elevated position, status, or talent (Taylor, 1985). Taylor points out it is
conceivable for a man to be vain, conceited and arrogant simultaneously.
Preoccupied with oneself, a man might believe if he were to be compared with
others he would come out “infinitely superior” (p.48). Believing that, any
comparison with others becomes superfluous. For both Aristotle and Taylor,
one requirement of proper pride is to hold correct beliefs regarding one’s
capabilities, character, and merit.
Aristotle’s discussion of pride is complex; it is an explication of the
nature and value of the proper appreciation of merit, the grounds for merit,
and the appropriate attitude toward public recognition. A proud person, on
Aristotle’s terms, is rare. Since “it is impossible without nobility and goodness
of character” to be genuinely proud, true pride is merited only by those that
have achieved noble characters (1124a5). The reward for a noble character is
honor, the greatest of external goods and the appropriate response to the
dignified status of greatness in “every virtue” (1123b30). The grounds for
feeling proud are, then, the proper concern for virtue and the correct judgment
that one has a virtuous character.
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We might assume Aristotle intends us to understand that a person is
virtuous so as to merit and receive honor. He claims honor is to be loved for
itself and that it is the “end of the political life” (1095b20). It, by necessity,
follows virtue. So this causal relationship seems to imply that one is virtuous
(the means) in order to be honored (the end). But a few lines later Aristotle
remarks that political “people seem to seek honour in order to convince
themselves of their goodness...so evidently in their view goodness is superior to
honour” (1095b26-30). In Aristotle on the Human Good. Richard Kraut
proposes how we ought to understand the virtue/honor relationship.

I take Aristotle to be saying...(people) want to be honored for
their virtue by those in a position to assess their character. In
other words,...they love virtue even more than they love honor,
and they seek honor as an indication they they have succeeded in
their efforts to become virtuous. If they are honored by the right
people for the right reasons, then they can be more confident
that they really do have the virtues, and no adjustments are
needed in the way they lead their lives (1989, p. 234).
Honor, on the Aristotelian account, is now seen as the public
confirmation of a virtuous disposition and as a motivational force to continue
living nobly. From these comments, we can extract a possible insight about
shame. It seems implicitly clear that to be dishonored (shamed) by the right
people for the right reasons signals a failure or a shortcoming that will require
an adjustment. What is explicitly clear from Aristotle’s account is that honor
must come from the right sources and greeted with “moderate” pleasure
(1124a2). Honors conferred by “ordinary people” should be discounted,
presumably on the grounds that these people are incompetent to judge all¬
round excellence in the virtues. And honor should be the source of only
moderate self-satisfaction for no external good “can be enough for perfect
excellence” (1124al0). Pride, what Aristotle calls “the crown of the virtues”,
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is, then, a feeling of moderate self-satisfaction for achieving - and being
recognized by the right people as having achieved - excellence in all the
virtues.
Recognition and confirmation by associates is important in several
other views of pride, none stronger than in Hobbes, and possibly none more
perplexing than in Descartes. The view from the audience, for Hobbes, is all
that matters.

The value or WORTH of a man is, as of all other things, his price
- that is to say, so much as would be given for the use of his
power - and therefore is not absolute but a thing dependent on the
need and judgment of another (cited in Dillion, 1995, p. 9).
On this account nothing is of intrinsic value. Virtue, as with any other
quality, has value if and only if it is valued by one's associates or by the
conventions of one’s society. Justice, conscientious effort, honesty, and
courage may or may not, at some particular time, be praiseworthy. It
depends entirely on societal conventions. In Hobbes’s view, there is no
Aristotelian sense of an individual evaluating himself appropriately. “Dignity
is ‘the public worth of a man...set on him by the commonwealth”’ (Cited in
Dillion, 1985, p. 10).
It is on the Hobbesian view of pride that a shame-culture is
comprehensible. In a shame-culture, pride and self-respect are synonymous
with public respect. Public esteem is the greatest good and it is merited by an
individual by conforming to the code that his society has established. By
conforming to this code, he establishes his reputation. Public recognition
establishes the appropriate level of pride or shame a man may take in himself.
It is tempting to characterize a shame-culture as appearances versus
reality. Shame-cultures seem to suggest that it is how a man appears to his
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group, not how he actually is, that dictates how he is received by the group.
And that reception of one’s appearance dictates or establishes his value. But,
in a shame-culture, as in Hobbes’s notion of pride, appearances are reality.
And, this is because, as Taylor points out, when there is no distinction between
public and private evaluations, “a person can assess himself only in terms of
what the public thinks of him” (1985, p. 55).
Numerous arguments can be offered to show that this view is flawed.
To consider attitudinal conflicts over segregation and slavery might
sufficiently illustrate the flaw in Hobbes’s proposition. Clearly, all societies
have a one time or another subscribed to bad codes. Not long ago in America
the social policies generated by appeal to the intrinsic value of blacks
accounted for some particularly offensive codes. But, if Hobbes’s view were
true, segregation laws would have, at one time, been correct and justifiable by
virtue of majority agreement on the presumed capabilities or social utility of
blacks. Secondly, when slavery or segregation were operative in society, those
individuals that objected to these policies could expect resistance and
devaluation simply in virtue of opposing the operative code. It is evident in
hindsight that those individuals who opposed slavery deserved respect for their
convictions, not derision; they had legitimate grounds for pride. Third, unjust
laws set the “price” too low thereby frustrating the talents, the aspirations,
and the self-respect of blacks. These laws were, therefore, morally
objectionable.
Descartes finds some middle ground between Aristotle and Hobbes. As
with Aristotle, proper pride, for Descartes, is intimately connected with being
honored by others. In The Passions of the Soul, he writes:
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‘Pride’ is a kind of joy based on the love we have for ourselves and
resulting from the belief or hope we have of being praised by
certain other persons. Thus it is different from the internal
satisfaction which comes from our belief that we have performed
some good action...For seeing that we are esteemed highly by
others is a reason for esteeming ourselves (CSM Pt. 3, Sec. 204,
p. 401).
Unlike ‘self-satisfaction’, which requires no third party acknowledgment,
Descartes claims that both pride and shame are inseparable from and
grounded in the recognition of others. “A good or evil which is in us, or which
has been in us, produces pride and shame respectively, when it is related to
the opinion which others may have of it (Pt. 2, Sec. 66, p. 352, underlining
added). And unlike Aristotle, when it comes to pride, Descartes appears far
less discriminatory with the composition and qualifications of the audience.
He offers the following directive:

For although the common people are very bad judges, yet
because we cannot live without them and it is important for us to
be an object of their esteem, we should often follow their opinions
rather than our own regarding the outward appearance of our
actions (Pt. 3, Sec. 206, p. 401).
Given his views on how one should verify that which one holds to be true,
this position seems quite remarkable.10 His comments on pride and shame
seem irreconcilable with this passage from his Discourse on the Method.

10 For a comprehensive discussion of Descartes’s view of justifying knowledge claims and
to fully appreciate the oddity and equivocal nature of Descartes’s directives for verifying
one’s sense of pride and shame, see Garth Matthews’s Thought’s Ego in Augustine and
Descartes (1992), in particular “Descartes’s Intemalism” pp. 125-140. Further, it cannot
be offered in Descartes’s defense that The Passions of the Soul was an early work,
containing views he would be inclined to revise; it was his last book. Nor is it much comfort
that he originally intended the work to be primarily for the edification of Princess Elizabeth
of Bohemia, with the inference Descartes believed appearances are uniquely important for
those in noble positions. It is unlikely he would be condescending to her (by advocating style
over substance), for in a letter to a contemporary he explicitly ascribed to Elizabeth
“extraordinary” mental powers (see CSM, vl, pp. 325-7).
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And yet a majority vote is worthless as a proof of truths that are
at all difficult to discover; for a single man is much more likely to
hit upon them than a group of people (Pt. 2, p. 119).
From Rules for the Direction of the Mind Descartes even rejects allowing
us to rely on a majority of ancient scholars.

We ought to read the writings of the ancients...But at the same
time there is considerable danger...even if all the writers were
sincere and open...we would always be uncertain which of them to
believe, for hardly anything is said by one writer the contrary of
which is not asserted by some other. It would be no use to count
heads, so as to follow the view which many authorities hold. For if
the question at issue is a difficult one, it is more likely that few,
rather than many, should have been able to discover the truth
about it (p.13).
As with Hobbes, in Descartes’s philosophy, the grounds for pride have a
public and quantitative feature. It is only when others recognize some good in
us that we are entitled to experience pride. Presumably, the greater number
of witnesses, the more confident one can become.
There is a parallel passage from Aristotle that also displays an
asymmetry regarding the appropriate audiences for pride and shame. With
shame, appearances seem to play an essential role. Whereas common opinion
is disdainfully ignored in assessing honorable activities, the court of common
opinion must be weighed in what may appear to be shameful.

For the sense of disgrace...is consequent on bad actions for such
actions should not be done; and if some actions are disgraceful in
very truth and others only according to common opinion, this
makes no difference; for neither class of actions should be done, so
that no disgrace should be felt (1128b21-25).

Ill

There is a further and troubling implication in Aristotle. Shame, we are
told, is “more like a passion than a state of character’’ (1128bl0). Pride, on
the other hand, can be properly defined through an investigation of a “state of
character or the man characterized by it” (1123b30). Whereas pride implies a
settled disposition, shame seems relegated to a feeling of disrepute. This
introduces a puzzle that will require attention. These various views might
suggest pride and shame are not contraries; the former being a virtue, the
latter a mere feeling or physiological reaction.
David Hume, for instance, suggests pride’s contrary to be humility, for
he writes, “it is impossible a man can at the same time be both proud and
humble” (Cited in Isenberg, 1980, p. 362) and “everything related to us, which
produces pleasure or pain, produces likewise pride or humility” (Cited in
Taylor, 1985, p. 20). These comments suggest two things. First, each emotion
signifies the acceptance of a position on a scale. The humble man accepts a
relatively low position correctly assessing his capabilities, accomplishments,
and his respective merit as rather meager. The proud person, by contrast,
assesses herself highly. This interpretation accords well with the definition of
humiliation. Humility offers immunity to humiliation, but it is not
immediately evident what implications this holds for shame. For example, if
an agent incorrectly were to rank herself too highly and to present herself as
such, there is little trouble picturing an audience gathering the necessary
evidence to deflate her presumptuousness. In their humiliation of her is the
assumption that she ought to have been more humble, not the implication
that she has been shameless. And, if the audience’s view is correct, and she
comes to see it as such, her new status requires not that she necessarily
reform shameful conduct, but that she make the necessary adjustments to
both her self-assessment and to her self-presentation.
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Although it will do little to sort out the puzzle with shame, it is relatively
easy to discount Hume’s contention that pride and humility are contraries.
One way is to recognize the possibility, and indeed a rather commonplace
occurrence, of agents who take pride in their humility. A person can take pride
in the absence of self-preoccupation or in the lack of an exaggerated sense of
importance as well as in their correct beliefs concerning their status. Arguing
against Hume’s notion of humility, Arnold Isenberg suggests this.

Humility consists in knowing one’s limitations as pride consists in
knowing one’s merits...the knowledge of both is comprehended in
the act of knowing one’s place...(Therefore) Humility is not the
opposite but the compliment of pride (1980, pp. 361-2).
Here humility tempers pride from the excesses of vanity, conceit or arrogance.
Secondly, being virtuously humble in a Christian sense need not be a
form of deferential meekness, but more an acknowledgment, as Isenberg
states, of one’s limitations and capabilities. Deferential meekness, as Aristotle
suggests, is to be unduly humble. But in an attempt to comprehend (and in
contrast with) God’s perfection, even our best efforts can be viewed, in the
words of Malcolm Muggeridge, as “utterly inadequate” (Buckley, 1980, p. 14).
His point seems to be that one can be proud of building a beautiful house while
at the same time humbled by contrasting that house with a European
cathedral. And we can further fine-tune our perspective on our house by
imagining the proud architects of the cathedral humbled (and inspired)
speculating upon the magnificence of God’s work.
A second point in Hume’s remarks establishes a condition of
relatedness or “closeness” with the object that elicits pride. Taylor illustrates
this condition with an example of a beautiful house. I can take joy or pleasure
in looking at any beautiful house, but I can only take pride in a house that is in
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some way is connected to me, as in “My beautiful house”, or “My family’s
beautiful house” A house, or anything that elicits pride, in addition to having
some direct connection with the agent, must also be seen, in some respect, as
desirable or valuable. Here it is not the value of the house, but the connection
of the house with the agent that is of value.
Hume’s additional requirements on pride are that the agreeable object
be “comparatively rare, fairly constant, and discernible to others as well as to
the agent himself” (Taylor, 1985, p. 21) For a quality or possession to be ‘rare’
implies that it exceeds some standard. These standards, Taylor calls, the
“norm of expectations”. Following Hume, Taylor’s norm of expectations are
established by 1) what a person can expect from external circumstances; 2)
by his view of his own abilities and limitations, what he can or cannot achieve;
and, 3) by the agent’s view of the expectations of others, by what in his view
society expects or can expect from him (1985, p. 40). As Aristotle has said,
exceeding these norms is rare; it therefore gives one reason to be proud. In
interpreting this same view from Hume, Taylor explains:

It is...that what a person is proud of goes beyond that person’s
norm of expectations, and in whatever way she sees it as
exceeding what she thinks she can expect, she will see it as an
achievement of hers (1985, p. 40).
The condition of “discernible to others” is explicitly rejected by Isenberg
in his article, “Natural Pride and Natural Shame”. There he defines pride as
“1) a quality which 2) is approved (or considered desirable) and 3) is judged to
belong to oneself” (1980, p. 357). Arguing that we are proud of something
which we value regardless of approval or disapproval from society, Isenberg
rejects the idea that the object of pride must be recognized with approval by
others. He illustrates his point by suggesting that the general public may be
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incapable of evaluating the attributes that justify pride for an artist or a
scientist, individuals who “demand applause on their own strict terms” (p.
356). It is by their own lights that these specialists must ultimately assess
their accomplishments.11 Citing this position by Isenberg, Taylor claims that
we naturally hope for the approval of others, but it is a mistake to suggest we
can be proud of something only on the condition others recognize and approve
of that quality (1985, pp. 25-6).

The restriction is not that she cannot be proud of this or that
because others do not see its value...it is that the person must
think her view of what is valuable in the situation is one that can
at least in principle be shared by others. And this limitation is
implied by the condition that a person is to be proud of something
she must believe it to be of value” (1985, p. 27).
Isenberg’s definition has a feature of self-sufficiency not found in
Aristotle, but there are some counter-examples that suggest it is, at the very
least, unenlightening. To suggest that - pride is a desirable quality that
belongs to me - fails to distinguish, or pinpoint, my attitude toward how that
quality reflects on my status. My attitude toward that desirable quality may
cause me to become arrogant, conceited, or both; and technically, these are
not instances of pride in the sense of a virtuous self-regarding emotion.
Clearly, arrogance - a vice - cannot qualify as “the crown” of the virtues.
Conversely, not every desirable quality of mine is reason to feel proud.
Isenberg claims, “there is no quality deemed desirable the possession of which
cannot be the source of pride” (p. 356). But this seems just plain wrong. Let’s
say I am physically well-proportioned, free of major deformities, and
11 The case of the artist (or the scientist) can be used to illustrate how the cognitive
components of humiliation and anger work. If the above analyses are correct, we can
imagine an audience, incapable of assessing the true merit of the artist, believing her to be
pretentious. The audience thinks she deserves a fall and they register that sentiment in,
say, an unflattering review. But the artist will not accept the audience’s evaluation,
knowing what she knows, thus she will not feel humiliated (although she has been
humiliated), but rather angry at what she perceives to be an unjustified slight.
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moderately handsome. In short, blessed with some desirable qualities. This
strikes me as an occasion to feel fortunate, not proud. There is nothing
exceptional about these desirable qualities; they are quite ordinary. They do
not exceed the norm of expectations nor have they come about through any
effort or achievement of mine so they cannot constitute any special merit. In
my case these qualities neither exceed a standard nor do they elevate my
status. In another example we might imagine I have been blessed with
exceptional intelligence. But if I were to waste away my life in one mundane
pursuit after another isolated from and contemptuous of others, there seems
to be no valid justification to take pride in the quality of my intellect. No good
works result from this desirable quality.
These examples seem to suggest Isenberg’s definition is too permissive.
So a satisfactory definition of pride ought to include: 1) restrictions on excess,
2) stipulations on the employment of one’s desirable qualities, and 3) some
requirements on the quality that it is some fashion earned ot the result of
effort.
Selected from the above views, the necessary conditions for pride seems
to be as follows. For a person to feel proud he must believe that he is
connected to some thing or quality that is in some respect desirable or
valuable. He must believe that he is at least partially responsible for bringing
that desirable quality about. That quality either maintains high standards or
will exceed one’s “norm of expectations”. That quality or feature is discernible
to others in the sense of being demonstrable. When it is demonstrated,
recognition must come from appropriate referees. The appropriate response
to recognition is a moderate self-satisfaction with the desire to maintain one’s
honorable position.
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We might define pride as:

X is pride = df. X is moderate self-satisfaction justified by the correct,
evaluative belief that by virtue of a desirable, personal quality an agent has
maintained or elevated his status by demonstrably exceeding an expectation.
The elements of the emotion of pride seem would then be: the cognition
that one’s status has been elevated by an activity that exceeds an
expectation, the pleasurable affect that one’s status has been elevated, and
the desire to maintain standards and to be recognized as honorable because of
such activity.
For Aristotle, the quality of one’s character is the proper grounds for
pride; only the virtuous merit favorable self-regarding attitudes. Immanuel
Kant introduced a completely different consideration. With the notion of
autonomy, Kant suggests all persons are entitled to respect. - regardless of
social position or conventions, and irrespective of character or merit. And the
component of desire to maintain standards may foreshadow a resolution to the
puzzle of pride as a virtue / shame as a feeling. It might be that pride entails a
‘sense of shame’: the cognition that certain conduct should be avoided (e.g.,
conduct that violates standards). This introduces the notion of self-respect. It
might be that a person maintains his or her self-respect by virtue of having
and maintaining certain standards. This would then supply a j ustification for
feeling proud. Let us review self-respect next.

Self-Respect

Respect is an emotion that can be interpreted from a variety of vantage
points. Depending on one’s area of interest one might attempt to understand
117

respect as it is grounded in the intrinsic value of personhood, or
in the context of rights and duties, or as it is appraised or distributed according
to social position, virtue, a person’s integrity, or achievements. Of all the
emotions of self-assessment, self-respect shares a particularly intimate
relation to shame; Rawls, in fact, defines shame as an injury to one’s selfrespect (1971, pg. 442).
In this section an attempt will be made to define self-respect so as to
distinguish it from self-esteem as well as to help explicate the notion of moral
shame.
It has been proposed that self-esteem is predominately a subjective
appraisal; esteem implies that an evaluator estimates and attributes value to
an object. With self-esteem people regard themselves favorably or
unfavorably. On the basis of these beliefs, feelings will range from high to low.
Respect, on the other hand, implies a multi-faceted phenomenon
involving evaluation, standards, activities, and responses to others. To
respect something, in one sense, presupposes evaluation. Having determined
some thing, X, to be important and/or good, X thereby merits due consideration
and commands appropriate treatment. We might say the worth of X requires
a respectful response. To propose a person deserves respect essentially
suggests one of two possible evaluative considerations.
First, we may believe all people have intrinsic value. By virtue of their
intrinsic value, a quality that is good in and of itself, people merit due
consideration. The position of inherent value in all people was, most notably,
introduced by Kant although this notion is central to many religious traditions
and doctrines as well as presupposed in ancient philosophies.
Second, a person “merits’’ respect, or is entitled to be self-respecting, by
virtue of the content of his character, the quality of his conduct, the
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assessment of his abilities, and, possibly, by the loftiness of his aspirations.
Unlike the inalienable and invariant dignity grounded in the intrinsic value of
personhood, merit requires individual calculations. Here the respect that is
merited may vary according to such things as talent, effort, achievement, or
virtue. This may suggest, unlike self-esteem, that respect is necessarily
connected to activity.
The sense of “properly valuing” certain attributes and accomplishments
significantly complicates this second sense of respect; if self-respect is a
subjective, relative emotion, to value some attribute objectively may be an
incoherent notion. Let us consider both these evaluative approaches intrinsic value and merit - and several views that propose the suitable
candidates to weigh in our calculations.
One of the most complex theories of respect is formulated by Immanuel
Kant in the Groundwork to the Metaphysics of Morals. An enormous amount
of critical commentary has been devoted to understanding Kant’s view of
respect. It has been justifiably criticized for, among other things, being:
obscure, open to counter examples, and lacking in persuasive arguments to
support several fundamental claims (Feldman, 1976); neglectful of the
significance and interplay of all other emotions (Oakley, 1992); an indefensibly
restricted view of morally worthy actions (Schiller, 1949). Kant’s theory does
however contain such suggestive and intuitively plausible insights about
respect that most subsequent theories acknowledge his general contributions.
Kant claims the attribute that makes one a person - a bearer of
intrinsic value - is the rational ability to prescribe moral laws for oneself and to
abide by them (1964, pg. 107). This capacity Kant calls ‘autonomy.
“Autonomy is...the ground of the dignity of human nature and of every
rational nature” (pg. 103). The Kantian prohibition to never treat people
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merely as means expresses the view that - regardless of character, conduct,
social status or native endowments - people, as such, must be respected. On
the basis of a rational, autonomous capacity for moral goodness, people are
worthy of respectful treatment since rational nature, in and of itself, is
dignified (p. 96). Kant’s theory follows the logic: reason, and beings who
possess reason, have moral value; to have moral value is to have a dignified
status; and, the obligatory response to bearers of dignified status is respectful
treatment.
Stephen L. Darwall, in “Two Kinds of Respect” characterizes this
Kantian notion as “recognition respect” or giving appropriate consideration to
some feature of an object and deliberating about the proper response due that
object. For Darwall, institutions such as the church, the courts, or marriage, in
addition to persons, are entitled to recognition respect (1992).
For a person to have recognition self-respect, in Kantian terms, is for
him to 1) recognize his person to entail rationality; 2) to evaluate that
characteristic as important; and, 3) to be disposed to treat himself
appropriately. Inappropriate treatment or disrespect, on the recognition
concept, would be instances where we denigrate ourselves - performing acts
the degrade or disavow our dignity. Kant lists duties to oneself to prohibit:
committing suicide, making false promises, allowing one’s talents to remain
undeveloped, and ignoring others in distress (1964, pp. 96-98). As to other
persons, Darwell concurs with Kant; recognition respect entails the moral
obligation to behave toward others in appropriate ways. In dealing with
others, Darwall acknowledges recognition respect restricts our conduct.

Recognition respect for someone as a person is to give
appropriate weight to the fact that he or she is a person by being
willing to constrain one’s behavior in ways required by that fact.
Thus, it is to recognition respect for persons that Kant refers
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when he writes, ‘Such a being is thus an object of respect and, so
far, restricts all (arbitrary) choice”’ (1995, p. 191).

Presumably, it is in the sense of recognition respect that we are to
understand such claims of democracy and biblical prescriptions as “All men
were created equal. They are endowed by their Creator with certain
inalienable rights...” and “Love your neighbor as yourself” (John 13:34) The
inability of some to recognize the inherent dignity of people of color - and our
duty towards them - is what prompted Martin Luther King, Jr. to portray non¬
violent opposition as “a means to awaken a sense of shame within the
oppressor” (King, 1986, pg. 12). Citing this Kantian imperative, King believed
subjugation (roughly understood as justifying the restriction of basic human
rights to some individuals or groups) to appeal to a misconception that is itself
- and results in - shameful behavior.12
Before Kant, Descartes similarly proposed: “I see only one thing in us
which could give us good reason for esteeming ourselves, namely, the exercise
of our free will and the control we have over our volitions (1985, sec 152, pg.
384). Descartes’s view of the importance of the capacity of free will - the
“freedom to dispose his volitions” - parallels features of Kant’s “autonomy”.
Descartes’s “control of our volitions” (p. 384) mirrors the Kantian
version of self-respect he terms ‘pride’. As we saw, autonomy, for Kant, is a
capacity the possession of which entitles the bearer a dignified status. In that
autonomy is a capacity, it may or may not issue into morally good action.
How that capacity is utilized introduces two other senses of self-respect found
in Kant: reverence for oneself and noble pride. Reverence for oneself
recognizes autonomy’s potential; it is the motivational, subjective feeling a
person has as a free agent. It is “the assessment of a worth which far
outweighs all the worth of what is commended by inclination” or self-interest
u

See “The Ethical Demands of Integration”, (King, 1986, pp. 117-125).
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(1964, p. 71). “The dignity of man consists precisely in his capacity to make
universal law, although only on the condition of being himself also subject to
the law he makes” (pg. 107, underlining added).
The evaluative form of self-respect is pride, or the level of self-respect
we merit on the basis of our specific actions or how autonomy is utilized.
Abiding by the commands of one’s universalized prescriptions justifies prideful
feelings. A Kantian reverence for oneself seems to imply certain behavior, as
in a slavish reliance on alcohol or an intentional verbal deception is beneath a
self-respecting person. To have one’s pride’ prohibits such behavior.
Respect, then, in Kant’s philosophy, is a complex phenomena. It entails
the recognition of an objective intrinsic value (autonomy), an obligation to
recognize the appropriate constraints upon our behavior (duty), a subjective,
motivational feeling to perform morally good acts and to avoid evil (reverence),
and an evaluative reflection for having performed good acts (pride). It is in this
last sense of self-respect that issues in the concept of individual appraisals.
On Darwall’s account, recognition respect involves the idea “this is
important”. Like Kant’s ‘autonomy, with Darwall the inherent dignity of
personhood is grounds for this kind of self-respect. In order to accommodate
the type of self-respect that issues from how one’s autonomy is utilized,
Darwall distinguishes two forms of appraisal respect: 1) an attitude toward a
person as a moral agent, and, 2) an attitude toward a person engaged in some
pursuit (1995). Therefore, the appropriate grounds for appraisal is either the
person’s character or their displayed excellence in a pursuit or profession.
The first form of appraisal respect can be illustrated by the simple
example of promise-keeping. Other things being equal, both X and Y have the
same (autonomous) capacity for keeping their promises. Different evaluations
are grounded in their specific conduct. Therefore, I will appraise X as
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trustworthy and Y to be untrustworthy by virtue of their keeping and
failing to keep their promises respectively. These particular evaluations then
factor into the general, overall appraisal.
The second form of appraisal respect is the evaluation of an individual
within a particular pursuit or vocation. Here we might propose a profession
entails objective standards of excellence: a “code of ethics”. For example, we
will appraise a surgeon highly if she correctly and consistently diagnoses her
patient’s illnesses and performs the required surgery successfully. We tend to
prefer, in the process, that she do so in a compassionate and timely manner
and that she recognize the dignity of her patients.
The idea in appraisal respect is “This is good” and the appraisal of a
person as a moral agent introduces, in a broad and preliminary way, the notion
of character. Character implies those habits and tendencies of a person that
require development. Habits and tendencies imply predictability. As Joel
Kupperman points out, “To have no character...is to be morally unreliable, a
state not as bad as being wicked. The wicked can be relied on in a negative
way” (1991, p. 7). Obviously, then, a person can have a “strong” character
that is wicked. To have ‘no character’ suggests a person without direction,
aims or convictions. Conversely, we can say that when a person’s habits and
tendencies are morally virtuous, we tend to ascribe to him a ‘good character’.
To have a good character suggests not only the presence of virtues and the
absence of major vices, but that others can rely on a person of good character
to act accordingly (Kupperman 1991). This also suggests how we can
understand a person acting “out of character”. We react with startled
amazement and disappointment when lied to by a person of good character.
Habits and tendencies also imply activity. To have a good and strong
character is to be committed to moral conduct (Kupperman, 1991).
123

Commitment implies having “a settled constellation of aims and ideals”
(Deigh, 1995, p. 137).
But where it was suggested that self-esteem can take the form of a
favorable self-assessment justified by projecting on what one intends to
accomplish, self-respect might be distinguishable by requiring activity. This
distinction would pose problems for a Rawlsian analysis of self-respect since
he equates it with self-esteem. This difficulty occupies the interest of Martha
Craven Nussbaum in “Shame, Separateness, and Political Unity. Aristotle’s
Criticism of Plato”. In a discussion of Rawls’s view of self-respect Nussbaum
creates several scenarios designed to highlight potential difficulties for Rawls.
One of her examples is essentially this: S is dissatisfied with her life. She is
not exercising her excellences. External circumstance conspires to frustrate
her efforts. Other times she is downright lazy. After a few sessions of “some
fashionable kind of therapy”, she is now quite content (1980, p. 398).
Nussbaum wonders: Has the treatment given S self-respect?
It would appear we could answer in the positive only if we acknowledged
S has adjusted her aims, ideals, and her life-plan as well as her assessment of
her capabilities. This seems implausible, but I see no difficulty in assuming S,
after therapy, may now view herself more favorably. Psychologists Rogers
and McKay claim these revised self-assessments constitute successful
therapy, they propose, moreover, it is therapy’s primary objective.
Nussbaum objects to the implication in Rawls that “if you feel your life
plan to be a worthy on and feel confident that you can carry it out, that
appears sufficient to make you a person of self-respect” (p. 398). Nussbaum
contends that the objective value of pursuits and the true beliefs ought to
distinguish a genuine self-respect from mere feelings of respect (p. 399).
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We do not think that my reducing my expectations and/or
becoming placid about failure to achieve my aims will necessarily
be a route to real self-respect...(W)e do not think that the solution
to all problems of shame lies in the effacement of the
uncomfortable feelings; we think it makes a difference pertinent
to judgments of self-respect whether I solve my problems...(not)
simply learning not to care (1980, p. 400).
According to Nussbaum, appraisal self-respect implies correct evaluations of
objectively good activities.
The differences between the forms of respect can now be distinguished
as follows: recognition respect is the acknowledgment of the inalienable and
invariant value of people as such and the awareness that our actions are,
therefore, restricted in certain ways. Appraisal respect acknowledges
individual merit according to 1) the particular deeds and character of
individuals, or 2) a person’s expertise within a particular pursuit. This
explanation seems to resolve the puzzle of how all people are entitled to
respect, under one description, while at the same time one individual is entitled
to more respect than another.
There is also a form of self-respect in the sense of maintaining standards
that one has set for oneself. Like Darwall, Elizabeth Telfer, in “Self-Respect”,
divides self-respect into two distinct kinds. For Tefler, an ‘estimative’ selfrespect is a favorable opinion of oneself. In her view, conduct and character
constitute the grounds for a favorable estimation, the self-regarding belief that
a person attains some minimum standard “with an appropriate emotional
accompaniment (of the)...admiration of others (1992, p. 107). Estimative selfrespect speaks to the proposition “This is good” and it coincides with Darwall’s
appraisal respect, the Rawlsian notion of “sense of
worth”, and the subjective accounts of psychologists expressed as personal
judgments of worthiness (e.g., Branden, Coopersmith).
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Tefler suggests that if estimative self-respect were all there was to the
emotion, it is unclear how we can attribute motivation or a desire to behave in
a worthy manner (1995). For her, “It is not clear how a belief that one is
already in some way satisfactory can be invoked as an explanation of
satisfactory behavior” (p. 108). And this is precisely one point on which the
subjectivist self-esteem advocates have been open to criticism. Fault found
with the report from the California Task Force on Self-Esteem includes their
dismissive references to achievement, competition, and success and their
reliance on personal attitudes (Leo, 1990). Critics wonder, “If children feel as
though they are perfect the way they are, what is there to strive for?”13
Tefler’s second type, a “conative” self-respect addresses this apparent
omission. It is defined as “a desire not to behave in a manner unworthy of
oneself, or a disposition which prevents one from behaving in a manner
unworthy of oneself’ (1995, p. 109). This type entails a motivational
component to abide by standards of worthiness and “to shun unworthy
behavior” (p. 110). Conative self-respect parallels recognition self-respect, the
realization that an important status entails obligations of appropriate
conduct. It seeks to acknowledge the “This is important” component.
In a review of Tefler’s view, Dillion interprets Tefler to suggest these
obligatory standards can be subjective or objective. “The standards include
both objective ones, some of which are dictated by the moral significance of
autonomous agency, and subjective ones, which one sets for oneself or are
provided by one’s goals, projects, and roles” (p. 26).
Tefler explicitly lists three objective, personal qualities that she claims
have universal moral significance.

13 See, for example, Leo. “The trouble with self-esteem”. U. S. News & World Report. April
2, 1990.
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When we say that someone has self-respect, we are attributing to
him qualities of independence, tenacity and self-control. A man
cannot have conative self-respect if he does not have these;
whether he himself values them or not is immatprial...thig will
involve meeting standards, attaining goals, fulfilling roles which he
has set for himself. On the other hand, the fulfillment of some
role is to be tested by an objective standard, even if the choice of
role is a personal one (p. 112, underlining added).

So Teller’s position seems to claim that by virtue of personhood all
individuals have some objective standards to recognize and that each
individual, at the same time, subjectively assumes other standards by virtue
of their self-chosen projects and pursuits. Further, in light of the subjective
choice of projects, the individual needs to recognize the objective standards
inherent in these pursuits. This might be illustrated by recalling the surgeon.
She subjectively chooses the field of medicine and is objectively obligated by,
among other things, the Hippocratic Oath as well as hospital regulations and
policies.
Two authors, Stephen Massey and Thomas E. Hill, Jr., make similar
points about self-respect. Massey, in “Is Self-Respect a Moral or
Psychological Concept?”, suggests the subjective view has the following
criteria: 1) a person identifies with a project, an activity or a particular status
as having value, 2) this project provides a standard of behavior; 3) a selfrespecting person believes that he or she acts in accordance with these
standards; and, 4) he or she intends to continue to act in an appropriate
manner (1995). Satisfying these criteria entitles a person to have a favorable
attitude (estimative) toward him or herself.
On this account, as Massey proposes, no reference need be made to
independent or objective standards. The above criteria seem compatible with
Rawls’s subjective (psychological) account of “a sense of worth” for Massey
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writes, “we can accept that (a person) respects herself, provided that she
believes her claims” (1995, p. 202, underlining added).
An objective (moral) version of self-respect would need to introduce the
qualification of an insistence upon the attitudes and actions of a person
satisfying independent standards of worthiness. Massey asserts that the
most frequent claim in the literature for objective standards “involves the
requirement that a self-respecting person believe himself to have equal basic
rights and properly value those rights” (1992, pg. 203). Much of the literature
on race relations and the women’s movement appeals to the Kantian notion of
the equal status of all people. A common argument for the objective basis for
self-respect makes reference to the concept of recognition respect prohibiting
unwarranted servility (Taylor, 1985; Dillion, 1995; Hill, 1995a, 1995b; Boxill
1995). For a woman to be deferential solely on account of certain beliefs about
gender, or for a black to assume a white has special entitlements or
capabilities can be considered morally objectionable beliefs.

If all people have

intrinsic value, it becomes a duty to oneself and to others to acknowledge one’s
equal rights and moral equality.
Massey claims that the subjective account of self-respect “need not
have any particular content nor must his actions meet any independent
standards of worthiness or appropriateness” (1992, p. 202). But he seems to
contradict himself when he lists as one of the four criteria of the subjective
account an objective feature of‘conative’ self-respect.

Identification with a project, activity, or status provides both a_
standard of worthy or appropriate conduct and a desire to act in
accordance with it. This desire is central to the attitude involved
when we speak of self-respect, since to respect oneself is to have
certain attitudes and desires, especially the desire to act in a
manner that one believes is worthy of oneself, and not simply to
have certain beliefs about one’s worth (1992. p. 201, underlining
added).
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Here Massey reinforces Nussbaum’s objection to the presumed value of
mere psychological realignment. In Massey’s psychological version of selfrespect emphasis is placed on an agent’s desire to behave appropriately.
However, one must be careful not to overlook his clear implication that the
subjectively identified project entails objective standards. It follows that for
an agent’s beliefs of personal worthiness to be correct, his perception of these
standards must be accurate and his evaluation of his compliance must be
correct.
In “Self-Respect Reconsidered”, Thomas E. Hill, Jr. takes up the idea of
fulfilling those roles that one has set for oneself. With it, Hill claims, there is a
new sense in which a person can be self-respecting that need not appeal to the
intrinsic value of persons nor to particular merit in conduct or pursuits. Hill
introduces “a case of respecting someone independently of rights and merits”,
the idea that a person can devise standards of appropriate behavior for oneself
without the Kantian requirement to “universalize” the standard (1995, p. 119).
Self-respect, in this form, requires one to five by personal standards, and
evaluate oneself accordingly, but not to extend any demands upon others.
These will be standards below which the agent himself cannot go. These
standards constitute both subjective ideals toward which an agent aspires and
constitute standards for the agent’s self-identification. Hill remarks, “Whether
one sees them as objective or not, one genuinely takes the attitude that one is,
in one’s own view, better or worse according to how one measures up to them”
(pp. 120-121).
The implication of the comments by Tefler, Massey, and Hill is that selfrespect can rest on a comparison with standards and need not be a
comparison with other people. The conceited or vain man compares himself
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with others, in some cases without reference to any standards. Hill, however,
introduces the notion that a self-respecting person feels an obligation to
adhere to standards regardless of comparative appraisals with others. A
person keeps her self-respect by maintaining her standards. It is in this sense
that Taylor considers self-respect a “protective” emotion (1985, p. 80). The
expectations of a person of self-respect must be those that the agent thinks
are important, that are of value, and that contribute to the life she is leading.
As Taylor, Tefler, and Hill suggest, some of these values maybe peculiar to
her life.
To summarize, many of the position papers on self-respect can be
classified into those that advocate for a moral or objective account and those
that propose self-respect is a psychological or subjective phenomena. Kant
would seem to be a strong advocate for the objective view; self-respect, in his
view, is construed as a moral duty to uphold the dignity of one’s rational
nature. With their emphasis on personal aspirations, psychologists Rogers,
McKay, and Branden, on the other hand, suggest self-respect should be
calculated by whatever the individual deems worthy. They argue imposing
objective standards upon oneself is a prescription for anxiety. The objectivists
counter that individuals can frequently be deluded concerning the worthiness
of aspirations (as portrayed by the cases of the neo-nazi, the gang members,
and the spousal abusers). Accordingly, the different accounts will logically
imply different views of shame.
Both views have appeal. What seems to have been largely overlooked in
the literature is that a plausible view of self-respect can blend elements from
each account into a coherent whole. Rather than concentrate on points of
disagreement, a compromise might be reached. One can find encouragement
for this approach by the fact that the two views need not be mutually
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exclusive. A further benefit of a successful blend of these two notions is that it
will afford us a greater precision in an analysis of shame.
The blend of the two views is suggested in a comment by Aristotle.

Pursuit and avoidance in the sphere of desire (appetition)
correspond exactly to affirmation and negation in the sphere of
intellect; so that, since moral virtue is a state involving choice,
and choice is deliberate desire, it follows that if a choice is to be a
good one, both the reasoning must be true and the desire right;
and the desire must pursue the same things that the reasoning
asserts (1139a20-26).
Earlier in the Ethics. Aristotle proclaims “Our characters are
determined by our choice of what is good or evil...”(1112a3). And since
character is, for Aristotle, the grounds for one’s self-respect, his analysis
incorporates: 1) conduct 2) motivated by the desire of a proper object 3)
correctly appraised. For S to respect her character, she must have confidence
that she has her aims right, that she can discern right from wrong, and that
she has the tenacity and strength of will to pursue the right. But this account
does not eliminate from consideration that the aims can be subjectively
chosen. For a person to truly respect oneself there would seem to have to be
the consideration of an autonomously directed life. One feature of servility
that characterizes it as an objectionable state is that aims or aspirations are
restricted or imposed upon an agent. That agent must conform to an alien
standard, one not self-chosen.
This suggests that we need not offer two definitions of self-respect, one
that recognizes intrinsic value (conative) and another that accommodates
individual appraisals (estimative). A satisfactory definition could incorporate
the objective features of due regard for human dignity, proper aspirations, and
conduct together with autonomously chosen goals and the fulfillment of
personal ideals. From the psychological account, autonomy is recognized and
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ideals are relative to one’s beliefs and calibrated, as Rawls suggests, to the
individual s talents and inclinations. From the moral account, the desires,
beliefs, and aims are verified to be directed at proper objects and connected to
reality. The objects are neither the result of muddled reasoning or values nor
are they indecent. Self-respect thus cannot degenerate into mere attitude nor
can it dismiss objective moral standards or tolerate affronts to human dignity.
As Aristotle insists, reason and desire pursue the same object. One reason for
remorse is that an agent desires and pursues that which he knows to be an
affront to human dignity. The agent is cognizant that he desires an object
that is incompatible with reason and one that detracts from the goal of living a
flourishing life.
If we were to concede these points, we might formulate a definition of
self respect to be:

Xis self-respect = df. Xis a self-regarding evaluative appraisal that
calculates an agent’s autonomy, aspirations, and conduct.
A blow to one’s self-respect is a serious matter. It is more than the
embarrassment over a stalled car, or the humiliation of realizing the days of
being sexually provocative to undergraduates have long since past. Neither is
it agent-regret, a sadness over how things might have been, nor even remorse,
a resignation that one could and should have acted differently. The discussion
of self-respect foreshadows several opportunities for an understanding of
shameful behavior that mandates a reassessment of self-respect. Some
candidates might include: treating people inappropriately, acting contrary to
one’s convictions, giving in to temptations, misconceptions of one’s worthiness,
or the disorganization of aims and ideals. Let us now turn to shame and see if
these candidates can be explained and supported.
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Shame

What soon becomes apparent in a review of the literature on shame is
the extent of the disagreements over precisely what it is and what significance
it might have. At the same time, there is substantial agreement on some of
shame’s specific features. Virtually all commentators agree that shame is a
painful feeling that impacts upon one’s self-assessment. A sense of
diminishment, which is never pleasant, is an integral component of the shame
experience. As with other self-regarding emotions, the subject and the object
of shame is the agent. No author that I am aware of disputes the basic
observation by John Kekes that “it is a bad, unpleasant, painful, disturbing
feeling, for it involves regarding ourselves in an unfavorable light” (1993, p.
143).
Commentators further agree that shame shares a connection with guilt,
self-respect and self-esteem. On account of a failure or a transgression one
feels diminished and a sense of diminishment requires a reassessment. The
attitude held prior to a shame experience is supplanted by a less favorable
one. And it is undisputed that some notion of an audience is involved; the
desire to hide, flee, or cover-up is universally recognized. As with humiliation,
in shame we are seen in a new light and we are sometimes startled by the
unfavorable evaluation; the admonishment “Aren’t you ashamed of yourself5
frequently alerts us to internal and external aspects of our thought and
behavior to which we have paid too little attention.
Lastly, although many people believe that to be ashamed is, in varying
degrees, a bad thing, I have been unable to locate a single source that
proposes to be shameless is, in any sense, good. Here is one clear difference
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between shame and guilt. To be and to feel guiltless (innocent) is a good state
of affairs. From the prior discussion of self-respect we can propose that to be
and to feel shameless, is to be, minimally, a person who is without aims, ideals,
and standards of appropriate behavior.
Given all this, there are still far more points of disagreement. One writer
believes shame can be classified into natural and moral categories (Rawls,
1971) while another proposes that shame in all its forms has moral
implications. Since it impacts directly on our attempt to lead good lives,
every shame experience has a moral dimension (Kekes, 1988,1993,1995).
Some believe shame to be a passive emotion (Urmson, 1980), others active
(Deigh, 1995). Plato is widely understood to believe a sense of shame is a
positive thing; it is a beneficial emotion that acts as a constraint on immoral
behavior. On several points, one author interprets Aristotle to agree with
Plato (Nussbaum, 1980). Others do not share this view. J. O. Urmson
interprets Aristotle’s position to be one of neutrality (1980) and John Kekes
offers persuasive evidence to suggest Aristotle holds a negative attitude
toward shame (1988,1993). The apparent conflict between Plato and
Aristotle and the variety of interpretations of Aristotle’s position are
representative of disagreements that exist today. Current disagreements are
fueled by the suggestive remarks of these ancient philosophers.
In several dialogues Plato suggests shame is an important safeguard; it
restrains immoral behavior. In the Republic, shame is referred to as a
guardian that constrains young men from dishonoring their elders (Bk. 5,
465b, p. 704).
In the Laws. Plato warns against disregarding wise legislation. When
one does, it is analogous to:
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the souls of drinkers...(which) become more juvenile...(thereby losing
the) fear which has received the name of modesty and the sense of
shame” (671d, p. 1268).
Again in the Republic, Plato suggests that to fall asleep with the parts of
one’s soul at war with each other is to invite dreams that are lawless and
shameful.

Of our unnecessary pleasures and appetites ...that are awakened
in sleep when the rest of the soul, the rational, gentle and
dominant part, slumbers,...endeavors to sally forth and satisfy its
own instincts. You are aware that in such there is nothing it will
not venture to undertake as being released from all sense of
shame and all reason...It is ready for any foul deed...and, in a
word, falls short of no extreme of folly and shamelessness
(Republic, Bk. IX, 57 led, p. 798).
Aristotle is characteristically less poetic. In the Nicomachean Ethics
he refers to shame as ua sort of fear of disrepute” (1128bl2). This statement
is obscure. It is unclear which attitude has prominence, the fear that one
appears dishonorable or the belief, irrespective of appearances, that one has
acted, or is capable of acting, dishonorably. Fear, in the Rhetoric, is defined as,

a pain or disturbance due to a mental picture of some destructive
or painful evil in the future...fear is caused by whatever we feel
has great power of destroying us, or of harming us in ways that
tend to cause us great pain (1382a20-30).
Shame, then, as a fear of a destructive evil, might be interpreted as a
cognitive and an affective response to a breach of integrity. Aristotle might
mean that an agent has failed to maintain a standard that he views as
important, a standard that contributes to his self-definition. But his account
of shame in the Rhetoric does not make clear what role the public recognition
of an agent’s disgraceful conduct serves.
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Shame may be defined as pain or disturbance in regard to bad
things, whether present, past, or future, which seem likely to
involve us in discredit; and shamelessness as contempt or
indifference in regard to these same bad things....We feel shame
at such bad things as we think are disgraceful to ourselves or to
those we care for (1383bl5-19).
What remains unclear from these comments is whether a person ought
to be motivated to avoid disgraceful conduct by the fear of punishment, as in
the loss of reputation, or by an aversion to vice. These motivations have been
roughly categorized as external and internal considerations respectively.
Three influential notions about shame, that in some circles enjoy the
status of received wisdom, are that shame is an external (Lynd, 1958),
4

primitive (Erikson, 1950), and unproductive (Isenberg, 1980) emotion. In
what follows I intend to support the claim that these last three views are all
false. The conclusions drawn from the arguments that shame can be an
internal, a complex, and a productive emotion will serve as an answer to the
first research question: “What is the emotion of moral shame?”
The procedure used to arrive at an answer to this question will be
organized as follows: 1. a discussion of the internal / external debate (which is
generally framed as the distinction between guilt and shame); 2. a review of
the various claims about the necessity of an audience in order to experience
shame; 3. a discussion of strengths and weaknesses in John Rawls’s
important distinction of natural and moral kinds of shame; 4. a review of
some of the most plausible and influential writings on the alleged significance
or insignificance of shame; and, 5. a proposal of the proper components of
shame. Next, from all of the above, I will propose a preliminary definition.
Finally, following the definition, this section will conclude with a proposal on
how moral shame relates to the other self-regarding emotions that have been
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previously discussed. Let us begin with the proposition that shame is an
external emotion.

The Shame as External. Guilt as Internal Argiimpnt
t

A common assertion among some psychologists and philosophers is that
shame is a social emotion. By social emotion, they mean shame requires an
audience or that shame is an exclusively external phenomenon. Whereas
Aristotle seems to imply shame depends upon some sort of public
recognition, Descartes is explicit. “Pride”, writes Descartes, results “from the
belief or hope we have of being praised by certain other persons” (CSM, 1984,
Sec. 204, p. 402). Similarly, shame is “a kind of sadness...which proceeds from
the expectation or fear of being blamed” (Sec. 205, p. 402). As noted above,
Descartes distinguishes pride from self-satisfaction by virtue of the former
emotion depending on “the opinion others may have of” a good quality of an
agent (Sec. 66, p. 352).
To explain shame’s social dimension, many authors contrast it with the
proposed internal operations they attribute to guilt. As with Descartes, in
Helen Merrell Lynd’s On Shame and the Search for Identity, the external
quality to shame is equally explicit. Lynd claims guilt is based “on the
internalization of values” whereas shame depends on disapproval from others
(1958, p. 21). Anthropologist Ruth Benedict agrees that shame is a reaction
to criticism from others, and to be “a more external experience” than guilt
(1958, p. 21).
Many current theories of shame seem to have evolved from these views
as well as from the influential writings and research of Erik Erikson. In
Childhood and Society. Erikson postulated the psychosocial development of
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people follows eight stages; shame, the second stage, precedes guilt (1950).
Erikson’s concept of shame is restricted to preadolescence (15 months to
three years) and his view has been far-reaching in the internal / external
debate.
Quoting from Erikson frequently, the popular work of John Bradshaw
has introduced the concept of shame to a wide audience. Bradshaw accepts
the Eriksonian notion that shame emerges prior to guilt. In the popular
Healing the Shame That Binds You. Bradshaw agrees with Lynd’s assertion
that guilt presupposes an internal value system.

Healthy guilt...results from behaving in a manner contrary to our
beliefs and values. Guilt presupposes internalized rules and
develops later than shame...Guilt is developmentally more
mature than shame. Guilt does not reflect directly upon one’s
identity or diminish one’s sense of personal worth. It flows from
an integrated set of values (Bradshaw, 1988, p. 17).
Bradshaw refers to the research of Fossum and Mason and their text,
Facing Shame, as support for his position. From that book, Bradshaw cites:

The guilty person might say T feel sorry about the consequences
of my behaviors’. In doing so the person’s values are reaffirmed.
The possibility of repair exists and learning and growth are
promoted...The possibility for repair seems foreclosed to the
shameful person because shame is a matter of identity...not of
behavioral infraction. There is nothing learned from it and no
growth is opened by the experience because it only confirms one’s
negative feelings about oneself (Cited in Bradshaw, p. 17).
The ideas that shame impacts upon one’s identity, that growth is not
promoted, and repair is not possible evolve in Bradshaw’s theory to regard
shame as “the belief we are flawed and defective persons” (1988, p. 195).
“Toxic shame is no longer an emotion that signals our limits, it is a state of
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being, a core identity” (p. 10). By contrast, Bradshaw recognizes a “healthy
shame” as a recognition of limits and fallibility, a “metaphysical boundary”
(p. 4).
So Bradshaw portrays shame as a global self-assessment and for one to
feel ashamed is to make this assessment that one is a defective and
irreparable individual. Shame, he claims, cannot connect with “an integrated
sense of values”. None of these propositions seem correct.
Bradshaw does not make clear what classifies the recognition of limits
to be shame as opposed to humility. One would expect him to do so, for there
need not be a failure, a transgression, or a specific moral wrong in an accurate
assessment of one’s capabilities. To define healthy shame as “a recognition of
limits” is simply a mistake. Consider this counter argument. A person, S, is a
genius. She is well aware that she possesses extraordinary intellectual and
artistic powers and energy. Her scientific research and publications receive
superlative reviews and her oil paintings hang in the finest galleries. S
recognizes, however, that she can rarely write more than one scientific text
and complete more than two paintings in the course of one year. She
recognizes this limitation. So, knowing her annual limitations, S contracts for
only those projects that she can honor at her level of excellence. I see no
reason to categorize this as an occasion for shame nor is it clear how
Bradshaw would meet this objection.
“Toxic shame”, Bradshaw writes, “gives you a sense of worthlessness, a
sense of failing and falling short as a human being” (p. 10). Bradshaw’s
distinction of guilt from shame parallels what sociologists term the
psychological states of primary and secondary deviance. Primary deviance
applies to cases where an individual recognizes that he has committed a wrong
act but that act does not affect his overall standing as an individual nor does it
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contribute to his self-definition. As an example, a man steals a pair of gloves
from a department store. Doing so might surprise him, for he attributes
stealing to have been a momentary lapse and “out of character”. Apparently
the appropriate emotional response to primary deviant behavior is guilt.
Making amends, in this case to the store owner, relieves the “pained feeling or
regret”.
Secondary deviance, on the other hand, applies to those cases where
acts express one’s character; the man understands the act of stealing the
gloves as representative of who he is, for he thinks of himself as a burglar
(Solomon, 1977). This seems to be Bradshaw’s point of toxic shame. A
secondary deviant identification goes to one’s character. An agent believes
himself to be a burglar; his global assessment or his “state of being” is
considered to be irreparably defective and undesirable.
Common and succinct definitions repeatedly heard in seminars and
surveys and gleaned from the work from Bradshaw express these
assumptions. A frequent response to an internet survey has been: “Guilt is T
made a mistake’. Shame is T am the mistake’.” (Cited by Claudia Black,
seminar overhead, and internet transmission, “BH”, 2 Dec 1997). This idea is
expanded upon in this carefully worded internet transmission.

For me shame has always been the result of being blamedsomeone telling me that something I had done was “shameful”.
When shame enters the picture, the message I get is that only
someone inherently defective would have done such a thing. That
shame can’t be resolved or expiated because it stems from a
“state of being”. When I become aware that I have done
something wrong, I feel guilt and remorse and possibly a desire to
make amends (internet transmission, “NS”, 30 Dec. 1997)
Here again guilt presumably applies to isolated, concrete acts,
whereas shame applies to identity or a person’s “global self-evaluation”
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(Lewis, 1993, p. 569). A second inference from these comments is that guilt is
self-imposed whereas shame must be imposed from outside; one “become(s)
aware” of one’s guilt (internal) whereas shame comes from “being blamed”
(external). Secondly, to feel shame is alleged to imply an irreparable defect.
Guilt, on the other hand, prompts remorse, atonement, and reinstatement.
And guilt is assumed to be a response to a momentary glitch as in an act that
is thought to be out of character. An agent is assumed to have acted contrary
to his or her mature, reasoned, and internalized value system. Shame implies
agents come to realize their values and aspirations are woefully mismatched
with their capabilities.
Like Bradshaw, Fossum, and Mason, Hebert Morris observes in Guilt
and Shame, “with guilt we are disposed to confess, with shame to hide” (1971,
p. 2). Morris goes on to note that guilt is resolved by confession and making
amends. “Restoration” is possible (p. 2). In shame, we are required to change.
But in many popular views, change is foreclosed by the belief of a secondary
deviance, an unmalleable identity. The agent is the mistake.
There are several dangers in accepting these positions uncritically. If
we look at these distinctions and psychological assumptions carefully, it
seems evident that they are ultimately unhelpful and seriously confused.
Restoration implies reestablishing an equilibrium or the return to an
original state. The learning and growth to which Fossum and Mason refer
implies improvement, so that the change to one’s character that can
accompany shame seems more accurately to suggest learning and growth.
Reinstatement does not suggest growth; it implies repair.
Secondly, no persuasive evidence is given to support the assertion that
secondary deviance entails any inherent claims about shame. A man
identifies himself as a burglar simply because he sees himself as habitually
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disposed to steal. That, it seems, is merely an acknowledgment that he is
guilty of repeated acts of stealing. It is easy to imagine a cat burglar or a
bank robber that approves of and enjoys his life of crime. Although he may
not harbor any misconceptions about his criminal identity, this does not imply
he is ashamed of that identity. His lack of desire (or inability) to reform might
be attributed to shamelessness.
Another consideration is that if the burglar is apprehended, he will face a
trial and probable conviction. In a trial evidence is submitted and weighed in
an attempt to prove his guilt, not his emotional disposition about his life of
crime. This scenario poses further difficulties for the internal / external
proposition. A public trial and a jail sentence certainly seem to qualify as
external sanctions for transgressions of laws or social conventions. And if the
burglar is unrepentant, that implies he has neither an internalized value code
nor is it likely that a rehabilitative conversion will take place. As happens
with many criminals, he may technically “make amends” by serving his
sentence, but, as criminal justice officials know all too well, this does not
guarantee rehabilitation.
Fourth, just as ignorance of the law does not absolve an adult from
punishment for a crime, children are occasionally admonished for certain acts
that they have performed even when an adult knows the child has not
considered the normative status of the act. Parents react with “You shouldn’t
ever do such and such” knowing full well that the child is learning something
for the first time. However, the child will still feel guilty. The point is simply
this: in these instances people come to feel guilty prior to the internalization of
any applicable value or rule.
The most important misconception in the formulations of how we are
instructed to differentiate shame from guilt involves the perspective of the
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audience. In the popular psychological literature shame is commonly
portrayed as an external judgment imposed on an agent. A third party
witnesses our failure or shortcoming and this observation serves to crystallize
our global assessment of defectiveness. But this view completely overlooks
many shame experiences that are quite commonplace. One example is the
shame I might feel when no one is there to observe me. In a department store
I might notice a beautiful pair of gloves and “consider” stealing them. To even
entertain the idea of taking someone else’s property makes me feel ashamed.
It is difficult to conceive of this as in any way “external” nor is it clear what, if
anything, I am guilty of.
Sartre has several examples of shameful activities that are frequently
referred to in the literature. A variation on one is as follows. A man is peeping
through a hotel keyhole, let’s say, at a woman undressing. He hears footsteps
of someone descending the stairs near the woman’s room. Immediately the
peeping tom stands up and begins to walk away. The third person, however,
continues down the stairs, never entering the hallway.
The first man avoids detection. There is no public disgrace. But, he
clearly feels ashamed for he now sees himself as the person on the stairs
might have - a man sneaking about in order to invade a woman’s privacy. The
psychological external model does not seem to be able to accommodate this
shame experience.
Additional objections concern instances where an agent, S, is ashamed
for failing to adhere to the supererogatory obligations she has set for herself.
Merely abiding by social conventions will be insufficient to satisfy her
internalized values. Illustrations of this might be S’s stringent work ethic, her
acts of charity and volunteer work for the less fortunate, or the kindnesses she
feels morally compelled to extend to animals. Although all these acts exceed
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the demands of social convention, failing to perform them may cause shame
for the agent who values them as constituting the requirements of leading a
good life. This shame is entirely internal. No one expects her to exceed
convention nor are they aware of (and therefore do not hold her accountable
to) her exceptional “internal” standards.
There is another example of standards only a person can impose upon
himself. Let’s assume S is a highly talented furniture maker. He makes a
comer hutch from beautiful pieces of cherry and mahogany, but he is
dissatisfied with the finished product. If people with his talent were to closely
scrutinize the workmanship, they would notice minor defects. Although this is
unlikely, this piece of furniture is not representative of S’s best work. As such,
he is ashamed it represents him. Gabriele Taylor refers to a craftsman to
illustrate this “higher order” self-consciousness that shame can entail.

(The craftsman) need not imagine an actual observer, and that
there is such an observer need not be part of the content of his
thought. All that seems necessary is that he shift his viewpoint
from that of the creator of the work to that of the critical
assessor, and he himself can fulfill both these functions (1985,
p. 58)
All these objections and examples suggest that a comprehensive
analysis of shame (as well as of guilt) will need to recognize internal and
external components. The claim that shame is an emotion solely in response
to external phenomena is false. But, this does not commit us to argue that
shame does not require some type of observation. When S reflects upon his
performance, some sort of detached or objective observation must calculate
how and to what degree his standards have or have not been maintained. To
consider this, let’s turn to the idea of an audience
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The Audience

Certain comments in Aristotle’s Rhetoric seem to imply that one must
be seen or have his deeds discovered by people close to him in order to feel
shame. At 1384a25 he writes: “Since...we only care what opinion is held of us
because of the people who form that opinion, it follows that the people before
whom we feel shame are those whose opinions of us matters.” Among
Aristotle’s list of shameful activities are cowardice, wronging people
financially, illicit sexual relations, profiting from helpless people, using flattery
for personal advantage, refusing to endure hardships, and boastfulness
(1383b20 - 1384a20). The list of people before whom we feel shame includes
family members, our elders, the well-educated, the acquaintances of our
friends, and those who take us as their models, such as, students, advisees,
and rivals, as well as all “those who admire us, those whom we admire, those
by whom we wish to be admired (1384a27 - 1385al0). In A Theory of Justice.
John Rawls makes a similar point.

Shame implies an especially intimate connection with our person
and with those upon whom we depend...(a man) feels ashamed
because his conduct shows that he has failed to achieve the good
of self-command, and he has been found unworthy of his
associates upon whom he depends to confirm his sense of worth.
He is apprehensive lest they reject him and find him contemptible
(1971, pp. 443-445).
An inference that one is inclined to draw from these comments is that
shame and humiliation share the common feature of a fall from a higher to a
lower position by virtue of an external assessment. In humiliation, an agent is
assessed by an audience to have allotted herself a position higher than that
to which she is thought to be entitled. Regardless of whether the agent
disputes the audience’s judgment, she nevertheless feels presumptuous for
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having assigned herself a rank that is not confirmed by others. As Taylor
observes: “When feeling humiliated a person realizes either that her good
opinion of herself is unfounded, or that her belief that she commands the good
opinion of others is mistaken” (1985, p. 139). The agent thus acknowledges
that she “appears” contemptible; the audience’s perception is that her selfassessment is overblown. She is perceived as vain.
Shame can operate in this way. In honor groups or in a shame culture
failing to meet societal demands or adhere to its code results in public
disesteem. And this view would seem to accord with the psychological
characterization of shame as an external experience. The audience witnesses
a failure or shortcoming and the agent, therefore, comes to realize that she is
not what she assumed herself to be (Taylor, 1985). So one cognitive operation
in both humiliation and shame is an unfavorable self-reassessment to
accommodate the audience’s perception.
But shame need not be the extreme and global overview that one is,
therefore, ‘defective’, nor must all shame experiences be predicated on public
exposure. The former claim extends the psychological umbrella of “shamebased identities” to range over too many cases. The latter claim Bernard
Williams calls “a silly mistake”.

The silly mistake is to suppose that the reactions of shame
depend simply on being found out, that the feeling behind every
decision or thought that is governed by shame is literally and
immediately the fear of being seen...If everything depended on the
fear of discovery, the motivations of shame would not be
internalized at all (1993, p. 81).
Gabriele Taylor expands upon the concept of the audience by
distinguishing two elements in each case of shame. The first is one of
identification, the self-regarding adverse judgment of the agent. A shamed
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person feels degraded, “not the sort of person she believed, assumed, or hoped
she was or...should be” (1985, p. 64). These notions of what an agent hopes to
be and what an agent believes one should be foreshadow the argument for
shame’s conditionally good status.
The second element - which consists of two parts - involves the agent’s
relation with the audience. This is the explanatory component and it shares
structural similarities with humiliation. The “first point of view” audience
observes the agent and renders an assessment.

The second point of view audience...concerns the relation between
the agent and the first audience. It views the different forms of
seeing, and always views them critically...To speak of the
audience is...to speak metaphorically...The metaphors of an
audience...reflect the structural features of the agent’s becoming
aware of the discrepancy between her own assumption about her
state...and a possible detached observer-description of this
state...and of her further being aware that she ought not to be in a
position where she could so be seen, where such a description at
least appears to fit (pp. 64-66).
This metaphorical “detached-observer” audience refers to what Williams
considers the “more interesting” of the two mistakes (1993, p. 82). “The
internalization of shame does not simply internalize an other who is a
representative of (one’s) neighbours” (p. 83). In an important passage from
Shame and Necessity. Williams describes the possibility of the detached
observer as other than one’s associates and more than the voice of one’s own
conscience. This “second-self” can be an agent’s conception of an idealized
version of him or herself, someone that more closely approximates a truly
virtuous person. Williams’s passage reads:

It is a mistake to take that reductive step and...that there are
only two options: that the other in ethical thought must be an
identifiable individual or a representative of the neighbours, on the
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one hand, or else be nothing at all except an echo chamber for my
solitary moral voice. Those alternatives leave out much of the
substance of actual ethical life (1993, p. 85).
Williams goes on to propose a feature of decision-making shared with
utilitarianism: the obligatory requirement that moral agents weigh the
consequences of various alternative courses of action in order to bring about
the best of all possible worlds available.

The internalized other is indeed abstracted and generalized and
idealized, but he is potentially somebody rather than nobody, and
somebody other than me. He can provide the focus of the real
social expectations, of how I shall live if I act in one way rather
than another, of how my actions and reactions will alter my
relations to the world about me (p. 85).
The forward-looking component of shame - a sense of shame - would
thus, upon consideration, restrict the field of alternatives. A sense of shame
excludes some courses of action. Clearly, Aristotle recognizes this potential
when he remarks, “For there are many things that shame...makes us do or
leave undone” (Rhetoric. 1385a6, italics added) and, “Men are ashamed of

saying, doing or intending to do shameful things (1367a8, italics added). It is in
this sense that Taylor considers shame a protective emotion. One retains
one’s self-respect by avoiding shameful activities. This maybe the sense in
which we are to understand Williams’s claim that a sense of shame is more
than an “echo-chamber”, more than the pangs of my conscience. In an ethical
dilemma, the consideration an agent entertains can be “What course of action
would a truly virtuous person choose?” This, it seems to me, is more than
“What should I do?” which carries the implication that my inclinations,
dispositions, and ethical history will sway my decision. In other words, when
asking what should I do, we ask what would be “in character” for me to do.
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But, this question, in one sense, lacks both abstraction and idealization. By
way of illustration, the difference is forcefully captured in the question
Christians ask, when they ask: “What would Jesus do?” Presupposed in this
question is the idea that I might be inclined, persuaded perhaps, to perform act
a; Christ, as an ideal, would not. What seems to be often overlooked in an
analysis of shame is that this “better self” - in the forward-looking
deliberations that are influenced by a sense of shame - is not the “present
self”.
John Kekes, in The Pluralism of Morality, concurs with the claim that
shame can entail an abstracted and detached observation. It is noteworthy,
that he does so however in the past tense.

The feeling (of shame)...requires us to compare some aspect of our
present self to a better self that would have approximated the
value more closely than we have done...One requirement of this
self-conscious comparison is detachment. We see a
characteristic or action of ours as others would see it... and we
accept this detached assessment (p. 143).
Presumably, “as others would see it” is an objective and harsh
assessment. The judgment is clear and unprejudicial, unaffected by a possible
leniency that permeates many self-assessments. Contrary to Kekes’s
implication, this sense of shame need not be confined by directionality; its
effectiveness can be in reflection (backward-looking) or in projection (forwardlooking). For the backward-looking version of shame - the emotional reaction
to a failure or a transgression (or feeling ashamed for some specific act) - can
inhibit this type of behavior in the future. Concerning the reflective power of
shame, Marcia Baron hits upon a simple truth.
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(F)or while it is not inconceivable that someone might make firstperson “moral ought” judgments in the present tense but never in
the past, it would be odd. It would be strange since our thoughts
about how we should have acted are one of the main sources of
ideas as to kow we should act (Baron, 1988, p. 260).
Not all commentators agree. Arnold Isenberg considers shame, as well
as regret, to be “literally helpless, for they are concentrated upon what we can
do nothing about, on the past. Hence, they are passive, incompatible with
action” (1980, p. 375).
Whether shame is a significant emotion brings us to the section where
we will take up several prominent and contrasting views in the literature.
These views are represented by those who consider shame to be conditionally
good (in a sense, positive), those who believe shame is neutral, and those who
believe shame is intrinsically bad (negative). Prior to the attempt to
articulate and comment on these positions, it is important to be clear about
what kind of shame is the target. This introduces the notion of natural and
moral shame to which we will turn next.
What seems to have been established thus far, however, is that any
emotion that accommodates a detached-observer status can hardly be
classified as primitive. It is not clear to me that I have come to terms with
what Erikson and Bradshaw mean to imply by ‘primitive’. If it connotes an
affective reaction restricted to Erikson’s preadolescent stage of development
and/or the idea captured by Harper and Hoppes in their definition of shame as
merely “an affect”, their claims fail. Even if we concede shame is confined to a
backward-looking ethical review, that requires us to acknowledge there is
cognitive reflection and affective reaction. Any property with two interacting
elements is more than primitive. To include the forward-looking desire to
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reform and improve offers additional support to the objection against a
primitive categorization.
So, at this juncture, there seems ample evidence to resist the claims
that shame is either exclusively an external phenomena or that it is merely a
primitive reaction.

Natural and Moral Kinds of Shame

In A Theory of Justice. John Rawls proposes that one way to distinguish
shame experiences is by a classification into ‘natural’ and ‘moral’ types. Rawls
defines natural shame as a reaction to a lack of, or the inability to exercise,
certain excellences (1971, p. 444). Excellences are goods that are beneficial
for the person who possesses them as well as for those with whom one
associates. Rawls considers these to be goods since they enable us to realize a
more satisfying plan of life. One way these attributes contribute to a more
satisfying fife is that the appreciation our associates have for our excellences
“supports our self-esteem” (1971, p. 443).
Rawls tells us that wit, beauty, imagination and grace are among the
natural excellences (1971). For a person to lack beauty or wit is an
involuntary lack of excellence and, therefore, not blameworthy. According to
Rawls, physical unattractiveness will occasion natural shame if, and only if,
an individual aspires to a position that requires attractiveness.

Natural shame is aroused by blemishes in our person....It is our
plan of life that determines what we feel ashamed of, and so
feelings of shame are relative to our aspirations, to what we try
to do and with whom we wish to associate (p. 444).
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Natural shame is in response to defects in our person “essential to our
carrying out our more important associative aims” (p. 444). My unpleasant
physical attributes, let’s say, my ugly face, would cause me repeated episodes
of natural shame were I to aspire to be a television newscaster. I can avoid
such episodes by adjusting my goals toward more reclusive professions. Rawls
illustrates his theory of natural shame with an example of musicality.
Recognizing one lacks musical ability, one wisely does not attempt to be, say,
a concert pianist. Such a person will devote her energies to other pursuits for
which she is better suited; without aspirations to perform, these occasions for
natural shame are eliminated. Rawls suggests one need not feel shame for a
lack of musicality, “indeed it is no lack at all” (p. 444). An agent need only
adjust her aspirations to accommodate her particular natural excellences and
thereby minimizing the occurrences of natural shame.
Moral shame, by contrast, concerns voluntary behaviors that involve,
say, acts of courage or self-control. The principles of right and justice are
“used to describe the actions disposing us to feel moral shame” (p. 446).

Moral shame is occasioned when someone lacks the virtues that
his plan of life requires and is framed to encourage. He regards
the virtues, or some of them anyway, as properties that his
associates want in him and that he wants in himself” (p. 444).
With “some of them anyway” Rawls presumably regards moral virtue to be
subject to an individual exercising a preferred selection of those virtues at
which he or she can excel similar to the selection of natural excellences.
Gabriele Taylor and John Kekes reject the Rawlsian distinction between
natural and moral kinds of shame. Natural shame, Kekes notes, is
occasioned “because we are ugly, stupid, deformed, or have the wrong accent”
(1993, p. 147). Defects such as these, he agrees, are unfortunate and may
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detract from our self-esteem, but they are not blameworthy since they do not
violate moral values. Moral shame, by contrast, “is supposedly caused by the
realization that we are in some respect morally deficient” (Kekes, 1993, p.
.145). Kekes cites cowardice, lying, and hurtful behavior as examples of
morally blameworthy acts (p. 145).
In the Rawlsian scheme natural shame is “placed outside of morality”
because it involves no choice (p. 146); but, Kekes takes a broader perspective.
For him, morality is “concerned with living good lives, and there are many
constituents about good lives about which we have no choice” (p. 146). These,
he suggests, include the absence of social and personal handicaps. It is to a
person’s advantage to live in a society hospitable to his aspirations and
endeavors, and to be blessed with the possession of the native endowments
included in Rawls’s natural excellences (e.g., wit, beauty, gracefulness). For
Kekes, since natural disabilities frustrate aspirations to lead a good life, these
disadvantages have moral implications. “The fact is...we find some aspect of
our fives deficient. Shame is thus a moral feeling because morality has to do
with living good fives” (p. 147)
Gabriele Taylor objects to the natural / moral distinction if the charge is
these can be distinguished structurally. In all shame experiences, she claims,
“the agent is seen as deviating from some norm, and in feeling shame he will
identify with the audience’s view” (1985, p. 57). The verdict that the agent
accepts, in every case of shame, is that the agent has lost status. Taylor does
not dispute shame can take different forms, just that they can not be
distinguished structurally. Kekes makes a stronger claim. All episodes of
shame have a moral dimension since each occurrence detracts from the
project of leading a good life (1988,1993).
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It is not easy to be clear about precisely where the disagreement lies.
Rawls explicitly recognizes that “we tend to be ashamed of...defects in our
person and failures in our actions” which negatively affect our aims (p. 444).
Kekes seems to say exactly this when he comments “defects and failures may
exist independently of our choices...(so) shame is...an experience of failure, but
it may or may not be culpable failure” (p. 146). By assigning culpability to
some episodes of failure and not to others, Kekes appears committed to
endorsing the natural / moral distinction.
Rawls is careful to distinguish those defects that we bring about from
those that are visited upon us. But of the episodes of shame for which we
assume responsibility, Rawls implies that only those that frustrate our
chosen aspirations are morally significant. An individual can insulate himself
to many shame experiences by adjusting his aspirations and by the selection
of his associations. “What counts”, Rawls proposes, “is that the the internal
life of these associations is suitably adjusted to the abilities and wants of those
belonging to them” (1971, p. 441).
Moral or natural shame therefore takes on a remarkable subjectivity in
a Rawlsian scheme. As Martha Craven Nussbaum remarks, this view is
counter-intuitive.

According to this account, apparently, a position that is not felt
as shameful is not so. And if you feel your life plan to be a worthy
one and feel confident that you can carry it out, that appears
sufficient to make you a person of self-respect. Rawls thus
implicitly denies that the objective...value of my pursuits and the
truth of my beliefs about them are at all relevant to the issue of
self-respect and shame (1980, p. 398).
Kekes’s view goes to the other extreme with his claim that all shame is
morally significant. In Facing Evil. Kekes develops an elaborate theory of good
and evil in which he classifies unchosen actions (which allegedly involve no
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choice) as among those acts that may legitimately considered morally wrong.
These, he suggests, include acts that emanate from settled dispositions to act
in particular ways in certain situations. An important point in Kekes’s
argument is that the contributing factors in the constitution of a settled
disposition need not be the result of personal choice.

Customs, laws, rules, ceremonies, and rituals may be evil in a derivative
way if conformity to or participation in them causes much undeserved
harm (1990, p. 48).
An illustration of such acts might be the various harms a klansman
inflicts upon minorities. Many of these harms may not be thoughtfully chosen
but rather manifest characteristically from a settled disposition of intolerance
acquired in the klansman’s racist upbringing. In Kekes’s theory, then, appeal
to a misguided education or an “unchosen” status does not absolve someone of
moral responsibility for committing evil deeds. In Kekes’s theory the
klansman ought to be ashamed of his beliefs and of the actions that emanate
from these beliefs. This is a complex concept, but much of it seems right. In
assessing the level of responsibility for one’s actions and also for having
certain emotions, Justin Oakley offers an important insight.

In determining whether a person is responsible for something
which they cannot simply at will prevent themselves from doing
or having, what we should consider is how they came to be in a
position where their doing or having it is now unavoidable (1992,
p. 129).
In “Shame and Moral Progress” Kekes appeals to this point in order to
justify investing all shame experiences with a moral dimension.
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The distinction (of moral and natural shame) becomes
untenable...since the distinction rests on the assumption that
morality and choice coincide. Since the objects of natural shame
are not chosen...natural shame (in Rawls’s theory) is placed
outside of morality (p. 285)
Kekes’s point seems to be to impress upon his readers that the impact
upon our lives of natural shame can be just as debilitating as moral shame as
both detract from the project of leading a good life. And that which contributes
to or detracts from leading a good life is a moral consideration. But this does
not make the distinction untenable. Kekes’s objection to separate natural and
moral categories relies on the effects of the shame, not on the specific grounds
that identifies an agent’s moral responsibility for a particular failure or
transgression. He makes his objection stronger.

Whether we feel ashamed depends on the fact that we have
violated some value of ours and not on whether the violation was
due to innate or acquired, voluntary or involuntary, accidental or
cultivated causes...(Shame) understands only success and failure;
the language of motive, intention, and effort, the consideration of
causes, obstacles, and odds are foreign to it. (1988, p. 146).

Many notions in this quotation seem wrong. Kekes’s primary error
might be traced back to an equivocation. At one point Kekes invests shame
with cognition, affect, and desire. Yet, at another time, he asserts shame only
understands success or failure and claims shame is “a primitive, inexorable
feeling* (1988, p. 286). Clearly an emotion with cognitive and appetitive
properties understands more than that one has failed. If moral shame is a
response to failing to approximate the better self, an agent will be well aware
of the sincerity of his motives and effort. And ‘intention’ is the very “index of
seriousness” that Kekes himself ascribes to shame.
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Secondly, it does not seem plausible that all episodes of natural shame
will affect an agent’s conception and acquisition of the good life. People
deprived of some of the blessings of good natural fortune are not necessarily
dissuaded from their important life goals. A person need not be handsome, a
witty conversationalist, or have other admirable social skills to be a successful
surgeon or an astronaut. For example, a surgeon may occasionally feel
ashamed of his blundering, awkward bedside manner and also of the
discomfort his physical unattractiveness creates in some situations. At the
same time, aware of his intentions, his extraordinary efforts, and his motives
to heal the sick, he accepts and views these unpleasant moments as quite
inconsequential. The surgeon may indeed be ashamed of his lack of natural
excellences, but these in no significant way detract from his important
commitments and accomplishments.
In conclusion, a distinction of natural and moral shame seems
legitimate. Not every episode of natural shame need be infused with moral
considerations. By the same token, it seems equally wrong to accept Rawls’s
proposal that the process of electing personal aspirations will thereby
designate the parameters for moral shame experiences. It is clearly an
indefensible position to suggest that murder, theft, or adultery are not
shameful if an agent does not feel ashamed after committing one of these
acts. A report such as this entails an incorrect belief, a morally objectionable
object, and a deficient sense of affectivity.
Kekes is correct to assign moral significance to shame. It has been
objected that the range of cases he allows is too broad. The literature on
shame is equally split on the issue of significance. In an attempt to propose
shame’s proper moral significance, let us turn to some representative and
conflicting views.
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The Significance of Shame

The claim that shame can be conditionally good means roughly that the
emotion can contribute in some positive way to the future conduct and/or to
the character of an agent. Inasmuch as shame is widely, if not universally,
recognized as a painful, self-directed feeling of diminishment, for an author to
propose that shame might be instrumentally good seems sufficient
justification to categorize that writer as holding a qualified positive attitude
toward the emotion. According to this scheme, alternative positions can be
classified as neutral or negative. In this section we will review representative
views from each category, consider the various strengths and weaknesses in
the respective positions, and conclude with a proposal suggesting shame has
moral significance.

The Negative View: Isenberg’s Argument

In Natural Pride and Natural Shame. Arnold Isenberg characterizes
shame as “misery heaped upon miseries” (1980, p. 365) and “an enduring
curse” (p. 366). Isenberg’s argument hinges upon the notion of
“reasonableness”. Pride, he suggests, is reasonable since it is “the pleasure of
reflecting upon what one has already accomplished, (and it) reinforces the
incentive to acts of the same kind” (p. 360). Citing Spinoza, Isenberg asserts
pride is synonymous with “self-satisfaction, the pleasure arising from the
contemplation of oneself...the greatest good for which we can hope’” (p. 361).
The analysis of shame, Isenberg writes, “runs parallel to the analysis of
pride” (p. 365). However, since he offers no specific definition, we may assume
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Isenberg accepts pride’s definition to be suitably adjusted for shame. That
would read: Shame is: 1) a quality; 2) which is disapproved (or considered
undesirable); and, 3) is judged to belong to oneself (p. 357). This definition is
supported by the text. Regarding shame, Isenberg offers the following
comments.

Shame is the feeling that comes with the consciousness of faults,
weaknesses, disadvantages - that is qualities deemed undesirable.
Most of these qualities, like deformity, ugliness, and vice, already
entail suffering by their very nature, so that shame is a misery
heaped upon miseries (p. 365, underlining added).
Isenberg acknowledges the position that suggests shame is potentially
beneficial in that it is necessarily connected with “standards of rectitude” (p.
374). Without a conception of the right and the good, the notion of shame
would be unintelligible. And Isenberg accepts Spinoza’s observation that it is
preferable to be an ashamed man than to be a wicked and shameless man
(1980). But shame and regret, Isenberg argues “cannot be sanctioned just
because it testifies to something good: the question is whether it accomplishes
anything good” (p. 374). On this point, Isenberg is unequivocal.

(Shame and) regret by (themselves) effect nothing...(They) are
literally helpless, for they are concentrated upon what we can do
nothing about, on the past. Hence, they are “passive”,
incompatible with action...Shame...is seen as a price we may pay
for our weaknesses and the attempt to cope with them; and
morbidity...is the evidence...of the inability to act (p. 375).
Since shame is powerless to effect positive change, but rather leads to
“despondency”, to “morbidity”, and to directionless “brooding”, it is
unreasonable to be ashamed of our weaknesses and of our vices (p. 374-5).
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It is as unreasonable to tolerate the sear of shame upon the spirit
as it is to permit a wound to fester in the body. There is no such
thing as a right amount of shame, as there is a right kind and
amount of pride. Every shame, however circumscribed, must go
(p. 369).
When feeling proud, on the other hand, we are encouraged to perform similar
acts as those that have elicited pride. Unlike shame, it is, therefore, a
reasonable emotion (p. 367).
Isenberg makes two separate claims in his analysis of shame. First, he
claims that shame invariably makes a state of affairs worse, never better.
Shame is a misery in reaction to a quality or vice that causes us misery.
Second, Isenberg claims that every shame is passive, incapable with
motivating action, and literally helpless to bring about reformative or positive
change. In us, shame festers ineffectually. Both these views, it seems to me,
are false.
In order to refute Isenberg’s first claim, it will require a discussion of two
different principles regarding how elements interact in a state of affairs. So,
let us turn now to Isenberg’s first claim, that shame is misery upon misery.

Two Wavs to Calculate the Instumental Value of Pain

The claim to be defended here is that Isenberg is wrong to assert that
shame always makes a state of affairs worse. To substantiate this objection
requires an understanding of the concept of shame as a part of a whole.
Isenberg’s point is that with the inclusion of shame into a wider state of
affairs, the whole is therefore invariably worse.
There are two relevant and conflicting theories of how parts contribute
to the value of a whole. One is explained by the principle of summation. This,
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it seems clear, is how Isenberg understands shame to contribute to a state of
affairs. The other theory is the principle of organic unities. This, it seems
equally clear, is the proper way to understand shame’s contribution as a part
of the whole.
Franz Brentano, in a footnote in his article “The Origin of Our Knowledge
of Right and Wrong”, explains: “The principle (of summation) tells us that if a
feeling is good, then if the feeling is increased, the goodness of the act is
increased” (p. 23). Degrees of bad feelings work similarly. As bad feelings
increase, the badness of the act increases and the intrinsic value of that act
decreases. Likewise as either good and bad feelings decrease, so does the act’s
goodness or badness respectively with the appropriate change in intrinsic
value.
The principle of summation can be defined as follows:

PS: The value of a whole is the same as the sum of the values of the parts.

It is important to note that this principle does not require that the parts
of a whole are static or that their value must remained fixed as in elementary
mathematical addition or subtraction equations. An example of a “fixed
principle of summation” might be this: Let’s assume, S, empties his pocket
and counts his change. He has a quarter, a dime, and a nickel. In all, S has
forty cents. The value of the whole (all the change) is the same as the sum of
the values of the parts (25 + 10 + 5). Regardless of whether S combines the
nickel with more change or spends the quarter and the dime, the nickel’s value
remains the same. The value of each coin is constant; the nickel will always
be worth five cents. Its value, then, is not subject to fluctuation by virtue of

161

the composition of the whole of which the nickel is a part. But this is not the
way Brentano intends us to understand the principle of summation.
As the principle applies to emotions and human conduct the elements of
cognition, affect (pleasure and pain), and desire interact. As they do, the
application of the principle becomes far more complex than the ‘fixed’ version.
To calculate the value of a state of affairs, Brentano establishes some
important distinctions regarding affect. In an analysis of Brentano’s position,
Chisholm summaries these relevant considerations.
We may ask, first, whether the pleasure or displeasure is correct
or incorrect. We may ask, secondly, about the quality of the
intentional object. Is it a pleasure (or displeasure) in the good, in
the bad, or in the indifferent? And we may ask, finally, whether it
is true or false (Chisholm, 1986, p. 67)
Two seemingly uncontroversial principles, and ones that Brentano
believes to be true, are: Pleasure, in and of itself, is good; pain, in and of itself, is
bad (1986). However, regarding pleasure in the bad, Brentano writes:
“Pleasure in the bad,...to the extent that it is...an incorrect emotion...is
something that is bad...Better that there be no pleasure at all than pleasure in
the bad” (p. 65).
In an explication of Brentano’s position, Chisholm illustrates this idea
with an example pertinent to this study.

Aristotle says that “shamelessness - not to be ashamed of doing
bad actions - is bad”. Suppose I believe I have performed an evil
deed and I contemplate what I take to be this deed. The
contemplation of this deed... will not in itself be bad; we may say
that it is neutral...Consider now that the neutral state of affairs
that is my not being ashamed of that which I contemplate. If we
combine these two neutrals we arrive at that bad state that is
failure to be ashamed at the contemplation of one’s misdeed
(Chisholm, 1986, pp. 84-5, underlining added).
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So it appears that Brentano has run into difficulty. If he intends to
claim that as a bad feeling increases, the badness of the larger state of affairs
(of which the bad feeling is a part) increases proportionally, then he appears to
have committed himself to endorsing conflicting principles. In combining these
two ideas, we arrive at the unfortunate conclusion that if we increase the
pleasure in the bad, since it is pleasure, then the goodness of the act will
increase and, since the intentional object is wrong (some bad from which the
agent derives pleasure) the badness of the act also increases.
Let us take a simple example to illustrate the difficulty. Let’s consider
S, a young boy, intentionally inflicts some pain upon a dog. Here are some, but
not all, of the features of this state of affairs. S commits an act of cruelty, S
has an emotional reaction to this act, and the dog experiences some pain. For
simplicity in this discussion, let us assign some arbitrary numerical values.
These could be:

Ex. 1: The act of cruelty (-10); An emotional response of shamelessness (0);
The pain to the dog (- 5)
The value of this state of affairs, according to the principle of
summation, is (-15). Now consider the emotional response of taking pleasure
in the infliction of pain upon the dog. Here, the emotional response might equal
(+10), for, as Brentano says, pleasure, in and of itself, is good. Now the parts
look like this:

Ex. 2: Cruelty (-10); emotion of pleasure (+10); pain to the dog (- 5).
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This implies the state of affairs in Ex. 2 is preferable to the state of
affairs in Ex. 1, since {- 5 > -15). But, Brentano wants to say that pleasure in
the bad is bad. From the essay “Origins of our Knowledge” he writes:

We prefer joy to sadness - unless it is joy in what is bad. Were
there beings who preferred things the other way around, we would
take their attitudes to be perverse, and rightly so (p. 22).
The difficulty for Brentano is that if he wants to claim that an emotion
has to be correct, then this conflicts with a simple reading of the sum of the
values of the parts. For example 1, although mathematically less, is
intrinsically preferable to example 2. However, example 1 would appear to
have three bad parts, or two bad parts and one neutral part, whereas example
2 has two bad parts and one good part (pleasure). The principle of summation
states that, in example 2, as the cruel boy’s pleasure increases, so does the
goodness of the state of affairs. If, for example, the boy takes immense
pleasure (say, + 50) in the infliction of some pain (- 5), we are left with a state
of affairs of positive intrinsic value ( + 35). This is, of course, a predominately
good state of affairs (pleasure far outweighs pain), but it is clearly a repugnant
conclusion. It seems sensible to conclude that the application of the principle
of summation has run into serious difficulty.
Isenberg’s comments suggest we arrive at a similar conclusion.
Following his argument, this appears to be the result.

Ex. 1: An act of cruelty (-10); shamelessness ( 0 ); pain to the dog (- 5).
Ex. 3: An act of cruelty (-10); shame (- 5);
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pain to the dog (- 5).

Isenberg’s arguments suggests Ex. 1 is intrinsically preferable to Ex. 3.
Mathematically we cannot dispute that shame has made this situation worse.
But this conclusion is problematic. G. E. Moore, in Principia Ethica. offers an
intriguing solution.

Whether the addition of a bad thing to a good whole may increase
the positive value of the whole,...is, at least, possible, and this
possibility must be taken into account in our ethical
investigations. However we may decide particular questions, the
principle is clear (Moore, 1988, p. 28).
The quotation continues with Moore establishing the principle of organic
unities. It is:

POU: “The value of a whole must not be assumed to be the same as the sum
of the values of its parts” (p. 28, italics in original).
In later writings, Brentano appears to have come to accept the theory
of organic unities (Chisholm, 1986, p. 69). In conflict with the principle of
summation, he proposes in particular circumstances that as a bad feeling is
introduced, the value of the whole becomes more positive.

In...”On the good that there is in order or arrangement”, Brentano
says that the evil that is involved in retribution may yet make a
bad situation less bad than it would have been without the
retribution. Wickedness accompanied by sorrow is better than
the same wickedness accompanied by pleasure; this fact,
Brentano suggested, may justify the sorrow that is involved in
repentance...If A is a wicked deed and if B is the suffering involved
in the sinner’s remorse...than the two evils, A and B, may be
preferable to A without B (p. 72, italics added).
The conclusion to consider is that a whole with a bad part can be
preferable to the same whole without that bad part. For what Brentano’s final
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view on organic unities suggests is that shamelessness in reaction to the
infliction of pain is an incorrect emotion. Likewise, if the boy were to justify his
shamelessness with the belief the dog felt no pain, then the shamelessness
component entails a false belief. This, then, expresses how to view the notion
that displeasure in the bad is a better state of affairs than pleasure in the
bad. This requires that we recalculate the values in our examples. To agree
with the principle of organic unities, we might propose this revision.

Ex. 1: an act of cruelty (-10); pain to the dog (-5); shamelessness {no pleasure
or pain (0), incorrect emotion (-10)}
Ex. 2: an act of cruelty (-10); pain to the dog (-5); shame {pain/displeasure
(-5), correct emotion ( +5), true belief (+5)}.
Here, we have an argument that appears to retain the general idea of
the principle of organic unities and one that contains adjusted values which
accommodates shame into a state of affairs that is mathematically
preferable to an alternative without shame. Obviously, we can conclude that
the introduction of shame into a state of affairs does not invariably make that
state of affairs worse. Feeling ashamed for intentionally inflicting pain upon
some innocent is intrinsically and instrumentally preferable to no reaction or a
reaction of pleasure. And this does not, of course, in itself prove nor commit us
to say that shame is good. The intrinsic value of Ex. 2 is (-10). It is only to
say, as does Brentano, that cruelty with shame is preferable to cruelty
without shame.
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Isenberg’s Argument Reconsidered

Providing the above points about the preferability of displeasure in the
bad are true, Isenberg’s argument for the unreasonableness of every shame
fails. For displeasure in the bad is preferable to both a neutral attitude or
deriving pleasure in the bad. For S to admit that he did intentionally inflict the
pain is true. And for S to be displeased is the correct emotion. To think
otherwise is a false belief; to feel otherwise, as argued in our examples of the
profound regret of the taxi driver, is a moral deficiency.
Citing Spinoza, Isenberg himself recognizes it is better to be ashamed of
some wickedness than to be “wicked and shameless” (p. 374,1980). So,
Isenberg recognizes instances when the inclusion of shame in a state of affairs
will be preferable to the emotional response of shamelessness. Isenberg can
still maintain that every episode of shame makes a state of affairs worse. He
need only propose that the same state of affairs with shamelessness is even
worse still. The ‘organic unity argument’ attempts to refute this logic. Either
conclusion, however, can stand independently of whether shame accomplishes
anything good, a qualification Isenberg wants to impose upon calculating
shame’s instrumental value. We will return to second point - that of
accomplishments - in a latter section. The refutation of Isenberg’s second
claim requires substantially more preliminary work.

The Neutral View: Urmson’s Argument

In his provocative and important essay, “Aristotle’s Doctrine of the
Mean”, J. O. Urmson examines the Aristotelian contention that all emotions
167

are legitimate if felt and expressed in the proper degree. Apparent exceptions
to the application of Aristotle’s mean (the triad of excessive /
mean/ deficient expressions of the emotions) are justice, envy, spite, and
shame. Although Aristotle explicitly recognizes shame to accommodate the
triadic scheme, Urmson makes some startling claims to disallow shame’s
inclusion in the Aristotelian table of virtues and vices.14 In that table, Aristotle
proposes the excess of shame to be shyness, the mean to be shame, and the
deficient state to be shamelessness.15
Urmson understands Aristotle to propose all emotions have a appetitive
component (e.g., fear entails the desire for safety, anger entails the desire for
retaliation, etc.). But in the case of shame, Urmson takes Aristotle to suggest
it is “a mere reaction”, an emotion without an element of choice and without
desire (1980, p. 169). Urmson concludes that:

In the case of shame...we seem to be faced with a mere passive
reaction involving no desire. Shame is largely a physiological
reaction...Neither (shame nor rejoicing in the misfortunes of
others) is a motive for action (p. 169).
Urmson concedes that his speculations on Aristotle’s account of shame
may not be “clearly true or clearly what Aristotle had in mind” (p. 169).
Several reasons suggest this account of shame is clearly not what Aristotle
had in mind.
Urmson maintains that shame is: 1) passive; 2) a mere physiological
reaction; 3) motivationless; and, 4) nonappetitive (1980). None of these points
are supported in Aristotle’s texts.
14 See J. A. K. Thomson’s translation of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics (1953) page 104.
15 In The Passions of the Soul. Descartes appears to propose impudence is a excess of
shamelessness. There he defines impudence as a contempt for shame. It is, he says,
“rather a vice opposed to shame and also to pride, inasmuch as these are both good”.
Impudence, he remarks, is especially bad in that it inclines people to disregard the “many
constraints to which honor bound them” with the additional feature of an apparent
deliberate choice to embrace shamelessness (see CSM, pp.401-2).
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Aristotle explicitly refers to shame as an emotion (NE, 1128b20). If the
earlier accounts of an emotion are correct, an appetitive component is a
necessary constituent. To define shame as “a fear of disrepute”
unquestionably implies, negatively, an agent desires to avoid disgrace, if not,
positively, to conduct oneself honorably. So the nonappetitive claim fails as
does the reductive view that shame is a mere physiological reaction. One
cannot engage in self-assessment of honorable and dishonorable conduct
without cognitive operations. If Urmson wants to claim these cognitive
operations precede the physiological reaction of shame and are not a
constituent of it, he encounters the serious problem of how he intends to
distinguish shame from, say, embarrassment or humiliation.
To suggest that shame is motivationless seems clearly to be a
misreading of Aristotle. As a result, Urmson seems to contradict himself as
he attempts to substantiate his interpretation. In the Rhetoric. Aristotle
explicitly says there are many things before those who admire us that the
motivational component of shame “makes us do or leave undone” (1387a7).
Urmson appears aware of this passage for he remarks: “Shame may, indeed,
hold me back from action; but perhaps we have to distinguish a desire not to
do something from an inability to bring oneself to do it” (1980, p. 169).
A defense of Aristotle’s claim of a motivational component could simply
rest on Urmson’s concession that shame “holds me back”. Not wanting to
perform a is reason to perform b (or not a). And, of course, this comment does
not address how Urmson intends to deal with those acts that shame “makes
us do”. But even the notion that we leave things undone from some alleged
“inability” to do them will fail to support Urmson’s claims. The above
quotation is an obscure, if not a muddy, sentence. Somewhat tentatively, I
take it to mean this: shame is not a motive for action if it renders us unable to

169

act. But how are we to understand the notion of being unable to act?
Consider inflicting pain upon children for pleasure and amusement.
Most everyone would be unable to bring themselves to do such a thing. They
have an inability to perform this act. But why? I suggest one reason this is so
is that it is disgraceful behavior. What is shameful is the needless infliction of
pain on a child coupled with perverse enjoyment. But this is not from an
inability to hurt a child in the sense of a physical impossibility. One refrains
from it because there are compelling reasons to minimize suffering in the
world.
A somewhat better illustration of the inability to act is captured in the
tale of George Washington and the cherry tree. It is reported he responded, “I
cannot tell a lie”. A common interpretation is that Washington meant lying is
prohibited, and that which is prohibited cannot be done. But a better
interpretation might be this: Washington meant lying is shameful behavior
and shameful behavior is repugnant to a virtuous man. Since under normal
circumstances virtuous men will not voluntarily elect to do that which they
know to be bad, Washington could not lie. Truthfulness is what morality
requires. If the desire to do what morality requires is strong enough, we might
say a man will be unable to act otherwise. As with inflicting needless pain,
there is no compelling reason for a virtuous man to lie. Lying is repugnant and
no one desires that which he estimates as offensive. In stark contrast to
Urmson’s proposal, here, perhaps, we are justified in being unable “to
distinguish a desire not to do something from an inability to bring oneself to do
it”.
Urmson’s claim might be that it is not desire because it emanates from
a settled disposition not to inflict pain; there is no choice because inflicting pain
is not an alternative we would entertain. To argue this, I think, Urmson would
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have to show that a sense of shame played no part in the formation, and in the
maintenance, of such a disposition. I do not see how this can be done. Or
Urmson’s claim may simply mean that on occasion we find ourselves simply
immobilized. If this is the point, then Urmson should make clear how shame is
the immobilizing factor and not that it can be attributed to confusion,
indecision, a weakness of will, or cowardliness.
As with Isenberg, Urmson’s argument hinges in an important way on an
account of shame that does not recognize a component of desire. This is a
fundamental mistake. To consider this, let’s review Urmson’s final charge
that shame is a neutral emotion because it is “passive”.

The Classification of Emotions as Passive or Active

One common method of distinguishing the emotions is to categorize
them as active or passive. Isenberg considers shame passive because it is
“incompatible with action” (p. 375). Presumably, active emotions are
motivational. John Kekes holds a similar view; shame is passive because it
often “assails” us and it also indicates no direction for us to turn in order to
respond to or rectify the assault (1988). Urmson interprets shame to be a
passive, nonappetitive emotion, a “largely physiological reaction...involving no
desire” (1980, p. 169).
In Morality and the Emotions. Justin Oakley distinguishes an active and
passive categorization by virtue of the nature of the desire in the particular
emotion. Oakley appears to imply that an emotion is active if the component
of desire motivates a public or external performance (as in the making amends
in the case of guilt), whereas passive might imply a solitary reaction of
withdrawal (as in the desire in shame to hide or disappear).
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Anger might be regarded as an active emotion because it involves
the desire to seek out the offender for retaliation, while grief might
be thought a passive emotion because it involves perhaps the
desire to be left alone and for the past to be different (1992,
p. 35).

But neither Isenberg nor Urmson can appeal to the nature of the desire
because, for them, shame entails no desire. Isenberg restricts shame to
reflections on “what we can do nothing about, on the past” (1980, p. 375).
Since no one deliberates about what is unchangeable, shame prompts
“irrelevant acts of atonement” and “despondency” (pp. 374-5).
To relegate shame to the status of a physiological reaction eliminates
the component of desire in Urmson’s account. Here shame is merely an affect
as in the recognition that we are blushing. But, as has been argued, without
desire shame could not be an emotion.
Oakley’s analysis of active and passive emotions necessarily connects
with activity. According to the nature of the act an emotion inspires, Oakley
distinguishes active from passive; one expects exertion from active emotions
and one expects withdrawal or a resigned acceptance from the passive
emotions.
What these accounts overlook is: 1) the Aristotelian insight that a
passive emotion entails a potentiality to be affected in a certain way, and 2)
that feelings not only precede actions but they also follow in the wake of
activity. Both these considerations are explored by L. A. Kosman in “Being
Properly Affected: Virtues and Feelings in Aristotle’s Ethics”.
Kosman tells us that for Aristotle, as for Plato, the questions of moral
philosophy are ones that address how we are to conduct ourselves as well as
how we are to become the type of person for whom proper conduct is second
nature (1980). “The good person is not simply one who behaves a certain way,
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but one who behaves that way out of a certain character” (1980, p. 103).
Clearly, good character requires activity, but Aristotle also recognizes that
how one is affected - how one is acted upon - is an important component in
one’s moral life. So, Aristotle is concerned with “activities for which the
virtues are dispositions of two sorts, actions and feelings” (p. 104).
(Aristotle) views what we would call feelings and emotions as
modes of a subject being acted upon. This fact is further revealed
in the list Aristotle offers us of emotions with which the moral
virtues are concerned and in which there can be excess,
deficiency, and right measure. The majority of items... are
described by passive verbs; in thinking of fear, anger, pleasure or
pain, Aristotle is thinking of being frightened, being angered, being
pleased, being pained (p. 104).
Since his list includes shame, Aristotle must be thinking also of being
ashamed. And the virtues, in Aristotelian terms, are activities broadly
construed as an individual acting as well as being acted upon. Kosman thus
understands Aristotle’s moral theory to be concerned with how to act well and
how to feel well. The moral virtues, Kosman takes Aristotle to be saying, are
states of character that enable a person to exhibit the right kind of emotion
and the right kind of action (1980). The development of a virtuous disposition,
then, necessarily requires a potentiality to feel and to act in the right measure.

The doctrine of passive potentiality enables Aristotle to envision
a state of character by virtue of which an individual has the
power to be affected in certain ways, the capacity to undergo
certain passions and avoid others. A moral virtue with respect to
feelings or emotions is just such a capacity; it is the power to
have and to avoid certain emotions, the ability to discriminate in
what one feels (p. 107).
A sense of shame, then, is a dispositional potentiality to be affected by
past, present, or future honorable and disgraceful behaviors; shamelessness is
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an inability to be acted upon by disgraceful behaviors. A passive emotion, in
the sense of being receptive to certain affections, is, for Aristotle, a power. To
say, as Aristotle tells us in the Metaphysics, that oil is burnable is to ascribe
to oil a potential to be affected in a specific way (Kosman, 1980).
Similarly, regarding actions and feelings, Aristotle is suggesting that a
virtuous person has developed his or her capacities to be affected in specific
ways. A moral virtue with respect to feelings “is the power to have and to
avoid certain emotions, the ability to discriminate in what one feels” (1980, p.
107). Kosman thus enables us to understand in a new way a famous passage
from Aristotle.

It is easy to get angry - anyone can do that...but to feel or act
towards the right person to the right extent at the right time for
the right reason in the right way - that is not easy...Hence to do
these things is a rare, laudable and fine achievement (1109a2628).
With the properly tuned potentiality, a person acts out of anger with
respect to the correct measure of feeling. Kosman points out with respect to
courage and fear, it is not that courage as a virtue disposes us to merely feel
fear in certain ways, or circumstances, or to some specific degree, “but rather
that it disposes us to certain actions with respect to and in light of our fear”
(1980, p. 108). A virtuous agent has developed his powers to feel in the right
measure which then enables one to act or respond appropriately to the
occasion.
The rich and complex notion of feelings that follow in the wake of actions
has also been largely overlooked. Here passive potentiality plays an equally
important role. Shame is often characterized as exclusively backward-looking
(Borysenko, 1990). Many discussions halt further examination after
proposing shame is a primitive and bad feeling that one has when reflecting on
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a failure (Bradshaw, 1988). Others classify it as a blow to one’s self-esteem
(Rawls, 1971). Warnings are then issued about dwelling on these feelings
(Isenberg, 1980). Alternative reactions are occasionally suggested (Kekes,
1988,1993). But here again the notion of passive potentiality benefits our
understanding as it sheds new light on another frequently paraphrased section
from Aristotle.

The virtues we do acquire by first exercising them.. Anything
that we have to learn to do we learn by the actual doing of it...we
become just by performing just acts, temperate by performing
temperate ones, brave by performing brave ones (1103a30-b2).

Aristotle is not suggesting that a child acquires a brave disposition by
performing one act of bravery nor is he suggesting, in a strict sense, that we
choose our feelings. As Kosman notes: “we do not decide to be virtuous and
straightaway become so” (1980, p. 111). It would be more accurate to
understand Aristotle to say that after an act of bravery, the child “feels”
brave and recognizes that feeling as pleasurable and correct. Kosman
addresses this point elegantly.

On this view the structure of becoming virtuous with respect to
feelings reveals itself to be of the following sort: one recognizes
through moral education what would constitute appropriate and
correct ways to feel in certain circumstances. One acts in ways
that are naturally associated with and will “bring about” those
very feelings, and eventually the feelings become, as Aristotle
might have said, second nature; that is one develops states of
character that dispose one to have the right feelings at the right
time...although we may in some narrow sense not be responsible
for our feelings, we are responsible for our character as the
dispositional source of those feelings (p. 112).
Viewed in this way the notion of a passive emotion becomes more
complex. It is a power, a potential to be affected in certain ways. So in
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deliberating how one should act an agent includes in his calculations how he
should feel toward the alternatives and how he will feel after each
alternative. A sense of shame influences the formation of an agent's
disposition and the agent’s perception of how he or she will feel with respect to
future conduct. One reason shamelessness is bad is that it is a lack of this
potential to correctly respond to disgraceful behavior. When we regrettably
marvel at the remorselessness displayed by serious criminals, part of our
reaction is puzzlement at how they can lack this potential to be ashamed.
And without the anticipation of an adverse reaction, shame’s power to restrain
immoral behavior is seriously hampered. On this reading we can guard
against the hasty reduction of passive emotions to be merely affect. The
agent sensitive to being “acted upon” in the right way, at the right time, and to
the right degree engages cognition, affect and desire. And although shame
may be characterized as passive, the influence this feeling has upon the agent
cannot be divorced from how he intends to conduct himself in the future.
Viewed in this way, the categorization of passive and active emotions can be
misleading; the ‘passive’ emotion of shame has an active component which
can be just as motivational as that found in anger.
Isenberg’s and Urmson’s theories of shame suffer from a neglect of
passive potentiality. This notion undermines Isenberg’s second claim of the
inability of shame to motivate action. In deliberating about alternative
courses of action, an agent naturally considers how he “will be” and how he
“will feel” in the wake of these various alternatives. These considerations,
contrary to Isenberg’s protests, seem perfectly “reasonable”. This limitation
also infects the elaborate theory of shame proposed by John Kekes. Let us
turn to that now.
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A Qualified Positive View: Kekes’s Argument

With the publication of “Shame and Moral Progress” in 1988, John
Kekes introduced a scholarly and persuasive theory of moral shame. His
through analysis accommodates what has been argued to be the essential
components of an emotion: affect, cognition and desire.

In its affective aspect, shame is a painful self-directed feeling; in
its cognitive aspect, it is a self-conscious detached comparison
yielding the conclusion that we are in some way deficient because
we have fallen short of some value we regard as important; and in
its moral aspect, we feel the importance of the value we have
violated because our conception of a good life requires that we
should have lived up to it (1988, p. 286).
Kekes’s acknowledges “the occurrence of shame is always significant”
(p. 286). Defining shame as “a response to the realization that we have fallen
short of some value we regard as important”, Kekes considers shame to be “an
index of the seriousness we feel about our values” (1993, p. 142). An individual
incapable of feeling shame is so because he or she fails to attach any
importance to standards, and Kekes proposes, as does Plato, that such
individuals are, therefore, “apt to lack moral restraint” (1988, p. 282). Shame,
for Kekes, is a sign of serious commitments, as well as an impetus for
honoring those commitments since violations “painfully lowers our opinion of
ourselves” (p. 282). With Rawls, Kekes believes by failing to live up to a
certain conception of a good life, “our self-respect may suffer and we...come to
feel shame” (p. 285).
Kekes’s analysis also accounts for the sophisticated viewpoint of a
detached-observer. An agent views an action of his as others might “and we
accept their actual or hypothetical assessment” (p. 283). As with Taylor
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(1985) and Williams (1993), Kekes considers the notion that shame
necessarily requires an audience to be a “general mistake” (p. 284). “What is
essential for shame is to detach ourselves from what we are, have, or do to the
extent that we can view it as falling short of some standard” (p. 284). Kekes
explicitly acknowledges the possibility of public manifestations of shame, but
he also recognizes occasions for shame when there is no one there to observe
us. For Kekes, shame, unlike humiliation, can emanate from either the
operations of external exposure or from internal, solitary insights.
Another impressive feature of Kekes’s analysis is his distinction of
shame categories. From his recognition of an agent’s commitment to
standards combined with a detached-observer status, he distinguishes three
shame-types: propriety-shame, honor-shame, and worth-shame (1988,1993).
Each shame-type involves a different cognitive operation and a different
perspective from the audience.
In propriety-shame, standards set by appearances count against us.
Here I feel shame when I am seen naked, in tattered clothes, or unwashed.
Honor-shame “is consequent on having made standards of appearances
definitive of our honor” (p. 290). We might say, as in a shame culture, “image
is character”. Here the appearance of bravery, of self-control, or of honesty

will outweigh the intrinsic value of these qualities. I am ashamed to give the
appearance of acting cowardly, not to have been cowardly. Detection by some
external source elicits honor-shame. The last category, worth-shame, is
independent of appearances. “Worth-shame is caused by a culpable failure to
live up to private standards” (p. 290). Worth-shame is occasioned when public
or private standards that an agent believes to be valid are violated although
no one need be aware of the violation.
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In propriety-shame, we care about appearances; in honorshame, we care about appearing as we are; in worth-shame, we
care about being in a certain way and do not care about
appearances. The progress is from caring about how we seem to
caring about how we are (p. 290).
As the title of his article suggests, Kekes is concerned with moral
progress, and the movement of one shame-type to the next is evidence of this
kind of progress. Worth-shame attaches to a conception of “a better self”, the
abstracted ideal to which one aspires independent of appearances or public
influence (1993, p. 143). But, unlike Isenberg, although Kekes attaches moral
significance to shame, his account, like that of Isenberg, ultimately argues
against it. From the chapter “The Prospects for Moral Progress”, a revision of
his 1988 article, Kekes succinctly remarks that: “the reasons against shame
outweigh the reasons for it” (The Morality of Pluralism. 1993, p. 142).
Kekes suggests various reasons to justify his negative view of shame.
Shame, for Kekes, is “likely to be self-destructive” (1988, p. 282). Not only
does shame alert us to our shortcomings, it makes “feel deficient on account of
them (1993, p. 142).

(Shame) tends to undermine our confidence, verve, and
courage...Thus it...jeopardizes the possibility of improvement by
weakening the only agency capable of effecting it (1988, p. 282).
Kekes further disallows the potentially beneficial forward-looking and
the backward-looking aspects of shame.

If the alleged protection of shame is backward looking, concerning
a wrong we have already done, then I fail to see how it can protect
the self from “corruption and ultimately from extinction” For
such corruption as there is has already set in due to the wrong we
have done (p. 292).
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And the claim that a sense of shame might encourage us “to leave
(disgraceful) things undone" is dismissed.

If (shame) is forward-looking, it is supposed to protect us from
doing wrong in the future. But it cannot be shame...since...the
wrong is in the future, so we have nothing yet to be ashamed
about. The best that can be said is that the protection is
provided by fear of shame, not by shame itself... And if we have
fear as deterrent, then fear of punishment or fear of loss of love,
respect, or status may serve just as well as fear of shame (1993,
p. 155).
After disallowing shame to entail a future-orientated protective feature,
Kekes lists what he considers to be several viable alternatives to the fear of
shame. These alternatives presumably do not carry with them the
debilitating qualities of shame. These, Kekes suggests, are: “anger at
ourselves, resolution to improve, the desire to make amends, and a quest for
understanding why we did what we regarded as wrong” (p. 292).
Having proposed viable alternatives to feeling shame, Kekes encourages
us to focus on “our conception of a good life”, rather than to “respond to our
moral failure by dwelling on the deficiency that produced it” (p. 294). This is
reminiscent of Isenberg’s portrayal of shame as “brooding over our infirmities”
in the throes of “self-flagellation” (Isenberg, 1980, pp. 374-5). Kekes even
metaphorically likens shame to the medieval medical practice of administering
poison to counteract illness (1988, p. 291). This reminds one of Isenberg’s
“misery upon misery” characterization. For both Kekes and Isenberg,
ultimately “there is nowhere for shame to go. Like a vermin it eats deeper and
deeper into the soul” (p. 289).
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Comments on Kekes’s Argument

John Kekes’s analysis of shame is comprehensive and has appeal. He
avoids several analytical errors that infect some of the earlier accounts
reviewed. Kekes acknowledges each of the necessary components of the
emotion of shame and assigns many of the proper attributes to them. Most
important, he recognizes shame’s elements of cognition and desire. With his
explanation of worth-shame, Kekes avoids the mistakes of relegating shame
to mere affect or of confining shame to merely an external operation. Worthshame entails the idealized and abstracted detached-observer audience.
A central feature of Kekes’s account is to propose an alternative
response to shame that will be more conducive to moral progress. Rather
than dwelling on our failures - which “undermines our control, reduces the
chances of moral reform, and weakens the seir - Kekes suggests an agent
redirect his concentration to that of the goal of living a good life (1993, p. 157).
But the fundamental problem with Kekes’s account seems to be that his
objections to shame’s possible effects do not align coherently with what his
analysis proposes to be worth-shame’s attributes.
Moral progress is alleged to occur as an agent evolves from a proprietyshame to worth-shame. Prevailing conventions and external appearances
give way to a personal sense of values to which an agent is committed. These
values then become definitive of that agent’s conception of the good life (1993).
“This is why his estimate of his own worth was connected to his values, and
this is why shame, worth-shame, could follow from his violation of them” (p.
152). Given this, it is difficult to understand Kekes’s easy dismissal of the
protective feature of a forward-looking sense of shame. If an agent is
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knowledgeable about and concerned with how he “ought to be” rather than how
he appears, then he believes that to act in one way and not another will
approximate the “better self5. To act contrary to this conception of the
abstracted ideal would bring about shame and disgrace. And this the agent
wants to avoid. So, a sense of shame is significant in that it is a recognition of
how honorable conduct constitutes and enables an agent to lead a good life.
Kekes’s suggested alternatives to the fear of disgrace simply do not
accommodate the sophisticated cognition and desires of worth-shame. To fear
the loss of status or respect speaks to a concern with appearances and public
recognition, not worth. The fear of punishment is no moral concern at all. In
order to avoid public censure, an agent can act in accordance with prevailing
conventions that he knows to be morally repugnant. Here an agent might
voluntarily do moral wrong in order to avoid public reprisals. This motivation
is irreconcilable with a “worth-shame” conception of a better self. What is
perplexing is that Kekes appears to recognize this.

If we fail, we are ashamed because we are dishonored. We are
dishonored by giving the wrong impression, but it is honor, not the
impression, that we care about...worth-shame is independent of
appearance. It is caused by our culpable failure to live up to
private commitments (p. 153).
To concede this, it is puzzling why Kekes would propose a fear of loss of
love, respect, or status to be a preferable substitute reaction to feeling
ashamed. Fear of these former eventualities apply to individuals motivated
by propriety and honor. By his own lights Kekes acknowledges that an agent
at a worth-shame stage will be discriminatingly unreceptive to appearances
for motivating virtuous conduct.
Kekes dismissal of the potentially beneficial aspect of the backward¬
looking feature of shame is equally troubling. Kekes neglects to address how
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an agent develops from propriety-shame to worth-shame but he does
recognize, “Nobody wants to feel shame; we are assailed by it. Shame
happens to us” (p. 157). When it does, why would it not indicate an alternative
direction to pursue? Since I did act a, and now feel ashamed, would I not
contemplate alternatives b or c for some similar future occasion. Second, if
shame assails us, it seems possible, on some occasions, that it is alerting us to
some course of action to which we gave too little thought. This seems to be
the spirit of Aristotle’s remarks that adolescents “living as they do under the
sway of feelings, they often make mistakes, but are restrained by modesty”
(1128bl8). Kekes readily admits that “shamelessness is bad and self-respect
is good” (p. 155). But, two reasons shamelessness is bad are the agent
neglects to acknowledge the moral dimension of his conduct - as Kekes says he
is apt to lack restraint - and that, passively, the agent is improperly affected.
In this regard, shame sensitizes the agent. To be assailed by something
suggests the agent had no particular idea of how the consequences of his
behavior would reflect upon him. This seems to me to be a common sense
view of how children come to learn some things. Motivated by anger or
frustration they strike out and only later do they recognize the extent of the
injury they cause. If and how they respond and adjust their future conduct is
evidence of moral progress.
The objection that a backward-looking shame is powerless since
corruption has already set in is simply too extreme. An isolated failure is not a
sign of an unreformably corrupt disposition. On the contrary, to be unaffected
by an isolated failure indicates the potential for corruptibility.
Kekes proposed alternatives to shame are equally unconvincing and
they also signal a misalignment with worth-shame. The alternatives Kekes
t

proposes are anger at ourselves, a desire to make amends, resolution to
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improve, and an effort to understand our undesirable behavior. If Kekes
recognizes an elevated sense of shame to transcend appearances, where no
one need observe us, to whom do we make amends? What motivates the
desire to make amends if this is not preceded by a pained recognition of a
failure or a transgression? And how is anger at ourselves preferable to shame?
How does one retaliate against oneself? How does retaliation suggest moral
progress? Retaliation implies someone deserves some level of suffering for a
past transgression. Nothing in the concept of retaliation entails the notion
that the suffering required is to be rehabilitative. Furthermore, if Kekes
attributes desire to shame, how does that exclude a “resolution to improve”?
Would not an agent able to feel worth-shame be so precisely because he
desires to improve? Pained by the discrepancy between his present self and
his conception of a better self, he desires to reform or eliminate his
shortcomings so as to more closely approximate the better self. Finally, anger
and amends have traditionally attached to guilt and the resolution to improve
attaches to repentance. So, there is nothing new in these alternatives.
Kekes’s project should make clear how they are also to attach to shame
without further blurring the distinctions between these emotions. Nowhere
does he undertake such a project. A comprehensive analysis of worth-shame
should address these questions specifically.
Kekes begins and ends his article with a reference to the alleged
disagreement between Plato (who attaches moral significance to shame) and
Aristotle (who presumably does not). On two occasions Kekes reminds us to
think carefully about Aristotle’s remark, “If shamelessness is bad...that does
not make it good to be ashamed” (p. 142; p. 155). For Kekes this statement
constitutes the gulf between Plato and Aristotle. Aristotle’s complete
sentence, from J. A. K Thompson’s translation, reads as follows:
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Although shamelessness, that is, not being ashamed to do what
is disgraceful, is a bad thing, it does not follow any the more from
this that to be ashamed if one behaves disgracefully is a good
thing (1128b31-33).
Aristotle immediately goes on to remark: “In the same way continence is not
to be regarded as altogether a virtue either; it is sort of combination of virtue
with something else” (1128b34). Aristotle establishes a hierarchy of states of
character: temperapt, continent, incontinent, and intemperant (Ethics. Book
VII). Temperance is preferable to continence because a temperate man
desires to do the right thing and does it. The continent man struggles with
conflicting desires and succeeds in choosing the morally correct alternative.
The incontinent man struggles and fails. Aristotle’s analogy seems
appropriate since the intemperate man desires to do the disgraceful, does so,
and, in all likelihood, is shameless. With the connection of shame to
continence, Aristotle’s point may be that to struggle with conflicting desires is
not ideal. An agent has yet to develop a character from which good acts
emanate characteristically. Aristotle is clear that he regards intemperance
as bad, but that does not commit him to suggest that the struggle with the
desire to do disgraceful acts - whatever the outcome - is good. And it is in this
manner that he considers continence and a sense of shame to be qualified
goods: they contain bad parts but are preferable to the alternatives of
intemperance and shamelessness respectively. Here the point is is that the
best and worst states of character contain no struggle with vice. Better to
struggle than to desire to do disgraceful acts and to lack the passive potential
to be affected by disgracefulness.
It seems plausible that Kekes has not only misunderstood the intent of
Aristotle’s comment but that he also errs in a comparison between two
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comments that have a temporal distinction. Regarding the time element,
Plato’s comments refer to shame’s beneficial property in assessing possible
courses of future action; Aristotle’s comment refers to a reaction to a deed
performed.
To dispel the notion that a legitimate disagreement on this point exists
with Plato, Kekes might refer instead to the following passage from Aristotle’s
Ethics. In this passage, the element of time for Aristotle coincides with the
time element in the quotation Kekes selects from Plato.
The passage from Aristotle reads:

(Lectures on ethics) are incapable of impelling the masses
towards human perfection. For it is the nature of many to be
ruled by fear rather than by shame, and to refrain from evil not
because of the disgrace, but because of the punishments
(1179b7-14).
For Aristotle, then, a love of virtue and the worth-shame stage are rare
and desirable. Recall Aristotle explicitly refers to shame as a fear of disgrace
applicable to the past, the present, or the future (see the Rhetoric. 1383b).
Referring back to a previous example, the meaning of Aristotle’s
comment that it is not good to be ashamed of a disgraceful deed might more
accurately be portrayed in the following fist. In assessing the intrinsic value of
states of affairs, the order of Aristotelian preferability is:

Ex. 1: an act of kindness (+10);
Ex. 2: an act of cruelty (-10);
Ex. 3 an act of cruelty (-10);

pride (+5).
shame (-5).
shamelessness (-10).

The temperant man and the continent man both perform the act of
kindness. A temperant agent is unconflicted; he wants to perform the
kindness and he does. The continent man, by contrast, is tom. Some feature
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of the cruel act is perceived as being pleasurable and the continent man does
not want to forego an alternative act that contains some episode of pleasure.
But reason succeeds over an appetitive leaning. The continent man comes to
believe what the temperant man knows: higher pleasures accompany virtue.
The incontinent man struggles with these same desires and loses. The desire
for the wrong pleasure overwhelms. The intemperate man, cognizant of the
pleasurable aspect of the cruel act and ignorant of the higher goods in an act of
kindness, is unconflicted. Shamelessly and remorselessly, he performs the
cruel act.
Aristotle is not suggesting it is a good state of affairs to have performed
a disgraceful act; it seems clear he is suggesting only that is better to be
ashamed if one does rather than to be unaffected. The struggle with
conflicting desires are the “something else” that is mixed with continence and
the restraining power of shame. Ideally, for Aristotle, the right act effortlessly
emanates from a settled disposition. Let us revise the chart to accommodate
this interpretation

1. (Temperance) An unconflicted act of kindness (+10) Pride (+5)
2. (Continence)
A conflicted act of kindness (+5) Pride (+3)
3. (Incontinence) A conflicted act of cruelty (- 5) Shame ( +1)
4. (Intemperance) An unconflicted act of cruelty (-10) Shamelessness (-10)
Now the intrinsic value of an unconflicted act of virtue (Ex. 1) takes
precedence over the struggle with vice (Ex. 2) although, in both instances, a
good act is eventually performed. As we see in the value of pride in continence,
the agent is aware that he has been susceptible to temptation clouding his
reason. This detracts from the pleasure. More than conflicted thoughts
plague the incontinent man; he loses to the pull of a wrong-headed desire. But
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in feeling some disgrace, Aristotle seems to clearly imply, the continent and
the incontinent have a chance at reformation. The intemperant man is
beyond repair. Aristotle can hold without contradiction that it is preferable to
exhibit a potential for reform than not (e.g. - 4 > -20), together with the notion
that to have performed a disgraceful deed is not good. For better still to be
virtuous. But nowhere does Aristotle suggest a sense of shame is intrinsically
bad. Again, without contradiction, he can maintain that shame is
conditionally good although the whole state of affairs (understood as a complex
organic unity) that entails a disgraceful act and a shameful reaction is not
predominately good (e.g. - 4).
If this interpretation is correct, then Kekes is mistaken to suggest that
on this point there is a disagreement between Plato and Aristotle.
To summarize, Kekes attributes moral significance to shame. However,
his eventual discounting of shame is unpersuasive. He suggests untenable
alternatives, he relies for support on a misinterpretation of a passage from
Aristotle, his general classification of all shame as psychologically debilitating
is too extreme, and his objections to the potentially beneficial aspects of
shame do not accord with his development of a sense of shame through his
shame-types.
In conclusion, Kekes recognizes the significance of shame - it is an index
of an agent’s serious commitment to standards and values. But he proposes
alternative responses because he questions the conditionally good status of
shame. Let us turn to two views of shame that do not share Kekes’s
reservations, those of Gabriele Taylor and Bernard Williams.
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Positive Views: Tavlor and Williams

Of all of the accounts of shame that John Kekes is aware, he considers
Isenberg’s and Gabriele Taylor’s to be among “the most illuminating” (1988, p.
282). Kekes finds much of value in Taylor and the details of their accounts
have many points in common, but he comes to prefer the negative view
expressed by Isenberg.
Features of Taylor’s account that Kekes adopts are the notions of: 1)
the structural similarity of all shame experiences, 2) the detached observer
audience, 3) a hierarchy of shame-types, and, 4) the view that all shame
experiences have a moral dimension.
Taylor recognizes “very different cases” of shame, but she suggests that
they all share the same structure (1985, p. 54). In every occasion of shame,
Taylor proposes, the agent identifies with an audience’s verdict that he has
deviated from some norm and has thereby lost status (1985). The agent and
the audience see the situation alike, and since there is a consensus, “in the
eyes of both the agent is degraded” (p. 58). But Taylor has a complex view of
the detached observer that gives the appearance of a contradiction; she
acknowledges a case of shame wherein the agent feels shame because the
verdict of the audience is one of approval. What distinguishes the different
cases of shame is “how he is seen, whether he thinks of the audience as
critical, approving, indifferent, cynical, or naive” (p. 60). The obvious difficulty
is to reconcile an audience’s verdict of approval with the notion that in the
“eyes of both” the agent is degraded.
Taylor resolves this apparent contradiction by identifying three
elements in each case of shame. The first element is the agent’s adverse self-
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regarding judgment. “She feels degraded, not the sort of person she believed,
assumed, or hoped she was or...should be” (p. 64). The second element is an
audience s “first point of view”. Here the audience sees the agent under some
description and with a particular attitude. These attitudes can range from
approval, to indifference, or to a hostile disapproval. The third element - which
resolves the apparent contradiction - is the “second” point of view audience.
The second point of view is the relation of the agent to the first audience.

This (second) point of view is always needed as a step towards the
self-realization which is expressed in the person’s self-directed
judgment...He has to accept it in this case because he thinks he is
as he is seen, i. e., his judgment coincides with the judgment
embodied in the observer-description...(or) although the
judgments do not coincide, there is nevertheless something wrong
in his being so seen (p. 65).
To be seen with approval “as wrong in his being so seen” is illustrated
in Taylor’s text with an example of an artist’s model. A woman posing
undressed for a painting or a sculpture suddenly becomes aware of the artist
gazing approvingly upon her not as an artistic subject but as the object of
sexual interest. Now the critical second point of view comes not from the
artist but from “a sophisticated type of self-awareness” of the model herself
(p. 67). The first point of view audience - the artist - approves, but the model,
identifying with another view, “is seen as being seen...(and this) is to be in a
position in which no decent woman would find herself” (p. 61). The model
comes to realize that she has put herself in a position that elicits lust and a
second audience viewpoint finds this type of approval to be contemptible. The
model now identifies with a detached observation that sees the artist seeing
her. This new perspective, the model comes to realize, illuminates a shameful
component in the state of affairs.
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It is plainly a state of self-consciousness which centrally relies on
the concept of another, for the thought for being seen as one
might be seen by another is the catalyst for the emotion (p. 67).
All shame experiences, according to Taylor, share these three elements.
For Taylor, as well as for Bernard Williams, this detached observer in the form
of the second point of view audience need not be an actual person. Shame,
Williams claims, “works for us” in essentially the same ways that it did for the
ancient Greeks (p. 102).

By giving through the emotions a sense of who one is and of what
one hopes to be, it mediates between act, character, and
consequence, and also between the ethical demands and the rest
of life. Whatever it is working on, it requires an internalized other,
who is not designated merely as a representative of an
independently identified social group...(the internalized other
moreover) embodies intimations of a genuine social reality...how
it will be for one’s fife with others if one acts in one way rather
than another (1993, p. 102).
With the notion of the detached observer, both Taylor and Williams
recognize a shame type more sophisticated than the conventional idea of
shame embodied in the conception of a shame culture. Williams invests
shame with cognitive operations that transcend mere adjustments to the
prejudices of one’s community. Shame is more than “the individual’s sense of
what should be done merely on (the) expectations of what others will think of
him or her” (p. 81). Feeling ashamed is more than being found out. With a
connection to self-respect, Taylor considers shame conditionally good in that is
an emotion of self-protection.

We can characterize self-respect by reference to shame: if
someone has self-respect then under certain ...conditions he will
be feeling shame. A person has no self-respect if he regards no
circumstances as shame-producing (1985, p. 80).
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The sense of value necessary for self-respect and for shame is what
Taylor considers “makes it clear why shame is...thought to be so valuable” (p.
80). In shame a person 1) retains her values, which 2) protects her from
“corruption and ultimately extinction” (p. 81). If an agent’s reasoning is
correct and her values are right, a sense of shame will dissuade her from
unethical alternatives or it will serve to direct her to future ethical conduct. In
shame, Williams expresses the connection as a lowering of self-respect as an
agent is diminished in her own eyes (1993). However, with regard to
redirection Williams suggests “more positively, shame may be expressed in
attempts to reconstruct or improve oneseir ( p. 90). It is here that the
analyses of Taylor and Williams will part company with the authors of the
neutral and negative views.
Guilt has been alleged to imply restoration and repair (e.g., Fossum and
Mason) as well as to be a developmentally more evolved emotion than shame
(e.g., Erikson and Bradshaw). In contrasting guilt and shame, Williams
persuasively implies both these views are mistaken. The dispute is complex;
overlooking some of the fine points will detract from a possible defense of
shame’s conditionally good status. In order to argue for shame’s restorative
potential and as a powerful aid towards improvement, let us
propose some final distinctions among the self-regarding emotions of guilt and
shame gleaned from the positive view of Taylor and Williams.

Shame and Guilt Revisited

In A Theory of Justice. John Rawls proposes that a distinction between
guilt and shame is expressed in what reactions an agent anticipates for his
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behavior. Every commentator reviewed accepts this aspect of Rawls’s
position.

(In guilt) he expects others to be resentful and indignant at his
conduct, and he fears their righteous anger and the possibility of
reprisal...(In shame) he is apprehensive lest they reject him and
find him contemptible...In his behavior he has betrayed a lack of
moral excellences he prizes and to which he aspires (1971, p.
445).
Rawls elaborates on this distinction. Guilt focuses on the infringement
on others, on the specific injury that we cause, and on the expected reaction of
resentment or indignation from the victim. In shame, we focus on our anxiety
about the possible loss of respect we will merit if others were to reassess us
and on “our disappointment with ourselves for failing to live up to our ideals”
(p. 446). But what all the commentators from the neutral and negative views
seem to miss in Rawls’s position is that the restoration in guilt does not occur
within the offender. It is primarily, if not entirely, an external restorative
operation that intends to redistribute benefit to the victims. For in guilt our
focus is on the victims and the element of their anger is explanatory and
justified precisely because they have been wronged. In shame, by contrast,
we focus on the internalization of an idealized figure “who shares the standards
or expectations in terms of which (some act) is a failing” (Williams, 1993, p.
222). Rawls makes this point explicit.

Guilt is relieved by reparations and the forgiveness that permits
reconciliation; whereas shame is undone by proofs of defects
made good, by a renewed confidence in the excellence of one’s
person (p. 484).
Clearly reparations and forgiveness must involve the persons (or
person) that the agent has harmed. Reparations are due to them; the agent
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hopes forgiveness is forthcoming from them. Reinstatement of the original
relationship requires action, therefore, from both parties. Nothing in Rawls’s
remarks suggests this is necessarily required in shame. An agent fails to live
up to moral excellences to which he aspires. Others may find him
contemptible for, as Rawls suggests, lacking self-command “and its attendant
excellences of strength, courage, and self-control” (p. 446). But, as even the
negative view acknowledges, in shame no one need know of the failure. And
secondly, when and if an agent is forgiven, Williams notes that “perhaps the
case is withdrawn from the internal judge, but their forgiveness has less power
to repair my sense of myself” (1993, p. 91). The injured party, through
forgiveness, has the power to reinstate the offender. But, the injured party
does not, in forgiving, reestablish the agent’s sense of himself. Nor does the
offending agent’s act of reparation suggest improvement or even imply a
renewed confidence on his part. Reparations, to be morally acceptable, ought
to have the well-being of the injured party as the primary motivation.
On the point of the distinctive features of these two emotions, Williams
has an instructive example of a moment of cowardice when we can feel both
guilt and shame. We feel guilty for letting someone down and we feel shame for
failing to live up to our conception of what we hope ourself to be or assumed to
have been.

(An) action stands between the inner world of disposition, feeling,
and decision and an outer world of harm and wrong. What 1 have
done points in one direction towards what has happened to
others, in another direction to what I am (p. 93).
Shame looks to who the agent is, guilt looks to what the agent has done
to others (Williams, 1993). Given this, Kekes’s position that shame
understands only success or failure looks to be all the more untenable. For
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that which looks to who I am will understand intentions, aspirations, and
desires as well as outcomes. Williams suggests that it is only when we come
to understand our shame that we can properly understand our guilt.

The structures of shame contain the possibility of controlling and
learning from guilt, because they give a conception of one’s ethical
identity, in relation to which guilt can make sense. Shame can
understand guilt, but guilt cannot understand itself (p. 93).
The Components of Moral Shame

Moral shame is a complex emotion. In its affective aspect it is a painful,
self-regarding feeling wherein both the subject and the object of the emotion is
the agent. In its cognitive aspect it is a detached comparison with an
abstracted and idealized figure that renders a judgment that the agent has
failed to approximate this better self. The cognitive component acknowledges
that moral values are important and essential for living a good life together
with the conviction that the agent could have and should have lived up to
these values. In its moral aspect it is the cognitive recognition that the agent
has failed to perform an ethically correct alternative that an abstracted,
better self would have performed. And in the component of desire, moral
shame is the willing to better approximate the conception of the better self on
future occasions.

An Answer to Research Question #1

In the form of a definition, the answer to the first research
question, “What is the emotion of moral shame?” reads:
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SI: X is moral shame = df. X is a painful, self-regarding feeling of
diminishment that acknowledges an agent has failed to live up to some value.
That value the agent: 1) regards as important; 2) considers it to constitute an
essential component of living a good life; 3) acknowledges it to be a value to
which he ought to aspire; and, 4) one that a better self would have more closely
approximated.
Chapter Summary

Many authors allude to an overlap of features in the various selfregarding emotions (Dillon, 1995; Goleman, 1995; Karen, 1992; Kekes, 1988,
1993; Isenberg, 1980; Rawls, 1971; etc.) Kekes, for example, has written
shame “shades into” the emotions of embarrassment, humiliation, guilt,
regret, and remorse (1988, p 283). But this literature review and the
arguments it has produced have pinpointed specific differences. These
differences are important in the consideration of the second research question:
“ What impact might moral shame have upon one’s character development?”
This section, then, will conclude with a brief review of a few of the conclusions
reached in this second chapter concerning specific differences between moral
shame and the other relevant self-regarding emotions.
Of all the self-regarding emotions, shame is, on occasion, most
easily confused with guilt and humiliation. It is hoped the comments regarding
guilt drew some clear differences. A frequent mistake, especially in
educational circles, is the use of humiliation synonymously with shame. And
humiliation is an emotion that elicits among educators - to borrow from
Kierkegaard - fear and trembling. This seems justified. It seems true that in a
great majority of cases it is both indefensible and morally offensive to
humiliate a child. But, it also can and will be argued: if shame is conditionally
good, then to instill in a child a sense of shame is a moral responsibility both
for parents and for educational caretakers. But this does not imply that with
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for parents and for educational caretakers. But this does not imply that with
shame one ought to be oblivious to precautions.
Humiliation, it was proposed, involves a fall. As with shame, some type
of audience is involved. But the function of the audience in humiliation is more
direct than it need be in shame; it necessarily consists of identifiable others.
In humiliation, some outside party alerts the agent to the fact that his selfassessment is considered by these others to be unjustifiably inflated. A
teacher would humiliate a student if, for example, she were to inform him that
he does not have the comprehensive grasp of a subject he pretends to have. If
this is done in front of the class and also with an air of sarcastic
condescension, it can be all the more devastating. The student feels deflated,
for the audience, whatever its composition, transmits the message that they
do not share the assessment of the elevated position the student has assigned
to himself. Taylor distinguishes the essential difference of humiliation with
shame to be the fall, rather than “the new degraded status” in shame (p. 67).
The student might redeem himself by exhibiting the required knowledge, but
until he does he will feel contemptible or ludicrous for having given the
appearance of presumptuousness.
Embarrassment has been defined as an emotional reaction to a
situation of less serious magnitude. It is primarily in response to the inability
to respond to the demands of an audience. An agent will feel tension and
confusion; the proper response to the immediate demand alludes him. In
the above example, the student’s humiliation can be compounded by
embarrassment. He may in fact know his subject, but flustered by the
teacher’s confrontation and his classmate’s attention, he freezes. But
embarrassment is usually in response to lighter situations as when I hit my
thumb with a hammer or I arrive at a party with a tear in my pants.
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Taylor further distinguishes shame, humiliation, and embarrassment
by the extent of their influence upon one’s self-esteem or upon one’s selfrespect. Since embarrassment is an adverse judgment only on an agent in a
given situation, it need not effect either self-esteem or self-respect. After
hitting my thumb with the hammer or building an unsquare frame, I can think
of no quick, appropriate, and redeeming response to the jeers of my week-end
carpenter friends. But, it would be illogical for me to consider a global
reassessment of myself for this momentary and inconsequential carelessness.
Self-effacing humor will quiet the jeers. They will be reminded, afterall, I am
only a week-end carpenter.
Shame and humiliation impact upon one’s status. In explaining how
these emotions affect one’s status, Taylor attaches humiliation to self-esteem
and shame to self-respect. Humiliation, for Taylor, is a blow to one’s self¬
esteem. In order to be humiliated Taylor claims: 1) a person must have a
favorable attitude prior to the attack, or, 2) a person will believe he does not
get the recognition he should (1985). He, therefore, believes he deserves more
than that which he receives. A blow to self-esteem “is an occasion primarily
for humiliation rather than for shame, for he may not therefore also think that
he is worth less than he thought” (1985, p. 78).
Shame, according to Tayor, connects with self-respect for a person may
feel shame regardless of whether he or she holds a favorable or unfavorable
self-regarding attitude.

The self-respecting person has certain views of what is due him
and from him...He will lack self-respect if he has no such views,
and he will lose his self-respect if the relevant expectations are
not fulfilled. But the frustration of his expectations...is precisely
the occasion for feeling shame: he will feel shame if he becomes
aware of his expectations are being frustrated (p. 80).
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Taylor is correct to take issue with the Rawlsian notion that self-esteem
and self-respect are synonymous. But attaching humiliation to self-esteem
seems unhelpful. The features of humiliation which serve to distinguish it
from shame are the fall and the verdict of presumptuousness. Unlike worthshame, both these attach to appearances. Accordingly, one cannot be
humiliated without a specific, identifiable audience.
A second problem with Taylor’s analysis of humiliation is suggested by
the fact that if an agent does not agree with the verdict, he will not feel
humiliated. Anger seems a more reasonable reaction. It seems unlikely a
person will feel humiliated on the basis of a view from an audience that the
agent deems incapable of assessing his true talents. This fact seems to be
largely overlooked in the literature. Shame, on the other hand, can be
protective of one’s values and aspirations above and beyond appearances or a
third-party confirmation.

To respect the self, then, is not to think either favorably or
unfavorably of the self, but is rather to do that which protects the
self from injury or destruction, just as to respect others is not to
think well or badly of them, but is at least to abstain from injuring
or destroying them...And shame is the emotion of self-protection:
it may prevent the person concerned from putting himself into a
certain position, or make him aware that he ought not to be in the
position in which he finds himself (p. 81).
This notion seems correct. It is a one description of a sense of shame.
Whether the leading theories of moral education accommodate this insight is
the topic of the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 4

REVIEW OF MORAL EDUCATION PROGRAMS

Introduction

One contribution of philosopher John Dewey was to pose some
fundamental questions that all teachers, as teachers, should contemplate.
Dewey considered these questions to be of primary importance: “What should
be taught?”, “How do children learn?”, and, “What type of society do we wish to
live in?” (Scharf, 1978).
To arrive at satisfactory answers would seem to require input, at a
minimum, from professional educators, curriculum specialists, developmental
psychologists, philosophers, sociologists, and politicians. As is to be expected,
the various responses to Dewey’s complex questions have been conflicting.
One particularly contentious area, implied in Dewey’s questions, has been the
effort to teach values in public schools. This is not surprising when one
considers the multicultural composition and the ideological diversity that is
America.
An answer to this papers’ second research question, “What impact
might moral shame have on character development?” touches upon all of
Dewey’s questions for educators. To assess what impact shame might have
upon a person requires each respondent to have a preconceived notion of how
moral character develops (or, “How do children learn?”) as well as to hold
certain beliefs regarding what constitutes a mature and ideal moral character
(and an “ideal society”). So, the objectives and content of moral education
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programs (or, “What should be taught?”), as in all educational endeavors,
ought to be guided by a clear conception of the desired goal.
Regarding moral education programs, logic requires that a theorist has
some concept of virtue and of vice prior to advancing a proposal on how to
facilitate sound moral development. Here the notion of an ideal character,
and/or “What type of society do we wish to live in?” should contextually guide
the answer to “What should be taught?”.
In this chapter five theories of moral development - and the role of moral
shame within these theories - will be reviewed. The review of the literature on
moral education theories and programs reveals an initial difficulty: objectives
and goals vary. And this is because there is theoretical disagreement as to
what constitutes a mature, moral character. Since each theory has a
different conception of character development, it follows practical methods will
vary accordingly as will the theoretical views on shame’s role in the
development of character. A review of these theories will illuminate what
significance shame has for each theorist.
Disagreements over the proper methodology and the proper goal can,
roughly, be classified within one of two general schools of thought
When an American public school considers incorporating the teaching of
values into the curriculum, there are essentially two general approaches from
which to choose. The school community may elect a “character education”
model or a “cognitive-developmental” model. These approaches differ
conceptually and practically.
Theoretically, character education holds that virtue can be taught, that
good models are essential for moral development and that the young are not
appropriate candidates for Socratic dialogues. Practically, teachers must
“impose” specific values to ensure the development of proper habits. This is to
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be done prior to, not necessarily concurrent with, intellectual rationalizations.
Virtually every leading theorist in character education refers to or directly
quotes Aristotle on the importance of good habits. One passage - often quoted from the Nicomachean Ethics reads:

(L)ike activities produce like dispositions. Hence we must give our
activities a certain quality, because it is their characteristics that
determine the resulting dispositions. So it is a matter of no little
importance what sort of habits we form from the earliest age - it
makes a vast difference, or rather all the difference in the world
(Trans. Thompson, 1953, p. 92).

This passage - and similar arguments that support an indoctrinative
approach - are dismissed as misguided by the cognitive-developmentalists.
/

The two most popular branches within this school are Lawrence Kohlberg’s
stage development theory and Sidney Simon’s Value Clarification theory.
Although distinctly different in many of their basic assumptions, both
methods share a distrust for the development of habits through
“indoctrination” or imposing upon the young a “bag of virtues”. Advocates of
these theories often contend that “habituation” is the transmission of values
that are not applicable in modern times while others object that indoctrination
usurps autonomous self-direction. In further contrast with character
education, these theories also enthusiastically endorse Socratic dialogues with
children when these exchanges are modified to be age appropriate. The Values
Clarification theory further suggests that these dialogues are to be conducted
in an atmosphere of nonjudgmental acceptance for each and every view
expressed.
Although moral education programs in public schools have been
primarily influenced by one of these two schools of thought, educators do not
have the luxury of an simple either / or choice among the practical
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applications of these methods. The values clarification theory demonstrates
that an influential theory can evolve from one of these schools of thought, yet
it will, in the suggested form of implementation, display little resemblance to
fellow approaches. It follows that the assigned significance and role of shame
can be decidedly different in theories sharing the same initial theoretical
orientation.
The format of this section begins with a review of the most influential
theories from these two schools of thought. The order of the theories to be
reviewed will be: 1) the indoctrinative model, 2) the cognitive-developmental
model as formulated by Jean Piaget, 3) the values clarification method, 4) the
moral stage development theory of Lawrence Kohlberg, and, finally 5) the
character education model. Following each section with be a short exposition
on: 1) the perceived shortcomings of each approach, 2) how shame appears to
be accommodated within each of these theories, and, 3) how each theory would
answer the question “What impact might shame have on character
development?”. The section concludes with an alternative conception of moral
development which will serve as an answer to the second research question.

The Indoctrinative Model

Early in the nineteenth century the majority of the public schools
adopted an indoctrinative approach to moral education (Scharf, 1978;
Bennett, 1993; Brooks & Goble, 1997). An indoctrinative model attempted to
teach specific values to children through literature, lecture, practice, and
example. Readings from the McGuffev Reader, “which by 1919 had the
largest circulation of any book except the Bible”, carried lessons of moral
virtues such as honesty and courage (Kilpatrick, 1992, p. 99). One reviewer of
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the McGuffey text observes the qualities of character referenced and
supported most frequently were charity, industriousness, kindness,
patriotism, and piety (Beach, 1992). In the McGuffev Reader, young children
were introduced, unapologetically, to values held to be universally true.

Always do to other children as you wish them to do to you. This is
the Golden Rule. So remember it when you play. Act upon it
now, and when you are grown up, do not forget it (cited in Lickona,

1992, p. 235).
Moral education held a central role in the curriculum of nineteenth
century American public schools (Beach, 1992). The influential educational
reformer, Horace Mann, advocated a public school curriculum that “sought to
/

form a sincere piety directed toward the Creator, (and) a morality based upon
the example and ideas of Jesus Christ and conducive to civic peace and social
righteousness” (Beach, 1992, p. 12).
Support was also garnered for this approach from social institutions and
clubs for children. The Boy Scouts of America, founded in 1910, established
this now familiar oath: A scout is trustworthy, loyal, helpful, friendly,
courteous, kind, obedient, cheerful, thrifty, brave, clean, and reverent. A good
scout, it is explicitly clear, is defined by a conformity to these specific values.
A basic tenet of indoctrinative instruction was that stories of virtuous
conduct helped to mold good children. Stories, such as “Jim and the Thief”
from the McGuffey Reader, provided children with examples of acceptable and
unacceptable conduct which were intended to stimulate their moral
imagination. These stories, it was believed, began the work of emotionally
attaching children to goodness (Kilpatrick, 1994). These insights have their
roots in Plato and Aristotle. Plato wrote that children ought not hear stories
“fashioned by any chance teachers and so to take into their minds
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opinions...contrary to those that we shall think desirable for them to hold when
they are grown up" (Republic, II, 378b, p. 624). Aristotle, we will recall,
believed that the habits learned early make “all the difference in the world".
Penmanship exercises in public school also carried clear moral lessons.
In The Case for Character Education, author B. D. Brooks lists these
sentences that children were instructed to copy twenty times.
Quarrelsome persons are always dangerous companions.
Great men were good boys.
Justice is a common right.
Wit should never wound.
Build your hopes of fame on virtue.
Zeal for justice is worthy of praise (1997, p. 13).
Many students of the indoctrinative approach were also familiar with
the list of virtues that Ben Franklin composed in order to self-monitor his own
behavior. His list included the following; temperance, silence, order, frugality,
industry, sincerity, justice, moderation, cleanliness, tranquility, chastity, and
humility (Scharf, 1978).
Three essential features distinguish the indoctrinative model.
Indoctrinative educators share the basic assumptions that the values that
they promote will serve their students well and these values will be as valid in
the future as they are in the present and as they have been in the past. For
example, indoctrinative educators believed that the truth value of “Honesty is
the best policy" would hold constant for future generations.
Second, in the nature / nurture debate, indoctrinative educators hold the
nurture dimension at a premium. Inculcation, modeling, rewards and
punishment, and repetition are highly regarded. Virtues are learned through
practice and while in the formative stages, children ought not be granted the
license to debate established wisdom. Following Plato, indoctrinative
educators believe those children who engage in Socratic dialogues lack the
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formative background, the skills, and the developed habits to benefit by such
exchanges. These young debaters will “delight like puppies in pulling about and
tearing with words” (Republic,VII, 539b, p. 771). They will not, however,
necessarily acquire the virtues by debating either the value of the virtues in
general or the specific application of them in particular and/or thorny cases.
Third, morality is defined by the specific values and rules that are
current within a specific society. Early American educators, for example,
attempted to indoctrinate their students with values that may have been far
different than those that had currency, for instance, in Germany or in China.
Educators from all these regions, however, could legitimately be classified as
indoctrinative. So one condition of a value need not be that it satisfy the
requirement of universal application. Indoctrinative educators “define
morality in terms of moral rules, values, and virtues of a particular society at
a particular point in history” (Scharf, 1978, p. 23).
In the practical application of the indoctrinative model, clear answers to
Dewey’s questions emerge. What should be taught included moral values.
Among the specific values that had societal approval in America were: piety,
kindness, courage, patriotism, obedience, justice, honesty, humility, and
moderation. An ideal society would be composed of citizens that exemplified
these virtues.
Presumably an indoctrinative educator would answer queries about how
children learn by claiming the primary importance of good example and the
development of good habits. Examples would come from one’s family, the
townspeople, the clergy, and one’s teachers as well as from carefully selected
literature. It was a common assumption that these lessons could be absorbed
without the active participation or extended group dialogues involving the
children. The saying “Children should be seen and not heard” held in schools.
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As in libraries, it would not be unusual for early American classrooms to
display a sign which read “Silence”.

Shame and the Indoctrinative Model

A common image of an early American educator is one of a strict
disciplinarian, hickory switch in hand, looming over his cowering and compliant
students. Other images are of dunce caps, red knuckles, and standing in the
comer of the classroom facing the wall. Essential elements in these various
forms of punishment were that the public disgrace and personal shame felt by
the student could be justified by being effective incentives to learn and to
become good children and citizens.
Punishment itself is a practice usually justified in one of two ways:
deterrence or retribution. Roughly, deterrence is forward-looking. One might
claim that in punishment one intends to provide an individual with an
incentive not to recommit a crime. Pain of punishment and shame, as with all
pain, is thought to be something all rational people attempt to avoid.
On a community level, deterrence hopes to dissuade others, often by
example, from committing a crime in the first place. Some writers consider
the latter purpose to be sufficient justification. In Punishing Criminals.
Ernest van der Haag suggests one view of punishment is that it can be
inflicted on someone solely for the benefit of others.

Deterrence protects the social order by restraining not the actual
offender, whoeo ipso, has not been deterred, but other members
of society, potential offenders, who still can be deterred. As an
English judge succinctly remarked: “Men are not hanged for
stealing horses, but that horses may not be stolen” (van der
Haag, 1975, pp. 60-61).
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In contrast to deterrence, retribution is backward-looking. Retribution
seeks to impose the amount of suffering an offender deserves simply for
having committed an infraction. By virtue of some past offense, a person
merits punishing. Providing an example to others, rehabilitation, and
incentives to conform need not be motivating reasons for retributive
punishment. In retribution the principle is simple: justice is served when an
individual receives what he deserves.
Shaming students, on the early American indoctrinative model, could
range over all three justificatory punishing practices. The offending student
deserved censure for an infraction and it was hoped the punishment would
dissuade both the individual and his classmates from similar future conduct.
For the common good, rules and values, having been clearly established, were
to be observed. Since these values constituted the ideal or “the better self”,
any instance of falling short could occasion punishment. If a child had
internalized this ideal, he would feel shame for having fallen short in addition to
the inevitable humiliation that accompanied his public reprimand.
In the twentieth century, the indoctrinative moral education model
began to fall into disfavor for a variety of reasons. Chief among the objections
were that it was unduly harsh, that it was disrespectful of the intrinsic dignity
of persons, that it was an unsound educational practice, that it relegated
students to that of passive receptacles (Dewey,1953), and that it did not work
(Simon, 1972). Indoctrination’s reliance on conventionalism was also faulted
as philosophically unsound. Opponents correctly observed that an act is not
morally right simply by virtue of it being permitted by society. Clearly,
societies have, at various times throughout history, legally endorsed morally
objectionable practices as permissible (e.g., segregation).
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Precisely when in the twentieth century this change began is not
certain. It is widely assumed that the change came abruptly in the 1960s.
This assumption appears to neglect the facts. Sociologist James Q. Wilson
notes that the emphasis on character development began to shift much
earlier.
In the 1920s, dramatic cultural changes began. The temperance
movement became discredited and conservative religion lost
ground. Professor Wilson...notes that from 1890 to 1910, about
one-third of the (popular magazine) articles about childrearing...dealt with character development. In 1920, only 3% had
this focus. By 1930, personality development was the dominant
theme of the women’s magazines (Christenson, 1996).
Another dramatic change began in the 1920s with the publication of
/

Yale University psychologists Hugh Hartshome and Mark May extensive
study of children’s moral behavior. Their findings suggested that the behavior
of children ultimately depends upon their immediate and particular
circumstance. Children who professed to have honest characters were found
t

to be guilty of stealing, cheating, and lying in circumstances of apparent low
risk (Lickona, 1992). These findings prompted Hartshome and May to
propose the “doctrine of specificity”: human behavior is variable and
dependent upon the situation and not predictable by virtue of someone’s
apparent settled disposition or professed values.
Other dramatic scientific proposals in the early part of the century that
affected the confidence of people in the validity of conventional values were
Darwinism and Einstein’s theory of relativity. Behavioral adaptation by
evolutionary means and Einstein’s thesis about physical matter were both
extrapolated to influence morality. As a result of these scientific theories, a
far greater sympathy for ethical relativism began to pervade America.
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Established religions, that supported public school moral education
efforts, also experienced internal reforms prior to 1960.

The theologian Richard John Neuhaus thinks that shame faded
away not in the moral relativism of the 1960s, as is usually
argued, but in the Pollyannaish 1950s, when spiritual leaders like
Norman Vincent Peale argued you could have the positive side
without the negative, which is philosophically and practically
impossible (Alter and Wingert, 1995, p. 22).

The indoctrinative approach was also subjected to assault from
psychologists and educational scholars. By 1960, the innovative work of Jean
Piaget had garnered a large and devoted audience. Expanding upon his work in
the 1970s, Sidney Simon and Lawrence Kohlberg would advance their
theories of moral development. These later theories were a direct and a harsh
assault on the indoctrinative theory. Let us turn now to these three
educational theories.

Jean Piaget

Swiss psychologist Jean Piaget revolutionalized the study of child
psychology. Piaget’s primary focus was on the process of the acquisition of
knowledge or the development of cognitive intelligence. Originally trained as a
biologist, Piaget developed an interest in psychology when, early in his
career, he was employed in the Binet Laboratory in Paris. Piaget’s primary
task was to develop and administer French versions of several standardized
tests, among them the famous Binet intelligence test (now titled the Stanford Binet) (Wadsworth, 1989).
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Piaget soon tired of his assigned work on standardized tests. Recording a
child’s correct answers might indicate how much a child knows, but, for Piaget,
the patterns emerging from wrong answers suggested to him a field of study
far more intriguing. From the patterns and the content of wrong answers he
was receiving, Piaget observed that as children mature they employ more
sophisticated forms of reasoning. Piaget came to believe that cognitive
development is a “process of successive qualitative changes of cognitive
structures, each structure...deriving logically and inevitably from the
preceding one” (Wadsworth, 1989, p. 24). One insight that lead to this
conclusion was that early on in his research Piaget observed that problems
that seemed insurmountable for children at one age were solved with relative
ease by children at a later age (Hersh, et. al., 1982).
To understand the process of reasoning children employ, Piaget
developed the “clinical method” of inquiry. Unlike the one word or short phrase
responses elicited by standardized tests, Piaget posed problems to children.
He then, through an interview-type format, could observe and record the
child’s approach to specific problems. Observations, dialogues, and clarifying
questions were the hallmarks of the clinical method and this approach
substantially influenced the methodology later employed by Simon and
Kohlberg.
Piaget concluded that the “fundamental differences in the way children
reason are age-related” (Hersh, p. 19). Broadly summarized, the Piagetian
stages of cognitive development are as follows:

1. The stage ofsensori-motor intelligence (0-2 years). During this
stage, behavior is primarily motor. The child does not yet
internally represent events and “think” conceptually, though
“cognitive” development is seen as schemata constructed.
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2. The stage of preoperational thought (2 - 7 years). This stage is
characterized by the development of language and other forms of
representation and rapid conceptual development. Reasoning
during this stage is prelogical or semilogical.
3. Th e stage of concrete operations (7 -11 years) During these
years, the child develops the ability to apply logical thought to
concrete problems.
4. The stage of formal operations (11 -15 years or older). During
this stage, the child’s cognitive structures reach their greatest
level of development, and the child becomes able to apply logical
reasoning to all classes of problems (Wadsworth, 1989, p. 25).
From his training in biology, Piaget brought to psychology an awareness
of an individual’s cognitive and affective development as one that is strongly
influenced by one’s environment. Piaget’s theory is predicated on assumptions
of knowledge as the assimilation of environmental stimuli, the cognitive
organization or “accommodation” of environmental stimuli and demands, and
the “equilibrium” or disequilibrium of these two elements (Hersh, 1982;
Wadsworth, 1989).

The mind does not simply absorb discrete data...rather the mind
“seeks” to organize itself. It seeks from the environment
specifically relevant information that it can “use” to “construct”
a system of order that makes sense of, and thereby enhances,
interaction with the world (Hersh, 1989, p. 24).
Cognitive development, for Piaget, requires four variables: direct
experience, the level of exposure to environmental factors, the social
transmission of new ideas through, for example, reading and instruction, and
equilibration, or the ability to usefully structure information and experience
(assimilation and accommodation). Although not everyone may achieve the
level of formal operations, all children, Piaget claims, invariably progress
through the stages in the standard order.
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In many respects, Piaget’s theory of moral development parallels his
theory of cognitive development. Admittedly, the majority of Piaget’s years of
research were devoted to cognitive development, but he did, with his
characteristic ingenuity, research and formulate a theory of moral
development.
Affective development, for Piaget, is inseparable from cognitive
development. In agreement with the notion that emotions are comprised of
cognitive components, Piaget has written, “It is impossible to find behavior
arising from affectivity alone without any cognitive element” (1981, p. 2).
Equally impossible is it to find behavior solely comprised of cognitive elements.
Affectivity ranges over feelings, interests, desires, tendencies, values,
and emotions (Wadsworth, 1989) and its connection with cognition, for Piaget,
is straightforward. The student who likes science is more apt to do well in
science. The one who does not will be at a disadvantage.
Since intelligence was for Piaget comprised of cognitive and affective
dimensions, it is not surprising to find that Piaget had these two aspects
developing along similar time lines. A comparison of the stages of cognitive
and affective growth is seen below.

Cognitive stage

Moral stage

Preoperational (2 to 7 years)

Egocentric (4 to 7 years)

Concrete (7 to 11 years)

Incipient Cooperation (7 to 11 years)

Formal (11 -15 and on)

Genuine Cooperation (11-12 and on)

According to Piaget, preoperational children are characterized in the
cognitive and affective realms by egocentrism. Supposedly, an egocentric
child cannot take the role, or empathize, with others and the child believes
that his perception of an event is the perception all others share. (Wadsworth,
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1989). Conflicting views to his are disregarded as incorrect. Children at this
stage speak in self-contained monologues and they play group games
relatively unaffected and uncomprehending of standardized rules (Ginsburg
and Opper, 1988).
At the egocentric moral stage, children believe rules are absolute in
nature and are handed down from some higher authority figure - one’s father
or mother, God, or the government.
The child's morality...is one of obedience, what Piaget called
unilateral respect. Preoperational children do not reason about
what is right or wrong. For them, what is right or wrong is
predetermined (by authority) and not subject to their own
evaluation. There is little cooperation in the social sense - there is
only obedience (Wadsworth, 1989, p. 108).
/

From his study of children at play, Piaget concluded that rules, to
children at the egocentric stage, are believed to be unalterable. The child may
be aware that he is unable to explain why certain rules are in effect; he will
simply explain an authority figure has established and will enforce them
(Ginsburg and Opper, 1988). Good and bad are determined by behavior that
accords or conflicts with these rules. “Any act that shows obedience to a rule
or even to an adult...is good”, Piaget writes, “and the good, therefore, is rigidly
defined by obedience” (1965, p. 111). ‘Good’ as obedience is justified by the
child’s belief that his parents or the authority figures are “omniscient,
omnipresent...the source both of the uniformity of nature and of the laws of
morality” (p. 375). Piaget succinctly summarizes the egocentric stage as a
“blind faith in adult authority” (p. 402).
Violations of the rules are measured or assessed in “real” terms - the
extent of the damage done. Piaget’s “moral realism” theory postulates that
egocentric children do not consider guilt to be moderated by subjective
intentions or motives. The child who breaks 15 teacups while trying to help
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his mother is guilty of a more serious transgression than is the child that
deliberately breaks one. Minor accidents, according to Piaget, overwhelm
children with a sense of guilt that is “proportional to the extent of the material
disaster instead of remaining subordinate to the intentions in question” (1965,
p. 136). Guilt and shame, at the preoperational or egocentric level, will be
“more burning...the more irreparable the damage” (1965, p. 136).
As a child matures, moral realism gives way to the incipient cooperation
stage. Now a child begins to be able to factor in motivation, intentions, and
the spirit of the law rather than a simple adherence to the letter of the law.
Rules are perceived as a mutually agreed-upon framework for activities and
the child is becoming more capable of interacting with others linguistically and
behaviorally (Wadsworth, 1989).
Genuine cooperation, beginning at about 11 years of age, parallels the

cognitive “formal operations” stage. At this level of development the child
begins to perform abstract operations with rules.

He enjoys settling differences of opinion concerning the rules,
inventing new rules, and elaborating on them...He finds that not
everyone accepts the views promulgated by his parents
(Ginsberg, p. 101).
Piaget continues and, at this juncture, makes an rather startling inference.

(As a result) the child reasons about rules and comes to the
conclusion that they must, to some extent, be arbitrary and,
therefore, changeable...The child (begins) to see rules as having a
human, and hence fallible, origin, and (he) agrees to participate in
their formation and alteration (p. 101).
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In that the incipient cooperation stage seems to be one of transition,
some commentators understand the Piagetian model of moral development to
involve only two distinct stages. Ginsburg and Opper summarize Piaget’s
theory on moral development to suggest that children begin at an
“absolutists” stage characterized by a “morality of constraint” (1988, p.99).
The central principle of a morality of constraint is: x is right if x accords with
adult commands. As a child matures this stage gives way to an autonomous
stage or “a morality of cooperation”. The revised guiding principle for this
stage will now read: x is right if x accords with society’s commands or
agreements. And, according to Piaget, society is to be understood as
containing the child as an emerging participant in the formation of these
commands.
During the (egocentric) stage, rules are regarded as
sacred...emanating from adults and lasting forever...During the
(genuine cooperation) stage, a rule is looked upon as a law due to
mutual consent, which you must respect if you want to be loyal
but which it is permissible to alter on the condition of enlisting
general opinion on your side (p. 28).
A two-stage theory agrees with the view of Exile Durkheim, a
philosopher Piaget held in high regard. Referencing Durkheim, Piaget notes:

Durkheim’s ethical teaching, “which strikes so sincere a
note...imbued with such a deeply scientific spirit...regards all
morality as imposed by the group upon the individual and by the
adult upon the child” (p. 341).
As we will see, Piaget’s views on cooperation and self-regulation
(autonomy) strongly influenced the theories of moral development introduced
by Sidney Simon and Lawrence Kohlberg.
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Shame in Piaget’s Theory

The majority of Piaget’s research efforts and writings concerned
cognitive development, and although there were parallels, his theory of moral
development was far less intricate. Guilt and shame, in Piaget’s work, were
rarely mentioned outside the brief references to moral realism. As mentioned,
moral realism suggests a child, under a morality of constraint, feels guilt and
shame in direct proportion to the actual, physical damage that results from
some action by the child.
Presumably, as a child matures, possible circumstances for feeling
shame will increase under the morality of cooperation. Since Piaget evidently
believes “society...is the only source of morality” (1965, p. 327), occasions for
shame will arise when one fails to conform to agreed upon social commands or
when one violates social prohibitions. The field of authority figures to whom
the egocentric child holds himself accountable now expands at the genuine
cooperation stage to entail obligations to the general community. A
communal obligation is not synonymous with a blind obedience to convention.
Individuals at stages of concrete and formal operations are active and
autonomous participants in the formation of the binding obligations.

A rule is...nothing but the condition for the existence of a social
group; and if to the individual conscience rules seem to be charged
with obligation, this is because communal life alters the very
structure of consciousness by inculcating into it the feeling of
respect (p. 101).
As egocentrism is displaced by cooperation, Piaget’s mature individual
actively participates in the construction of his own social world.
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Autonomy means being governed by oneself, not by others.
Autonomy of reasoning is reasoning according to one’s own
constructed set of norms. It evaluates rather than automatically
accepts the preformed values of others. In addition, autonomous
reasoning considers others as well as the self. Autonomy is self¬
regulation (Wadsworth, 1989, p. 108).
But Piaget’s view of a mature individual has some definite and
restrictive parameters. Since his work has been so influential to the
originators of the Value Clarification method and to Lawrence Kohlberg methods to which we turn next - these restrictions deserve attention.
In Dialogues with Children. Garth Matthews offers several probing and
original criticisms of Piaget’s work. One concern Matthews has centers on the
field of evidence Piaget allows in his effort to assess a child’s development. It is
natural, Matthews notes, “to conceive developmental psychology on a
biological model, where a mature specimen is taken as the standard toward
which the immature individual develops” (1992, p. 117). Having a conception
of the mature specimen allows a scientist to gauge the progress and assess
the developmental stage of specific individuals.
Matthews offers persuasive evidence to suggest that Piaget’s
investigations discount the natural philosophical inquisitiveness of children.16
With numerous examples, Matthews verifies instances wherein Piaget shows
a remarkable lack of interest in some of the philosophically provocative
answers children offer in the clinical interviews. For a researcher who began
his investigations inspired by “wrong” answers on standardized tests, this is
particularly puzzling. Equally perplexing is the fact that the clinical interview
was specifically formulated to allow a flexibility in responses and in the follow¬
up questioning.

10 See, for example, Philosophy and the Young Child. Chapter 4, pp. 37 - 53.
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Piaget seemed uncharacteristically rigid when confronted by
philosophical puzzlement and religious convictions. For example, those
children who believe God intervenes in their lives are considered to labor under
a misconception of “artificialism”, an inability to attribute all occurrences to
natural processes (Ginsburg and Opper, 1988). In instances where a child
expects punishment to be imposed by divine intervention, the clinical
interview halts abruptly.

The subjects who answer “God did it” should immediately be put
aside...It seems quite natural to the child that a fault should
automatically bring about its own punishment. For nature, in a
child’s eyes, is not a system of blind forces regulated by
mechanical laws operating on the principle of chance. Nature is a
harmonious whole, obeying laws that are as much moral as
physical (1965, p. 256).
By discounting philosophical inquiry coupled with the assumption that
religious convictions impede development toward autonomous, formal
operations, Piaget’s clinical interviewing method overlooked many of the
possible investigative avenues into the moral life and thought of children. Any
egocentric-stage child who views nature as a harmonious whole seems a likely
candidate for engaging conversation. In Piaget’s method, these dialogues
never materialize. More importantly, it is not clear that every child will or
ought to have absolutistic views supplanted by the view that society is the
source of all morality. The objection can be raised that Piaget had things the
wrong way around: some “mature specimens” come to believe that only those
social rules are valid if they reflect universal and absolute truths.
With the uncritical adoption of many of Piaget’s ideas, Values
Clarification brought a secular and highly flawed theory of moral development
into the public schools.
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Sidney Simon

In the preface of Values and Teaching: Second Edition written by Louis
Raths, Sidney Simon and Merrill Harming, (hereafter referred to as Simon) the
authors exclaim that “hundreds and hundreds of schools and school districts”
have used their first edition published in 1966 (1978, p. viii). This claim seems
modest. In “Ethics Without Virtue”, Christina Hoff Summers cites a Hoover
Institute study which reports that as of 1975 perhaps thousands of school
programs employ the values clarification method (VC) and “ten states have
officially adopted values clarification as a model for their moral education
programs” (1984, p. 290).
There are several reasons for VC’s past popularity. Its main tenets can
be explained within the time constraints of short term workshop settings.
After these workshops, teachers can easily implement the practice of the
theory - with a minimum of study - when they return to their classrooms. And
the several books published by Simon contain hundreds of classroom activities
that are easy to implement with a minimum of preparation. As of 1978 with
the publication of the second edition, Simon claims “we are only able to say
that the need is even greater than it was a decade ago” (Simon, 1978, p. viii).
The urgency seems to be this:

The children and youth of today are confronted by many more
choices than in previous generations. They are surrounded by a
bewildering array of alternatives. Modern society has made them
less provincial and more sophisticated, but the complexity of
these times has made the act of choosing infinitely more difficult
(p. 15).
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The external pressures that confront children according to Simon
include, single parent families, increased mobility and the geographical
separation of extended families, international unrest, the exposure to a
seemingly infinite number of opinions, and endless technological changes
(1978). These and other external factors make value decisions such a
complicated process.

As a consequence, some people flounder in confusion, apathy, or
inconsistency. They cannot get clear on their values. They cannot
find patterns for themselves that are purposeful (p. 4).
Due to both the complexity of modem times and the exposure to so
many divergent viewpoints, more and more children experience problems “of
deciding what is good and what is right and what is desirable” (p. 10). Simon
lists as a sample of the divergent opinions to which children are exposed to
include those of parents, the church, peers, Hollywood, radical spokespersons,
and cumulative effect of all of one’s teachers (1972, p. 16).
The rationale for a new public school method of moral education is that
“Until recently clear procedures based on adequate theory have not been
available” (p. 12.) Simon explicitly states that the practical application of all
other previous value theories have failed to establish the necessary clarity in
less complicated times; these theories are, therefore, ill-suited to address these
complex modem times.
Simon lists specific approaches that will be ineffective. These are:

1. Setting an example either directly, by the way adults behave, or
indirectly, by pointing to good models.
2. Persuading and convincing by presenting arguments and reasons for
this or that set of values and by pointing to the fallacies and pitfalls of
other sets of values.
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3. Limiting choices by giving children choices only among values “we”
accept.
4. Inspiring by dramatic or emotional pleas for certain values often
accompanied by models of behavior associated with the value.
5. Rules and regulations intended to contain and mold behavior until it is
unthinkingly accepted as right as through the use of rewards and
punishments to reinforce certain behavior.
6. Using the arts and literature...to model and promote what “always
has been” and what “should be”.
7. Cultural and religious dogma presented as unquestioned wisdom.
8. Appeals to conscience...that we assume is within the heart of
everyone; often used with the arousing of feelings of guilt...such as...he
shamed his parents (p. 41).
This is clearly an attack on the indoctrinative method. Not only does
Simon explicitly assert that these approaches are poorly suited for the
development of values in present times, but the claim continues that there is
clear evidence that they have always been ineffective.

(These) methods do not seem to have resulted in deep
commitments of any sort...They just do not seem to work very
well. This alone suggests that we should try a new approach
(pgs. 41 - 42).
There should be no dispute with Simon over his descriptive analysis of
certain features of modem times. He correctly recognizes that modem life is
“complex”; children are indeed exposed to a wide variety of “value conflicts”
in politics, religion, work, family configurations, matters of sexuality, and in
sources of authority.
According to Simon, such a descriptive portrayal of modem life ought to
suffice to discredit all the approaches that advocate “inculcation”. His
reasoning seems to be as follows: The “direct inculcation of values works best
when there is complete consistency” in what constitutes “desirable” values (p.
42). Since a descriptive portrayal of modem life clearly shows a lack of any
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consensus, value methods that incorporate inculcation will be ineffective.
Inculcation (or indoctrination) is further discredited by stifling “ free inquiry,
thoughtfulness, (and) reason” (p. 42). Blind adherence to existing societal
norms, Simon correctly observes, has its dangers. But this starting point
leads Simon to an extreme conclusion. Following the Piagetian notion that
cognitive and moral development is characterized by the emergence of
autonomous self-regulation, Simon’s value clarification method entrusts
children with decision-making authority almost entirely unencumbered by
adult intervention. This point is verified by the goal of the theory which is
clearly articulated on the back cover of Values Clarification.

The goal is to involve students in practical experiences, making
them aware of their own feelings, their own ideas, their own
beliefs, so that the choices and decisions they make are conscious
and deliberate, based on their own value systems (1978, dust
cover).
People grow and learn, Simon writes, through experience.

Since we see values as growing from a person’s experiences, we
would expect that different experiences would give rise to different
values and that any one person’s values would be modified as
those experiences accumulate and change (p. 26).
If values evolve from experience and these experiences offer new or
different insights, it is to be expected that one’s values will accommodate these
new insights. It appears to follow by necessity that since everyone’s
experiences - and their insights into those experiences - will be different, then
conceivably everyone’s values could be different. In the preface to Values and
Teaching this relativistic claim is explicitly affirmed.
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Different groups of people might have different values and...all
views should be open for discussion, examination, possible
affirmation, rejection, or doubt. In other words, people should be
free to differ in their value indicators and their positions should be
respected (pgs. viii - ix).

For Simon, values are, by definition, personal things. Being a product of
personal experience values are not subject to proof or consensus. Simon
reasons that since there is no consensus on what constitutes ‘desirable’
values, the imposition of a specific value on a young child will inhibit his
development. Blind conformity to external codes - be they religious
commandments, moral imperatives or social conventions - are all rejected as
stifling: external codes limit choices. Simon states xmequivocally, “There is no
room in this theory for values that are imposed by outside pressure (1978, p.
47). The final break with the indoctrinative model could hardly be more
pronounced.
Predictably, Simon maintains that values are not “hard and fast
verities”; they are “the results of hammering out a style of life in a certain set
of surroundings.” After enough ‘hammering’, patterns develop. These patterns
of evaluation and behavior become our values. These values “are treated as
right, desirable, or worthy” (p. 26).
In Helping Your Child Learn Right From Wrong: A Guide to Values
Clarification. Simon states, “Values cannot be taught” (1976b, p. 23). One
reason he offers is that no one has the ‘right’ values for anyone else. What can
be taught to children is the process by which to arrive at values and the
necessary criteria to examine “whether they really are living according to
what they say they value” (p. 23).
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Simon proposes values must satisfy seven criteria. These are:

Choosing:

Prizing:

Acting:

(1) freely
(2) from alternatives
(3) after thoughtful consideration of the
consequences of each alternative
(4) cherishing, being happy with the choice
(5) enough to be willing to affirm the choice
to others
(6) or doing something with the choice
(7) repeatedly, in some pattern of life (p. 28).

Consistent with the view that indoctrination is a misguided approach,
advocates of the VCT are not much interested in identifying the values which
children ultimately hold. The “process” by which children can find their own
/

values - so as to deal with their unique experiences - is the operative feature of
the theory. From Helping Your Child Learn Right From Wrong. Simon
comments:

Values cannot be taught. But the process for arriving at them
can be. We can teach our children to examine life rationally...Then
we can help them to learn how to scrutinize their lives to see
whether they are really living according to what they say they
value. We can impress upon them the importance of arriving at
their own personal values (1976b, p. 23).
The methodology recommended by Simon for classroom VC exercises
borrows heavily from the therapeutic approach of client-centered therapy
devised by Carl Rogers. One similarity is in the proposal that a teacher should
employ nonjudgmental active-listening techniques. Active-listening,
another technique with roots in the Piagetian clinical method, is characterized
by the use of clarifying responses.
Some of the essential characteristics of an appropriate clarifying
response from a teacher are that it signals to the students an accepting and
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noncommittal attitude, that it is phrased nonjudgmentally, and that elicits
opportunities for the student to ponder alternative courses of actions as they
survey all possible consequences of different actions.
Directives that are especially pertinent here are:

1. The clarifying response avoids moralizing, criticizing, giving
values, or evaluating. The adult excludes all hints of “good” or
“right” or “acceptability”, or their opposites in such response.
2. It puts the responsibility on the students to look at their
behavior or ideas and to think and decide for themselves what it is
they want.
3. A clarifying response also entertains the possibility that the
student will not look or decide or think. It is permissive and
stimulating but not insistent.
4. Clarifying responses operate in situations where there are no
“right” answers - as in situations involving feelings, attitudes,
beliefs, or purposes. They are not appropriate for drawing a
student toward a predetermined answer. They are not questions
for which the teacher has an answer...in mind (1976b, p. 56)
“In all cases,” Simon insists, “responses are open-ended - that is, they
lead the student to no specific value. No one must deliver a “right” answer to a
clarifying response. Each student must be permitted to react in a personal
and individual way” (p. 58)
Again, the justification for this directive is that no one has the ‘right’
answer to deliver. This may explain Simon’s disinterest in identifying specific
values: in that it is conceivable each individual will hold different values, the
identification process would be a daunting, if not impossible, task.
Simon qualifies this directive as not necessarily communicating
“approval”; rather, value clarifying requires “acceptance of a person’s total
being as it is”. Here the parallels with Rogerian client-centered therapy are
striking. With the recognition that some people may prefer not to be more
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thoughtful about values, coupled with VC’s aversion to “imposition” and in
recognition that “the particular content of (the teacher’s) values holds no
more weight than would anyone else’s” (1972, p. 27) the following directive
emerges:

It should be increasingly clear that the adult does not force
personal values upon children. What the adult does do is create
conditions that aid children in finding values if they choose to do
so. When operating within this value theory, it is entirely possible
that children will choose not to develop values. It is the teacher’s
responsibility to support this choice also (1976a, p. 48).
In summary, the originators of the Value Clarification theory have
proposed that all previous methods of moral development are inadequate in
present times. The main reasons they offer in support of this claim are that
modern times are complex and that children become perplexed about what is
morally right due to the array of conflicting opinions they hear.
Furthermore, Simon charges previous methods of moral development
have always been ineffective. Although ‘values’ themselves are not subject to
‘proof or ‘consensus’, objective observation of the current state of valueconfusion seems to clearly indicate that these other methods have not
assisted people to arrive at “deep commitments of any sort”.
The indoctrination to specific principles and values and the process of
habituation will inevitably lead to an undesirable state of affairs. No one has
the ‘right’ values for someone else’s child. Here again Simon cites the
prevalence of children that display Value-confusion’ as evidence. Unlike the
assumption in the indoctrinative method that there are specific values that
have served others well in the past as they will serve children well in the
future, in VC “there is the implicit assumption that the moral norms of society
have largely broken down” (Scharf, 1978, p. 27).
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To remedy value confusion, Simon offers a process of valuing that is
relatively easy to implement in schools. This process prescribes seven criteria
that establish the necessary and sufficient conditions for something to be a
‘value’. It is assumed that a cognitive clarity on value issues will lead to a more
purposeful and satisfying life.
Another essential feature of VC, which distinguishes it from the
indoctrinative approach, is that learning is gauged predominately by an
increased awareness of oneself and not by the level of conformity to accepted
societal values. Autonomy, not conformity, is one goal.

Shame in Simon’s Theory

Although one may hear an occasional reference to VC in public schools,
as a credible theory and as an operative method it currently has few
supporters. Throughout the years many objections have been leveled against
VC. Commentators charge that the theory is merely a simple formulation of
ethical relativism (Kilpatrick, 1992; Stewart, 1976). Unlike conventionalism,
that can rely on a consensus as a system of checks and balances, the
relativistic orientation of VC ultimately leaves individual children to their own
devices in the decision-making process and in the justification of their
decisions. Teachers report that if they are to adhere to the directives of the
method, they can not respond to clear cases of objectionable choices (Lickona,
1992). When teachers are instructed to avoid all pronouncements of “good”,
“right” and “acceptable”, shameful behavior is allowed to go unchallenged.
Simon’s seven criteria of a “value” can be faulted for being too
permissive. Merely to choose one value from among those available and to
then happily and repeatedly conform to it are insufficient requirements. S
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might choose self-centeredness and dishonesty and, although deluded, he might
consider himself content with his choices. A co-author of the theory, Merrill
Harmin, appears to have considered this objection.

Our emphasis on value neutrality probably did undermine
traditional morality...As I look back, it would have been better
had we presented a more balanced picture...It makes a good deal
of sense to say that truthfulness is better than deception, caring
is better than hurting, loyalty is better than betrayal, and
sharing is better than exploitation (cited in Lickona, 1991, p.
237).
Shame, in Values and Teaching, is only referred to once. In this
quotation it is unclear whether Simon means to imply that shame and clear
values can coexist.

There is something about emotional needs which are the source of
shame...If we are extremely fearful or feel deeply guilty, we are
somewhat ashamed of the situation and do things to hide the
facts. On the other hand, when we have values, we are genuinely
proud of them; we cherish and esteem them and hold them dear
(1966, p. 198).

It is not at all clear that any general assessment of shame’s influence on
character development can be made in the value clarification theory. If each
individual establishes their own value system, then feelings of shame will vary
accordingly. For example, if an individual, S, adopts an operative egoistic
principle of “me first” to guide his actions, then instances of disregarding the
rights and needs of others need not elicit feelings of shame. And if optimal
character development operates as the theory suggests, no external
imposition of rules or codes of conduct will cause S to reassess his position. S
will not be influenced by “honesty is the best policy” or similar virtuous
prescriptions if these are all to be dismissed as value impositions from some
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alien and external source.
Simon’s rather confusing quotation above seems to imply that value
clarity eliminates occasions for shame. Shame might be an incentive for
someone to “get clear” on their values. But it is difficult to know, from Simon’s
text, whether the self-centered S is on his way toward greater clarity or has
already arrived.

Lawrence Kohlberg

In the 1970s Lawrence Kohlberg introduced an extensively researched
theory of moral development that was more substantial than the alternative
theory advanced by Simon. Kohlberg proposed that moral development
occurs in an invariant and universal sequence of six qualitatively distinct
stages. His research also advanced a method for identifying and scoring these
stages as well as a proposal on how moral development can best be fostered.
In Kohlberg’s view, moral development occurs in six steps of three
consecutive levels. The major levels he labels as the preconventional, the
conventional, and the postconventional. Each major level is subdivided and
the subdivisions are labeled numerically (e.g., stage two is the second step of
the preconventional level, stage three is the first step of the conventional level,
etc.). The preconventional level is occupied by most children under 9, some
adolescents, and most criminal offenders (Kohlberg, 1976). The conventional
level is “the level of most adolescents and adults in our society and in other
societies” (p. 33, italics added). The postconventional level is reached by only a
small minority (1976).
“Conventional” Kohlberg defines as “conforming to and upholding the
rules and expectations and conventions of society or authority just because
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they are society’s rules, expectations, or conventions” (p. 33). And the three
different levels are best understood, according to Kohlberg, as the relationship
of the individual with these conventions, rules, and expectations
of society (1976). The levels are distinguishable by changes in the social
perspective of an individual, specifically by the justifications he will give for
what is right and by his reasons for upholding what is right.
Kohlberg believed all people are philosophically inquisitive. Irrespective
of age, many of the philosophical puzzles that all people ponder are moral in
nature. These questions, believed to have universal appeal and which guided
Kohlberg’s investigations were: “How should I live?”, “What is right?”, and,
“How do I know it is right?” (Howard, 1991). Like Piaget’s clinical interviewing
method, and with obvious and acknowledged credit to Dewey, Kohlberg’s
research aim was clearly established. His elaborate research method intended
to assess the maturity of an individual’s moral reasoning by the justifications
that were given to resolve standardized dilemmas and stories.
Movement to a higher stage is characterized by an individuals ability to
offer more sophisticated justifications for the resolution. Kohlberg’s most
famous testing dilemma was that of Heinz. With his wife dying from a rare
form of cancer, Heinz becomes aware of a druggist who has formulated an
expensive new drug that might save his wife. Heinz is distressed to learn that
he does not have enough money to purchase the drug and that the druggist
with neither lower his asking price nor will he issue credit.
Kohlberg asks his subjects, “Should Heinz steal the drug?” The
classification of the responses according to Kohlberg’s stage model will
determine an individual’s level. For example, Stage 1 responses resemble
“Stealing is wrong. It is against the law. Heinz will be punished for stealing”.
A stage 3 conventional level response might be: “Heinz should not steal. If
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everyone in difficult times, stole, society would break down. Only bad people
steal.” Kohlberg gives this example of a stage 6 response to the Heinz
dilemma.

It is wrong legally but right morally. Systems of law are valid only
insofar as they reflect the sort of moral law all rational people can
accept. One must consider the personal justice involved, which is
the root of the social contract...Personal justice means, “Treat
each person as an end, not as a means (p. 39).
Kohlberg’s theory of moral stages is summarized below.

LEVEL 1- PRECONVENTIONAL
Stage 1: “Punishment and Obedience” Orientation
What is right - literal obedience to authority, avoid breaking rules
Reasons for doing right - to conform with authority, to avoid punishment
Social perspective - egocentric outlook, unable to empathize with others
Stage 2: Instrumental purpose and exchange
What is right - obey rules only when it is in one’s best interest
Reasons for doing right - to best serve oneself
Social perspective - right is relative to concrete individuals
LEVEL 2 - CONVENTIONAL
Stage 3: “Good bov. Nice girl” orientation
What is right - to abide by expectations of ones associates
Reasons for doing right - the need to be regarded as “good”, desire to
maintain rules of authority figures
Social perspective - expectations of others takes precedence over selfinterest, awareness of Golden Rule and shared feelings and
agreements
Stage 4: Social System and Conscience. “Law and Order” Orientation
What is right - Fulfilling obligations, doing one’s duty, behavior that
contributes to and supports society or one’s group
Reasons for doing right - to avoid breakdown of groups and systems
Social perspective - takes viewpoint of system that defines roles and rules
LEVEL 3 - POSTCONVENTIONAL
Stage 5: Social Contract. Utility and Individual rights
What is right - to impartially uphold values that are relative to one’s group,
and to uphold values recognized as universal.
Reasons for doing right - obligation to the law for welfare of others, feelings of
contractual commitments, concern for law based on utility
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Stage 6 - Universal Ethical Principles
What is right - determined by universal and self-chosen ethical principles
Reasons for doing right- personal commitment to moral principles
Social perspective - a rational person recognizes that the nature of morality
requires people be treated as ends in themselves
Kohlberg’s moral stage theory is far more elaborate than Piaget’s,
although the latter’s influence on Kohlberg is clearly evident. Both theorists
consider progress to be successive qualitative cognitive changes with each
new stage deriving from and supplanting the preceding one. Piaget’s
preoperational child - as with Stage 1 and 2 children - will presumably view
laws as external impositions of an authority’s commands. Each theorist
proposes these children are egocentric and that they will obey rules primarily
to avoid punishment.
Piaget’s concrete operational child begins to understand the purpose of
laws and to assess the motivations of others. In a like manner, Kohlberg’s
conventional individual (Stages 3 and 4) recognizes lawful behavior as
supportive of society, is concerned with the welfare of others, assumes
obligations and duties for the common good, and is capable of empathic
interplay with his associates. Both concrete operational and conventional
stage individuals are capable of subordinating personal needs for the welfare of
the group. The formal operations person in Piaget’s model will view laws as
alterable and he will assume a participatory role when it is merited. Similarly,
a person at Kohlberg’s Stage 6 will override laws if they conflict with universal
or self-chosen moral principles.
With a clear reference to Piaget, Kohlberg explicitly states that the
attainment of higher moral stages is contingent upon cognitive development.
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Since moral reasoning clearly is reasoning, advanced moral
reasoning depends upon advanced logical reasoning. There is a
parallelism between an individual’s logical stage and his moral
stage. A person whose logical stage is only concrete operational is
limited to the preconventional moral stages, Stages 1 and 2
(Kohlberg, 1976, p. 32)
Only cognitive growth allows one to pass sequentially through the
qualitatively different moral stages. For Kohlberg, this growth takes place
most effectively in a “just community” or in a school that encourages Socratic
dialogues and policy decisions arrived at democratically. The use of dilemmas
to foster moral development and a school curriculum organized to
accommodate democratic participation illustrates two fundamental
differences between Kohlberg’s theory and the indoctrinative model.
The direct transmission of values advocated by the indoctrinative
approach is rejected by Kohlberg as a “romantic” misconception. With an
emphasis on moral reasoning and personal experience, Kohlberg shifted the
focus from modeling and lecture to one of Socratic dialogues geared to be
personally relevant. “Teaching virtue”, Kohlberg writes,”is the asking of
questions and pointing the way, not the giving of answers” (cited in Howard,
1991, p. 51). Socratic dialogues was one operating philosophy for the “just
community” schools. Another distinctive notion was that effective schools
ought to be run by democratic participation. Students, staff, and faculty in
community “town meetings” would set and enforce the schools rules and
debate appropriate punishments for infractions. Each person gets one vote
on all policy issues.
In classes, current events and difficult social issues (e.g., pollution, racial
and gender discrimination, nuclear proliferation) as well as specific behaviors
(e.g., lying, stealing, drug use, attendance) are the topics of debate (Howard,
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1991). Although Kohlbergian techniques are still endorsed by many teachers
and consultants, the just community school experiment had dismal results.
From his office at Harvard’s School of Education, Kohlberg’s most direct
involvement benefited the Cluster School in Brookline, Massachusetts. In
addition to Kohlberg’s supervision, the school had an envious student - teacher
ratio: thirty students interacting with six teachers and dozens of consultants
(Kilpatrick, 1991). However, one observer remarked that the school seemed
in constant turmoil. “Student-citizens (were) forever stealing from one
another and using drugs during school hours” and the community meetings
seemed to be continually preoccupied with “problems with drugs, theft, sex,
and racial divisions” (cited in Kilpatrick, p. 92). In only its fifth year of
operation the Cluster School closed.
The enthusiasm with which Merrill Harmin (co-author of VC) and
Kohlberg introduced their theories was not matched by positive personal
evaluations of the practical results of their respective theories. Kohlberg
himself became disenchanted with his theory in practice. Reminiscent of
Harmin’s reconsideration of his value clarification theory, Kohlberg retracted
his disdainful assessment of the indoctrinative methodology.

Some years of active involvement with the practice of moral
education at Cluster School has led me to realize that my
notion...was mistaken...The educator must be a socializer
teaching value content and behavior, and not only a Socratic or
Rogerian process-facilitator of development...I no longer hold
these negative views of indoctrinative moral education...This is
true, by necessity, in a world in which children engage in stealing,
cheating and aggression (cited in Kilpatrick, 1992, p. 92).
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Shame in Kohlberg’s Theory

As with any complex and innovative idea, Kohlberg’s theory has been
subjected to intense scrutiny. A common criticism is that Kohlberg’s method
relies almost exclusively on cognitive operations (Lockwood, 1978; Beach,
1992; Kilpatrick, 1992). It is one thing, Kilpatrick suggests, to know the right
thing to do and quite another to do it (1992). A careful review of Kohlberg’s
theory supports the charges that it overlooks much of the impact of the
affective dimension on moral development, that it fails to account for cognitive
rationizations undermined by a weak will or a lack of moral courage, that the
early moral stages are portrayed as one-dimensional, and that the theory
entails an inadequate notion of the central role of moral training in moral
development. By far the most common criticism concerns Kohlberg’s neglect
of the moral emotions.

Kohlberg, like Piaget, is particularly weak on the development of
the affective side of morality, of the moral emotions such as
“guilt”, “concern for others”, “remorse” and so on...(and) Kohlberg,
in his references to ego strength, sees the importance of will in
morality, but offers no account of the type of habit training which
encourages or discourages its growth (Peters, “Phi Delta
Kappan”, June,1975, p. 678).
By way of illustration, in a clinical interview setting, an agent, S, may
cognitively sort out and verbally justify some course of action, a, in situation,
x. But Kohlberg seems to underappreciate a legitimate concern: that, in
action, S might actually do b or c regardless of what S might say. And having
done b or c, presumably knowing a to be the right thing to do, how might this
affect S? Kohlberg seems to anticipate one aspect of this objection.
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A variety of factors determines whether a particular person will
live up to his stage of moral reasoning in a particular situation,
though moral stage is a good predictor of action in various
experimental and naturalistic settings (1976, p. 33).

In a subsequent article, Kohlberg even softens his claim that a moral
stage is a good predictor. He explains away those occasions of a discrepancy
between words and deeds by suggesting a person, at a given cognitive stage,
“maybe one or more stages lower in morality” (1981, p. 138). To avoid
unpleasant consequences, or “not wishing to be a martyr”, a person may
“prefer to reason at a lower level” (p. 139). But to reason and to act at a lower
level clearly sounds like stage-regression - something Kohlberg denies ever
occurs.
Kohlbergian moral stages, then, are only predictors of the range of
alternatives an agent is aware of and of why one ought to act in some specific
way, not a predictor of what the individual will actually do. And if Kohlberg’s
theory confines itself with the range of alternatives and justifications as the
sole constituents of a particular moral stage, neither an agent’s emotional
response to his actual conduct nor that agent’s resistance to pressures and
temptations will be introduced or calculated. Only cognitive justifications are
Kohlberg’s target; conscience, desire, emotional reactions, and concrete acts
will not be influential designators of one’s moral stage. If one factor in
calculation of the strength of one’s character is the ability to withstand
temptation, any theory which neglects this variable is, by design, flawed.
So Kohlberg’s theory, with its cognitive “what-if” orientation, does not
calculate feelings of shame. As has been argued, reflecting upon the selfregarding emotions will influence how one thinks about how one ought to
conduct oneself on future occasions. Since one objective of Kohlberg’s work is
to assess how children progress to the next higher stage, ignoring the affective
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factor that will - arguably - foster this movement seems to be a serious
oversight.

And it is not surprising that religious educators are among those

that are most dissatisfied with a Kohlbergian approach to moral development.

In the classical Judeo-Christian tradition of moral theology, much
attention is given to the nature of conscience, as the inner
principle that determines choice...(and) much attention is...given
to the troubled or guilty or “accusing” conscience, where the self
comes to acknowledge that it has acted in violation of the moral
norms the self knows or at least professed in principle. Guilt,
remorse, contrition, repentance, forgiveness - these traditional
categories of moral theology - are lacking in Kohlberg’s descriptive
and normative analysis of cognitive moral development (Beach,
1992, p. 39, italics added).

An even more startling limitation is suggested in an analysis of
Kohlberg’s moral stage theory by Gareth Matthews. Matthews observes that
according to the conditions of Stage 1 and 2, children will resist performing
prohibited acts only to avoid punishment. This assertion, Matthews notes,
necessarily categorizes these children as “pre-moral”.

The reason they are only pre-moral is that their concept of
obligation as the realization that they will likely be punished if
they do such-and-such is not a concept of moral obligation at all.
It is just the recognition that there are some things we get
punished, or rewarded, for doing (Matthews, 1995, pp. 55-56).
Even if a particular child is only occasionally capable of doing the right
thing for the right reason, Matthews reasons, then they are entitled to be
classified as more than pre-moral. To say otherwise is simply mistaken and
condescending, if not morally objectionable.
Matthews’s insight can apply to the conventional stages with equal
force. To act in such a way so as to please others (Stage 3) or merely to
maintain the social order (Stage 4) may cause us shame if and when we let
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others down. But to merely abide by conventions need not take on a moral
dimension. Kohlberg himself defines “conventional” as abiding by society’s
commands just because they are society’s commands. So a person can
conform to these conventions amorally; he need not trouble himself with
whether the particular laws of his society or his associates are just. An agent
will conform simply because it is the conventional practice or because it is
an external imposition (“It’s the policy” or “We’ve always done it this way”) or
in order to maintain the respect of his associates (“I was only following orders”
or “This is what is expected of me”). Performing the objectionable
requirements of membership in a street gang, a blind obedience to corporate
policies that are clearly harmful to others, committing murder so as to be a
“made-man” in the Mafia, or subjugating blacks as a policy of a white
supremacist group are all concrete examples.
If these conventionalists rationalize their questionable behavior as the
means to maintain acceptance within a group or to maintain order within a
particular society, then their activities will not necessarily elicit a moral
shame. It would be incompatible for an individual at Stage 3 or 4 to feel
shame in acknowledging of a moral failure and, at the same time, to feel pride
for successfully upholding a group standard. An agent’s shame would require
that some aspect of the group’s standard is seen as reprehensible and
conformity to it, therefore, would be no justifiable basis for pride. One might, of
course, feel conflicted; one might acknowledge the “dirty hands” problem.17
But conflict implies an uncertainty as to how to order one’s priorities. For the
Stage 3 or 4 conventionalist, in Kohlbergian terms, the sole priority is to abide
by the expectations of one’s associates. This troubles Matthews.
17 The concept of “dirty hands”, as I understand the term, refers to the acceptance of
performing some act that entails a morally repugnant feature or, because of its alleged
benefit, the act itself transcends moral considerations. Issuing orders for a military attack
knowing innocent civilians will undoubtably be killed might qualify as an example.
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One who conforms to expectations simply to avoid disapproval
(Stage 3) or even one who acts to maintain the “given social order
for its own sake” (Stage 4) has not, it seems, or at least not for
those reasons, attained a specifically moral understanding of
obligation. It begins to look as though all stages before Stage 5,
or even Stage 6, are really pre-moral stages (1994, p. 60).

As Kohlberg himself defines the “good-boy” and “law and order” levels, an
individual’s primary concern is with appearances, pleasing others, or
supporting the current operating system. Whether these conventions are
“just” or universally applicable are only considerations that supposedly
motivate action for Kohlberg’s highest stages - the postconventional.
Matthews’s “pre-moral” criticism has profound implications. For
according to Kohlberg’s theory, it is quite possible to be cognitively and morally
at Stage 4 while being a thoroughly evil person. To see that this is so we need
only reflect on the idea of a violent Klansman doing what he deems necessary
to keep his social world “pure”. And what this example illustrates is that
Kohlberg’s moral stage theory - up to and including Stage 4 - fails to
discriminate among the objects of a person’s values and interests. A mere
conformity to group conventions are not principles by which one can
distinguish the good from the bad; nor are they prescriptions by which we can
evaluate right from wrong. Clearly it is the case that the values and interests
of maintaining a Klan group is not morally equivalent to the value and interest
of supporting a town’s elementary school or its church.
Kohlberg never addressed this criticism, but he, as well as others, have
attempted to answer the critics who charge that his theory inadequately
accommodates the affective aspects of moral development. A standard
response is articulated in “Lawrence Kohlberg: The Cognitive-Developmental
Approach to Moral Education”.
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Kohlberg claims that he has not neglected will and feeling in
moral development; rather they are part of the process of moral
reasoning. Thus, he would argue that the exemplars of stage 6
morality - Gandhi, Martin Luther King, and Jesus - are proof the
‘the cognitively developed’ person is also a person of great moral
passion and feeling...The Stage 6 person who has reached the
heights of cognitive moral development is also a person of great
moral passion (p. 79).

But this response hardly addresses whether moral feelings affect moral
development. It merely acknowledges that Jesus, Martin Luther King, Jr., and
Gandhi - unquestionably Stage 6 (or higher) individuals - are “also people of
great moral passion”. To say that moral feelings are part of the process of
moral reasoning at Stage 6 is not to say that they are essential components of
the earlier stages or that they are necessary for the attainment of subsequent
stages. Kohlberg merely acknowledges Gandhi to have been a man of moral
passion. This is beyond dispute. Consider the suggestion that what Kohlberg
overlooks is that Gandhi was an individual of great moral feeling from a very
early age. Precisely because of this attribute, one could argue further, Stage
6 became attainable for Gandhi. Kohlberg has no explanation for how this
could be.
It is, then, a valid inference on Kohlberg’s model that only persons at
Stage 5 or 6 can feel moral shame in instances of personal failings that involve
and appeal to notions of universal values. This insight suggests that Kohlberg
does more than ignore the moral emotions; at the early stages, his theory does
not allow for them. Since one can experience moral shame only after one has
reached the highest levels - something very few actually do - than, in
Kohlberg’s theory, moral shame can have no impact on the development of
character. Kohlberg appears to be committed to the view that one will be
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sensitive to moral shame only after one’s moral development has evolved into
that of a “mature specimen”.
So another startling implication of Matthews’s dissatisfaction with
Kohlberg’s theory is the apparent suggestion that, aside from instances of
violating conventions (which in themselves maybe misguided), all children and
most adults are morally shameless. What is there to be ashamed of if one
satisfies his own interest or supposes he has abided by the prevailing
conventions?
A final difficulty with Kohlberg’s theory of moral development concerns
what his method of assessment purports to measure. A Kohlbergian stage is
assigned to individuals by virtue of how he or she resolves an ethical dilemma.
But if we are to understand character as defined by the patterns and
continuity of thoughts, actions, and habits of an individual which are guided by
the values to which this person is committed, then a proper assessment of
character requires a long perspective - a reflective view of an entire life or, at
least, a sizable portion of a life. Survey answers hardly seem adequate to
render a clear portrayal of this intricate nature. Even if we were to concede
what a person says he would do to be an authentic and accurate testimony of
what he will do, resolving the conflicting claims in a hypothetical dilemma
gives but one perspective into a person’s character. Joel Kupperman objects
to this “snapshot” orientation which he claims infects many ethical theories.
Kupperman observes that the decision-procedures proposed in many ethical
theories are formulated in terms of discrete choices so that “the character,
habits, and past decisions...of the moral agent drop out of the picture”
(Kupperman, 1991, p. 151). Along these same lines, Matthews faults the
narrow focus of the Kohlbergian approach.
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In Matthews’s view moral development takes place across five
dimensions: paradigms, defining characteristics, the range of cases,
adjudicating conflicting moral claims, and moral imagination (1994).
Paradigms are the ability of a person to identify acts that exemplify virtues
and vices (e.g., is this particular act an act of‘lying’, ‘bravery’, ‘responsibility’,
etc). “Defining characteristics” is an ability to define terms of moral
assessment in enlightening ways. For example, the definition of lying as
uttering a falsehood with the intention to deceive signifies growth from the
response of “naughty words”. “Range of cases” concerns the ability of a
person to identify the various acts that can be morally assessed within each
paradigm. Is keeping incorrect change at the supermarket an act of stealing?
And is it lying if, at the time, one notices the teller’s mistake and says nothing?
Matthews’s fourth dimension - adjudicating conflicting moral claims - is the
ability to sort out the right thing to do when two moral claims appear to make
demands on us at the same time. The Heinz dilemma is a case in point. Does
our obligation to help others or alleviate suffering override our duty to respect
another person’s property? Matthews faults Kohlberg’s focus on this
dimension to the exclusion of all the others (1994).
The last dimension in Matthews’s view, moral imagination, is the ability
to see the moral import in our lives and actions. It is, among other things, the
ability to empathize with others, a projective sensitivity to anticipate whether
our actions will alleviate or cause suffering, and an openness to concrete
instances of moral obligation. Quite literally, before one decides whether to
contribute some money to a hungry beggar, that person must notice him there
on the sidewalk. If one is insensitive to suffering, then he will be unaware of
some of his moral obligations.
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Envisioning the “better self is an act of moral imagination. So some
instances of shamelessness might be explained - in the past tense - as moral
unreflectiveness, and - in the future tense - as an inability to see, or an
insensitivity to, our moral alternatives. The conventionalism of early
indoctrinators, the rigidity and limited view of the personal constructivism of
Piaget, and the presumptuous relativism and value-neutrality of value
clarification all, in their own way, inhibit moral imagination. And Kohlberg
cannot calculate how moral shame will affect character development when it
occurs in these other dimensions if he does not recognize - or if he fails to
acknowledge - these dimensions exist. Character education takes a broader
perspective on moral development. Let’s turn to that now.

A Modem Character Education Model

Current models of character education (CE) subscribe to many of the
same principles espoused by their indoctrinative predecessors. Some
character education advocates, most notably, Thomas Lickona, have
developed moral education theories that are also selectively informed by the
work of Piaget and Kohlberg.
One principle of CE is that certain core ethical values form the basis of
good character. Honesty, fairness, responsibility, respect for oneself and for
others, and thoughtfulness are among the values that many CE organizations
consider obligatory (such as the Character Education Partnership, The Center
for the 4th and 5th R’s18, the Heartwood Institute, the Jefferson Center for
CE, and the Josephson Institute of Ethics). Schools committed to CE
unapologetically name specific qualities they expect their students to strive

18

The fourth and fifth R’s are respect and responsibility.
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for, their staff to model, and to which all school members are held accountable
(Huffman, 1994; Lickona, Schaps, and Lewis, 1995).
The direct evolution of current CE models from the early indoctrinative
model is justified in the literature as sharing the educational goals of assisting
people to become both smart and good and by the vision consistent with the
American Founders of democracy (Lickona, 1992). Since democracy is
government by and of the people, the reasoning goes, people themselves must
be good for the government to be good.
A second guiding principle of CE, unlike a cognitive-developmental
approach, is that effective programs must address the cognitive, the
emotional, and the behavioral aspects of moral life. It is not simply enough to
proceed through more sophisticated reasoning stages; desire and action play
equally important roles in moral development.

Good character consists of knowing the good, desiring the good,
and doing the good - habits of the mind, habits of the heart, and
habits of action. All three are necessary for leading a moral life;
all three make up moral maturity (1992, p. 51).
The emphasis on action in CE programs shifts the focus of an ethical fife
of reasoning through dilemmas to one that emphasizes the affective
dimension. It is just as essential to desire virtue and to do the right thing as it
is to reason correctly. There will be no dilemma, CE proponents point out, if
stealing is thought to be permissible or considered to be attractive. The story
of Kohlberg’s puzzlement over the ineffectiveness of his approach in prisons
testifies to this point.19 The Heinz dilemma will only be a dilemma to those
who believe that stealing is, with few exceptions, an immoral activity, and, as
such, repugnant.

19 See, for example, Kilpatrick, 1992, “How Not to Teach Morality”, pp. 78 - 95.

245

Another notion which distinguishes character educators from cognitivedevelopmentalists (CD) is their respective views of human nature.
Developmentalists charge CE as having a dim and pessimistic view of
children. Some see CE as focusing on how to teach children to restrain
impulses, to overcome self-centeredness, to socialize them away from their
natural tendencies to be, in Hobbesian terms, “mean, nasty, and brutish”.
But an optimism about children’s natural goodness does not motivate
alternative approaches. Alfie Kohn, in support of the developmental
approach, cites scientific studies that replicate Hartshome and May’s findings
that propose people are at the mercy of circumstance.

(CE) ignores the accumulated evidence from the field of social
psychology demonstrating that much of how we act and who we
are reflects the situations in which we find ourselves. Virtually all
the landmark studies in this discipline have been variations on
this theme (Phi Delta Kappan, Feb. 1997, p. 431).

Kohn alleges CE teachers overlook the notion of character formation as
a function of one’s social environment. This misconception is so common,
Kohn claims “social psychologists have dubbed this the ‘fundamental
attribution error’” (p. 431). Cognitive developmentalists hardly seem to gain
any moral high ground with this view if they are committed to the notion that
all children are susceptible to a kind of social determinism. Arrange the
environment in a certain way, they seem to be saying, and a certain product
inevitably emerges. The character educators, on the other hand, propose
children need guidance, models, and socialization to develop virtue. If there is
cause for optimism in either view, it might weight in favor of the CE view:
regardless of the environment, or more to the point, in spite of a bad
environment, CE suggests good children can emerge with good training.
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Training is a point of contention between CD and CE. Character
educators favor practice so that “habits” form. Their hope is that good acts
become second-nature. CD views habit as unreflective, a “mindless
conformity to externally imposed standards of conduct” (Kohn, 1997, p. 434).
Developmentalists favor a participatory arrangement of the classroom to
foster empathy, skepticism and “the cultivation of autonomy” rather than a
blind obedience to uniform standards (Kohn, 1997). CE methods, Kohn
charges, encourage children to follow rules “regardless of whether they are
reasonable and to respect authority regardless of whether that respect has
been earned” (p. 432).
Other shared principles of CE with the early indoctrinative model is the
central roles of stories, a belief in the power of example, and of the importance
of discipline to help children to develop the virtues. CE believes, as did the
early indoctrinative educators, that stories provide children with good
examples thereby creating an attachment to goodness and proper codes of
conduct (Kilpatrick, 1994). The power of example is emphasized in many CE
programs. Huffman cites the Mount Lebanon School District’s Code
of Ethics that requires “the staff and the members of the Board of
Directors...to model the District’s Core Values in their work” (1994, p. 51).
Discipline is thought of as an edifying deterrent.

Responses to rule-breaking should give students opportunities for
restitution and foster the students’ understanding of the rules and
willingness to abide by them (Lickona, et al 1996).

Rationales for implementing a character education program in a public
school will frequently open with a list of dangers facing children and a report on
the undesirable behaviors of contemporary children. On the first page of
Thomas Lickona’s preface to Henry Huffman’s Developing A Character
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Education Program, he cites statistical reports of increasing levels of
dishonesty, violence, disrespect, peer cruelty, bigotry, self-centeredness, self¬
destructive behaviors, and ethical illiteracy as incentives to institute
character education efforts (Huffman,1994). Enlisting the support of parents,
community politicians and organizations, the public school staff, area
businesses, and the clergy are integral parts of CE efforts. Unlike early
indoctrinative initiatives no longer can one assume the goals for moral
development initiatives will be universally supported. For example, parents
and social institutions can no longer be taken for granted as support systems
for public school character education initiatives. A May, 1994 newspaper
article reports a “modest amendment” before Congress to award public school
grants to support the teaching of values such as honesty, responsibility, and
caring. The amendment was “soundly defeated” for the seventh time (Sharpe,
Wall Street Journal, 10 May 1994). During consideration of the measure,
Representative Richard Armey (R - Texas) argued to the Education and Labor
Committee:

I, for one, would not tolerate anyone having the presumption to
dare to think they should define who my children are, what their
values are, what their ethics are...The fact is these people don't
know my children...love my children...they don’t care about my
children...(nor do they) accept responsibility for the outcome...and
they ought to, by God, leave my kids alone (10 May 1994).
Opposition to character education in the public schools also takes the
form of objections to indoctrination, as the imposition of religious doctrines,
and as a potential inhibitor of critical thinking skills. Developmentalists allege
that a primary objective of CE initiatives is, in fact, not to foster a child’s
social or moral development, but to merely demand good behavior or, in early
indoctrinative terminology, conformity to the prevailing norms. As Kohn
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understands it, the goal of CE is to “get compliance, to make children act the
way we what them to” (1997, p. 434). Traditional responses from CE
advocates are that the values they promote are objectively worthwhile and
that schools have an obligation to “not only expose students to these values
but also to help them to understand, internalize, and act upon such values”
(Lickona, 1991, p. 38). This, they contend, can be accomplished without
religious influence.
A response to the developmentalists that might be more persuasive is
that as a child develops it is hoped he will accept the moral virtues not
because they have been imposed upon or required of him but because the child
recognizes virtue to characterize human excellence. A virtuous life, to this
child, is seen as something of great value.

Shame in the Modem Character Education Model

Although Lickona, in Educating for Character, recognizes the
importance of the affective dimension in moral development, little or no
attention is given to the emotion of moral shame as an intrinsic motivation to
guide present behavior or to modify future behavior. This is also true of the
rest of the literature from the character education movement with which I am
familiar. In this way CE resembles VC and CD in essentially overlooking
specific emotions of self-assessment.
When one fails to do what one supposes to be right, Lickona (as do many
psychologists) presumes this will evoke a “constructive guilt”.
A mature conscience includes, besides a sense of moral obligation,
the capacity for constructive guilt. If you feel obligated in
conscience to behave in a certain way, you will feel guilty...
Constructive guilt says, “I didn’t live up to my own standards. I
feel bad about that, but I’m going to do better” (p. 58).
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In this brief description, Lickona attributes to constructive guilt: 1) the
failure to live up to an important value, 2) a painful self-regarding feehng, and,
3) the resolve to improve. From the earlier analyses of the emotions, it seems
none of these characteristics are necessarily unique to guilt. Painful feelings
are common to many self-regarding emotions (e.g., regret, remorse,
repentance, humiliation, shame, etc.) and, therefore, Lickona’s analysis fails to
help us locate distinguishing attributes of guilt. Failing to live up to a personal
standard elicits feelings of shame. The resolve to reform belongs to
repentance. Guilt, it had been suggested, concerns the violation of a
prohibition that carries with it the obligation to make amends. One can make
amends without a personal reformation.
Lickona also ascribes this resolve to improve to humility which he
defines as a: “genuine openness to the truth and a willingness to act to correct
our failings” (p. 61). But humility need not recognize moral failings; more
accurately, humility is an appraisal of one’s limitations. Here honest
recognition is called for, not motivation for correction or improvement.
With the affective dimension in full play, Lickona leans to the cognitivedevelopmental approach to resolve specific difficulties. He suggests that just
as teachers actively involve children in the democratic adoption of classroom
rules, they can “continue (this) same critical thinking process with regard to
consequences” (1991, p. 118).

By discussing...consequences, the teacher can help students
understand that the purpose of a consequence is not to make
them suffer but to help them improve their behavior (p. 118).
Although this approach emphasizes the positive, democratic
participation needs to be utilized carefully whenever the topics are rules and
consequences. Many methods that advocate this approach (Discipline with
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Dignity, Conflict Resolution) all contain disclaimers that instruct the teacher
to override student’s poor choices and suggestions. Most students quickly
come to see the limits of this type of classroom “democracy”.
Character education advocates, in particular Thomas Lickona, are doing
important work in public education. Their overall approach has much to
recommend it. More precision in the affective dimension, however, will only
improve an already admirable undertaking.

Summary of Moral Education Theories

The answers to Dewey’s three fundamental questions for educators
summarizes the respective differences between the theoretical approaches to
moral education.
For the early indoctrinative educators, “What is right?” is answered by
the prevailing societal and cultural norms. The Value Clarification Theory
(VC) proposes that right is relative; each child, through reflection, experience,
and circumstance will arrive at their own personal response. Cognitivedevelopmentalists (CD) believe valid and universal moral principles exist.
Justice and respect for human dignity are preferable to both an egocentric
self-interest and to an unquestioning conformity to convention. Character
Education (CE) advocates also believe a set of core universal ethical values
define good character. But CE considers right conduct to embody affect and
desire as well as cognition. Precisely how desire and affect contribute as right¬
making characteristics of an act remains undeveloped and vague in many CE
theories.
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Unique theoretical assumptions of the individual approaches emerge
most clearly in answer to the question “How do children learn?” Indoctrination
emphasizes repetition, modeling, rewards and punishments, and learning by
example. A student learns, in large part, by a passive internalization of the
prevailing societal norms. Anecdotal evidence suggests coercive measures to
force compliance was frequently employed. VC dismisses this approach as
ineffective; children, they suggest, learn by self-analysis, experience, and
weighing the consequences of personal choices. Learning occurs as one
becomes more aware of his or her own inner values. Cognitivedevelopmentalists propose learning occurs through direct and democratic
participation, by engaging in Socratic dialogues, role-taking exercises, and by
individuals resolving cognitive conflict. Moral learning is a process of
increasingly sophisticated ideas as to why certain conduct is considered to be
right. CE borrows aspects from each of these theories. Modeling, example,
stories and internalizing acceptable social codes are imported from the
indoctrinative theory. Socratic dialogues and role-taking exercises are
endorsed by some character educators but, again, an emphasis on developing
proper desires and appropriate emotional reactions and behavioral responses
are also stressed.
The direct transmission of values, practice, and the inculcation of habits
are signature aspects of the CE model. CD considers this method
condescending and “unlikely to leave children with a commitment to that
behavior” (Kohn, p. 435). Direct transmission is inherently condescending in
that the adult / child relationship relegates children to “passive receptacles to
be filled, lumps of clay to be molded, pets to be trained, or computers to be
programmed” (p. 434). Following Piaget, CD views true learning to occur when
a child actively constructs meaning for himself (Kohn, 1997).

252

Children must be invited to reflect on complex issues, to recast
them in light of their own experiences and question, to figure out
for themselves... what kind of person one ought to be, which
traditions are worth keeping, and how to proceed when two basic
values seem to be in conflict (Kohn, 1997, p. 435).
For CE, “the kind of person one ought to be” can be transmitted. It need
not be discovered anew by each child. One ought to be, among other things,
just, responsible, and kind. CE advocates argue that children need not, nor
should we expect them, to reinvent the wheel. A child learns by example, with
study, and with practice. Against the romanticism of the cognitivedevelopmentalists, CE distrusts the notion that ethical behavior will
spontaneously unfold. And just as children will not “invent” algebra or the
proper rules of English grammar, neither should one assume that they will
“construct” proper ethical principles on their own.
As it is with the previous questions, each theory has its own view of
present society and the type of society it envisions as ideal. The early
indoctrinative method has commonly been characterized as viewing society as
under a constant threat of moral dissolution from vice and undisciplined
natural impulses. Under strict controls, a uniform conformity to conventional
norms is possible. VC views society as a product of failed previous methods.
As a result, apathy, indifference, and value confusion plague the majority of
citizens. An ideal society would be comprised of autonomous individuals
pursuing their personal conception of values and goals. Cognitivedevelopmentalists envision an ideal society to be composed of high level
critical thinkers adhering to universal moral principles. Societal norms may
vary but Stage 6 citizens will contribute to a society that prizes justice for all.
Present society contains a scant minority of Stage 6 citizens. With the proper
developmental method this percentage can increase.
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Character educators frequently justify the need for their approach with
dire current statistics of youth misbehavior. For CE, the threat of the moral
dissolution that the early indoctrinative educators feared, has, to a large
extent, taken hold and pervades society. CE hopes for a society of high level
critical thinkers who also adhere to a set of core ethical principles. CE
dismisses the relativism of the VC theory. Although they acknowledge and
welcome society’s pluralistic composition, specific values are believed to apply
to all American citizens (e.g., respect, responsibility, fairness, honesty,
integrity, etc.). A society becomes better as more citizens attach and adhere
to these values.
Each theory accommodates the emotion of moral shame differently.
Nonconformity to conventions creates a shameful condition according to
indoctrinative adherents. A person who does not abide by these conventions
will feel shame if he considers these conventions binding. The relativism of VC
requires a case by case analysis as to when and how someone feels shame. To
be theoretically consistent VC is committed to the view that nothing is
inherently shameful. So Simon can not maintain that values can not be
imposed from external sources and then claim a special dispensation to render
judgments on tax-evasion or apathy. In order to avoid contradiction,
dishonesty, theoretically can not universally be deemed a shameful condition.
The decision not to aspire to be honest must be respected as does the
individual who rationalizes honesty can be overridden whenever it proves to
threaten his comfort or security. And Simon suggests when a person is clear
about his values then shameful conditions will disappear. But this proposition
is remarkably simple-minded. Klansmen are perfectly clear about their
commitment to objectively shameful and morally repugnant values.
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It has been argued that Kohlberg’s composition of the moral stages and
his emphasis on cognitive operations has the unfortunate result of minimizing
the affective dimension in general, and, specifically, of committing Kohlberg to
the position that individuals at the early stages of moral development are
incapable of being informed and guided by a sense of shame. For the question
on how moral shame might affect character development, Kohlberg’s narrow
focus on adjudicating conflicting moral claims neglects important dimensions
of one’s moral growth and one’s character.
The theory is also troubled by the concern that the transition from
Stage 4 to Stage 5 is not logical. How does a conventionalist evolve into a
person who adheres to universal principles? How does the transition work?
And how and where does moral training fit in with the theory? When does it
begin? As a final concern, why should we accept the claim that, at certain
stages, all children are at all times shamelessly committed to their own best
interest? Egocentrism need not be a vicious egoism. His view of children, by
itself, ought to render the theory defective. All these concerns seem to remain
unanswered in Kohlberg’s work.
Character education, even with an emphasis on the affective dimension,
fares no better. Although it appeals to notions of habituation, practice, and
lectures from the early indoctrinators and to constructivism and Socratic
interchanges from the cognitive developmentalists, the picture
of how character develops remains sketchy. This vagueness is compounded
by imprecise formulations of guilt, humility, and pride and a complete neglect
of shame.
In conclusion, it seems evident from the review of the literature that an
explicit and comprehensive answer to how moral shame might affect
character development does not emerge from these theories.
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An Alternative

Various theories from scholars on how children learn and on what should
be taught have been reviewed. Arguments and counter examples have
demonstrated that each theory has unique problems. What follows is an
alternative proposal of character development and an attempt at locating the
proper place of moral shame. In its essential respects this alternative is
Aristotelian.
The format of this section begins with notes on Aristotle’s theory of
moral virtue and good character. This will be followed with an explication of
Aristotle’s view on how a good character develops. From these sections, an
answer to the second research question, “What impact might moral shame
have upon one’s character development?” can be formulated.
Any suggested moral development program ought to be preceded by a
clear conception of virtue and vice. Common sense dictates that if an author
is suggesting a method by which people can become virtuous, we should know
something of his or her view of virtue. Errors or omissions at this primary
stage will infect all subsequent efforts. A fundamental weakness with the
value clarification theory is the proposition that the necessary conditions for a
value to be right, good, and desirable are a person’s autonomous choice,
thoughtful commitment, and repeated affirmation of that value. From this
position, a method of practical exercises to clarify values evolves. But VC is
doomed from the start. To appeal again to the wrongheadedness of racist
ideologies, the klansman’s choice of and thoughtful commitment to the value of
white supremacy does not render that value right, good, and desirable. The
klansman has organized his life around a reprehensible goal. Acts that

256

exemplify this value and which are conducive to attaining this goal are wrong,
if not evil. So more than free choice, commitment, and repeated affirmation
are needed to distinguish right from wrong and the good from the bad. Some
theories avoid this fundamental error; Aristotle’s is among them.

Aristotle

An influential, complex, and controversial conception of virtue and of
good character can be found in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics (NE). Aristotle
distinguishes two kinds of virtue, intellectual and moral. The development of
each kind is distinct: intellectual virtues are developed through learning and
experience, moral virtue “is the result of habit” (NE, 1953,1103al8). The
intellectual virtues are excellences in Science, Art, Practical Wisdom,
Understanding, and Philosophic Wisdom (Book VI). Aristotle’s list of the moral
virtues includes courage, temperance, liberality, magnificence, proper
ambition, patience, truthfulness, wittiness, friendliness, modesty, and
righteous indignation (p. 104).
A moral virtue is defined as “a purposive disposition, lying in a mean
that is relative to us and determined by a rational principle and by which a
prudent man would determine it” (1107al-2). Until we understand the
meaning of many of these terms, this definition remains far from clear.
First, to begin at the beginning, we need to know what Aristotle means
by a purposive disposition. One famous passage from the NE explains how
moral virtue is acquired through habit: “we become just by performing just
acts, temperate (self-controlled) by performing temperate acts, brave by
performing brave ones” (1103bl-2). It is in this way that “like activities
produce like dispositions” (1103b20). A disposition, Aristotle suggests, is the
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“condition...(by which) we are well or ill disposed in respect (to) feelings”
(1105b26). Being properly disposed towards feelings takes practice. “The
causes and means that bring about any form of excellence are the same that
destroy it, and similarly with art; for it is the result of playing the harp that
people become good and bad harpists” (1103b8-10). So, for example, bravery
will be exemplified in acts whereby the agent is well disposed, through practice,
to respond appropriately to fearful circumstances.
To develop the proper disposition requires the agent to reason and to act
so as to hit the mean.

Moral virtue...is concerned with feelings and actions, and these
involve excess, deficiency and a mean. It is possible to feel
fear...too much or too little; and both of these are wrong. But to
have these feelings at the right times on the right grounds
towards the right people for the right motive and in the right way
is to feel them to an intermediate, that is to the best, degree; and
this is the mark of virtue (1106bl5-24).
The mean incorporates an array of considerations: motive, timing,
correct objects, and measure. In general, feelings and actions in the mean are
characterized as neither too little nor too much. For a number of reasons, this
is a complex proposition and the “Aristotelian mean” has generated thousands
of pages of critical commentary. One area of contention is that having defined
and established the importance of the mean, Aristotle immediately asserts it
does not apply to all feelings or all actions. It is impossible to have the right
amount of shamelessness or envy or too much justice and temperance.

Not every action or feeling admits of a mean...some have names
that directly connote depravity, such as malice, shamelessness
and envy, and among actions adultery, theft and murder. All of
these, and more like them, are so called as being evil in
themselves...In their case, then, it is impossible to act rightly, one
is always wrong (1107a9-15).
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From these many examples and “more like them” it is not immediately evident
precisely when and where the mean should apply.
Another misconception regarding the mean is to propose that Aristotle
intends the mean to be understood as a moderate feeling or act. Clearly this is
mistaken since Aristotle would apparently condone as appropriate a heated
and intense indignation toward acts of murder or
theft. The concept seems to be further complicated when Aristotle says that
the mean ought to be “relative to us”. Presumably we are to gain an
understanding of this phrase by examples such as charitable contributions
from a school teacher and from a corporate executive both can be considered
generous while being substantially different amounts. Since the particulars of
everyone will be different, there can be no universal principle or hard and fast
rule by which we can determine the mean. It is established, when it applies,
by perception.

So it is not easy to define by rule how, and how far, a person may
go wrong before he incurs blame; because this depends upon the
particular circumstances, and the decision lies with our
perception (1126b3-7).
According to the definition of virtue, our perception will be correct if it
accords with that of the prudent man. Prudence is the practical wisdom to
deliberate correctly about “what is conducive to the good life” (1140a28) and
the “rational principle” in moral conduct is prudence (1144b25). Virtues,
as moral or intellectual excellences, actualized prudently are intrinsically
valuable constituents of this good life.
We can propose two preliminary considerations: 1) the proper education
of a child ought to be guided by this target of virtue, and 2) a failure to exercise
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these excellences can constitute a shameful condition. An agent will feel
shame if she has a certain awareness of a discrepancy between her pursuits,
feelings, or actions and those of this good life. But what is the good life as
Aristotle conceives it?
In the opening paragraphs of the NE, Aristotle writes that every action
and every pursuit is thought to aim at some good. If an action aims at some
end, that end, by nature, is considered superior to the activity. Therefore
some things are extrinsically or instrumentally good - good for procuring
something else (e.g., money, medicine) - and some things are intrinsically good good in themselves (the leisure that money affords, the health that medicine
restores). Book 1 of the NE asks and gives the outline of an answer to the
question “What is the supreme good for man?”. Aristotle tells us: “Human
excellence will be the disposition that makes one a good man and causes him
to perform his function well” (1106a21). The supreme good will be an intrinsic
good and it will be man’s true function.
Just as a conception of virtue is essential to a reliable evaluation of a
moral development program, some understanding of Aristotle’s answer to the
ultimate aim is required to locate the appropriate grounds for moral shame as
well as an understanding of how children develop so as to participate in this
intrinsic good. And since more than one thing is intrinsically good (candidates
are the moral and the intellectual virtues), Aristotle’s project is to find the
supreme intrinsic good or that which is “in accordance with the best and most
perfect (virtue or excellence)” (1098a20). This good Aristotle claims will be
eudaimonia or happiness. Happiness is, of course, defined differently by

different people: a hedonist will propose pleasure, a politician will suggest honor
or public esteem, while others might propose happiness consists in lavish
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material comforts. Aristotle refutes these claims and proposes happiness
consists in one of two activities; the best being the exercise of theoretical
wisdom or contemplation or, if this is unattainable, second best would be
virtuous practical activity (or a life exercising the moral virtues).
Early in Aristotle and the Human Good, Richard Kraut devises a chart
to demonstrate Aristotle’s hierarchical arrangement of goods. Kraut’s chart is
arranged with the lowest level representing goods desired instrumentally such
as wealth. The next row is comprised of goods desirable in themselves, “such
as honor...though they are not to be identified with happiness” (Kraut, 1989, p.
6) Next are intrinsically desirable ends - virtuous activities. The hierarchy is
arranged with each good on the lower level considered “choiceworthy for the
sake of some good on a higher row” (p. 6). Virtuous activity as an end, what
Aristotle refers to as the political life, is thus represented on top. Kraut’s
chart is this:

B
M
X

N
Y

Z

B: ethical activity
M, N: other goods desirable in themselves
X, Y, Z: goods that are conditionally desirable (p. 6)
Kraut continues that the philosophical life, or a life of
contemplation, according to Aristotle, is represented by the addition of still
another level where [A] = contemplation. The completed hierarchy now reads:
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A
B

M

X

N

Y

Z

[A] is, then, man’s true function and, by this plan, it is important to note
contemplation is exercised by an agent who has the ethical virtues [B]. With
this plan of the ultimate aim some insights can emerge regarding instances of
moral shame by virtue of miscalculations of the proper hierarchical order or,
said another way from SI, failures to live up to values that constitute
essential components of living the good life. We can propose further that this
hierarchy will afford us a better grasp of the components essential to the
moral development of children. To these issues we will turn shortly following
some brief comments on possible objections to this arrangement.
Controversy swirls around many Aristotelian assertions. As has been
noted, the complexity of Aristotle’s thought invites this. At the outset it is
conceded this researcher has neither the space nor the talents to resolve
interpretive differences which have occupied scholars for years. The modest
objective here is to defend the conditionally good status of moral shame and to
locate its place in child development while suggesting that to do this Aristotle
is a valuable resource largely overlooked by moral developmentalists. Before
proceeding, however, two premises of his theory deserve a defense. One is the
assertion that humans have a function, the other is that his concept of the
mean is ultimately intelligible.
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Aristotle s attempt to show that human beings have a proper function
can be considered the single most important argument in his discussion of
happiness (Kraut, 1989). Happiness, or the human good, is defined as “an
activity of (the) soul in accordance with virtue, or if there are more kinds of
virtue than one, in accordance with the best and most perfect kind” (1098al618). An activity “in accordance with virtue” I take to mean an activity which
actualizes or makes use of that virtue. Human excellence has been defined as
the disposition that causes a person to perform his function
well (1106a21). According to the hierarchy Aristotle says that that good
which is desirable for itself and for which every other good is desired for its
sake is contemplation. Next best is the practical life of virtuous activity.
Some commentators object to the basic concept that human beings
have a function. If they could prove their objection it might not be overstating
the case to say they would thereby reduce Aristotle’s main argument to a
house of cards. When Aristotle says “the virtue of a thing is related to its
proper function” (1139al6) he claims things have a function. A hammer
functions to pound nails, a saw to cut, a horse to run, “carry his rider, and
(face) the enemy” (1106a22). The virtue of a hammer would be the proper
distribution of weight and hardness, a saw its sharpness, a horse his strength,
stamina, and courage. For humans it is the exercise of his highest faculty and
excellence in conduct. One expression of a common objection to the function
argument is from Eric Moore in his doctoral dissertation, “Desert, Virtue, and
Justice” (University of Massachusetts, February 1998). Moore argues there
that the function thesis:

seems to imply that humans are like tools - - they have a
particular function, and the virtues are what allows them to
perform their function well...However, it does not appear that
there is a characteristic function of persons. We are not like tools
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in at least one important respect: we were not designed to do
anything, either well or poorly, because we were not designed. So,
the virtues are not those dispositions which allow us to achieve
our function (p. 125-126).

Moore offers no explanation to support his claim “we were not designed”.
In Aristotelian fashion, Moore does accept the claim that a virtue is “a
disposition to do certain acts, and those acts exemplify that virtue” (p. 133).
For example, truthfulness is a virtue, someone with this virtue is disposed to
tell the truth, and a specific episode of truth-telling is an action that
exemplifies this virtue. Moore then argues that having the virtues is a desert
base. People of virtue deserve good things; people with vices are not entitled to
these same good things. Moore’s projects are to present and defend a view
that the moral virtues are legitimate desert bases and to argue for a theory of
justice that calculates virtuous merit. All these general points accord with
Aristotle’s ethical system; Moore seems only to resist Aristotle’s move of
elevating theoretical wisdom to the top of the hierarchy. One justification for a
split with Aristotle is that Moore believes there is more than one way to lead a
good life and this is represented in his expansion of moral virtues to include
artistic, social, and athletic excellences. Presumably these lives can be
commensurate. In Moore’s list talents for music, painting, and gardening are
artistic moral virtues and strength and hand - eye coordination are athletic
virtues. Actualizing these virtues entitles someone to good things. And it is a
plausible and appealing notion that there are numerous ways to lead a good
life.
Moore concedes, with his example of Mike Tyson, that a tension exists
between virtues that make a good person with those that make for a good
athlete. Being clear about this tension seems important not only in defending
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Aristotle’s function argument but also for educating the young.
Using Tyson as an example Moore proposes that on the basis of his
athletic abilities and talents Tyson is deserving of good things. This seems
right. Because of his diligence (one of Moore’s moral virtues) Tyson has
developed his natural gifts of strength, quick reflexes, and stamina to become
one of the world’s best current boxers. However, his inability to control his
emotions has resulted in numerous assaults on people and allegations that he
has raped women. For these crimes he has been repeatedly jailed. So, Moore
suggests, an accurate appraisal of Tyson would be that he is a very good
boxer, and thereby deserving of social goods, and that he is probably less than
a good person, thereby “not deserving of many good things as (a) moral
person” (p. 127). But it is not at all clear, if athletic talent is morally virtuous,
how this alleviates the tension. Under Moore’s scheme developing athletic
talent is one way to lead a morally good life.
Many great athletes, musicians, actors, and painters, in order to
diligently pursue their art, have left their families and friends devastated and
have spent their mature years in a drugged, self-absorbed, and unproductive
haze. On the basis of their remarkable works these individuals justly deserve
some social goods but it is unlikely we should characterize their lives as happy
or attribute much merit to them based on moral virtue. So an obvious way to
resolve the apparent tension is to object to Moore’s inclusion of athletic,
musical, and artistic talents under the umbrella of unqualified moral virtues. I
see no reason to assume winning a title fight is a moral victory. For diligence
to be morally praiseworthy the activity and motivations have to be assessed.
Diligently training for a title fight motivated by, say, a desire to have access to
more and more women to treat badly and to earn money to spend on drugs
does not qualify as virtuous intentions or activity. Diligence, then, may be a
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desert base but it is not an unqualified moral virtue. If, however, athleticism is
a moral virtue, then Moore’s scheme implies Tyson is not deserving of many
social goods even though he might win several world titles. For regardless of
how diligently Tyson trains, if his training is motivated by base intentions,
then his diligence is on the wrong grounds for the wrong motives. Therefore,
Tyson has not been “morally diligent” according to the definition of virtue
Moore explicitly accepts from Aristotle. Furthermore, Moore offers no
explanation of why diligence should be “chosen for its own sake” or how it is
intrinsically good. It is hard to imagine how this could be done since it is easy
to think of examples of persons working diligently for ignoble ends. Since few
people would dispute Tyson is a “good” boxer, Moore’s inclusion of athletic
talents and diligence as moral virtues does not seem to be persuasive. We
might conclude that a person can be deserving of good things based on
something other than virtuous merit.
The mere claim that people are not designed does not address Aristotle’s
assertion that happiness consists in the exercise of a human’s highest
function - that feature distinct to man. Moore seems to assume his phrase
concludes the argument and, without further elaboration, he dismisses the
case. But if this refutes the function argument it would imply happiness
consists in innumerable activities - pleasure for some, wealth for others or,
from Moore’s list, the exercise of the moral virtue of hand - eye coordination.
Presumably Moore finds Aristotle’s attempts to refute these ends as extrinsic,
secondary goods to be inconclusive.
One objection to this thesis is found in Martha Nussbaum’s article
“Shame, Separateness, and Political Unity: Aristotle’s Criticism of Plato”.
Nussbaum offers an example of an assembly line worker, X, at a General
Motors plant who performs the same repetitive task all day, day after day. X
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may consider himself happy (by exercising his hand - eye coordination). But
Nussbaum remarks that “there certain sorts of activities that are unworthy
of the diverse capabilities with which most humans are endowed. Even if X
likes his work, we can still call it degrading and subhuman, his position a
shameful one” (1980, p. 400). When and if a machine is designed to do the
work of 10 people, or 100, how will this affect X’s self respect? As with a
person who dedicates his entire career to campaigning for a politician who is
eventually revealed as a thoroughly disreputable character, false beliefs,
objectively verifiable to X himself, will demonstrate X’s shameful condition.
Moore’s design argument does not refute Aristotle’s rich metaphysical and
psychological description of man’s higher faculties. Moore may simply believe
in a different ontological scheme. Beliefs aside, Moore offers no persuasive
argument to discredit Aristotle’s function thesis, although the claim that there
are innumerable ways to lead a good life is compelling.
Aristotle’s rich psychological description introduces an alternative way
to understand the doctrine of the mean. His doctrine suggests that a prudent
man will organize extrinsic and lower level intrinsic goods so as to contribute
optimally to a morally virtuous life or to the maximization of contemplation.
The good life, then, is not a composite of all intrinsic goods. For each individual
it will be only those amounts of lower level goods that contribute to the good
life. As Kraut states: “A perfectly happy life...will have all the goods he needs not all the goods there are” (1989, p. 308). So a good life is not enhanced by
directing one’s attention to acquiring more than is needed of extrinsic goods
(e.g., money). Such activity will infringe upon time better spent in
contemplation. Since the proper amount of goods varies from person to
person - just as the proper diet varies for a professional boxer in training from
that of a poet or a musician - no precise and universal rule can establish the
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mean ^ everyone as it applies to these lower level goods. Practical wisdom
and the autonomous direction of one s own life will determine each person,s
correct measure.

Any account of conduct must be stated in outline and not in
precise detail...Now questions of conduct and expedience have as
little fixity about them as questions of what is healthful...the
agents are compelled at every step to think out for themselves
what the circumstances demand (1104al -10).
This seems to be why the person with [A] needs [B]. One will be
deflected from contemplation by unbridled appetites or malformed
dispositions. For each of us, then, the correct decision, he tells us, “lies in our
perception” (1126a5). We must work out for ourselves how much is just
enough of the lower level goods so as to maximize the upper level intrinsic
goods. But what is universally true is that neither too little nor too much of
extrinsic goods will contribute optimally to maximizing intrinsic goods.
Aristotle has a plausible and appealing theory on how children develop this
correct perception which leads to good character.

Notes on the Development of Character in Aristotle's Ethics

Since children cannot have a fixed disposition, their characters cannot
yet be truly virtuous. Intuitively this might seem to commit Aristotle to hold
a disreputable attitude toward children. Children, it seems, cannot be
virtuous. What redeems him, I think, is this. By definition, virtue is more
than an isolated act that is good. If it were not, then the coward, who is clearly
capable of acting bravely on one occasion, or the habitual liar who tells one
truthful statement, could be appraised favorably - in a “snapshot”
assessment - at the time of these fleeting moments of uncharacteristic
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bchfivior. Furthermore, a. liar or a coward may be motivated, on some specific
occasion, to do a good deed only by some perceived immediate extrinsic benefit
or immoral aim. Consider the Tyson example. Thus the requirement for an
agent to choose the act “for its own sake”. So a virtuous act has to be more
than an isolated and random performance of, for example, a brave or truthful
deed; these deeds must emanate from an agent who is in a particular state of
mind. Aristotle makes this explicit.

Virtuous acts are not done in a just or temperate way merely
because they have a certain quality, but only if the agent also
acts in a certain state, viz. (1) if he knows what he is doing, (2) if
he chooses it, and chooses it for its own sake, and (3) if he does it
from a fixed and permanent disposition (1105a28-33).

It follows that an assessment of one’s character cannot be made
without insight into the disposition of the agent. Therefore, good character will
be comprised of a fixed disposition to perform virtuous acts, the cognitive
awareness of why these acts are good, and a desire to perform them for their
intrinsic value.
Motivated by personal advantage, the one episode of truth-telling by the
habitual liar fails to meet several of the required conditions. So just as we will
not consider the liar to merit the excellence of a truthful disposition on the
basis of one true statement, neither should we ascribe virtue to children until
they come to understand truthfulness as intrinsically desirable and conducive
to a good life. This is not to say children are not fully capable of performing
good acts from which good habits develop. This is, then, a far more respectful
attitude toward children and a more optimistic picture of moral development
than that implied in Kohlberg’s theory. But since children as yet do not have a
clear understanding of what constitutes a good fife, how can good character
develop?
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Myles Bumyeat, in “Aristotle on Learning to Be Good”, offers a
compelling interpretation of Aristotle’s answer. Burnyeat credits Aristotle
with a more comprehensive theory than a Socratic or Kohlbergian
intellectualism - theories that suggest moral development is predominantly a
process of cognitive sophistications. Burnyeat also credits Aristotle with a
plausible psychological theory.

A wide range of desires and feelings are shaping patterns of
motivation and response in a person well before he comes to a
reasoned outlook on his life as a whole, and certainly before he
integrates this reflective consciousness with his actual behavior
(1980, p. 70).

Living as they do under the sway of desires and emotions young people,
Aristotle writes, “often make mistakes” (1128bl6). Aristotle does not dispute
Matthews’s belief that children, even very young children, are genuinely moral
agents because “they are capable of sometimes doing the right thing for the
right reason” (Matthews, 1994, p. 56). Aristotle conceives of a settled
disposition to develop in a sequence of stages with both cognitive and
emotional components and by virtue of the blessings of nature, the
advantages of a good upbringing, and living in a society hospitable to
institutions supportive of virtuous conduct (Aristotle, 1176b; Burnyeat, 1980).
Bumyeat outlines the course of moral development with the use of the
rather cryptic Aristotelian terms “the that” (or, to be used here from the
Thompson translation, “the fact”) and “the because”. For a person to get
ahold of “the fact” is for that person to know or believe that something, x, is
true, as in x is true = x is truthfulness is a virtue. Good parents, teachers, and
political leaders impart these “facts”. A person can know x is true or believe
on authority that x is true and not yet truly understand why x is true. Having
“the because” is understanding why x is true.
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The man who knows for himself is someone with “the because” - in
Aristotle’s terms he is a man of practical wisdom equipped with
the understanding to work out for himself what to do in the varied
circumstances of life (1980, p. 71).

This is a feature of the final stage of moral development. At the first
stage, with the advantages of a good upbringing, children will hear about
virtuous conduct and the specific moral virtues (e.g., truthfulness, courage,
temperance, etc.). They will become familiar with those actions “in
accordance” with virtue. What they learn specifically is that these actions
are noble and just. This gives a cognitive dimension to developing virtue
through habit. For if a requirement of a virtuous act is to choose x for its own
sake, habituation must entail more than the mere recognition of x - type acts.
The morally developing child has to be on the way to understanding why x is
true. Contrary to the critics of indoctrination who charge that habituation is a
mindless conformity to authority or a repression of emotion,
Aristotle’s conception of being habituated in good conduct is to be
forming correct ideas regarding the nobility of virtuous acts, discerning
appropriate exemplifications, and desiring opportunities to directly experience
virtuous conduct. The direct experience is accompanied by the pleasures
these acts bring; this is another essential step in the process of forming a
mature sense of values (Bumyeat, 1980). Since our natures are such that
what is thought to be pleasant is what we will pursue, Aristotle considers it of
primary importance in early training that pleasure and pain be appreciated in
conjunction with the right objects. “True education” Aristotle states, is to
learn to be pleased by the right things (1104b).
The instruction appropriate to this age, Joel Kupperman believes,
“should center on dogmatic instruction of the central moral norms”
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(Kupperman, 1991, p. 175). Kupperman supports this view in three ways.
First, children should not be expected to reflectively justify why lying, murder,
or theft is wrong. This would simply be age-inappropriate - analogous to
sending a novice skier down an expert slope. Second, any society in order to be
secure must be able to agree upon some basic set of moral norms without
question and to be able to distinguish these from ones that invite respectful
disagreement and debate. In the basic set ought to be a promotion of the
moral virtues, and clear prohibitions of specific things such as murder, torture,
rape, child abuse, mistreating animals, and discrimination. Third, dogmatic
instruction in the clear cases is important because moral reflectiveness at the
mature stages needs a foundation of habits and attitudes to which one can
appeal. Analogously, we should not expect children to read a novel before they
learn the alphabet and the basic rules of sentence construction. But we do
want all children to read.
So the first stage of moral development is the introduction to and the
grasping of moral “facts”. The advantages that benefit acquiring “the facts”
are the blessings of a receptive temperament, good parents and teachers, and
a hospitable society.
The second stage is when the good acts learned through practice become
“second nature”. At this stage truthfulness begins to characteristically
emanate from the child. When an action becomes second nature the person
has a cognitive grasp that x is true and begins to emotively respond to x as
pleasurable.

Aristotle holds that to learn to do what is virtuous, to make it a
habit or second nature to one, is among other things to learn to
enjoy doing it, to come to take pleasure - the appropriate pleasure
- in doing it (1980, p.77).
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Having been trained, as Aristotle says, “from infancy to feel joy and grief
at the right things , the proper attitude toward pleasure and pain is key to
developing a good disposition (1104bl4). Inappropriate enjoyment of a virtue
would be to do acts that exemplify a virtue merely to get one’s allowance or to
incur favor. Here again we see the important connection between acts and
feelings. A person with the wrong motivation or feeling can perform an act
which gives the outward appearance of a good act.
The appropriate pleasure of virtuous activity is to enjoy it for its
intrinsic value and to appreciate it as a component of the good life irrespective
of contingent rewards. Vice, in the same regard, will begin to appear
unpleasant. Acts of theft and lying, for instance, to a child in the second stage,
begins to lose attractiveness and these acts will feel as though they go against
the child’s nature. This child need not yet understand why x is true, she only
need believe x is true and take pleasure in x type acts. But she is beginning to
learn for herself, in part because of the pleasure, that what she has been told
is true. How she learns this therefore has both cognitive and emotional
components. The step of learning to love an x type act for itself motivates
similar action since that which is pleasurable is attractive. She is, therefore,
on her way to choosing virtuous activity ”for its own sake”.
It is here that we can see a failure to do x will cause shame. With the
belief that acts in accordance with virtue constitutes the good life, vice seems
ignoble and unpleasant. When she fails, she will feel ashamed and pained
“internally, not consequentially” (Burnyeat, p. 79). The less well-brought up
child, being swayed by feelings of the moment and not cognitively aware that
virtue is pleasant will, as Burnyeat says “abstain from wrongdoing not
because it is disgraceful...but simply and solely as a means to avoid
punishment” (p. 79). External consequences, not a sense of shame, will be the
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only deterrent. If the perceived threat of external consequences has little or no
force, as is the case in many areas of modem life, the danger to healthy
development should now be self-evident. And here it is also important to recall
Matthews’s devastating objection to Kohlberg’s “good boy - nice girl” and the
law and order stages. Motivated by a concern to avoid punishment is not a
moral consideration. Embedded in Kohlberg’s theory is a improbable
assumption regarding transitions to higher stages.
Aristotle acknowledges that in the developmental picture, as activities
become second nature, change from one’s initial course becomes difficult. The
importance of early education comes through forcefully in this important
passage from Aristotle.

Now if discourses were enough...to make people moral...Many
and fat would be the fees they earned’, quite rightly...(but
lectures) are incapable of impelling the masses toward human
perfection. For it is the nature of the many to be ruled by fear
rather than by shame, and to refrain from evil not because of
disgrace but because of the punishments...of that which is fine
and truly pleasurable they have not even a conception, since they
have never had a taste of it...To dislodge by argument habits long
embedded in the character is a difficult if not impossible task
(1179b3-20).
The second stage of moral development, therefore, seems an
appropriate time to judiciously interject, with Socratic interplay, examples
that cover Matthews’s five dimensions. The variety of models, an increasing
clarity in defining characteristics, the added experience of the maturing
student to perceive various cases, and adjudicating conflicting moral claims all
can begin to teach students the complexity of applying their knowledge from
dogmatic instruction to particular cases. Their moral imagination, fueled by
noble and just motivations and sensitive to the feelings of others, will only
enrich the other dimensions. It is at this stage that Kupperman suggests
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teachers dispense with authoritative dogmatic instruction to allow
independent perspectives to develop. Moral instruction, to be effective, must
accommodate individual circumstance; imposing a rigid blueprint for all will
prove futile and is, in light of individual differences, undesirable (Kupperman,
1989). But the facts must first be there. If students are debating whether
truthfulness is, in fact, a virtue as opposed to, for example, a specific instance
when complete honesty will cause unquestionable suffering, then
developmentally they have things the wrong way around. The metaphorical
Platonic “puppies” will tear at arguments precisely because they do not have
hold of the “facts” to which they can use as guides in particular applications.
The final stage in Aristotle’s theory of moral development is reached
when the agent grasps “the because”. Here a person understands virtue to
constitute the good life, and he desires virtue for itself. With good fortune, a
person’s disposition is fixed and she chooses virtue for its own sake.
Virtue, she knows is pleasurable because it is noble and the noble is
pleasurable because it is good. The mature agent also has the practical
wisdom to work out for herself, in her particular circumstance, the right thing
to do. She has her lower level goods in perspective and she aspires to
maximize the higher level intrinsic goods.
In summary, a good character develops by performing good acts. These
acts are introduced to a child by authority figures as being right and good. The
child accepts these acts to exemplify virtue on external authority. Through
repetition and guided practice the child begins to realize that what she has
been told is true and with this belief these acts become pleasurable. Acts that
exemplify the virtues begin to become second nature.
As the child matures she begins to see the world in all its complexity as
well as to clearly assess her talents and limitations. As an individual in this
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world, to be self-respecting, she realizes that to engage in worthy activities is
what virtue requires. And to be self-respecting she leads her life rationally,
undeterred by unreasoned appetites, undeflected by empty glamour, and not
subservient to others in matters of designing and implementing her important
life plans.
Her own practical reasoning works out the specific details of the best
course for her life plan. She ranks and chooses activities and her reason
ensures the plan is objectively worthy and that she can carry it out.

Final Comments on Moral Shame

At 1107a27 in Book II of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle refers to a
“table” or “diagram” of the virtues and vices. This table is not listed in W. D.
Ross’s translation (Random House,1968) or in the revised edition (Oxford,
1980), It is fisted in J. A K. Thompson’s translation (Penguin, 1953).
Whether this is Aristotle’s actual diagram is a matter of speculation.
Included in the diagram of moral virtues in the Penguin edition is a
virtuous disposition called modesty. But at 1128bl0 Aristotle states: “It is
not correct to speak of modesty as a kind of virtue because it is more like a
feeling than a state”. Again at 1128b30 he writes, “Modesty can only be good
in a conditional sense...but this is not true of the virtues”. And the feeling of
shamelessness, along with malice and envy, he fists as feelings that are
intrinsically bad. Intrinsically bad things do not admit of a correct or proper
degree; however felt or done “it is impossible to act rightly, one is always
wrong” (1107al4). So the inclusion of modesty on the fist of virtues is suspect
for, at least, three reasons. Since shame’s deficiency is intrinsically wrong, it
seems improper to locate this emotion in a diagram where the proper measure
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is a virtue. Second, the text repeatedly and clearly implies it ought not be
there; it is not a virtue. Third, it seems unlikely, preposterous perhaps, to
suppose Aristotle would advise us to choose a conditionally good thing “for its
own sake”.
Aristotle does say shame admits of degrees. Modesty is the mean
between shamelessness (the deficiency or “too little”) and shyness (the
extreme or “too much”). Since shamelessness is the extreme, a “sense of
shame” might be considered synonymous with “modesty”. A shameless
person, then, is one without a sense of shame, or, as Nussbaum defines it, a
person who “evinces good or confident feelings where we would think a good
man right to feel shame” (1980, p. 399). It seems plausible that
shamelessness can also apply to a person who displays no particular feeling
toward committing a morally wrong act. Either failing to perceive some act as
morally wrong or through a complete indifference to moral considerations, a
person could be shameless without the good or confident reaction. This idea
has textual support in the Rhetoric where Aristotle describes shamelessness
to include “contempt or indifference” toward things “likely to involve us in
discredit” (1383bl7-19). This, then, to me, seems plausible and,
dispositionally and developmentally, just as bad. So let’s expand the
description of a shameless person as “one who is either unperturbed or evinces
good or confident feelings where a good man would be right to feel shame”. This
description seems to fit Aristotle’s portrayals of the shameless
man as one “who feels too little shame or none at all” (NE, 1108al7) and one
who “is not afraid of (disgrace)” (1115al5).
To illustrate a case of shamelessness lets take an uncontroversially
wrong act, torture, from the basic norms list for dogmatic instruction. The
case is “S tortures a child for pleasure”. By uncontroversial I mean the case,
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to all rational people, is objectively wrong. From this example we can see for S
to be shameless is for S to be both cognitively and emotionally in error.
S is cognitively in error because he lacks the disposition to have feelings
of shame in a situation and toward a certain activity agreed to be morally
wrong. So S is in error in at least three respects: 1) he fails to exercise human
excellences, 2) he is pursuing an activity that degrades himself and/or others,
and, 3) he fails to acknowledge the situation of his causing a child needless
suffering to be morally wrong. However motivated and by any rational
standard the torturing of children is a base activity. S is emotionally in error
because his disposition is such that he takes pleasure in an unworthy activity,
in a wrong object, and in disgraceful behavior.
A sense of shame is conditionally good because it is an element in the
right disposition toward disgraceful behavior and conditions. A person will
have a sense of shame, as Nussbaum says, “if the agent has a certain degree
of awareness both of the conception of value relative to which (some acts) are
shameful and of the nature of his own pursuits” (1980, p. 403). A man of selfrespect, she continues, “must be one who reliably pursues activities that...are
worthy for a human to pursue (p. 403). A sense of shame, then, acts to
designate honorable parameters. To be able to discern these parameters and
to be emotionally attached to stay within them is to have cognitive and
emotional assets. And to have these assets is conditionally good.
Nussbaum’s requirements for a man to be truly self-respecting are that
“reason must rule both as legislator, choosing and ranking activities, and as
administrator, ensuring that the rational plan is effective” (p. 405). From this
we can extract three ways a person may come to feel shame. A person may
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realize her plan or activity is 1) directed by her appetites, not reason, 2) that
her beliefs about the activity or plan are mistaken and now seen as unworthy,
or, 3) that she is not the autonomous director of her life plan, but subservient
to the practical wisdom of others. Regarding this last consideration, a
rationally chosen life plan appeals to objective standards - that which
determines what is worthy of humans. Autonomous direction is the practical
wisdom to work out the particular details for oneself within the confines of
objective standards. These standards establish the hierarchy and each man’s
practical reason works out the specific details “relative to us”.
This consideration suggests a problem with the preliminary definition of
moral shame, SI, presented in Chapter 3. Nussbaum appeals to these
objective standards and to autonomous self direction in her objection to
Rawls’s subjective formulation of self-respect. Nussbaum proposes: “Perhaps
an ideal of rationality or of the rational judge may need to be built into the
initial specifications...of self-respect” (p. 402). Just as has been argued that
Rawls mistakenly proposes a condition is not shameful if a person does not feel
it shameful, and self-respect is a feeling of capacity or conviction, so to is SI,
open to objection on the grounds that it is too subjective. SI reads:

SI: X is moral shame = df. X is a painful, self-regarding feeling of
diminishment that acknowledges an agent has failed to live up to some value.
That value the agent: 1) regards as important; 2) considers it to constitute an
essential component of living a good life; 3) acknowledges it to be a value to
which he ought to aspire; and, 4) one that a better self would have more closely
approximated.
In this definition moral shame has no objective standard by which to
measure the “value” as important. Each person’s conception of living a good
life will dictate where and how sub-standard deviations occur. So a
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legitimate objection could be this is no improvement over Rawls’s definition of
self-respect or over the inherent relativism of values clarification. The
elasticity of personal circumstance ought to be built into how virtues are
exemplified, not in disputing what the virtues are. For some individuals
cognitive errors of omission, personal inclination, or poor upbringing will
effectively eliminate objectively virtuous activities (e.g., truthfulness, courage,
patience, etc.) from the field of values “to which (all) ought to aspire”.
According to SI, if one does not think of some virtue as important, one will not
be diminished by its absence. It is simply not there to calculate. But it is the
case that good teachers and friends of good character will at times enlighten us
as to the limitations of our self perceptions.
Appealing to Aristotelian principles of objectively worthy human
activity, SI might be repaired in the following way.

S2: X is moral shame = df. X is a painful, self-regarding feeling of
diminishment that acknowledges an agent has failed to live up to what virtue
requires. That virtue the agent now: 1) regards as a worthy disposition; 2)
considers it to constitute an essential component of living a good life; and, 3)
acknowledges it to be a virtue a prudent person would have more closely
approximated.
With S2 it still is the case that if a person is unaware of a virtue then he
will be unashamed of his failure to exemplify that virtue in action. It does
seem with S2 that that person may now be objectively blameworthy for his
ignorance whereas under SI the person himself established the range of the
virtues. I do not know how to repair it otherwise.
With this revised definition and with insights from the Aristotelian model
of development we can proceed to answer Research Question #2.
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An Answer to Research Question #2

If one accepts the Aristotelian model of moral development, then it
follows that a sense of shame will have a beneficial influence on the formation
of a person’s character. In the above I have tried to argue why there are
persuasive reasons to accept this model as preferable to many alternatives.
An answer to the Research Question #2: “What impact might moral shame
have on character development?” requires us to view shame at each of three
broadly construed developmental stages. These stages correspond with the
sequence of Aristotle’s theory of acquiring the virtues.
With an example from a psychological research study of a fifteen month
old infant comforting another crying infant, Gareth Matthews supports his
contention that very young children “are capable of recognizing and accepting
a moral obligation” (1994, p. 56). This observation effectively discredits
Kohlberg’s theory of the stages of moral development, calls into question many
remarks by Piaget, and implies the narrow “toileting” focus of Erikson’s
preadolescent “shame” stage to be significantly inadequate. Nothing in
Aristotle’s work suggests disagreement with Matthews’s subtle but
devastating objection to Kohlberg’s theory.
In Book X of the NE, Aristotle writes: “Some thinkers hold that it is by
nature that people become good, others that it is by habit, and others that it is
by instruction” (1179bl8). In what follows in his text it appears Aristotle held
that all three contribute, in this order, to moral development.
Just as it seems to him that some people are born with a temperament
that is resistant to “discussion and instruction”, others, “by some divine
dispensation”, are receptive (1179b20). But anyone who spends time on a
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playground with young children, as I do, will observe when a child is hurt, there
will frequently be a universal display of concern. It will not be unusual for a
half a dozen of these “egocentric” toddlers to suspend their play, take matters
into their own hands, and assist the injured boy or girl to the nearest teacher
or to the nurse’s office. So Matthews is right. Very young children recognize
moral obligation, are sensitive to the suffering of others, and are capable of
doing the right thing for the right reason. More than a promise of reward and
the threat of punishment is present in a young child’s cognitive and emotional
machinery. So at an early age, children are capable of doing good deeds and
are innately sensitive to right and wrong. How else are we to understand
modem psychology’s claim that the saturation of television and movies with
violent images “desensitizes” young children to the suffering of others? To be
“desensitized” implies a prior state of sensitiveness. Whether all psychologists
recognize this implication, they are, perhaps inadvertently, attributing an
admirable quality to very young children. Given this, they would do well to
take Aristotle in all seriousness when he advises true education is learning to
take pleasure in, and to be pained by, the right objects.
At the first stage of moral development (approximately preschool and
elementary grade levels) and with the benefit of good parents and teachers,
children are introduced to the basic moral “facts”. How they are introduced to
these facts is extremely important. It is obvious that children of this age will
have little knowledge of the concept of character as a disposition which is
unified over time and they will be cognitively and emotionally limited in their
experience and social interactions. So instruction, as Kupperman insists,
ought to be dogmatic. But if we attribute the ability to do genuinely good acts
to children, we must, at the same time, recognize that when they make
mistakes their response can be, or is, more than a fear of punishment. So,
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again, there must be some capacity for a sense of shame that is innately
present and capable of development. Shame will impact on these children in
clear instances of violating these central moral norms, in reaction to causing
others to suffer, and in cases of perpetuating injustice, as in, perhaps, hoarding
all the cookies for oneself. Getting ahold of the moral “facts” is also getting
ahold of instances of clear violations. Allowing an insensitivity to violations to
fester is negligent instruction as is engaging in inappropriate debates that
confound cognitive and emotional reactions.
This innate sense of shame will emerge as a beneficial force as specific
acts become second nature in the second stage (roughly the late elementary
to, perhaps, the high school years). Guided by instruction in good conduct,
children begin to learn first hand that what they have been told is true. With
luck, the pain a child feels following a mistake or a transgression has an
internal component. This, it seems, is what Myles Bumyeat means when he
says “Shame is the semivirtue of the learner” (1980, p. 78). Having learned
that “x is true” is more than a mere conformity to the content of adult
instruction as a child begins to take pleasure in x - type acts. Following a
mistake, feeling ashamed expresses a desire to do better.
At this second stage the child has yet to take appropriate pleasure in
acts that exemplify the virtues because of the intrinsic value of virtuous
conduct. And the things that appear pleasant will be many. So mistakes will
happen. But now virtue is beginning to be desired as noble and just conduct
and a scheme of values - as the noble and the just - will become integrated
with what the young person desires.
Moral instruction at this second stage can emphasis the idea that
character is a disposition unified over time which encompasses commitments,
projects, goals, and responsible conduct. These young students will be
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receptive to the analogy that developing a virtuous character can be likened to
the effort and time it takes to be an accomplished musician, a good athlete, or
a formidable chess player. Children can clearly see they are, as yet, none of
these through no fault of their own.
Rules and principles dogmatically instilled can be examined, the
adjudication of conflicting moral claims can be discussed, and the range of
cases of the exemplifications of the virtues and the vices can be expanded. A
respect for multiple perspectives can be introduced and the appropriate and
inappropriate applications - or limits - of tolerance explored. This stage seems
critical for whether one develops a proper sense of shame as a semi-virtuous
disposition or merely one learns to only fear punishment. A sense of shame
will offer new motivations for virtuous conduct as one’s practical reason
becomes integrated with one’s desires. With only a fear of punishment the
taste for wrong objects can become habits. Shame will impact upon character
development with the cognitive assemblage of honorable parameters and in
the emotive attachment to objects as well as in thoughtful reactions to
weaknesses.
Early on, certain acts will be avoided because they are simply wrong. It
is not as yet clear why they are wrong. This would seem to suggest the child
will be somewhat perplexed by why she feels ashamed. But the second stage
brings a cognitive awareness that wrong is synonymous with disgraceful and
that disgrace connects with one’s character. This signifies that a child is
inspired by her sense of shame to avoid wrong acts by a fear of disgrace. Part
of the reason shame or disgrace is unattractive is because it is an internal
pain.
At the third stage (high school and on) when a disposition is becoming
settled or fixed, shame can contribute to one’s character to guard against a
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weakness of will. Good character has to be characterized as a strong
character. Strength of character can be characterized as the resistance to
emotional temptations and cognitive confusions. A mature character desires
the noble and the just. As Aristotle puts it:

The appetitive element in a temperate man should harmonize
with reason; for the noble is the mark at which both aim, and the
temperate man desires the things he ought, as he ought, and
when he ought, and this is what reason directs (1119bl5-18).

Aristotle’s temperate person has ahold of the “facts” and the “because”.
She desires virtuous conduct and the exercise of intellectual virtue for itself.
Irrespective of reward or public acknowledgment, she desires virtue for its
nobility. And her desire is, according to Aristotle, an uncorrupted and
incorruptible conformity with what her reason asserts to be good.
This view of the final developmental stage sheds new light on the
remarks introduced early in this paper that appeared so perplexing in their
apparent contradictory nature. Shame is becoming to youth because all that
seems pleasant is not so. All desire is yet to become reasonable. Part of the
struggle the continent man experiences is that there seems to be compelling
reasons to do something wrong. Some feature or features of an immoral
alternative appears tempting.
When cognition and desire are in time, affect - or pleasure in the good becomes a prime motivation. A sense of shame, as an awareness of honorable
parameters, informs cognition of the particulars in one’s unique situation. The
continent man will feel ashamed merely to be tempted and to have struggled.
The incontinent man will be ashamed to have succumbed to desires that
betray his hierarchical scheme of values. And to have succumbed, as
Aristotle says, and to feel as one should following a failure, is to feel an emotion
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that “ought not be felt” (1128b20). Introducing shame into the state of affairs
seen as an organic unity “does not make it good” (1128b33). Seen as a whole a
state of affairs that one is ashamed of is predominantly bad. But, as has been
argued, it is not the feeling of shame that makes it so.
Modem life, as everyone knows and as the interviews to follow
show, is indeed hard. Cowardly administrators, discouraged teachers, illprepared and overwhelmed parents, entertainment executive’s stupidity and
base motivations, and an association with influential, developmentally young
peers conspire to corrupt a young person’s alignment of desire and affect with
reason. Modem science even calls into question a person’s natural
receptiveness and ability to develop temperance with speculations on genetic
predispositions to infidelity, substance abuse, and uncontrollable emotional
reactions that require medication. Even the fear of punishment as an
incentive one should outgrow, resurfaces, as the interviews show, to tempt us
in new, profound, and many displays of ineffectiveness to be justly
administered. Recent high profile cases testify to the fact that with an
expensive defense team and shameless acts of perjury and obstruction of
justice, one can “get away” with virtually anything.
True Aristotelian temperance may be an attribute of saints. In many
areas of our lives - throughout our fives - continence is probably the best most
can hope for. All the more reason to keep a sense of shame operative.

Chapter Summary

This chapter reviewed five theories of moral development which
influenced different programs for public school moral education programs.
These theories were: the indoctrinative model, the theories of cognitive286

developmentalists Piaget, Simon, and Kohlberg, and a modern character
education theory. Following an explication of each theory, how the emotion of
moral shame is accommodated within the theory is reviewed. Next an
Aristotelian theory of moral development is examined. It is argued that this
theory of moral development is superior to the others previously reviewed by
virtue of its comprehensive analysis of character development, its
sophisticated view of virtue, and its recognition of shame’s beneficial
properties.
The Aristotlelian theory proposes a person develops moral character in
three stages. With good teachers and good fortune, in the first stage a child is
introduced to the basic moral facts. In the second stage the child becomes
emotionally attached to acts that exemplify the virtues. At this stage
virtuous activity becomes second nature, or, said another way, habitual. The
pleasure that one experiences from virtuous activity pleases one internally
and motivates continued virtuous activity. At the final stage, a person’s
cognitions, affections, and desires harmonize to pursue the noble and just.
This model of moral development permits the answer to Research
Question #2 to conform to these three broad stages of growth. Moral shame
alerts and sensitizes the young child to violations of the basic moral principles.
In the second stage, shame pains the child internally. Mistakes are recognized
as disgraceful and are seen as contributing to one’s disposition. Shame in the
final stage is the recognition that a person acted unreasonably. Right reason
recognizes virtue to contribute to a happy, noble fife. Reasonable behavior
requires one to desire and to perform good acts. Shame is the realization that
one has, in some way, erred.
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Interviews with children and teenagers as well as a priest, a rabbi, a
state trooper, teachers, and others testify to the fact that moral shame ought
to play a more prominent role in human experience than many of the theories
of moral education recognize. Pertinent excerpts from these interviews are
assembled in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 5

ANALYSIS OF DATA

Introduction

This study presents an analytical definition of moral shame, reviews a
series of alternative definitions, and describes several operative school-based
approaches to moral education. Interviews were conducted with a variety of
individuals who are professionally and/or personally involved with children to
ascertain their views - and their perceptions of the views of children - on
education, society, the development of character, and moral shame.
This study is guided by three research questions. These are:
1. What is the emotion of moral shame?
2. What impact might moral shame have on character development?
3. What implications for the reform of school curriculum are suggested
by the findings of this study?

As a result of the review both of the related literature in Chapter 3 and
of moral development programs in Chapter 4, an answer to the first research
question was proposed. It reads:

S2: X is moral shame = df. X is a painful, self-regarding feeling of
diminishment that acknowledges an agent has failed to live up to what virtue
requires. That virtue the agent: 1) regards as a worthy disposition; 2)
considers it to constitute an essential component of living a good life; and, 3)
acknowledges it to be a virtue a prudent person would have more closely
approximated.
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Chapter 4 reviewed school-based moral education theories and
programs and discussed how these theories accommodated moral shame
practically and conceptually. In light of the analytical definition, S2, various
objections to each theory were presented. An Aristotelian model was
presented and defended as a preferable alternative.
Surveys and interviews were conducted to determine how different
individuals perceive moral shame to impact upon character development and
to investigate whether their insights and their experience contribute to
possible suggestions for curriculum reform.
The analysis of the data corresponds to aspects of the second and third
research questions. These research questions provided the aim by which to
design the interview guide (see Appendix B). One aim of the interviews is to
determine whether the participants consider moral shame to contribute to
moral progress and to the development of good character (Research Question
#2). A second aim in conducting the interviews is to seek possible suggestions
for reforms to the public school curriculum from the insights of the
participants (Research Question #3).
The words of each participant provided the descriptive accounts, or raw
data, of the phenomena under study. Data from each interview were
transcribed, sorted, and complied according to the general interview guide.
This guide will be outlined following the introduction of the participants.

Participants

Twenty-four participants were interviewed for this study. Twenty-one
individuals agreed to have their interviews tape-recorded. The interview tapes
were transcribed verbatim by the researcher and a professional secretary.
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From the interview transcripts, excerpts were extracted and organized
according to themes relevant to the second and third research questions.
To protect the identity of the participants, all proper names have been
omitted. Participants are referred to only by their occupation (e. g., Priest,
Probation Officer, Elementary School Teacher #1, #2, etc.). All proper names
of schools and town departments, as in Amherst Police Department, are
omitted if these names might lead to disclosing the identity of the participant.
When a proper name appears in the transcripts and this section is quoted, the
name is replaced with the designation “XXX”.

In quoted sections, words

enclosed in parentheses are those of the researcher. These words were
inserted only to help clarify the meaning of the participant’s comments.
The participants were:

Priest: 71 years old, retired in 1998, converted to Catholicism, pastor at his
last assignment for over 12 years.

State Trooper: 46, has worked as a trooper for 23 years, employed in Western
Massachusetts, began career working through the District Attorney’s office in
several towns.

Social Worker (DSS): mid-forties, Supervisor of the Department of Social
Services - western Massachusetts, supervises staff of six case workers for
adolescents, oversees roughly one hundred and twenty cases “at any given
time”.
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Judge: fifty, hears cases in three different western Massachusetts District
courts, served on the bench for five years, previously criminal lawyer, married,
two children.

High School English Teacher (HSET): Late fifties, taught in the same school
for thirty-three years, married, three children.

High School Teacher / Aide #2 (HSTA): Early fifties, six years experience at
the high school level, artist, vocational arts instructor, married, two children.

Juvenile Probation Officer (JPO): Female, late forties, JPO for 15 years,
Bachelor’s degree in Criminal Justice and Psychology, Master’s degree in
Criminal Justice Administration, Associate’s degree in court stenography,
oversees approximately 400 cases a year which are primarily Children in Need
of Services complaints (CHINS).

Counselor #1 (Cl): fifty-one year-old female, twelve years at the elementary
school level, masters degree, married, two children.

Counselor #2 (C2): forty year old female, seven years in human service
organization, three years at the elementary school level, master of science in
counseling, divorced.

High-school student #1 (HS1): 17 year-old male, 10th grader, spent two years
in an court mandated alternative school setting, lives in foster home, Mother
has history of substance abuse, does not know who his father is, has lived in
mother’s home with an abusive boyfriend, serious criminal record (e.g., assault
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and battery, grand theft, breaking and entering, violating probation, lewd and
lascivious charges), has older sister who is deaf, older brother who is mentally
impaired, believes their problems are attributable to Mother’s past substance
abuse.

High-school student #2 (HS2): 15 year-old female, sexually-active, uses
recreational drugs, may drop out of high-school, failed every class in ninthgrade, father alcoholic, younger brother has serious record with police, lives
with mother and mother’s boyfriend, does not get along with either

High-school student #3 (HS3): sixteen year old senior, lives with biological
parents, honor student, accomplished athlete

Rabbi: fifty, served 10 years as rabbi in a small town’s only synagogue

Elementary School Teachers: Eight elementary school teachers from three
different schools were interviewed. These individuals range in age from the
mid-twenties to the early fifties. The grade levels that they teach range from
first to sixth. They are designated by order of appearance, an in EST #1,
followed by his or her classroom grade (e.g., EST #1 - 2nd).

Organization of the Data Analysis

The data are organized and presented according to the interview format.
The first portion of the interview sought to gather biographical data from each
participant. Some of this information is listed above. For those participants
who are, in some capacity, professional service providers for children, intake
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questions attempted to establish what the nature of their profession is, how
long they have been employed in this profession, and the characteristics of the
population they serve. When interviewing children and adolescents, the
researcher began by drawing a standard genogram with the student. In most
cases this procedure helped to establish a suitable comfort level to pursue
further questions.
The second interview question attempted to elicit information regarding
a participant’s view of the current state of affairs of: a) the family; b) children’s
view of the importance and purpose of education; c) an overview of the general
nature of student’s behavior; and, d) children’s level of respect for authority
figures.
The third interview question asked participants how they thought
children respond to acts of wrong-doing. That was, in some instances, followed
by a fourth question which attempted to establish what connection that act,
and the reaction to that act, might have to authoritative directives or
prohibitions.
In some instances the fourth question was expanded to include the
participant’s view on what motivates ethical behavior. The researcher’s
objective was to determine, in the view of these participants, why people
behave. Is the motivation grounded in a fear of punishment or social disgrace?
Or to people behave because it is the honorable thing to do?

Delimitations

Over six hundred and fifty students and more than thirty professional
adults participated in this study. The overwhelming majority of these
participants are white and middle class. All reside in New England. All school
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personnel and students who were surveyed or interviewed attend or are
employed in public schools.
Future studies would benefit by conducting surveys with an more
diverse population in different geographical locations. A comparison of results
complied among more diverse public school settings as well as with those from
private and religious schools might offer intriguing contrasts. Furthermore,
the survey results included in this study do not cover all grades in middle and
high school. No results from a college age population were gathered.
Canvassing these grades in future studies would give a more accurate basis
for comparison and analysis.
This study was hampered by the researcher’s relative inexperience in
the art of interviewing and in designing research instruments. While reviewing
the transcripts it became apparent that many avenues to investigate as well
as points that merited clarification were missed. The Detention survey
instrument was administered to allow respondents anonymity. This made it
impossible to follow up on brief but provocative answers. This restriction
detracted from the data that could have been studied in Chapter 5.

Interview Questions and Excerpts
The Family

There is an enormous body of research on the family and its effect on
child development. Divorce rates and the detrimental effect of a family
breakup on children is well documented. Many scholarly research projects
have been conducted on the added stress one-parent families experience as
well as the negative effects on children of fatherless families.
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These concerns and the apparent lack of parenting skills were concerns
expressed by most of the participants. A representative comment comes
from a high school teacher.

(HSET) Modeling is either non-existent or negative. We are
talking two-thirds of the population in this school...or take that
down to 30 or 40%,...they just don’t have it. Parents are either
single and overwhelmed with their children or there is just too
much work and responsibility for them to supervise their kids.
They don’t know how to set standards...Parents, today more than
ever, need to be educated.
Much the same concern is heard from a juvenile probation officer [JPO]
and a Department of Social Services supervisor [DSS].
[JPO] I don’t know how it got from there to here...but it has in the
last 20 or 30 years. I think there has been a big change in
parenting skills...The parental abilities to not only curb delinquent
behavior, but to teach the basics of right and wrong and to be
able to handle their children out in public. (I)t is just not there. So
I spend as much time teaching parents to parent as I do teaching
children (that) they have to abide by the law.
[DSS] These kids just don’t have (life skills) because dads have
never been there, they don’t know who dad is, or where dad or
mom is...Those (parents) who are there are so overwhelmed,...
just overwhelmed. They can’t manage it all. They (the children)
don’t have anyone to connect with. And I think that that is where
some of the hopelessness is driven from.
Little here seems new or surprising. These comments seem to reflect
and support common perceptions on the difficulties facing and the apparent
shortcomings of current parenting. But, three points of interest concerning
families were not expected by the researcher. These were: 1) the number of
high school students living on their own, 2) the number of very young children
who live in one-parent or divorced households, and, 3) the tendency

of custodial parents and guardians to offer excuses for their child’s
misbehavior.
In this order, pertinent interview excerpts are as follows.

[HSET] So many kids in our school have jobs now. They have
jobs after school...some...start at 3:00 o’clock...and end at 9:00
o clock at night - sometimes even 10:00 o’clock. I notice more and
more kids getting their own apartments. When I first came here
for a kid to be living in an apartment was almost like somebody
getting a divorce in the 1920s. Now it’s normal to be living in an
apartment and to be holding a job to pay for the apartment.
Interviewer: Could you give me a rough percentage?
[HSET] I’m going to say between 5 and 10%.
Interviewer: That’s alot of kids.
[HSET] Yeah, that’s alot of kids.
It is also common knowledge that the nation is plagued by a divorce rate
of approximately fifty percent. However, what was not clear to this
researcher at the outset of the study is that, in some regions, that rate
accurately applies to households with very young children. The researcher
assumed that couples would be more stable when their children were young
and couples would tend to separate or divorce with more frequency after their
children had grown.
This exchange occurred in an interview with two third-grade teachers.

[EST #1- 3rd] Easily half the children in my class live with one
parent or are living with guardians or foster parents. I’d be
surprised if half had both parents at home.
[EST#2 - 3rd] That sounds right for my class, too. I’ve never
asked them, but if you check the emergency cards I bet that’s
what you’d find.
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Informal conversations with a number of other elementary school
teachers confirmed that the ratio of children living in single parent households
compared with children living with both biological parents is thought to be 1:1.
Another startling observation that emerged from the interviews was the
commonplace occurrence of parents attempting to deflect the responsibility
for misdeeds away from their child. Deeds cited in the interviews range from
the relatively minor incidents of undone homework, failure to bring in signed
permission slips, and inappropriate dress to more serious issues of fighting,
lying, stealing, and dangerous bus behavior. “Some parents”, one teacher
[EST #3 - 6th] remarked, “will first try to find out what another (classmate)
might have done to cause their child to behave this way. I’ve had some
(parents) put me on the defensive.”
One elementary school teacher spoke of an incident of a first grader who
stole money from a class fund collected to buy trees for a school beatification
project. The evidence clearly identified one particular boy. In numerous
private conversations, the boy repeatedly lied about his involvement. Finally
he admitted he had, in fact, stolen the money. After school, on the day of the
boy’s admission, the teacher called his mother.

[EST #4 - 1st] The mother made all sorts of excuses for his
behavior. “His father is working nights now, the house has been
upside-down lately, it’s understandable because we’re having
money troubles” those kinds of things. I couldn’t believe what I
was hearing. I think stealing and lying are pretty serious things.
It was as if she didn’t want to be bothered about what her son did.
Not only that but I got the impression since she wasn’t bothered
about it -1 shouldn’t be either. She said something to me like
she’d appreciate it if I didn’t bring it up again because she’d take
care of it and it really wasn’t any of my business.
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A school counselor (C#l) confirmed that parental excuses are
commonplace.
Well, just yesterday I called a mother about (a boy) who has been
fighting on the playground. She told me (he) has been getting
teased to and from school. If we had done something about that,
the fighting would never have happened. I guess she’s trying to
tell us part of this - it’s our fault.
Parent’s attempts to minimize or excuse student misbehavior is not
confined to the elementary schools. With her daughter on report for suspected
marijuana use on school grounds, a high school teacher recalls the parent’s
response to this allegation by asking: “Do you know what’s been going on in our
house lately?’ and “Do you know the stress she has been under?” (See
Appendix F).
Several teachers lamented the loss of the days when children feared the
double punishment they would receive when they went home from school. The
obvious implication is that in years past teachers could rely on parents to
support them in disciplinary matters. Although some parents do, many
teachers mentioned this is not support one can automatically rely on.
Secondly, several teachers expressed frustration with their administrators.
After citing a few examples of incidents where the administration failed to
follow through on his efforts in disciplinary issues [HSTA] remarked simply,
“After you get burned a few times, you learn”. The high school English teacher
voiced similar concern.

[HSET] Teachers do get up in arms when the administration
tends to side with the students...Whether there is a verbal or
physical confrontation with a student and a teacher, the
administration, in the opinion of many teachers, goes out of its
way to satisfy the students...So, I’m afraid to say that that puts
out a pretty awful message to kids - which basically means they
run this institution ultimately. Right?
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As a result, many teachers comment they are increasingly hesitant to
involve parents or administrators in issues of student misbehavior.
In summary, themes which emerged in discussions of the family with
the participants were: 1) parents have less time and/or a compromised ability
to consistently model and to insist upon appropriate behavior from their
children; 2) more children are working long hours after school; 3) teachers
cannot rely on parents or administrators to support their efforts at discipline,
and, as a result, many teachers overlook obvious infractions for fear of student
reprisals or in anticipation of administrative non-support; and, 4) several
participants in education referred to a dual trend of parents offering excuses
for their child’s misbehavior with administrators tending to appease the
parents and child rather than support the teacher.
One could conclude that if the behavior of school-aged children and
adolescents is to be restrained by an external fear of punishment, then the
perceived force of this restraint is relatively weak.

Children’s View of the Importance of Education

Over the past decade there has been a concerted effort - one might say a
media blitz - to impress upon children the importance of a education. Famous
television and movie personalities make commercials, full-page newspaper
advertisements are run, and popular musicians make announcements at
concerts aimed at encouraging children to stay in school. Nevertheless, many
educators remain disheartened by the attitudes of the students themselves.
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[HSET] There is more gross indifference to the education process
itself. There is more of an attitude from the students, “Did I
pass? Did I get the ‘D’ ?” I hear (that) from alot of kids today “Did I get the ‘D’ ? The sense of academic achievement is not
there. It is just not a big deal. They know they can get into the
Community College and they know they can get in to some other
college.
One inference we might draw is that more and more students do not
consider knowledge to be intrinsically valuable. Indeed, this notion may be
true. But what seems uncontroversial is that an increasing number of
students appear to require proof of how their academic achievements will be
converted into financial compensation. One problem of this view lies in the
fact that for many students academic achievement does not appear to be
defined by or synonymous with high levels of learning, critical thinking skills, or
reading comprehension. For many achievement can merely be measured by
the acquisition of a diploma or a degree. This seems to be the sense in which we
are to understand how a ‘D’ is thought to be adequate. And most students who
wonder if they “got the D” acknowledge, by virtue of the question, that they are
not sure if they have done the bare minimum in order to pass. No one harbors
any illusions of the student having developed a love for learning after these
kinds of dialogues.
An elementary school counselor speculated that one reason for student
indifference to education is the comparative unattractiveness of the learning
process.

[Cl] Reading is way down on the list (of what children enjoy). It
takes time to relax, to find a quiet spot to get into reading. Kids
want to be immediately involved, immediately gratified.
Computer games do that, and TV...And there’s peer pressure, too.
I’ve never seen a group of kids (who) had reading in common...but
they get really animated talking about (computer) games and
horror flicks.
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This same counselor commented on the possible influence of the
internet. Bits of knowledge now seem adequate to many students and parents.
The sustained effort to master a subject now seems burdensome. The
counselor suspects many students have the the impression that knowledge
can be “punched up” and printed out in mere seconds.
The concerns for financial reward and the minimal effort to pass emerge
in the interviews during discussions of homework. In this interview topic two
unexpected themes emerged: 1) students have begun to dictate homework
policy in the upper grades; and, 2) some administrators foster the attitude that
the learning that occurs through homework be justified or defined by the level
of future job readiness skills.
The idea that learning and homework are subject to a job
compartmentalization or time constraints is evident in the following.

(HSET) In general there is less of an emphasis on doing
homework. That’s another big change in attitude or aspiration or
value. Homework just doesn’t seem to be what it used to be.
More and more kids, even (honor student) kids are saying that,
“Weekends are my own”, and prior to that teachers were of the
mind (that) weekends were the time teachers gave kids more
homework. They would be able to do it and it was a time they
could get caught up on the behind work. That seemed to be logical
and that seemed to work. Now we’ve got (students) saying, “We
aren’t going to do homework if it comes on (week-ends).” So what
the teachers have done, generally speaking, is to give weekend
assignments and have them due on Tuesdays instead of
Monday...Many kids reason, “Look, I work here five days a week,
that’s my job, now it’s over”.
A local newspaper article reports similar teacher and administrative
reactions in Boston high schools. In Boston it is being reported that “as many
as two-thirds of students...will ignore homework assignments. In response, at
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least 5 percent of Boston teachers have simply stopped assigning homework”
(Nicole Cusano, “Greenfield Recorder”, 23 November 1998).
Very few kids do homework, and those that do it, every other
sheet has the same ridiculous answers”, he (David Dingley,
English teacher, Madison Park High School) said. “They cheat”,
said Dingley, who assigns homework three or four times a week.’
“You have to keep giving it, but it is hard to base a lesson on
homework if the work isn’t being done” (Cusano, 23 Nov. 98).

Two months after the publication of this statistic in the Recorder, Time
magazine cited a Boston Globe article which puts the percentage of teachers
who have stopped giving homework at 20% (Morse, “Too Much Homework!”,
Time, 25 January 1999). But in the Time article, homework seems to be an
area that currently admits of extremes. The cover story focuses mainly on
children in wealthy suburbs and private schools that are overwhelmed by the
amount of homework they are assigned.
One aspect in common appears to be the justification of economic
advantage as an incentive to do homework. This comes through clearly in the
comments of an area administrator in the Recorder report.
Frances Zak, principal at the Ralph C. Mahar Regional High
School in Orange, said he didn’t have statistics on homework at
his own school. But he said homework is more important than
ever at a time when the job market requires strong
communication and math skills (Cusano, 23 Nov. 98, italics
added).

Zak’s emphasis on mathematics and communication skills
demonstrates a shift from the educational priorities from HSET’s early years
in teaching.
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[HSET] When I first came into teaching I think the general
mission was to make children literate, make children moral,
make them aesthetically conscious, make them love learning for
the sake of learning...I think our mission statement now excludes
some of that stuff. I think other forces in this country of ours are
trying to move it in the direction of more pragmatism. I think the
mission now seems to be career pathways and the school to
work...They are asking us to operate almost as these kinds of
vocational schools. We are not here to prepare kids for vocations,
we are here to prepare them for life.

Although her students are young to be contemplating possible
vocations, an elementary counselor commented that on the basis of the fifth
and sixth graders she knows, the media blitz does not appear to have been
effective.

My kids from impoverished backgrounds don’t seem to
understand they can get out of (poverty) with an education. They
don’t have much motivation to go to college. When I do hear
something about how they will make a living it’s I want to be a
rock star or I’ll marry somebody with alot of money.
To summarize, in the themes that emerged in the discussions of
children’s view of education, children are perceived: 1) to want material
justifications for how effort spent on schoolwork with be rewarded; 2) to he
more attracted to those activities that offer immediate gratification; and, 3) to
assume, in the upper grades, that they are entitled to participate in
administrative decisions regarding, specifically, homework assignments.
Complaints from interview participants regarding homework are that too few
children do enough or do it adequately while national news articles report some
teachers have stopped assigning it or assign far too much.
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Perceptions of Student School Behavior

Elementary school teachers and a high school teacher all report gradual
changes in student behavior. A third grade teacher [EST #5 - 3rd] remarked
that she is shocked by the lack of common courtesy displayed by her students.
“I guess their parents never talked to these kids about common courtesy...At
this level I shouldn’t have to teach them to say thank you or excuse me.”
Another teacher [EST #6 - 4th] spoke of the lack of deference shown to adults
in the hallways and the stairwells. “Children must think I’m suppose to move
for them or stop my conversation with another teacher (to speak with them)”.
When the high school teacher began his career, “you would never hear of a
young woman using the heavy T word...now it is so common”. In one high
school, it is not a matter of overhearing vulgarities, some of it is directed at
teachers.

[HSET] I feel threatened because with kids today...they will snap
at you. They are very angry. They will humiliate you if they can.
They will do whatever they can to strike back. It isn’t like it use
to be many years ago when you could say something to a student
and...he would feel a certain...presence there on your part. Today,
students do not find it an issue to curse teachers.
An interview with a social service provider testifies to the fact that even
with the children who chronically misbehave, the seriousness of their
misbehavior has increased.
[DSS] I have been seeing these kids for 20 years and working
with this population of kids and I don’t see these kids as the same
kind of kids I saw 10 years ago, or even 6 or 7 years ago. The
population I work with here are CHINS (Children in Need of
Services) kids. The CHINS law was never designed to manage
the types of behaviors these kids are presenting. You know the
CHINS statue was developed for kids who ran away from home a
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couple of times...The kids that are coming through now with
CHINS petitions have multi-level problems. They are failing in
school, they are out for weeks at a time, they are substanceabusing. Regardless of all the education you give them they are
incredibly sexually promiscuous...I don’t remember these kids
having so much chaos at home...the violence is much more
extreme than it was. So I do see a different phenomena
happening here. I’m not sure exactly what it is, but these kids are
acting out much more recklessly and much more destructively
then I think they ever did before.
The explanation given for some of this misbehavior is that the effects of
poor parental modeling are not always immediately apparent. Some parents
who displayed delinquent behaviors when their children were young,
apparently assume that since they now have reformed, their children
should - or will - automatically model this new parental example. The social
worker views this as a myth.

[DSS] (A) very consistent (element) to all the kids (whom) we see
is the chaos that they experience, the trauma they experience
when they were young. It is not ongoing. It doesn’t have to be.
And this (fact) confuses parents. When these kids come in here
and I sit down with a mom who appears to be very intact with me,
doing a wonderful job today, and can’t figure out for the fife of her
what her child is reacting to, why he’s behaving this way. What
these kids are reacting to is what they got from their parents in
their early years - the very, very critical years. And I find out (as
young children, they) were witnesses or victims of sexual abuse
(or they were) witnesses of domestic violence. All those lines got
very blurred very early on for those kids (as) to what is
acceptable, to what you grow up believing, and what is okay. And
that is what Fm talking about in terms of what kids really know is
right or wrong. They are reacting to what was presented to them
in those very early, critical years...These kids basically need re¬
parenting.
In the experience of the DSS worker, the population of children she deals
with do not think reflectively nor do they, in her estimation, exhibit moral
imagination. The implications of the following exchange are troubling.
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Interviewer: Do these kids realize how dangerous their behavior
IS?

[DSS] I don’t think these kids stop to think at all, to question, or
think about the effects (their behavior) has on themselves...I am
talking about very significant abuse here because it is a part of
the culture of their group and it is okay and acceptable by their
group.
Interviewer: You mean if it’s approved of by their group then it’s
acceptable behavior?
[DSS] Yes.
Interviewer: Can’t they think for themselves?
[DSS] There is very little reflection or projecting (on) any of the
consequences that may be on themselves - let alone on other
people.
Interviewer: Why is that?
[DSS] They just don’t seem to have the time.
Interviewer: The time?
[DSS] Yeah. I think so. What really strikes me is that even alot
of the kids that make it through high school or graduate from
college really don’t get time to sit down and think about much of
the future other than “How am I going to make enough money to
get my own place and pay for my car?”, and things like that.
Even for the kids that get alot of family support - financially,
emotionally, whatever, it is just scary. Day to day stuff is very
scary even for the put together kids.
Interviewer: Are you saying most all kids are preoccupied with
material things?
[DSS] Survival, I think. All kids seem to have a sort of
shattered sense of security.
Interviewer: That’s sad.
[DSS] Yep. It really is.
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Worries about car payments hardly constitutes a survival issue, but
this may be quibbling over word choices. What does seem clear is in the view
of many social service providers, many children and adolescents are focusing
on lower level extrinsic goods. An important theme to be revisited is why do so
many children appear to be morally unreflective? It is clear that the DSS
worker believes most children today are otherwise preoccupied.
Themes that emerged from discussions concerning student behavior can
be summarized as: 1) many younger children are believed to be entering the
early grades unversed in basic manners and deference to adults; 2) for a
segment of the population, destructive behaviors are at dangerously high
levels; 3) a significant population of children are openly hostile toward
authority figures; and, most importantly, 4) there is a perception that many
children are morally unreflective.

Children’s Level of Respect for Authority Figures

In an interview with a Rabbi, he recalled a conversation he had had with
a young woman in the mid 60s. At that time, he considered her view to be
representative of many of the young people toward authority figures.
Moreover, he considers this view to be prevalent today.

[Rabbi] I remember talking with this young woman...and she
was saying the difference between my generation and (hers was)
that I thought that the government was upstanding and right and
I was dismayed when I found out that they lied to me. She
started out with the assumption that they lied to her and so she
had no expectation of righteousness out there...I think that to the
extent that you think that the system and the world is corrupt,
then you know whether you get punished or you don’t get
punished, doesn’t mean alot because it is not coming from a place
that is just in its own self. So, if you can get away with it, okay.
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This attitude would rate very low on a Kohlbergian stage theory. And
this young woman’s logic is not very impressive. From her premises to
conclude, “If you can get away with it, okay” can be classified as both
fallacious and repugnant. Unpunished wrong-doing is still wrong irrespective of
the supposed level of governmental corruption. It is not clear how shame will
affect her character development. Presumably she, at one time, derived her
values from societal conventions. Since the authority who established these
conventions has proven to have been corrupted, supposedly the conventions
are thereby negated or invalid. Now one might suppose for her to violate a
convention will not elicit moral shame. But for her to then suggest one ought
to get away with whatever one can implies such a person now concentrates on
maximizing her own good, however that is construed. Better had she appealed
to some higher notion (e.g. the spirit of the law, personal commitment, or what
morality requires).
The priest believes this woman’s view is prevalent among the young.

[Priest] It’s the authority that is gone. And I would contend that
one of Idle reasons that there is no respect for authority or anyone
else is because there is no respect for self. I watch kids on Main
Street...they have no regard for themselves...I think that one of
the things that brings disrespect for authority is that everything
tells us that we must have what we want. You watch television.
What it is is you can’t live without this bicycle, or whatever...It
not being obedient to authority and being a law abiding citizen, it
is getting enough money for everything you want. And if you don’t
have the money, you’ll get it anyway you can. And, of course,
there is no morality in that.

Three beliefs are advanced here. First, it is assumed that most adult
authority has eroded. Second, the notion that young people have no respect for
others because they have no respect for themselves has taken on the status
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of received wisdom. The priest may have thought he was stating the obvious.
But this notion does not seem to be necessarily true. Most of the children I
interviewed for this study had relatively high opinions of themselves. Not all of
them thought highly of others. Nothing seems paradoxical here. One can
easily imagine an agent, who, however deluded, thinks highly of him or herself
while having disdain for everyone else. In the earlier section on self-esteem
this point was discussed.
The third point is that the priest reiterates the social worker’s
observation that a percentage of young people seem consumed by material
things. He seems to imply that those who acquire these things illegally tend to
be morally unreflective regarding the means of acquisition (e.g., by deception or
theft). As the priest observes, this disposition entails either a disregard or a
certain contempt for authority, for laws, and for religious commandments.
In an attempt to verify the frequently stated observation that a large
percentage of children appear to have little respect for authority, the
researcher devised and conducted a survey that asks participants to rank
fifteen professions on a scale from 1 to 5. A score of 1 signifies the participant
has little or no respect for individuals engaged in that specific profession and a
score of 5 signifies the participant highly regards those individuals (see Table
1). From the fifteen professions, five that can be regarded as authority figures
(Mother, Teacher, Priest, Judge, Police Officer) were extracted and ranked in
order (see Table 2).
The aim of the survey was threefold. One objective was to determine
how the authority figures would actually fare. Second, it was of interest to the
researcher to see how the rankings would change as children matured. Third,
the researcher was curious to see if the rankings of those professions that are
usually associated with liberal compensation (e.g. professional athletes,
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lawyers, movie actors, etc.) would support the comments of the
participants who suggest many children appear to value money (or material
things) above all else.
For the researcher the survey had surprising results. It is noteworthy
that there is little variation in the scores across grade levels. In particular the
scores between the 2nd through the 6th grades are remarkably consistent.
Mother, lawyer, stock broker, television actors, priest, and rock musicians
fluctuate less than .65 across all grades. And, according to Table 2, authority
figures ranked relatively high. For instance, the profession of priest - although
low among the authority figures - ranked higher than a lawyer and a rock
musician while scoring comparably to a movie actor/actress and a professional
athlete. For second and third graders this seems to be a sophisticated, yet
unlikely, response. An encouraging result was that up to and including the
sixth grade, mother, police, and teachers scored above 4.0 and in some cases
significantly higher. And professions in athletics, acting, and law - obviously
well-paided occupations - scored only moderately. There seems to be much
reason for optimism here (See Tables 1 and 2).
It might be objected that the survey merely asks children what they
think, or, less impressively, what they think adults would like them to think.
Psychological experiments and studies have persuasively demonstrated that it
is one thing to say what we might do or what we believe and quite another, in
real life, to act upon these statements and beliefs (Hartshome and May, 1930;
Milgram, 1974). It may also be objected that surveys cannot distinguish
between what a person’s character is and what that person pretends to be or
incorrectly believes him or herself to be.
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Judge

Judge

Police

T able 2. Rank Order of Authority Figures by Grade Level

An example that illustrates both these ideas comes from the
researcher’s experience administering the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for
Children - Third Edition (WISC-DI). In five years the researcher has given the

WISC-m to well over five hundred elementary school children between the
ages of six and twelve. Of these five hundred students, although
disproportionally white and lower middle class, several races and most
socioeconomic brackets are represented. One question on the comprehension
section asks: “What are you supposed to do if you find someone’s wallet or
purse in a store?”.
Appropriate two point answers include: turn it into the cashier, to the
owner, or to a security guard, give it to the police, and mail it if there is an ID.
In the researcher’s experience a very small number of the youngest students
could not think of an answer. At all ages, however, the great majority of
students do offer something in response. Yet only one student responded with
a devilish smirk, “I’d keep it” and he quickly retracted this answer. The point
being: Clearly not all children, or adults, would return the wallet. We leave it
to the reader to estimate the approximate ratio.
In an recent article, Howard Gardner objects to assessing intelligence
solely with standardized “paper and pencil” instruments. One objection is that
these tests frequently contain questions that admit of cultural bias. Gardner
illustrates this point with the question cited in the text above. His objection
reads:

Some class bias are obvious....Others are more subtle. Suppose
the question is what one should do with money found on the street.
Although ordinarily one might turn it over to the police, what if
one had a hungry child? Or what if the police force were known to
be hostile to members of one’s ethnic group? Only a canonical
response...would be scored as correct (1999, p. 70).
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But Gardner is injecting a conflicting moral claim that is not present in
the original WISC-III question. He may have been thinking of Kohlberg’s
Heinz dilemma. And Kohlberg would not have classified the Heinz example as
a dilemma unless stealing were not considered to be wrong. He sought to
determine the level of cognitive sophistication by means of adjudicating
conflicting moral claims. His dilemma essentially asks “What would be
required to override one’s obligation to respect another person’s property?”.
But every child the researcher tested recognizes - barring a moral conflict that a person is “supposed” to return lost property. So all the children
recognized their primary moral obligation. Whether one does return the wallet
is another matter. But that, as all these children recognize, is not the
question. The operative word is “supposed”. Personal circumstance aside,
viewing the test results in this way is encouraging.
One can concede the points suggested by the psychological studies and
from various testing experiences regarding actual behavior and still find
reasons for optimism. The point of asking children to rank professions was an
attempt to elicit a response which weighs a student’s recognition respect as
opposed to their appraisal respect. This asks a student to report what respect
they consider is due the office of full-time mothering, police work, or the
political life, not their individual assessments of their mother, their local police
officers, or Bill Clinton. As the researcher administered this survey, he was
careful to make this perfectly clear to each class. So even if children
responded with what they think adults would like them to think, there is still
an indication that, if the responsibilities of these professions are met, then 1)
children are aware that they merit respect, or 2) it is the case that they
acknowledge others consider them to he honorable. Even if we accept the
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weaker of the two alternatives - children acknowledge that since adults
consider certain professions to be honorable, then they should too - it is still the
case that when these children are contemplating vocations for themselves,
this consideration is there to be weighed in their calculations.
Another reason for optimism is that the authority figures ranked
relatively high. Even if deeds do not always coincide with words, it is a hopeful
sign that those professions that advocate high ideals (learning, family, legal
and moral behavior) are recognized by children as meriting respect. One
conclusion to draw from this is that adults in the professions that enjoy
recognition respect have an obligation to conduct themselves so as to merit a
high level of appraisal respect.
To summarize the themes of the responses to this question: 1) the topic
of moral unreflectiveness surfaced again; 2) a prevalent view among many
professionals is that adult authority has seriously eroded; and, 3) results from
the respect for professions survey suggest that the recognition respect for
authority-figure occupations is high.
If it is a reliable and valid finding that among those elementary and
secondary school children surveyed, recognition respect for positions of
authority is high, then one can justifiably infer that these children will feel
some obligation to abide by authoritative standards or directives. These
standards and directives will affect a child’s thinking and emotions. But a
breach between survey responses and actual conduct does seem to exist.
Does this disparity signify a reaction of guilt or shame? Interview question #3
pursues this apparent disconnection.
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Children’s View of Legal and Ethical Wrongdoing

Distinct new themes emerged in the interviews regarding how some
young people seem to respond to legal and ethical wrongdoing. Following Jeffrie
Murphy’s definition of repentance (Chapter 3, pg. 67), one hopes if someone
were to commit some moral transgression or legally prohibited act that agent
would, at the very least, remorsefully accept responsibility for his act, be
sensitive to the harm he caused, “repudiate the aspects of (his) character that
generated the act”, and resolve to reform and/or make amends (Murphy, p. 3).
If an agent reacted to a moral wrongdoing in this way, then, we might submit,
that person is capable of making, or has made, moral progress. The emergent
themes from the interviews on Question 3 suggest there are a multitude of
barriers to this moral progress.
Two related themes expressed were that many young people appear to
be genuinely unrepentant for wrongdoing as well as unintimidated by the
possible consequences they might face from authority figures if they were to
be apprehended. Regardless of the specific evidence in individual cases,
denying personal responsibility for wrongdoing is a common reaction observed
by a juvenile probation officer.
[JPO] I don’t think they come here at first thinking any specific
way about their transgression because I think most kids come
here thinking they have been victimized. The cops just happen to
grab them...they are on their case...They don’t admit any guilt or
that they are accountable for their behavior. It is always
somebody else. And if they don’t accept any guilt, then they can’t
change - they will never change. You know it’s always some
excuse, but they all are angry for having been caught or
victimized (italics added).
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One worry about children with this attitude is that there might be some
justification for it. If the child’s experience supports the notion that
“everyone’s doing it”, say, smoking marijuana, then he might consider his
arrest to be somewhat arbitrary. And if he views pot-smoking as legally or
morally justifiable - or something soon to be legalized - then prosecution for it
will be seen as a type of victimization. A Catholic priest attributes such an
attitude to be justified by the prevalent belief that one’s conscience can
override all religious, ethical, and legal proscriptions.

[Priest] There’s no sense of sin, there is just a thing of being
caught. You see, there is just no idea of sin. Sin, of course, is the
breaking of God’s law, it’s going against the divine law and I think
all sense of... any kind of natural law is (also) gone. There is no
such thing because we are heavy in this “it’s all your conscience”
is the rule. That is the guide to your behavior - a guide from
reality. So consequently, if you feel it is perfectly alright what
you are doing then it is alright, there is no sin involved...The kids
aren’t sorry they have done something to upset their parents,
they are sorry they have been curtailed in what they want to do.

The perception of arbitrary arrest is exacerbated for some offenders by
their view that the court system is incapable of exacting just punishments in
the great majority of cases. The researcher visited two court houses - each
twice - on juvenile day to simply observe the moods of the people who were
there waiting to appear before the court. The emotions that the majority of
the children and adolescents appeared to exhibit on all four occasions might be
best described as ranging from a mild annoyance at an inconvenience to
outright disdain. Whatever these emotions were, they seemed far removed
from feelings of disgrace or guilt. Other interview participants had stronger
reactions to the mood of the waiting defendants.
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[Priest] I thought “What is this? Some kind of class outing?” But
no, these are the ones being hauled into court. Incredible! It was
chaos!
[State Trooper] The attitude in the hallway just reeksL.In XXX
they’re not scared at all. It s like we’re going to get the revolving
door treatment, it s just another day in paradise. I see that in the
hallway.
On this question of the emotional response to appearing in court, the
following exchange occurred with the Probation Officer.

Interviewer: I have noticed when I have been here (in court) that
there are juveniles sitting around on the benches and they appear
to be very cavalier. I don’t know if this is a youthful bravado - a
front they are putting on - or if they are genuinely unaffected by
the process. I have been in court with elementary school children
and I’ve been amazed at how contemptuous they are of apparently - all authority figures.
[JPO] I think alot of it is bravado, but Fm not going to brush it off
- because in court you’re going to see kids that are going to be alot
tougher because they are with their peers so they have to come
off as really cool...But do I see alot of kids that breakdown and cry
or show great remorse? Usually not until they see the handcuffs
being put on them and they are being brought out of the
courtroom and then all of a sudden they realize that there are
intense consequences...You have to get to that point of really
showing them that you are going to follow through because not
many people in these kids lives ever follow through as far as
(doing) what they say they are going to do.
What is unfortunate is that the probation officer observes “great
remorse” to coincide only with “intense consequences”. Of the children who
appear, only a small percentage are led away in handcuffs. So one explanation
for this relaxed or unaffected demeanor is that many offenders seem to know
that it is unlikely they will ever be punished. It seems clear to the judges, to
the police, and to the offenders that the likelihood of intense consequences is
remote.
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Interviewer: I talked with a police chief in Athol and he told me
that he had seen a study that says that a very high percentage of
kids believe that the chances of being apprehended, brought
before a court, sentenced, and then to have to serve their full
sentence is very slight. Literally one in a million he said - if that’s
possible. Somewhere along the line (these children believe) they’ll
get off or their case will be dropped. And the study goes on to say
the kids are precisely right. I wonder if this accounts for the
cavalier attitude I see in the hallways and in the courtroom.

Judge: I think that that is true. I think that is absolutely true
and it’s almost like a badge of honor to come before the court. We
don’t do anything within the system to discourage that. For
instance if you come to XXX Court on juvenile day you will see
wall to wall people, wall to wall kids, and what goes on in the
corridor is beyond our control. We don’t have any way to deal
with that physically...There is supposed to be a certain amount of
confidentially involved when there are juveniles involved, but it is
everyone else’s business. Kids are getting together and laughing
at the system, as to what occurs, the noise that occurs.
One of the most interesting themes to emerge from the interviews is a
reason which helps explain the apparent cavalier demeanor, or response, of
youthful offenders to ethical and legal transgressions. Some offenders
calculate the magnitude of their wrong-doing by how they feel those who have
been trespassed against should react to the transgression. According to
many offenders, an appropriate response would be how the offender himself
would feel if it happened to him. By an inability of the criminal to empathize
with the actual suffering his or her crime causes, the seriousness of many
crimes, in turn, is devalued. A school shooting incident is a case in point.
The “Boston Globe” reports Evan Ramsey, 16, admitted to shooting and
killing his principal, one student, and to wounding two others. The Globe
reports Ramsey had this to say about how the families of the injured parties
should react.
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But he was less apologetic when asked about the effect of the
crimes on friends and relatives of the victims: “I think I’ve
(expletive) these people’s lives up - temporarily. And if they’re not
(expletive) morons they’ll get on with their life. What happened
was really screwed up, but that don’t mean that they should just
stop living and stop doing what they were doing before (Steve
Fainaru, Boston Globe, 20 October 1998).
Similar sentiments were expressed by a high school student who was
interviewed. A relevant portion of that interview with this 15 year old reads:
[HSS#1] I still steal cars once in awhile. Just for the
excitement. Plus I don’t get to drive much, But I have never
gotten caught for it, so I really haven’t had a chance to think
about it.
Interviewer: Would you think more about it if you were to get
caught?
[HSS #1] Well, I would probably think about a better way to do
it. What do you mean, How do I feel about it?
Interviewer: Well, you said that you felt bad when you stole that
last car and...
[HSS #1] Yeah, but I didn’t get to take it out of the driveway. It
was basically they had to wake up in the morning and see it
halfway down the road because I accidentally snapped the
ignition and I couldn’t get it started. It was getting too early.
Interviewer. So you felt bad about the snapped ignition...
[HSS #1] Maybe because I didn’t get to drive it around first. I
don’t know.
Interviewer: Then you’re not feeling sorry for the people.
[HSS #1] Maybe. Maybe I am, maybe Tm not. I guess I don’t
know how I feel about it. Some things I don’t feel bad about.
Drugs and alcohol I don’t care because it’s not good for them. Like
I wifi steal somebody’s cooler of beer. I don’t really care. Who
cares if they have to go buy more. I just take it. I know if it was
mine I would be pissed and I would try to find out who did it, but I
wouldn’t sit there for the rest of my life and worry about it. If the

321

car was stolen, it was stolen. I get pissed when someone steals
my bag of weed or something, but I get over it. If that’s how I feel
about people then that’s how I expect them to feel about me in
the same way. Even if they don’t, oh well.
Interviewer: So if they are really upset that their car was stolen
or that their house had been broken into, they’d be overreacting?
[HSS#1] Yeah. Get over it!

Later in the interview HSS #1 expressed concern over the possibility of
being arrested for stealing cars. He believed that because of his previous
record, mandatory jail time would result from a car theft conviction. Unclear
as to the nature of the concern the researcher attempted to gain clarification.
Interviewer: Do you feel guilty afterward?
[HSS #1] I don’t know if I would call it guilt or if I would call it
worrying. Maybe I didn’t wipe off all my fingerprints. I worry
about protection. Did I remember to get all my tools? My
fingerprints might be on something I forgot.
Interviewer: Oh, I get it. I think. How long do you worry?
[HSS #1] Coupla days. Cops don’t show up by then, they’re not
coming.

At one point in a subsequent interview with another high school student
the researcher addressed a range of cases. HSS #2’s matter-of-factness over
widespread wrongdoing seemed significant to the researcher.

Interviewer: Tm going to list off a few things and I would like you
to tell me, not what you think I’d like to hear, but what you think
most kids you know think about these things? Okay? How do you
think most kids you know feel about stealing from stores?
[HSS #2] Kids enjoy it.

322

Interviewer: How about stealing from the phone company?
[HSS #2] What do you mean by that?
Interviewer. Well, credit card fraud, charging calls to someone
else.
[HSS #2] They don t care. My friends steal from each other, so
stealing from the phone company is nothing’ to them.
Interviewer: How about cheating at school?
[HSS #2] If it benefits them? I don’t know anyone really who’d
care about that. I mean, I know there are some good kids in my
school - they do their homework and study - but most of them
don’t care.
Interviewer: So if they had the opportunity to cheat on a test
they would?
[HSS #2] Yeah.
Interviewer: Okay, what do you think most of your friends think
about cheating the government - like not paying their taxes?
[HSS #2] I’d say all of them would if they had the chance.
Interviewer: Do teachers ever bring up any discussions about
some of these things - like cheating or stealing - here at XXX?
[HSS #2] No.

The themes that emerged from the third research question support the
impression that many youthful offenders appear unrepentant in response to
their supposed wrongdoing as well as unaffected by the possible punishments
that might be imposed. There is also the impression that many children have
what we might call an “episodic life view”. “Snapshots” of ethical behavior
can stand alone; they need not connect with the past nor the future. At the
risk of stretching the metaphor too far, when a snapshot is not pleasing, it
never is put in a picture album; it is disposable. And this might explain the
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impression of* concerned, observers that many children appear to be morally
unreflective. An episodic life view need not calculate discrete acts in the global
self-assessment of one’s character. And this is a different type of
rationalization from the view that a particular act is out-of-character or that
one acted under coercion or from some fatalistic predetermination. This view
suggests ethical conduct and one’s character is not unified over time but the
result of a subjective and selective memory of only discrete and disjointed acts
or “scenes”. No one suggests this is advisable. It does, however, appear to be
happening. An elementary school counselor articulated the episodic life view in
this way.

[Cl] I think TV and movies are largely responsible. Kids see so
many acts of violence and people just go on with their lives - if
they’re left standing. “Pulp Fiction” is an example. It’s all out of
sequence, just disjointed acts of violence. There’s no connection
to how people are after (committing violent acts). And the “Die
Hard” movies. Bruce Willis is in those too. Hundreds of people
get killed and at the end he (Willis) is reunited with his family with
some kind of happy ending. After killing all those people he looks
fine. It’s back to life as usual. I think kids are acting like that though not to that degree obviously. But it’s a very skewed sense
of reality.
Interview question #4 attempts to examine the emotions and the beliefs
of the episodic life view in more detail.

Motivational Forces
When asked, “What do you believe is a stronger motivational force for
people - external restraints (e.g., fear of punishment, the fear or social
disgrace, ostracism from the community) or internal restraints (e.g., personal
morality)?” a State Police Officer responded that he believes the hold of social
sanctions on families and individuals has significantly weakened because the
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community, through uninvolvement, is perceived by many observers to tacitly
condone misbehavior.

[State Trooper] I asked some other (police officers) when I knew
I was coming, “What do you think? What do you think about
shame?” I think they all were a little to quick to say - police in
general - “Nobody cares”. Still I have to admit that they are kind
of right, they don’t care. I really think alot of people just don’t
care. Even some good people just want these problems to go
away and in a way they don’t care either. I think the social
perception that a criminal gets., .is kind of like saying “Okay just
go away and do it, I don’t care. Just go do it over there in your
comer and don’t bother me. It’s alright if you want to do it.
That’s not really social disgrace, it’s not. It’s acceptance and
condonement. Just go over there, right? There is a place for
everything and the place for it is over there.
An interview with a Rabbi suggests that, for the Jewish community,
this is significant change that has occurred only within the last fifteen years.

[Rabbi] There was a great deal held under wraps in Jewish
homes and I think it has opened up in the last fifteen years. It
was a disgrace if you were unemployed, whether somebody (in
your family) had a mental disease, whether someone had
substance abuse problems, whether there was violence in the
house. Those kinds of things were not talked about in public
(because) to be part of America you had to be good otherwise we
were outsiders. Outsiders were dismissible...So in order to secure
one’s place in America’s society you had to be good.

To be dismissed or ostracized by one’s social group has traditionally been
a powerful incentive to abide by the prevailing conventions. Asked about
internal versus external restraints, the Rabbi related this incident from the
60s that lends credence to the power of ostracism.

[Rabbi] In some ways I don’t know the answer. I don’t know
what’s going on in people’s minds, but I know in some settings it's
the push of the community on the individual. There was this
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(situation) that took place in Boston in the late 60’s which the
community really got down on this slum landlord. He had this
property and his tenants had tried to get him to work and
upgrade it and he just ignored them. The tenants at one point
brought him in front of the court in Boston. The court said there
were obligations the tenants had abused and that the landlord
had abused...But...what they said was until he agreed to do (the
repairs) that no Jewish institution may grant him any privileges.
In part what made that work was even the Jewish social settings
went along with that, so that the country club would not allow
him membership. And that became very public shame in terms
of the community saying we are going to name this person and
put him in a position of excommunication until he complies with
this requirement...There is really nothing in most places where
you can bring that kind of pressure to bear. You know if someone
was doing something in XXX or whatever town and the
community said they wanted to publicly call that person to task,
there is really no mechanism to do that. You don’t have any
authority or framework to do that in most places. That story in
Boston is a somewhat unique example, but it is a powerful one for
what it offers. And there is a piece of me, when we talk about
how to move people, that thinks it is increasingly (important)
that the community has a role to play, though it is not clear to
me how you get to a place where the community can play that.
Much of the force behind the early indoctrinative model of moral
development was propelled by the cohesiveness of the family, the school, the
community, and the church in transmitting the same message to children. If
it is true that adult authority has seriously eroded, that church attendance is
down, that parents and teachers are often at odds with one another, one worry
is what then constitutes this modem “social group” for children today. The
composition of each child’s social group would seem to vary greatly in
contemporary society. This concern, for the high school English teacher,
accounts for a “futility we are sensing in the schools (which) is the same type
of futility we are sensing out of the schools - in society in general: this lack of
control that the adult population has on the younger population”. The priest
expresses a similar thought, remarking: “Today there is no discipline because
there is no morality and you have nothing to hold over their heads . Recall the
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DSS supervisor who implied for many children the influence of one’s peer’s will
override other ”groups”. When binding social conventions for these adolescents
are self-imposed they can be profoundly misguided. To come to see these
conventions as misguided seems unlikely if, as the DSS supervisor testifies,
these children don’t “stop to think at all”.
Recent social science studies on binding conventions offer neither
encouraging results nor hopeful predictions. In “Moral Credibility and Crime”,
Paul Robinson summarizes some preliminary research findings on why people
are predisposed to lawful behavior. His findings suggest social
disapproval to be one of three important independent variables which
encourage people to obey laws.

Beyond the threat of legal punishment, people obey the law
because they fear the disapproval of their social group and
because they generally see themselves as moral beings who want
to do the right thing as they perceive it...But one key condition
must exist if personal moral commitment and the power of social
disapproval are to be harnessed: criminal law must be seen by the
potential offender’s social group as an authoritative source of
what is moral, of what is right...More specifically, the social
science studies suggest, the extent of the law’s power to gain
compliance depends upon the extent of the law’s moral credibility
(Atlantic Monthly. March, 1995, pp. 75-6).
Robinson suggests that people will obey the law, or feel some compulsion
to obey the law, more readily if: 1) they perceive the law to be
an “authoritative source” of what is moral, and, 2) they believe the law will be
applied justly (1995). By applied justly, Robinson means people get what they
deserve. This is clear from his clarification of the term “moral authority”.

By “moral credibility” and “moral authority” I mean criminal
law’s reputation for punishing those who deserve it, under rules
perceived as just...and where punishment is deserved, imposing
the amount deserved - no more and no less (p. 76).
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If this is true, it is cause for worry for Robinson cites specific
percentages to show, according to his definition, that the law has no moral
authority.
The overall conviction rate among those arrested is 30 percent.
Fewer than half of those convicted are sentenced to prison...the
median time served by those actually sentenced...ranges from 5.5
years for murder to 2.2 years for kidnapping to 1.4 years for arson
(p. 73).

For the threat of punishment to regain “moral authority” Robinson lists
several necessary reforms that need to take place. Among these are: a
substantial revision of parole, abolishing probation, the reform of rulings on
what can be submitted or repressed as trial evidence, eliminating diplomatic
immunity, expanding the powers of the police, and significant revisions of plea
bargaining guidelines (1995). We can speculate that virtually no thoughtful
observer expects these reforms to happen anytime soon.
A state police officer expressed the discouragement his colleagues feel
regarding the ability of the police to assist the courts in exacting just
punishments.

[State Trooper] Til tell you after O. J. (Simpson) all the cops - ALL THE
COPS - are so bad (negative) about going to court...As bad as it was
before O. J., it’s ten times worse now. You can’t get anything. It’s like
the attorneys are putting in stuff that’s almost asking you to prove your
existence...They come up with everything, like “Prove you were on duty
that day”. Pm not kidding you. It’s that bad...All you have to do is make
the slightest mistake in any of your (evidence) readings and your case is
out the window. I mean the attorneys know it and the criminals know it
because they are getting off more and more routinely...They tried to
make the L. A. P. D. into a conspiring police department, and they are
making it the same (for police) in every courtroom.
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Robinson’s suggested legal reforms might help to create a more just
state of affairs (as in, more people will get precisely what they deserve), but
his argument is grounded in a dubious philosophical principle. When Robinson
states that the key condition to harness the power of personal morality and
social disapproval lies in the recognition that the authoritative source of what
is right is criminal law’s efficiency rates of punishment, he elevates law above
morality. This suggests one’s personal morality is defined by and confined to
the parameters of lawful behavior. Social disapproval is similarly constricted,
if not more so, since public disclosure is required. But a good person is more
than a law-abiding citizen. Motivated by self-interest someone can technically
obey all the existing laws begrudgingly. Morality is clearly broader than lawful
behavior.
The primary difficulty is the inherent circularity of his argument.
Robinson claims a person will be more readily disposed to obey the law if he
perceives the law to be moral. A law is moral if that law is applied justly.
When a law is applied justly - exacting the appropriate punishment when
deserved - than it is moral. So Robinson appeals to the notion of the just
application of a law to define moral, and he appeals to the notion of moral to
define the just application of law. In Robinson’s axiology, or theory of value,
morally right is contingent upon a just application of rewards and
punishments. But this would seem to be a necessary condition of whether a
state of affairs is just or unjust and not whether it is moral or immoral.
From the findings of his own research Robinson concludes the justice
system does not punish all those who deserve it. Those who are punished
often receive unjustly light sentences: serving 5.5 years for murder, if you are
one of the 3 out of 10 to be convicted - hardly seems the numbers that would
deter most potential offenders. This too Robinson concedes.
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Deterrence requires that potential offenders think about the
consequences of their actions, as many fail to do...Unfortunately
for deterrence,...(they) think the threat of capture and
punishment applies to others but not to them. Unlike the other
guy, they will avoid detection by taking the necessary
precautions...(and) if a robber faces a mere four percent chance of
going to prison, why should it matter to him whether the likely
sentence is two years or ten years? (1995, pp. 73-74).

From his own research statistics and according to the premises of his
argument, this is Robinson’s conclusion: present laws have no moral
authority. What this argument overlooks is that, regardless of conviction
rates and just punishments, some acts are intrinsically wrong. So, because of
a flawed axiology, a second problem with Robinson’s theory is that it cannot
account for bad laws. In years past for an official to justly apply punishments
for violating a segregation law or a statute that restricts women’s rights does
not confer moral permissibility on acts of discrimination. Regardless of how
effectively a community adhered to a segregation law, no moral authority was
established for that law by virtue of some community’s conformity with it.
Another case which illustrates this point is that fervent opponents of abortion
find no solace in laws which grant legal access to this procedure. The moral
status of abortion, for them, remains unaffected by vacillating Supreme Court
decisions. In some eyes the punishment of conscientious objectors in no way
enhances this law’s moral credibility.
So the fundamental problem with Robinson’s argument is that the
moral status of an act is not determined by the efficiency rates of
apprehension and conviction. Efficiency rates attach to levels of social justice;
percentages of specific conduct by individuals attaches to the level of moral or
immoral behavior in that society.
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Furthermore, in a forward-looking perspective, in order for a law to deter
potential offenders they must believe there is a possibility they will be
apprehended. Even if the law, in every instance, justly punishes all those
apprehended, most offenders will still assume they will not be caught. This is
precisely what Robinson’s statistics show. Here Robinson’s study would be
benefit by precisely defining who a potential offender is.
Psychologically, potential offenders are those who are not constrained
by personal morality to evaluate some immoral acts as unattractive. Some
feature on an illegal and an immoral act tempts them. Robinson’s reforms are
merely intended to impress upon potential law breakers that the
attractiveness of these base activities decreases as the efficiency rate of
apprehension increases. But these are not the people for whom Aristotle’s
lectures are intended. Robinson’s project is not to recommend virtue as
desirable in and of itself. As Bumyeat interprets Aristotle, lectures on the
intrinsic value of virtue will influence only those who have ahold of the moral
facts and are motivated to more clearly understand why and how to be
virtuous (1980).

This is why Aristotle can claim...that the goal of the study of
ethics is action, not merely knowledge: to become fully virtuous
rather than simply to know what virtue requires. Someone with
a sense of shame will respond, because he wants to do better at
the right sorts of things. Someone with nothing but a fear of
punishment will not respond; the only thing to do with him is tell
him what he will get in trouble for (Bumyeat, 1980, p. 81).

Robinson suggested reforms to the justice system are intended to edify
potential offenders to the fact that what they have been told about
apprehension, conviction, and punishment is true. But, given these reforms,
the best that he can hope for is an increase in the number of people to be
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thinking at Kohlberg’s law and order stage. All the improvements Robinson
suggests are merely intended to transmit the message that the chances of
apprehension, conviction, and punishment have greatly increased. In short,
more people will actually be “in trouble”. But this is not instruction regarding
an act’s moral permissibility; it is only a pronouncement on the efficiency of
the justice system to punish that which it considers to be wrong. We still may
not know, or care, why some act is wrong; we will avoid it because it is
something we are relatively sure we will punished for doing.
Robinson hopes are directed towards enhancing the fear of punishment.
But to instill a fear of punishment hardly seems a worthy aspiration for
education, law, or a democratic society. Any society that strives to motivate
her citizens with that logic may very well get what it deserves: a citizen body
of “pre-moral” beings.
What is missing is an effort to harness the power of a sense of shame.
A personal morality guided by a sense of shame will be unaffected by the
current efficiency rates of punishment since acts for which one is legally and
morally blameworthy will not seem attractive. Such a person is dissuaded by
an immoral act’s disgracefulness and the knowledge of the internal pain it will
cause long before he calculates the odds of possible public apprehension. To
conclude, Robinson’s reforms might have a beneficial effect on reducing crime,
but far more than this is needed to help young people develop good and strong
characters.

Detention Survey

To investigate the deterrent potential of in-school detentions, the
researcher conducted a survey of 574 students in seven elementary school
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grades. Students were asked to answer questions pertaining to what they
thought the purpose and the effectiveness of detentions and how they might or
have reacted to receiving one (See Appendix C).
The summaries of the detention survey (Tables 3, 4, and 5) show that
the perception of the effectiveness of detentions steadily decreases
consistently from kindergarten to the sixth grade. Ninety-four percent of
kindergartners believe detentions help to enforce school rules and curtail
misbehavior. Only 21% of sixth-graders agree.
As children mature the frequency of split decisions increase. Although it
was not an option on the survey sheet, many students wrote in that they
believe detentions could be effective for some children but not for others.
Whereas the percentage of detention’s effectiveness steadily decreases with
age, the percentage of split decision write-ins steadily increases.
Representative comments of this view are: “I think it depends on the person.
Some people may think nothing of it or some people really learn from it (5th
grader). A frequent response expresses the opinion: “It would work for me but
you see the same kids in there all the time” (6th grader). From the fourth
grade on, many children make the observation that “the same kids” are in
detention repeatedly.
As children mature, the nature of the responses to how one feels
changes. At the kindergarten and the first grade level customary responses
were “angry5”, “sad”, “mad”, and “bad”. Second through fourth grade were
“guilty”, “shouldn’t have done it”, “bad”, “bad if I deserved it”, and, “mad if I
didn’t do anything wrong”. Only one third grader wrote, “I feel fine”. A small
percentage of fourth graders wrote, “It doesn’t bother me at all”.
From the fourth grade on, the researcher had the general impression
that those children who had never served a detention were more inclined to
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believe detentions were effective than were those children who had served
them. As cited above, several comments were of the nature: “It would work
for me, hut... . From these same classes responses of “Not so good” occurred
as frequently as “Not so bad”. For others at 5th and 6th grade level detentions
have become routine. One child wrote “it feels like a daily assignment”.
In addition to the expected “It’s only a fifteen minute recess” and “I don’t
care at all” type responses, at the 5th and 6th grade level, there were some
answers that implied, or explicitly stated, more. One child wrote: “I like
detentions because it’s alot warmer in the winter and colder in the summer
and it’s quiet. I like that alot better.” Three others wrote simply “It’s quiet”,
and another said “It’s fine. I can read or do homework. It’s usually quiet and
(that is) good”. The appreciation of a period of quiet time seemed significant to
the researcher (See Tables 3, 4, and 5).
One conclusion to be drawn from this survey is that detentions become
less painful as they become more familiar. Conversely, if a child has never
received one, the threat of a detention retains a deterrent quality. In the
upper elementary grades, however, a majority of students believe that
detentions do not have a deterrent property for the general population.
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Table 3. Detention Survey by Class

Class

Yes

No

Kindergarten 1
Kindergarten 2

12
16

2
0

0
0

First 1
First 2
First 3

14
16
12

1
2
4

0
0
0

17
16
13
13
13

3
0
5
4
3

0
0
2
2
3

Third 1
Third 2
Third 3
Third 4
Third 5

15
13
13
11
12

4
7
8
1
3

1
0
0
6
3

Fourth 1
Fourth 2
Fourth 3
Fourth 4
Fourth 5
Fourth 6

8
8
12
6
12
9

4
10
5
9
8
6

4
0
0
3
0
6

Fifth 1
Fifth 2
Fifth 3
Fifth 4
Fifth 5

6
6
7
4
6

12
12
13
15
7

5
4
4
3
4

Sixth 1
Sixth 2
Sixth 3
Sixth 4

10
2
4
2

2
6
15
12

5
14
3
1

Second
Second
Second
Second
Second

1
2
3
4
5
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Yes and No

Table 4. Detention Survey by Grade
Grade

Yes

No

Yes and No

Kindergarten

28

2

0

First

42

7

0

Second

72

15

7

Third

64

23

10

Fourth

55

42

13

Fifth

29

59

20

Sixth

18

35

33

Table 5. Detention Survey by Percentage

Yes

No

Yes and No

Kindergarten

94

6

0

First

86

14

0

Second

77

16

7

Third

66

24

10

Fourth

50

38

12

Fifth

26

55

19

Sixth

21

41

38

Grade
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The most interesting responses were from those children who reported
they liked or enjoyed detentions. Other than a few children who reported they
disliked recess, it appears that a small but significant number of children
reported an appreciation for moments of quiet. In order to meet the
instructional daily teaching time required by the new curriculum frameworks,
study halls in many elementary schools have been eliminated.
It is acknowledged that the threat of a detention is only one variable
among many that influences a student’s behavior.
In general, schools are active and vibrant communities, but they are
also noisy places. If a child’s home is fast paced and noisy, as many are, then
quiet moments for reading and reflection will be few. In a letter to the editor
regarding the cover story on homework, one teacher wrote in:

The students in one of my classes beg for a 10-minute sit-silent
period that I instituted in response to chronic overstimulation.
Can you believe it? Middle-school students have a desire to sit
silent? (Time. 15 February 1999).

A schedule that accommodates periods of quiet time to read and to
reflect upon what one has read is one obvious suggestion for curriculum
reform. If Aristotle was correct to assign contemplation a place above all
other moral and intellectual virtues, those schools involved in the development
of character now have a concrete goal at which to aim.
There is a resurgence of interest in character education and in the role a
public school can play. Two established institutes - Thomas Lickona’s
“Center for the Fourth and Fifth R’s” and Kevin Ryan’s “International Center
for Character Education” - offer school programs that have credible
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suggestions for establishing and for reforming curricula to foster moral
development. With a goal of the practical implementation of their
comprehensive moral development theories, neither program has
concentrated on an extended analysis of moral shame nor do they emphasize
the role a sense of shame occupies in the development of character. This
following section focuses on reforms that are specifically associated with a
sense of shame.

An Answer to Research Question #3

Various public school initiatives have appealed to guilt and shame to
change attitudes and behaviors. Bolstered by the knowledge acquired from
their classroom teachers, their counselors, and in health classes,
kindergartners regard smoking as harmful and foolish, first-graders can
identify a “good touch” from a bad one, and from the second grade on most
children come to believe littering is wrong, “extinct means forever”, drug use is
bad, and tolerance is a cardinal virtue. As a result, many young people today
regard disgraceful conduct to be exemplified by polluting, smoking, the sexual
abuse of minors, discrimination, and substance abuse. To be informed on
these issues and to revise one’s behavior accordingly undoubtably constitutes
personal, social, and ecological advancements. But this is not to say a child is
on his way to grasping the essential “moral facts”. For example, tolerance
can be an attitude, when directed at improper objects, that can undermine
moral responsibility and obscure sound judgment. Teachers are under no
obligation to tolerate dishonesty, disrespectfulness, unkindness, or
irresponsibility. Similarly, students ought not develop a value scheme that
dismisses acts of this nature lightly. And the inadvertent message that many
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children receive from school health classes and from that which trickles down
from some modern psychological theories is that physical well-being has
supplanted moral goodness. The easy call is to identify and avoid that which
makes one physically ill. Too often a preoccupation with “health” comes at the
expense of recognizing an ethical dimension. Appraisals of something as
morally right or wrong is avoided so as not to be faulted for an archaic
judgmentalism, personal zealotry, or controversial “indoctrinative”
impositions. Without question, physical health is a blessing and excellence in
mathematics and communication skills are valuable commodities. But if
these goods are attained at the expense of, or as importantly, without an
accompanying moral knowledge, then some of our children may live long and
possibly prosperous lives, but these lives could ultimately be unhappy ones.
Commercially produced laminated posters that hang in many public schools
read: “Zero tolerance for violence” or “Drug-free Zone”; no such posters are yet
produced which read: “Zero tolerance for dishonesty”.
Public schools share in the responsibility to introduce children to the
basic moral facts. One suggestion that will help to introduce these facts is to
establish a “Word of the Month” program. This practice is endorsed by some
character educators; specific new suggestions can be offered, however, to
connect this program with the development of a sense of shame.
Word lists can vary to include those core values a school community
identifies as most appropriate. Below is the list the researcher proposed and
oversees for the academic year 1998 -1999 in the Orange Elementary School
system.
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September - Honesty
October - Responsibility
November - Consideration (Golden Rule)
December - Cooperation
January - Politeness / Courtesy
February - Respectfulness
March - Fairness / Justice
April - Friendship
May - Sportsmanship
It is suggested that each month every class - systemwide - attempts to
define the word (or virtue), to offer examples as to how that virtue is
exemplified, and to be attentive to examples from lessons and from literature
when the virtue, or its contrary, emerges. Monthly newsletters alert families
to the new topic and encourage discussions to be held at home. A systemwide
adoption of the program affords the opportunity for siblings to concentrate on
the same topic which will help coordinate these home discussions.
If schools approach parents at the beginning of the year with an
invitation to discuss the list, and in the spirit of assisting them - as the
primary caregivers - in helping to develop these qualities of character that
they most assuredly want to see in their children, a healthy partnership can
begin to develop. A simple contract to take the project seriously between all
parties - parents, teachers, and children - can be signed. Now, much like the
boy scout oath, to be a good member of the school community is defined as one
who is honest, responsible, courteous, respectful, and so on. Nothing seems
too controversial here; either parents want their children to be honest, kind,
and courteous or they don’t.
An additional value of a systemwide adoption of the program is that
children can directly experience the increasing sophistication of their ability to
offer defining characteristics and the range of cases in which these virtues
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operate. It will be instructive in itself to learn that the topic is rich enough to
revisit. And the adjudication of conflicting moral claims can be engaged so as
to be age appropriate. There are many ways to approach such questions as:
“Is one obligated to be brutally honest?” or “Is it honest to leave out the whole
truth?” Hopefully, in the family discussions older siblings will tax the moral
imagination of their younger brothers and sisters (or vice versa) with
some thorny cases or new considerations. But, unlike Kohlberg’s theory, this
dimension is hardly all there is.
Violations of the qualities of character on the list can now be handled
with a new clarity and assurance. These virtuous qualities, and others, have
been agreed upon to contribute to good character. And good character ought to
be portrayed as beneficial for the individual as well as for the community. No
student need be publicly humiliated when falling short, but an honest
engagement must take place. As the school’s adults model these virtues,
students have tangible examples of how better to approximate these qualities.
By example a child can be shown, simply and concretely, a better way to
behave. And if adults do behave accordingly, surveys of appraisal respect will
more closely coincide with the results of the recognition respect poll.
A suggestion that accompanies the word list concerns how a teacher
should respond to the reaction of a student who displays wrong behavior. If a
student expresses shame for his behavior, the most appropriate reaction from
a teacher might be to accept this expression of repentance, acknowledge the
behavior as unacceptance, but also point out that it is commendable that the
student honestly recognizes his transgression, has not lied to conceal the
mistake, has reacted to it with the proper regret, and has displayed a genuine
willingness to improve. The teacher can point out to the student that what he
did was indeed wrong but, more importantly, for him to see it as such and to
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assume responsibility for it signals the desire to improve. A brief discussion of
better alternatives for future conduct can ensue.
The task for the teacher is far more complicated for the student who
reacts shamelessly or with disinterest. In these instances the teacher will
have to refer back to the list and its contraries and attempt to persuade the
student to see certain qualities and dispositions as contributing to a happy life.
How one does this will be dictated by the child’s developmental stage.
When and if a parental objection arises, a respectful, philosophical
dialogue can ensue. Administrators and teachers have no monopoly on
insights into possible conflicting moral claims or the range of cases; but now
they do have, with the contract and the list, standards to which all must
adhere and specific guidelines which restrict the field of individual liberties that
might disrupt the school community.
It would be an attractive selling point to propose that this program can
be adopted with a minimum of added work for an already overburdened staff.
It might be suggested the program is but another dimension that merely
augments the work that is already being done. But, for the program to be
effective, this is not the case. And here additional suggestions for curriculum
reform emerge. One illustration is that examples from literature will
spontaneously emerge. But the teacher must seize the opportunity and direct
the class discussion appropriately. And the time to research the virtue, poll
the students for examples, display the children’s thoughts on a bulletin board,
and synthesize these thoughts to arrive at age-appropriate and enlightening
definitions all will take considerable time. As the year progresses interest may
wane and other duties may seem more pressing. One school member, possibly
the principal, a counselor, or the school psychologist, might be assigned to keep
interest high.
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Second, the most worrisome observation that repeatedly surfaced in
this study’s interviews is the concern that too many children appear to be
morally unreflective. Remarkably a social worker suggests that this can be
explained by the fact that young people do not have enough “time”.
Presumably, their priorities are otherwise arranged so that all their attention
is in other ways preoccupied and consumed. It seems more plausible to
suggest they have not had the opportunity to develop this admirable reflective
quality. In our fast paced world it may be too easy to overlook the simple fact
that thoughtfulness is hard work. To be thoughtful, one must have exposure
to material upon which to reflect, the discipline for extended and undistracted
mental operations, and the emotional control and will power to stay focused.
But one must be able to focus. As mentioned, with vibrant communities
comes high levels of noise. Administering intelligence tests in three different
elementary schools the researcher takes pains to find the quietest place
available so students can perform at their best. It is not easy. When asked
about noise levels, few students seem bothered. Regardless, the researcher
will oftentimes feel required to suspend a test session until a later time. He
wonders if their reports of the apparent negligible effect of noise on their
performance is a good thing. If children are becoming acclimated to high noise
levels this suggests a topic worthy of further study. So another suggestion for
reform is for administrators to set building-wide times for quiet reflection. If
buildings can coordinate, at one and the same time, all classes to have midmorning snacks or daily assemblies, so to can they arrange a short period of
silence for reading and reflection. If moral reflection is an activity, like virtue,
that requires practice, this seems a good place to begin.
Moral unreflectiveness attracted national attention with the Clinton Lewinsky matter. This coincided with conducting research for this project, it is

343

introduced here reluctantly. If there are any hopeful signs for a country
fatigued by this disgraceful performance, it is the reemergence of a public
dialogue that utilizes so many terms of moral self-assessment. Hundreds of
newspaper articles and numerous television commentators, along with the
principal players themselves, have used the terms ‘guilt’, ‘shame’,
‘shamelessness’, ‘regret’, ‘remorse’, and ‘repentance’. The drafted Senate
censure characterized Clinton’s behavior as exemplifying “shamelessness”.
The chronology of Clinton’s public statements followed the graduated scale of
regret, to guilt, to remorse, and finally to shame. Many commentators were
distressed it proceeded so slowly; this public dissatisfaction unquestionably
accelerated the progression of Clinton’s emotional responses. Others
questioned the sincerity - and we have yet to hear - of Clinton’s “repentance”.
Still others, Lewinsky among them, remark that this appears to be a case
study in the difference between a fear of punishment and a fear of disgrace.
Lewinsky reportedly believes Clinton is only sorry to have been caught
(Jurkowitz, 1999a).
In this unfortunate incident one benefit is the refocusing of national
attention on these emotions of self-assessment. For a time it was a daily
occurrence for newspaper articles to refer to shame. This was a word one saw
only infrequently from the press during the 70s and 80s - a time often
characterized as eras of self-preoccupation and materialism. A recent article
by syndicated columnist Donald Kaul, “Without Shame” is an example. He
wrote this as a clever opening paragraph.
I watched Monica Lewinsky’s interview with Barbara Walters
last week and...I was appalled. I found the woman altogether
insufferable: vulgar, obnoxious, and utterly without shame.
I didn’t like Monica much either (Recorder, 15 March 1999).
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With both Clinton and Lewinsky, the public was exposed to clear
instances, as Aristotle has said, of affective miscalculations and youthful
desire overcoming reason. This exchange transpired in the television interview
Kaul refers to between Walters and Lewinsky.

BW: Did you ever say to yourself, “Tm doing something
wrong...This is bad for the country. Did you ever think about
that?

ML: Now with everything that’s happened...I feel bad I didn’t.
But I didn’t at that time. I was enamored with him. And I was
excited. And I was enjoying myself (Jurkowitz, The Boston Globe,
4 March 1999)
Later in the interview, Lewinsky’s moral unreflectiveness and fuzzy thinking is
again exposed.

BW: If you had it to do over again, would you have the
relationship with Bill Clinton?
ML: There are some days that I regret that the relationship ever
started, and there are some days that I just regret that I ever
confided in Linda Tripp (Jurowitz, 1999a, italics added).

White House correspondent Sam Donaldson reacted to the interview
with: “Here is a young woman who clearly doesn’t feel any personal shame,
doesn’t think she did anything wrong...she doesn’t get it (Jurkowitz, Globe, 11
March 1999, italics added). With more than a year to reflect upon the
situation, it is perplexing Lewinsky “doesn’t get it”. From the study’s
interviews this same unreflectiveness appears to hold true for the high school
car-thief and the young woman on academic probation. As was proposed at
the outset, a developed sense of shame could have avoided these problems.
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The costly and ugly national disgrace we have all endured gives us some
perspective to shame’s potential value.
Moral reflectiveness will increase a child’s control of his or her actions
with a new understanding of one’s motivations. The aspiration to lead a good
life and to avoid disgrace requires clear thought, proper affective responses,
control of the emotions, and a desire for the just and noble. Acknowledging
instances of moral shame points to future avenues of preferable behavior. A
sense of shame designates these parameters.
Third, if Kupperman is correct to propose young students will benefit
from dogmatic instruction, that instruction ought to be consistent within a
school system. Investigating rationalizations from different perspectives and
resolving ethical dilemmas might be appropriate at the high school level, but
not in the early elementary grades. In specific subjects - mathematics for
example - there has to be a curriculum of logical progressions from year to
year. So too with moral development. This requires that, in establishing moral
development strategies, the coordination of efforts will have different focuses.
Elementary school programs will need strong, continued guidance in imparting
the basic moral facts coherently and consistently. Just as algebra ought not
precede the learning of the multiplication tables, having students debate
dilemmas ought not precede the cognitive and emotional attachment to the
virtues. We must first believe stealing and dishonesty are wrong before we
can calculate how extreme the circumstances must be in order to override our
moral inclinations and responsibilities. There will be no dilemma in the first
place if our sense of shame does not inform us that stealing and dishonest acts
will cause us internal pain. In large part, it is precisely this sense of shame
that creates the conflict. It is, then, logically required that the sense of shame
precede the project of adjudicating conflicting moral claims. The upper grades
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will have more flexibility in discussing the particular circumstances and
applications of the virtues. But teachers at the elementary level are just as
much individuals as are those in the upper grades. So creativity and individual
input in relaying the moral facts is especially important in the early grades to
keep interest high.
Fourth, counseling is an area in need of reform. It is vitally important
what transpires systemwide be supported in individual efforts. Confidentiality
is an umbrella that extends over so wide an area that many times little is
known about what transpires in private counseling sessions. At team
meetings on a student’s individual education plan (IEPs) or in special education
meetings (SPED evaluations and reevaluations) counselors often report only
that they see a child for “outside issues” or for “personal problems”. Nothing is
shared about a counselor’s objectives for a child, specific counseling successes
or failures, or future plans. Parents, teachers, and administrators must
operate blindly in good faith.
If moral development programs are an essential part of the school
experience, counselors are, by design, apt to encounter many instances of
violations of school rules which have ethical dimensions. Many students are
referred to counseling precisely because of just such a history of violations.
But one can earn counseling certification without any exposure to ethics,
ethical theories, logic, or educational philosophy.
Fifth, it is suggested that this change at the university level. Counselors
trained in Rogerian-type methods are still being instructed never to use the
terms “should” or “shouldn’t”. This, it was explained to this researcher during
his course work, stifles dialogue and personal discovery. Then and now, this
seems preposterous. The teachers of teachers should encourage their
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students to take moral progress seriously. Anything less constitutes an
irresponsible omission.
In interviews for this document, the researcher noted many wall posters
that hang in counselor’s offices. Many have pithy, but rather confused,
messages. A popular one reads: “All emotions are O.K.; it’s what you do with
them that counts”. Presumably, envy is alright if it remains bottled up, malice
can be exemplified in an acceptable manner, and there is some proper
measure of shamelessness. One counselor remarked, “Shame is not a word in
my vocabulary”. So for her shamelessness must not exist in any measure. It
is understandable how some children can get confused. Counselors and
teachers encounter difficult cases every day. Counseling and teaching
certification that requires three credits in the study of the emotions, of logic, or
in ethical theories could strengthen the critical thinking skills so as to deal
more effectively with these important and difficult cases.

Chapter Summary

Many public school children and adults who work with public school
children offered their insights through surveys and personal interviews on a
variety of topics related to the emotion of moral shame. On being approached
for an interview all of the adults who participated reported, in varying degrees,
to an initial uneasiness to discuss shame; none felt qualified and no one was
perfectly comfortable with the topic. The researcher was denied permission to
speak with students in one school and with inmates in a correctional facility.
A few requests by telephone were never returned. Of those who agreed to
participate, however, while reviewing their interview guides prior to our
meeting or in the interview itself, all of the participants became animated and
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engaged. With slight encouragement, and almost as if they were recovering a
suppressed memory, they seemed to realize that they had much to say about
moral shame and its role in child and character development.
All the participants recognize an enormous variety and amount of
stress on the family. It is commonly thought by all participants that the
biological parents in approximately half of the families with school age children
are divorced. A significant percentage of the families that the participants are
involved with are thought to desperately need - or would benefit by - parenting
skills education. A consensus is many parents either do not model appropriate
behavior or have a compromised ability to educate their children in matters of
character development. One reason for a compromised ability to parent is
that many households have both caregivers working full-time. Simply put, at
the end of the day the parents or guardians are understandably tired. And in
many households, because of after school jobs, so are the children.
More and more students are reported to be working after school. As a
result, these students appear tired during school. Many schools report
increasing numbers of students do not regularly or conscientiously do their
homework and the connection with outside employment is obvious.
Some students have assumed an administrative role of dictating
homework policy to which some teachers and administers have acquiesced.
Students in the upper grades show outright disdain for authority, while
younger students are occasionally characterized as ignorant of the common
courtesy of showing deference to their elders. By acquiescing in matters of
homework policy and in enforcing discipline, one high school teacher recognizes
adults have abdicated their authoritative responsibility.
Another troubling trend reported by elementary school teachers is the
impression that children appear to be unversed in basic manners while high
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school teachers are distressed by the levels of vulgar language and
disrespectfulness. Across all grade levels, most troubling to some educators is
the tendency of parents to intercede on their child’s behalf with excuses for
misbehavior. Offering extenuating circumstances to absolve a child of his or
her responsibility is becoming commonplace. This parental intercession
creates an adversarial relationship with the teacher. When teachers appeal to
administrators to resolve the conflict, a common perception is that too often
the principals and superintendent will attempt to appease the parents at the
teacher’s expense.
The general picture seems to be one of younger children who have not
been exposed to - and, therefore, do not have ahold of - either the basic “moral
facts” or the conventional rules of etiquette. Older students are thought to be
preoccupied with survival and/or material goods. Teachers are reluctant and
discouraged by past efforts to impart these lessons due to parental charges of
inappropriate intervention as well as non-support from their administrators.
The long term effect of all these factors on maintaining discipline, academic
standards, and the work ethic is profoundly negative.
Compounding these problems, as one high school educator related, is the
perception that a liberal education is becoming too dependent upon producing
demonstrable relevance to job readiness skills. He worries further that too
many of his students are demanding a justification for how their efforts and
educational pursuits will translate into “billable” skills. He is saddened to see and cites as evidence for this trend - that art and music appreciation courses
have been replaced by Accounting I, II, and III (see Appendix F).
Mathematics and “communication skills” seems to constitute the primary
educational objectives for one principal.
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Of particular relevance to this study is the troubling and complex
observation that many children and adolescents appear to be morally
unreflective, if not shameless. Several candidates - and candidates in
conjunction with one another - emerged to explain this phenomenon.
First, a shared opinion was that respect for authority has significantly
eroded. Although a recognition respect survey for authority figures registered
optimistic findings, this did not coincide with the experience of the participants.
Second, as children mature they seem less susceptible to a fear of
punishment from schools (e.g., the detention survey) and from legal
institutions (e.g. the apparent nonchalance of defendants in area court
houses).
Third, a rabbi, a priest, and a state trooper reported that communities
no longer wield a controlling power over her citizens. The state trooper
observed that many communities no longer have the means nor the desire to
hold some of her members accountable for harmful or immoral behavior. This
behavior is tolerable, the message seems to be, if it is confined to the fringes.
But it may be true that as a community retreats from insisting upon and
imposing acceptable standards of behavior of all citizens, the community itself
begins to dissolve or fracture. As the social worker observes, many young
people have formed their own social groups. And to only these groups do they
feel answerable. Here it is not a question of a community dissolving; young
people have never joined. In turn, one will not fear ostracism from that to
which one has never been connected.
Fourth, having never connected with a community may account, in
part, for a morally unreflective disposition and the emergence of the adoption
of the episodic life view. As the rabbi observed, not long ago the perception of
Jewish citizens was that the way to assimilate into American society was to
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be “good”. Shameful, undesirable, or unfortunate family circumstances were
kept hidden. But if communities are slowly becoming smaller associations
defined by subjectively chosen norms, the shameful can become, for some,
acceptable. Recall the comments of the social service supervisor who implied
that for some young people dangerously high levels of destructive behavior is
the price of admission into their group. Street gangs share similar
requirements.
This returns us full-circle to the episodic life view. Some participants
reported they fear children see life as a series of discrete and disjointed
episodes that are independently negotiated by whatever means necessary to
maximize extrinsic goods. If, for example, that extrinsic good is a diploma, a
grade of D will suffice. Two high school students reported that for them - and
everyone they know - there is no compunction to cheat to acquire the D. A
conception of virtue does not portray cheating as unattractive because virtue
does not unify activities, projects, commitments, or goals. Good character will
not be conceived as unified over time if life is a series of disjointed “scenes”.
As a school counselor charges, the media shares responsibility for this
phenomena. The visual media is riddled with daily images of glorified violence
seemingly disconnected from emotional impact and lasting influence, splitsecond flashing images that require no expenditure of sustained attention, and
casual sexual encounters that require no commitment or sacrifice. One
cannot look to television or the movies to find an alternative to the episodic life
view exemplified and recommended.
Reforming the justice system so as to legitimize a fear of punishment
will not reorient anyone to desire virtue for its own sake. An external threat
might inhibit activity, it cannot, by itself, motivate an internal conversion.
These findings are summarized in Chapter 6.
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CHAPTER 6

SUMMARY OF THE STUDY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Introduction

At the end of the twentieth century, public schools, as never before, are
expected to care for a wide array of children’s varied developmental needs.
Many public schools feel obligated to provide children with, among other things,
a healthy breakfast, after school tutoring and recreation, emotional and
behavioral interventions, and instruction in good hygiene, sexually transmitted
diseases, safety issues, and the dangers of substance abuse.
There is also a resurgence of interest in the public school’s role in a
child’s moral education and character development. Simultaneously there is a
concern in this country that the severity of school age children’s misbehavior
is on the rise. In 1999 reports of heavily armed students firing on and killing
their classmates and teachers have become tragically commonplace.
One problem that this study addresses is the parallel development of an
increase in an apparent shamelessness for social misbehavior and criminal
deeds (Kahan, 1997; Jurowitz, 1999; Kaul, 1999). Many self-reports from the
school-aged population include testimonials that some students feel no shame
or remorse for their misbehavior (Jurowitz, 1999). One hypothesis of this
study is that if a child had acquired a sense of shame, some of these criminal
acts might never had occurred.
A second problem addressed by this study is that it is not at all clear as
to what the emotions of shame and shamelessness are. Initially, Anstotle s
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comments on shame seem contradictory while some modem commentaries
are even more obtuse. At a fundamental level, a review of the pertinent
literature suggests there is substantial disagreement as to how one defines
“emotion”. On another level there is an even greater disagreement over what
moral significance ought to be ascribed to the emotions. And moral shame is
an emotion that is particularly plagued by this imprecision and these
disagreements. By way of illustration, there is no consensus in the literature
on the moral significance of shame. Some authors claim shame has no moral
significance, it is intrinsically bad (Isenberg, 1980). Others believe shame to
be neutral (Urmson, 1980). Some writers believe shame to have positive
attributes outweighed by its negative qualities (Kekes, 1990,1993), while still
others believe shame to be a positive emotion (Taylor, 1985; Williams, 1993).
If moral shame can be shown to be conditionally good, a third problem
arises: Do public school moral education programs recognize and utilize
shame’s beneficial qualities?

Summary of the Study

This is an exploratory, conceptual study with three aims. These aims
are outlined in Chapter 1. There it is detailed that the study will, first, attempt
to offer a clear, precise, and useful definition of moral shame. Second, if moral
shame can be persuasively argued to be conditionally good, can it be shown to
affect character development positively? Third, from the conclusions of the
preceding aims, do suggestions emerge for the reform of public school moral
education curricula. These aims guide the formulation of the three research
questions. These are: 1) “What is the emotion of moral shame? , 2) What
impact might moral shame have on character development? , and 3) What
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implications for the reform of school curriculum are suggested by the findings
of this study?”.
Chapter 2 details the research design and procedure. Since this is a
conceptual study the literature review is extensive. This review spans
ancient philosophical texts to modem educational articles.
In depth interviewing, as a quantitative method, is employed to produce
descriptive data from twenty-four professional men and women who, in
various capacities, serve children. Two surveys are conducted with 576 school
children. One survey asked children about their perceptions and reactions to
in-school detentions. As only one variable among many which affect behavior,
detentions are of interest because the researcher gained some insight into a
child’s emotional reaction to misbehavior. These data intended to elicit
information regarding one effect shame might have on character development.
The second survey asked children to rank occupations according to the
child’s level of respect for fifteen different professions. The rationale for
collecting these data is that one can assume that if a child has respect for a
profession, then he or she will likely have some respect for the principles, laws,
or standards of that profession. Ranking a profession highly gives some initial
insight into a child’s respect for these principles.
With the aim of arriving at a suitable answer to Research Question #1,
“What is the emotion of moral shame?”, Chapter 3 proceeds in three specific
steps. First, an emotion is claimed to be comprised of the interrelated
components of cognition, affect, and desire. Arguments are advanced to
discredit the positions that claim emotions are solely cognition or affect. In the
second section, having established the necessary and sufficient conditions an
emotion must meet, several self-regarding emotions related to shame are
analyzed. In order, these are: regret, remorse, repentance, guilt,
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embarrassment, humiliation, self-esteem, pride, and self-respect. Following a
review of the literature on these emotions, specific definitions for each are
formulated.
An analysis of these emotions enables the researcher, in the third
section of Chapter 3, to embark on a study of those qualities that are
distinctive of shame. To be clear about what an emotion is seems to logically
precede any attempt to attribute significance to that emotion. Accordingly,
the analysis of moral shame next reviews various positions in the literature
that concentrate on specific features of this emotion. These include
arguments that shame is either an internal or an external experience, whether
an audience is required in order to feel shame, whether all shame experiences
are moral in nature, and, finally, a review of positions that question shame’s
moral significance. Arguments are advanced which propose shame can be
experienced internally and externally, an audience is not required, not all
shame experiences need be moral in nature, and that shame is highly
significant for moral progress. Having advanced an argument for each of
these points, a formal definition of moral shame is advanced.
Chapter 4 reviews past and present theories of moral development and
moral education programs. The purpose of this review is twofold. The review
attempts, first, to determine if these theories and programs are cognizant of
shame’s beneficial qualities and, second, to ascertain whether the insights
gained from the analysis of moral shame suggests revisions that will
strengthen existing public school moral education theories and programs.
The theories and programs reviewed are an early American
indoctrinative model, three theories of the leading cognitive-developmentalists
Jean Piaget, Sidney Simon, and Lawrence Kohlberg, a contemporary
character education program, and an Aristotelian theory of moral

356

*

development. Edch section concludes with how shame is accommodated
within each theory or program.
A synopsis of this review is as follows. The early indoctrinative model
has much to recommend it, but it is faulted for being inflexible to personal
circumstance and unnecessarily restricted to the operative social customs.
Such confinement can relegate moral shame to violations of social customs
exclusively.
Both Piaget’s and Kohlberg’s theories of moral development could have
been improved by a greater emphasis on the emotional aspect of the human
condition. Piaget’s theories of moral development and shame are faulted for an
unpersuasive reliance on “realism”. It is argued Kohlberg’s stage theory is
defective by virtue of a “pre-moral” conventionalism that infects all stages up
until the fifth level. Through Stage 4, with its emphasis on appearances and
abiding by social conventions, Kohlberg’s theory is insensitive to moral shame.
Simon’s Value Clarification Theory is discredited for many reasons.
Among these are its permissive requirements for a “value”, its ethical
relativism, its emasculation of teacher authority by prescribing
nonjudgmental adult intervention, and a theoretical incoherence. Moral shame
has no discernible role in such a relativistic value program.
The modern character education theory is defended as preferable to all
the previous theories and programs reviewed but it is faulted for its near total
neglect of some of the self-regarding emotions, most notably, moral shame.
Chapter 4 concludes with an explication of a moral development theory
which is Aristotelian in nature. This theory proposes moral development
occurs in three developmental stages. In the first stage children learn the
basic moral facts. Dogmatic instruction is appropriate with this age group.
Shame occurs in instances of clear violations of central moral norms. In the
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second stage, children begin to develop habits of good conduct. In doing so, good
conduct becomes second nature. As conduct becomes habitual, those rules
. and principles that have been dogmatically instilled can now be examined in
greater detail. Moral complexities can be studied and multiple perspectives
can be debated. Shame now pains an agent internally because children at this
stage begin to see how their behavior contributes to the development of a
settled disposition. In the third stage of moral development an agent works
out for herself how the virtues are appropriately exemplified given her
particular circumstance. Her reason coincides with her desire and moral
conduct appears to her as pleasurable. Virtue is seen as intrinsically
desirable. Shame is the pain of disgrace for falling short of what virtue
requires and of failing to approximate her “better self”. A conditionally good
status is attributed to moral shame by virtue of its power to reorient an agent
to more desirable alternatives. The reaction to moral failures at the three
developmental stages serves as an answer to Research Question #2.
Chapter 5, through interviews and surveys, reports on data that are
collected regarding the participant’s views on several different issues that
relate to shame, character development, and the public school experience.
These are: the family, children’s view of the importance and purpose of
education, the state of current student behavior, perceptions on children’s level
of respect for authority figures, how children respond to legal and moral
wrongdoing, and what motivates good and bad behavior. Lastly, surveys on
how children emotionally respond to school detentions and their level of respect
for a variety of professions were conducted.
Regarding the family the majority of people interviewed believed there to
be too many families with poor parental modeling, after school jobs negatively
impacting on education, and an alarming increase in the number of parents
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offering excuses for their child’s misbehavior in school. The most distressing
observation of the participants was an increase in adults attempting to deflect
attention away from their child taking responsibility for his or her behavior.
Interviewing adults about their impression of how children regard an
education, many participants noted an indifference in many children. This
impression is supported by a trend of more and more students who are not
doing homework, are satisfied with barely passing grades, and are disrespectful
toward educators. Out of frustration, some teachers have stopped giving
homework assignments, have abdicated their disciplinary authority,and do not
oppose an emphasis on job readiness skills. For example, one veteran teacher
remarked that his high school today more closely resembles a vocational
school than a institution dedicated to a child’s intellectual, aesthetic, and moral
development.
When the interview shifted to how adults perceive current student
behavior, common observations were that many students lack basic manners,
show no deference to adults, and many students are openly hostile to people in
authority. For the first time the theme of student’s apparent moral
unreflectiveness surfaced.
The respect for professions survey had surprising results. Students
were asked to rank fifteen professions according to the level of respect that
they had for these occupations. From the results five professions that can be
construed as authority figures (Mother, Teacher, Priest, Police Officer, Judge)
were extracted and ranked.

Across grades from second to twelfth these

professions scored generally high. This suggests that school children have high
recognition respect for positions of authority. Appraisal respect for particular
individuals within these professions may not score as well, which may, in part,
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explain the disparity between why adults believe children’s level of respect for
authority to be low and the alarming juvenile criminal rates.
Moral unreflectiveness reappeared when the researcher questioned the
participants about their views of how children respond to ethical and legal
wrongdoing. Many children are thought to be unrepentant for wrongdoing,
unintimidated by school punishments and legal ramifications, and are
skeptical that the justice system is capable of exacting just punishments in
the majority of cases. Reforms to improve the reliability of the justice system
to exact just punishment may dissuade some, but it was also noted by the
participants and the researcher that a fear of punishment is not the proper
motivation to act virtuously.
Even the motivation to do good so as to avoid ostracism from society
seems to have lost much of its force in contemporary society. Many
participants appear to believe a large percentage of children have never
connected to an adult social group. A young man will not, then, fear ostracism
from that to which he is not attracted or to which he has never connected.
Many of these participants further believe that a community’s ability to
restrain undesirable behavior has become negligible.
The detention survey also had surprising results. From kindergarten to
the sixth grade there is a constant and alarming drop in student’s beliefs that
detentions are an effective means to control and shape behavior. While 94% of
kindergartners believed detentions to be effective, only 21% continued to
believe so by sixth grade. Many other variables contribute to how one
behaves, but the detention survey seems significant since this is one of the few
remaining ways a school can exert influence on student behavior.
The study concludes with several recommendations for curriculum
reform which serves as an answer to Research Question #3. Among the
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recommendations suggested are the institution of a Word of the Month
program. In the early elementary grades this program serves to introduce
children to basic moral principles. In the later grades it provides an excellent
forum to discuss the exemplification of the virtues and the particular personal
circumstances and moral conflicts that makes ethical matters so perplexing.
This program is recommended also for the opportunity it allows for parents,
teachers, and students to work in concert to establish a positive learning
community.
Other advantages to the Word of the Month program are that it can
help reestablish adult authority. Principles outlined in the program should
extend to all facets of school life. Children who violate the values or virtues
covered in the program can be confronted. But teachers need training in how
best to handle reactions of shame and shamelessness. Current teacher and
counselor certification programs presently offer no instruction in this area.
This suggests a final recommendation that university teacher and
counselor certification programs add required course work in both the study of
the emotions and in how to address student’s reactions to their behavior. A
student who expresses shame for her bad conduct has made a positive step
toward reform. Here the opportunity presents itself for a teacher to
acknowledge the transgression, offer a better alternative, and to commend the
student for taking responsibility for her actions as well as for displaying the
proper emotional reaction.
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Recommendations for Further Study

Important issues illuminated by this study include the perception of
many participants that a disturbingly large percentage of school children
appear to be morally unreflective, that they do not exhibit shame for
transgressions, that they are disrespectful of authority, and that they do not
hold either education or the law in high regard.
Most the participants in this study are from New England and are of
similar economic standing. All the school children interviewed and surveyed
are from one school district. The current study could be improved with a wider
sample of people of different races, socio-economic standings, geographical
areas, and educational institutions. It is possible that the explanation for
shamelessness could be quite different among the advantaged and the
disadvantaged. For instance, this study did not conduct research among
populations who - because of their immense good fortune - may consider
themselves above the law, nor does it examine the views of those who because of their profound misfortune - may feel marginalized or hopeless.
Feelings of shame might operate quite differently in these two extreme
circumstances. Future studies could augment the ideas presented here by
conducting this more diversified research.
A key element in the moral development of children requires a
partnership between parents and the school personnel. The current study
would have benefited by a larger sample of parents. Many of the teachers who
were surveyed are parents, but they spoke primarily as educators. The
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perspective of moral education in the schools from the parents viewpoint
would be valuable data for future studies.
One recommendation for curriculum reform is at the university level. It
is suggested that teachers and counselors need instruction to properly
confront instances of shame and shamelessness. One way this study can be
instructive is in teaching educators what these emotions are, but more
research needs to be done in the exact nature of the necessary reform of
university certification programs and in the implementation of the new
required course work.
It is a valuable learning opportunity to engage the child who feels
ashamed. As with the study of moral shame, too often this condition for
learning has been neglected.
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APPENDIX A
VOLUNTARY CONSENT FORM
Dissertation Title: An Analysis of Moral Shamp

Consent for Voluntary Participation

I volunteer to participate in this study and understand that:
1. I will be interviewed by Jay J. Conway, a doctoral candidate at the
University of Massachusetts at Amherst, using an open-ended questioning
interview format.
2. The questions I will respond to will address my views on the significance
of self-regarding emotions. I understand that the interview will have a
particular emphasis on moral shame.
3. The interview will be tape recorded to facilitate analysis of the data.
4. My name will not be used nor will I be identified by name in any way or
at any time. I understand that I will be identified by a pseudonym and my
actual profession (e.g. priest, rabbi, social worker, high school teacher,
etc.). No geographical designation or place of employment will be used.
5. I may withdraw from part or all of this study at any time.
6. I have the right to review material prior to the final oral examination or
other publication as well as the right to request a copy of the taped
interview and a copy of the transcript in order to review the accuracy of
the transcription.
7. I understand that all children must review this consent form with their
legal guardian and that the guardian’s signature is required to participate in
this study.
8. I understand that the information from this interview will be included in
Jay J. Conway’s doctoral dissertation and may also be included in
manuscripts submitted to professional journals for publication.
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9. I am free to participate or to not participate without prejudice.
10. Because of the small number of participants, approximately forty
people, I understand there is some risk that I may be identified as a
participant in this study.

Participant’s signature

Date

Guardian’s signature

Date

Researcher’s signature

Date
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APPENDIX B

GENERAL INTERVIEW GUIDE

1. Briefly outline the work that you do.
a. How long have you been doing this work?
b. What attracted you to this profession?
c. What is the age of the children that you serve?

2. During your professional career, what changes have occurred with or in:
a. families
b. peer influences
c. the media and media influences
d. the level of stressors on children
e. children’s view of authority figures
f. children’s view of education
g. children’s behavior
3. How do you think the children of today view legal and ethical
transgressions?
4.

What do you believe is a stronger motivational force for children: external

restraints (e.g., the fear of punishment, fear of social disgrace or ostracism
from the community) or internal restraints (e.g. personal morality)?
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APPENDIX C
DETENTION SURVEY FORM
Detentions

Please take a moment to answer these questions thoughtfully and
honestly. Thank you.

1. What do you think is the purpose of a detention? Or, What do schools hope
to accomplish by giving someone a detention?

2. Do you think detentions are effective (do you think they “work”)?
Yes_ No_
Please explain.

3. How would you feel if you got a detention? (Or how have you felt when
you got one?)

Teacher and Grade
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APPENDIX D
SURVEY INSTRUCTION FORM
FOR HIGH SCHOOL PARTICIPANTS
SURVEY INSTRUCTIONS
* Do NOT place your name anywhere on the survey form.
* In the survey, you are being asked to indicate your level of respect toward
several professional fields. As you consider your thoughts, it is important that
you focus your thinking on the profession itself and NOT on a specific
individual or individuals in that profession.
For example, in the first category, which is MA Professional Athlete”, you may
think highly or lowly of Michael Jordan or Rebecca Lobo, but it doesn’t matter
for this survey. The concern here is with the profession itself and NOT with
particular members of it.
* For each category, place a circle around line 1, or line 2, or fine 3, or line 4, or
line 5 - whichever number BEST represents your feelings of respect toward
that profession.

So,

I

A Full-time Mother

©

means that you have a high level of respect for full-time mothers, but not the
highest level.

And if you were to enter,

A Full-time Mother

©

you would be saying that the profession of full-time mothering gets less than
average respect from you. Thank you for your cooperation.
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APPENDIX E
LEVEL OF RESPECT FOR PROFESSIONS SURVEY FORM

Professional Athlete

1
I_

Movie Actor/Actress

I_

Politician

I_

Veterinarian

I_

Rock Musician

I_

Priest

I_

2

3

4

t

Television Actor/Actress

I_

School Teacher

I_

Doctor

I_

Judge

I_

Stock Broker

I_

Police Officer

I_

Car Salesman

I_

Lawyer

I_

Full-Time Mother

I_

1 = little or no respect

5 = respect very highly
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APPENDIX F

INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPTION
Interviewer. To begin, would you tell me how long you have been a teacher and
what grades you teach?

HSET: For about 33 years this is my first job and it will be my last job. I
teach English. In 1980,1 started my position as chairman of the department.
I have been around 9th, 10th, 11th, and 12th graders. I do not confine myself
to one grade nor do I confine myself to a level ability of learning, that is, I don’t
just teach honor students, I teach all students and have taught all students
through my 33 years.
4

Interviewer: During these 33 years, what changes have you seen occur within
the family?

HSET: Clearly that’s the one on the top of everybody’s fist - the breakdown of
the family. That families are generally speaking, at my level at least and
probably even at earlier levels, as I am hearing, turning their kids over to the
kind of culture I believe which finds its basis in sort of establishing its own
authority, or finds its basis in absence of authority. My own sense is that the
absence of authority for many children today - probably more than what we
would like to know about - it really begins at birth. That could be probably be
verified through some research. This kind of culture also strikes me of not only
one which defines its own authority, but also one which is premised upon this
kind of cool indifference. Cool in the sense of a jazzy term. The more
indifferent one is - maybe with a little tinge of anger in it - that’s my sense
anyway.
Anger seems to be a little bit of maybe a big part of it for all I know of
that kind of culture. I mean if you just take a look at some of the personnel
that make up the kind of culture on the popular level, the people who you
would point to and say he/she is a member of this kind of culture. You almost
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never see a smile from these people, they seem to be so unhappy. You look on
a record album, or whatever it might be, and there is this frown that seems to
characterize a little bit of that. It is very difficult. I think it is an arrogance,
and I am not sure what adjective I ought to precede with arrogance, but there
seems to be an arrogance that has made up this kind of culture. And I think
this kind of culture is not something that was invited. I think it evolved over
many many decades and I certainly think all teenagers have been part of this
kind of culture since the beginning of time. This particular kind of culture
seems to have more force I think than the ones I’ve known or participated in.

Interviewer: Do you think that the children are emulating this anger that they
see in the leaders or do you think that they have anger themselves?

HSET: I think that it is really a combination of both. I think for the kids who
would be a part of this kind of culture is just because they want to belong. I
think that it is adopted. I think for some kids who need this kind of culture, and
who need it in a pretty serious way, I think a lot of anger has built up, genuine
anger that has built up in them. And it just finds its place in this kind of
culture itself. I bet we have something there with that anger - an arrogance.
But this kind of culture, my sense again, seems to put a certain amount of
weight on the adult world for this unhappiness that there is in the world, if not
in our own personal lives. Relatively speaking that is to let’s say pre 40’s and
speaking probably specifically the sexual revolution that took place between
the 50’s and 60’s and thereafter. I think that the thing that annoys me the
most about this though, is that this kind of culture is like an
“I -1” thing as opposed to an “I - thou”. I mean that in the sense that Martin
Buber spoke of the aI - thou” , I don’t think they seem to understand an
“I - thou” kind of relationship that is at the center of all existence. I think you
know. It’s like “I -1”. And it’s not as if it is intentional, but it’s like they don’t
know anything. They don’t understand that there is a world beyond their own.

Interviewer: How’s that?
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HSET: I don’t know if I got that right, but I thought about that. I have to say
this, Jay, that the sexual revolution is a very very big part of your inquiry here
into the question of shame. The ultimate form of shame had at one time to do
with sexuality, as you well know. It started way back in prehistoric times.
You know with issues dealing with incest for example, which was the ultimate
taboo. But I remember in the 50’s when I grew up, there was still something
to virginity that still a sense of the value of virginity for example. Today as
everybody in the world can tell you, anybody who knows some of this stuff, it
seems to be reversed. What I am finding in the kids today is that there is
general willingness to, it isn’t even a sacrifice, they don’t see it as a sacrifice their virginity, they just see it as you know the natural course of events. I
don’t even think they ask a lot of intellectual questions, like why shouldn't I
give up my virginity or whatever.

Interviewer: No?

HSET: No. I just think it is part of the flow the way the world is today. Fll
give you an example in my own life. I brought up, well, I have three girls, but
the two girls that are out of the house now we brought up as Catholics. They
would go to communion every Sunday, they went through all the various
whatever, the lessons and sacraments and all that other stuff that goes on in
the church. They were a big part of that world and as soon as they graduated
from high school, they both left the church, they cohabitated, and so on and so
forth. I didn’t really understand it. Cohabitation to me was just the wrong
thing to do until I realized that “No”, the culture has moved it into an
acceptable thing to do now. It seems to be acceptable. I know this is true of
some very dear friends of mine whose names I can’t mention, but who brought
their children up Catholic and were astounded when their children left high
school and started cohabitating with their mates, or whatever, their partners.
So I think when we talk about shame I don’t know where the beginning or the
end of this whole thing is, but I think that the sexual revolution had a whole lot
to do with that motion of what’s there to feel bad about. You know if I can
more or less deal with the shame that comes from the sexual mores, or the
absence of shame really, then nothing else seems to come up and measure up
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to that. So therefore, everything else underneath the sexual revolution is
acceptable. It almost seems, see if you agree with this, it almost seems as if
we adhere to the old standards of like waiting until marriage, we have
something to be ashamed of.
I can see that in my 17 year old daughter right now. I was telling my
wife just last night that some place along the way, you know, in her life, just
like the fact that she has some very pure and very pristine values right now.
They are almost archaic, in some ways by today’s standards. They are just
beautiful. They are so healthy. They are so positive and so respectful of her
own humanity and in humanity in general. I told my wife that I just have this
awful sense that once she leaves high school and gets out there in that world
that the forces out there are so powerful that even the very best kids in the
world in my estimation are almost compelled (to conform to the popular
culture). It’s a scary thought. Especially when it is your own child.
<

Interviewer: Do you see any other forces affecting children and families that
seem different today?
HSET: I think another thing is the whole philosophical dilemma we are in
today, which is, you know, is at a very high level, but I think it does filter into
their (the students) minds (is) the question of “What’s the purpose? What’s
the meaning?, Why am I doing what I am doing?” I mean if the answer is only
to get ahead - to be successful with money and so on. They don’t see any other
kinds of purposes, any higher purpose, and we as a society haven’t given them
much to search for either.
We have such very bad models out there, as you well know, in the world.
Some of the people that are supposed to be adults are behaving like infants, in
terms of their creed, in terms of the kind of standard setting. I don’t want to
sound like Bob Dole here or like the conservative party, which I don’t identify
with in the slightest, but there are adults who are putting out films and other
types of entertainment. There are adults who are compromising the truth for
their own good, intelligent beings who are compromising the truth, and various
truths, for their own welfare. And I think the kids sense that. I think that
right now in America we are a little bit weird. We are little bit out of it - very
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confused about what it is we want as a nation, as a country. And I think that
the adults are responsible. You see this is the thing. We talk about kids here
and I think the biggest issue is adults. Where are they? Because if they are
the leaders, these kids have really lost their leaders in many ways and Fm not
sure that we are getting the leadership that we need from the adult world - on a
family level, on a political level, on an intellectual level. I mean all these
various things I think are somehow they get into the minds of these kids. Kids
know.
They can sense if they want to get into college they can just because
they have enough money to get into college and that it doesn’t take any degree
of academic excellence. And indeed, academic excellence in public schools -1
can speak for but not in private - that academic excellence is so relative now.
You know we have taken away the absolute standards of excellence and we
have just basically scaled everything we do here in terms of, you know, taking
the so-called raw scores and turning them into passing grades. Honor societies
aren’t even honor societies any more if you check into them very carefully.
They are just not societies with standards. Kids know that they can get so
many A’s, so many B’s, so many C’s, have a good leadership record and so on,
and take average to low-below average courses, and get A’s and B’s in those
and still be on the honor society.
I think kids are sensing that the world in general has these kinds of
oscillating, or else non-existent standards. And I think that they sense that. I
think that what I am trying to describe here is a kind of, you know, instead of
saying that it is just you are dealing with just a question of shame - I think we
are talking about all these contributing forces that really somehow (get) beat
into them. That’s why I say this is a huge problem.

Interviewer: Could you explain what scaling is?
HSET: Scaling would be like if a kid got a 54 on a test in a class of 20 students
and the highest grade on that test was a 74, then the 74 becomes an A and
the 54 becomes a “C”.
Interviewer: Oh, I see. Where the 74 should have been a C .
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HSET. Yeah. So we are sort of feeding the curve here. You know you have to
have so many A’s, B’s and C’s and all that sort of stuff. But even then, it is a
different kind of thing. It s not only that we are feeding the curve but it’s like
we are almost devising a curve of our own here and again, it is lowering the
standards.

Interviewer: Could you tell me more about your comment about a lack of
purpose in kids today?

HSET: I think it’s also in society today. There is a sense, in terms of purpose,
I think the kids that I teach anyway, they sense that in order to really get
along and be happy in today’s world, that they would have to reach heights
that are impossible for them to attain. I mean, you know, it’s the lottery
mentality you know. Either you’ve got a lot of money or you don’t have
enough and I think that some of these kids are sensing that they can’t get a lot
of money, so there’s a certain kind of resignation that they operate under. Like
okay, I’ll work for what I can get but I know I can’t get everything I want.
There’s nothing there for them. What I am suggesting is that for many kids
they don’t see striving towards something and for something as a real thing
today because they know that, or they sense that at least, that in order for
them to get all of what they want out of life they would have to be like
(Michael) Jordan, making millions like some of these actors and musicians

I

with tons of bucks.
Interviewer: Do you perceive it like a combination of skepticism and
defeatism?
..

HSET: I think so. They are skeptical about the standards. Yes, I think they
are skeptical.
Interviewer: And the models?
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HSET. And the defeatism in relation, yeah, I absolutely agree with that. And
I also think that the institutions of education themselves are not sure of what
they want from kids any more. I think that all our standards in education, I
think there are people who are debating it out there. There are so many damn
debates on what education is and what do we want our kids to get from it, and
what do we want them leaning toward. I think generally speaking that the
institution of education right now are simply unclear about what our mission is
- if indeed we have a mission. And I think that there is again, there is that
relativism that has crept in, you know, and I think that a certain amount of
relativism is important but I think that there have to be stopping points.
There have to be points where you say “yeah, that’s acceptable”, but as far as
this, as opposed to this kind of thing that keeps rotating and rotating, there is
no getting off point. Do you know what I mean?
Interviewer: I think so, yeah.

HSET: So, what I am sensing here, like at (XXX) High School, we are just
going along blindly what we do. We don’t have any leadership basically. This is
where I want to be careful, but I think school committees in general over the
years I have taught, these are not educators, they are not people who are in
touch with education. These are people who have been educated through
public schools, alot of them, whose kids are in school, but they don’t know very
much about education in the conceptual sense of education. They haven’t
been around education. They haven’t studied. They don’t know what the
research is. These people are not paid or paid pennies and they are there.
Some of them are there because they are really conscientious members of the
community and some of them are there for the prestige that it brings them,
but they are not really there as knowledgeable people in the field of education.
Therefore, they are not leading us.
I don’t have to talk about the Federal government. Are we going to have
a Department of Education or are we not going to have a Department of
Education? What does it stand for? You bring in a conservative
administration, they’ll end up abolishing education - that is the Department of
Education. Then you bring in other groups and they want to take something

376

which, has had a long history or whatever they want to dispense with it and
start something else. We have got more debate going on in the field of
education, yet we haven t asked the question: “What do we want our kids to get
out of education?” and “Why do we want them to get it?”. And I think kids
sense that kind of equivocation.

Interviewer: Uh huh. What kinds of changes have occurred in approaches to
discipline here at the school?

HSET: Well, I would have to say that over the years that I have been here,
there have been gray areas, grayer areas of approaches to discipline. We still
use the old detention system and its, I mean, you can’t say it works. You can
say it serves as a kind of a threat, like who does it threaten? Well it doesn’t
threaten the chronically undisciplined kids, if I can use that term. Those kids
don’t care how many detentions they accumulate. In the 33 years that I have
been here, that has never changed. You still get your steady list of kids. They
will be in there 3-5 times a week or maybe twice a week. The kids that really
benefit from the detention program are the ones that are never there because
they always feel like there is where I think shame is still alive. Level I kids still
feel, generally speaking, in our school, Level I students, the honor students, feel
a sense of public shame. It’s almost as if they are on display if they were to
appear in detention. I tell you it will drive some kids to tears and they do
everything they can to avoid it and sometimes they fall into it, but it is rare,
they fall into it unwillingly. And when they do, it is like the ultimate
humiliation. There is that sense there, but I do have to say that has always
been the case. Level I kids, honor kids in the schools, probably nationwide, just
don’t want to be identified as detention type of people.
We have got internal suspension and external suspension. Expulsion is
almost illegal. I mean we almost can never use it, it is rare. Basically that’s
where we pull back I think. When we use to suspend kids, externally, it was for
longer periods and then there would be more expulsions, but I think we have
pulled back. A lot of that has to do with litigation. You know, the legal
profession has gotten into this thing and I think that, you know Boards of
Education at the state level have sent dictums to the areas advising them

377

that if a kid is blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, he/she still has to be educated and so
on. I mean the State Department has muddied up the waters in a lot of things
in education and I think discipline is one of them.

Interviewer: How important is it if the kids know that being expelled is
virtually impossible?

HSET: You have to understand that for some kids that school is a social world
for them. This is where they come to be with other children. It is a primal
instinct to want to be with the herd and when kids are going to be suspended
for two days, and that’s the ruling of this place generally, most kids are
suspended for two days because it has to be terrible for them to be suspended
for more than two days. Two days is okay with them. That’s almost a little
status thing you know. Fm out for two days, I don’t have to go to school for
two days and all that. It strikes me that they would be terribly uncomfortable
if it was for like 5 days or 10 days they were suspended. My sense is that it
would probably be more of a deterrent if it were that long because these kids
know what to do with themselves for two days, but for 5-10 days they would
have a lot of trouble. So, I think that it would definitely have some affect. I
can’t be sure, but that would be my sense anyway.
Interviewer: What’s the view of the faculty toward detentions?
HSET: We have a faculty now as opposed to many years ago that’s pretty
relative. I mean many years ago, the faculty found detentions to be generally
an acceptable part of what school is about. Now we have many faculty
members who agree with detention and (those) who disagree with detention.
Who agree with suspension and who disagree with suspension. I mean that
you are finding amongst your faculty, you know, this kind of diversity of
opinion. I think that that is okay but diversity of opinion generates into the
community itself, in the school community itself, and I think that people get a
sense here that discipline is on unsteady ground. That we are not actually
sure what to do with it.
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Teachers do get up in arms when the administration tends to side with
the students in various ways. Whether there is a verbal or physical
confrontation with a student and a teacher, the administration, in the opinion
of many teachers, goes too far out of its way to satisfy the students in that
kind of situation. Feeling it would be safer for them to satisfy the students
instead of to satisfy the teachers. So, I am afraid to say that that puts out a
pretty awful message to kids which is basically means we can run this
institution ultimately. Right? So I see that as another problem.
Interviewer: When you say there is a relativism among the faculty on
detentions, do the students get the idea that in your class for a certain act
they might get a detention, where in Mrs. Brown’s class they wouldn’t?
HSET: You got it. Teachers know that in some cases, I include myself in this,
I am not of the same mind of other teachers in this school regarding the same
issues. If I see two people in the hall making out, you know, kissing or petting,
I mean I feel embarrassed to go up there and say cut it out. And I am not only
feeling embarrassed, but I feel threatened because with kids today and you
interfere in that kind of intimacy that goes on, even though they are doing it in
the wrong place and at the wrong time, they will snap at you. There are very
angry. They will humiliate you if they can. They will do whatever they can to
strike back. It isn’t like it use to be many years ago when you could say
something to a student and somehow he would feel a certain amount of, you
know, presence there on (a teacher’s) part. Today, students do not find it an
issue to curse teachers. I will give you one case in point. One of our new
teachers who came to our school, this was this year, caught a student
cheating and she had all the goods on him, it was just so blatant, it was just so
visible, and of course a lot of denial set in on the part of the kid, so the teacher
called the Vice Principal and said we are coming down there because I need
some action on this and I can’t get this kid to either admit or comply in some
way and I am even trying to offer him ways to deal with this thing and he just
won’t do anything with it. The Vice Principal said come on down and as the
new teacher was taking this boy down to the V.P.’s office, the boy was walking
either in front of her or behind her, (he) said to other students who would be
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standing in the hall at the time, “If you see this bitch on Main Street, shoot
her, shoot the fucker.” And, he said that a couple of times as he was walking
down the halls. You could talk to her if you need further information, or I could
get it for you.
Interviewer: On the way to the office?
HSET: Yes, this was on the way to the Vice Principal’s office that this
happened. Now, admittedly this may sound like an outstanding, remarkable
case, and I would say that I’ve never heard of that before, but it was verified.
It did happen. The heavy “P and that kind of an abandon, that kind of threat
to the teacher, is not unusual these days. Therefore, teachers tend to back off.
Interviewer: And you?
HSET: I’d back off to some degree. Partly because I feel, Pm not going to be
dishonest here, that I feel a threat of these kids. Fm not afraid of them, it’s
just that I have reached the point in my career where I am not sure of whether
I want to sacrifice my own safety sometimes just because I catch a kid
smoking in the bathroom. And I get this awful sense that if I catch a kid
smoking in the bathroom, I know this is sounding really contradictory and it
probably is, but if I catch a kid smoking in the bathroom and I go through all
the hassle that encompasses and leads to places that I don’t even want to go
to either, and then I find that, and I have found it with my colleagues over the
years, Fm better off to find ways to get out of it and avoid it. You know, I take
some of the punishment here. I mean my (past) efforts feel so feeble. You
know when I am doing it against so many people. But, I am not trying to get
myself out of this thing. I am as guilty as the next person when it comes to
that kind of asserting myself in matters of discipline around the school.
Interviewer: But as you commented to me earlier, it sounds as though if you
were to assert yourself, many times you might not be backed up by the
administration. I mean it sounds likes this child who was swearing at the
teacher and cheating - what were the consequences?
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HSET. I believe he got two days suspension. A lot of teachers were angry
about that. I mean we thought he deserved a harsher punishment than that.
We feel that this kind of language is freely used and not only in this school but I
am sure in a lot of other schools. Although we remind kids, people like myself,
kids use the words pissed-off5 on their papers and I will underscore it and say
that this is inappropriate language. I hear kids conversing, let’s say during
class, I tell them that is perfectly all right for them to talk but I don’t want to
hear any type of that language in the classroom. But there is that - and I have
had bad experiences with Vice Principals - where I have gone the extra mile
and come out on the wrong end of the deal. And when you get burned enough
times on something like that, and after a while you just say no.
I think that alot of us when it comes to discipline in the school, I think
we are all feeling a sense of futility but I do have to say I think that futility we
are sensing in the schools is the same type of futility we are sensing out of the
schools - in society in general. This lack of control that the adult population
has on the younger population. I mean once again it comes down to the old
concept of whether the schools can do the job that the society really needs to
do on its own. The schools are supposed to be institutions for fundamental
learning but we have had to take on so many jobs, replacing the parent, you
know, in so many ways, that I am sensing that the administration keeps sort
of hoisting on us this psychological, sociological kind of approach to teaching
and you have to consider the whole kid and they give us all this kind of stuff to
think about. We have got 22 kids and sometimes they would have us teach all
22 kids individually so we would have to go in there with 22 individual lesson
plans - totally oblivious to what it means to prepare for a class. It is difficult
to prepare for one class let alone 22 individuals in that class. The
administration has bought that I think, but the teachers have not bought it.
The teachers want to go straight ahead and they want to teach and they want
to meet problems as they confront them, but we don’t want to deal with kids
as if we knew what was going on in their lives every single minute of every
single day of their life here at the school. We just can’t. It’s crazy, you would
get anything done.
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Interviewer: Yeah. Do you have to second guess what impact criticism would
have on their self-esteem too?

HSET: Yeah, it’s always going on. Self-esteem is bug-a-boo at high school
level, I mean it is very difficult. Life is unfair. You know the things we learn we
learn too late, number one, and most of the things we learn, what I mean by
too late is that I am suggesting is that it is almost impossible to change
ourselves but we can modify how we can do things. But at this level here, we
can t really do a hell of a lot for self-esteem. It has already been so ingrained in
them. You know the self-esteem buzz word around here strikes me as kind of
hollow.
Interviewer: Do you hear it alot?
HSET: Not a lot any more.
Interviewer: No?
HSET: Which is good. Teachers have stopped using it because we just don’t
take that stuff seriously any more. We believe that we need to dignify kids but
we don’t think that we need to try to improve their self-esteem as if it were
something, as if it was something measurable in that we could move it from
this level up to that level.
Interviewer: What changes have you seen in educational approaches?
HSET: Well, it has changed. It’s trying to change. I mean that when I first
came into teaching I think the general mission was to make children literate,
make children moral, make them aesthetically conscious, make them love
learning for the sake of learning, learn for the sake of learning. I think that all
those things were going on. I think our mission statement now excludes some
of that stuff but I think other forces in this country of ours are trying to move
it in the direction of pragmatism. I think the mission now seems to be career

382

pathways and the school to work. What I think they are asking high schools
to do is the impossible, (to be) comprehensive high schools. They are asking us
to operate almost as these kinds of vocational schools or something you know.
We are not here to prepare kids for vocations, we are here to prepare
them for life. Life is more than vocations. I think that alot of us will agree
with that. So, I think that we are band wagoning them, not surprisingly, but I
am not sure about all that. Fm just speculating.
Incidentally that whole mission statement thing is very interesting
because that is a term adopted once again from the business community.
Boy, that tells you something! Business puts out mission statements you
know. If I can just be liberal here with language a little bit, but I think that it
is so much bullshit you know to take that thing called a mission statement and
apply it to you know this world of human beings with so many factors to be
concerned with . You know its an encroachment, is what it is. The business
community has been doing its level best in this state especially, and maybe in
other states too, but this state especially it is done. Infringing upon the very
sacred world of education.
They want us to operate, if they could, if we could, like a business. They
want us to basically prepare students for the working world. They are vague
as to what the working world is you know? We don’t work with factories any
more. How do you want us to prepare them? If you want us to prepare them
for the working world, then you better change what we have got here in terms
of the architecture, changing the curriculum, changing a lot of ways. You can’t
do it with what we’ve got now. We don’t even want to do it. We still see the
system as the best system of all to prepare the kids in a lot of different ways.
So, the mission statements generally, and there has been one major
shift and the on major shift that I have detected is the move from the
development of the whole person to the development of just part of that person
that is going into the job market. They want high schools to do that now.
Before they were asking colleges to do that. It seems to me that there
has been a great emphasis on math and science. I mean that’s the kind of
indication. Remember when Ronald Reagan came out with the “Nation at
Risk”? I don’t know if you remember that. He issued a report “The Nation at
Risk.” You should read it, you would be astounded. It was so politicized.
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Basically he was saying, it wasn’t really that the nation that was at risk, but
it was, it was a report about education. The reason why he entitled it “The
Nation at Risk”, or they did, is because the thing we were risking was our
national security. So what they envisioned, ultimately, if you read the
document, is that education is here to serve national security in times of war.
That we weren’t doing well with weapons and that we weren’t doing well with
rockets and so on and so on. So there was this big move toward Math and
Science as was there was in the days of Sputnik. You might remember in ‘57,
that was kind of a renewal of the effort.
Interviewer: Even Clinton is making noise about Math and Science as well.
HSET: That’s right.
Interviewer: And art was seen as kind of a fluff course and Music.
HSET: That’s funny you should say that because maybe that really does in
some ways - again - (function) as kind of these hidden messages these kids are
picking up all over the place. We don’t value the arts. The arts are in
shambles in public education. They are in shambles. Check our music
program, check our art program for example in our school system alone. It is
tokenism. Pure tokenism, if anything. So if you think about what the arts are,
art is statements about humanity. Art ultimately tries to assert, even if it is
in no uncertain terms, a certain morality, a certain basis for our being in
eternity. I mean it if you want to put it that way. It entemalizes us in some
way. It says that there is more to life. There are bigger things and bigger
issues in life. And we have taken the one thing that I think a lot of kids could
be drawn to in the world of art, in the world of music, and basically we have
suppressed them.
So fundamentally what we have done today, and maybe we have been
doing this since ‘57, we have been shifting more toward the what I would call
the amoral discipline of education - science and math. These things don’t deal
with morals. That’s not their concern. I mean questions of ethics.
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Oh, incidentally, the move toward business too. You can see a clear
move in that direction. You look around the schools and you will see more
computer rooms - IBM’s competing with Macintoshes and so on. You can see
that the curriculum has broadened in the business areas. There’s Accounting
I, II, and HI. I can remember when I first got here there wasn’t any
accounting or maybe Accounting I. And (now) they have all these office
courses. Don’t get me wrong, I have nothing against that, but what I am
saying is that that seems to be the proclivity - the direction as opposed to the
arts.
Interviewer: You make a good point. When Accounting II and m came in did
other art courses go out or has it always been just Art I?
HSET:

I am not saying that we should forsake one for the other, but what I

am saying is that you know we need to have a broader curriculum in that way.
We need to hire a couple of more personnel to help move that music and art
curriculum in our particular school. And bring in other forms such as dance.
Require the student body to take those courses, not just electives. You can do
some checking on that yourself and you will see that it is not a question of we
need more in business but we do need more in the arts, definitely.
Whoever adopted, and I forgot who it was, if it was the guy from Brown
University, the big educationalist down there, I can’t even think of his name
right now. If he was the one who called Music and Art the frills, but he was
right. Whoever said it, they used the word “frill”. They were exactly right.
That is still what it is right now. Drama - we have been frying to get drama
going in the school. There is no one who is going to get behind drama in this
school. No one. I have been trying to get writing across the curriculum to be
become a big part of this education unit. I can’t get an administrator who will
support it. Just so that writing can become a creative thing - writing is being
creative.
Interviewer: Have the students attitudes and behavior seem to have changed
over the course of your tenure here?
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HSET: I would have to say that attitudes have changed. Generally there is
more abandoned in their attitudes genuinely. I remember when I first came
here you would never hear of a young woman using the heavy “T word, at least
publicly, you just wouldn’t hear it. Now, it is so common. You would never
hear anyone burping in the halls, or if you did it was some weirdo. Now,
burping in the hall is pretty much an acceptable form of behavior. I’m not
saying it goes on all the time, I’m just saying that they think that it is
perfectly okay to do this and it’s not a big issue. Even girls burp and that’s
okay. I know that it sounds pretty sexist, but there was once when there was
a kind of genteelism here, you know, and maybe some people might frown on
that. Fm not sure if there wasn’t some value in it.
There is more gross indifference to the education process itself, too.
There is more of an attitude from the students “Did I pass? did I get a D? I
hear from a lot of kids today - did I get the D? The sense of academic
achievement is not there. It is just not a big deal. They know they can get into
the Community College and they know they can get into some other college
and still be able to get some sort of a passing grade from me or some of the
other teachers. Again, did I get a D because they didn’t want to get the F. Did
I get the “D” as opposed to the “F”. They are alot more casual, I should say
careless, not alot more, but they are careless, in the way they dress. Fm not
saying that dress codes, ah, I am saying, I mean dressing up isn’t what it used
to be. “Dressing up” just isn’t what it used to be. The only way they do is if
they are forced to.
There is more liberal attitude towards drugs and alcohol in this school.
There is that simmering anger I was talking to you about before that is always
there and you have to be very careful how you talk to kids these days - very
careful. They are just ready to just pounce on you verbally and some of them
physically. Although most kids are pretty careful about assaulting teachers.
Most of the kids who maintain pretty good standards in this school are the
upper level kids. I will tell you again, honor kids. That is very interesting and if
you do a profile on some of these honor kids you will find out that their families
are generally pretty stable. You probably know this as a counselor. The
families have standards you know what I mean and they are moving the kids
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in that direction. The mothers and fathers have kept together, they devoted
their lives to their kids and it is paying off.
There is less of an emphasis on doing homework. That’s another big
change in attitude or aspiration of value. Homework just doesn’t seem to be
what it used to be. More and more kids, even Level I kids are saying that
weekends are my own and prior to that teachers were of the mind, several
years ago, weekends were the time teachers gave the kids more homework.
For kids, they would be able to do it and it was a time they could get caught up
on the behind work. That seemed to be logical and it seemed to work. Now, we
got them saying “We aren’t going to do the homework if it comes up on Friday
night”. So what teachers have done, generally speaking, is to give weekend
assignments and have them due on Tuesdays instead of on Monday. So that
way it gives them the option to do it over the weekend, or if they want, they
can do it on Monday when they are back to what they call school which to
them is “Look, I work here five days a week, that’s my job, now it is over”
And you know the other thing is that so many kids in our school have
jobs now. They have jobs after school and, you know, some of these jobs start
at 3:00 o’clock, which I think is a crying shame, and end at 9:00 o’clock at night
- sometimes even 10:00 o’clock.
I notice more and more kids are getting their own apartments - not a lot
more. When I first came here, for a kid living in an apartment it was almost
like someone getting a divorce in the 1920’s. Now it’s not uncommon living in
an apartment for a kid on his own and holding a job to pay for the apartment.
I wouldn’t say it’s the rule but more kids are there.
Interviewer: Could you give me a rough percentage?
HSET: I am going to say there are - I’ll just take my own percentage -1 am
going to say between 5 and 10%, which I think is pretty high.
Interviewer: That’s a lot of kids.
HSET: Yeah, that’s a lot of kids, but you can check that with the office and
get more valid information on that and I would if I was doing this report.
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Interviewer: How has parenting changed over your thirty plus years?
HSET:

I mean I think that the modeling and the involvement is absent in

general. I could tell you many instances. The other day the Vice Principal
was called up to a classroom to smell one of the female students because the
teacher detected the smell of marijuana and, indeed, the Vice Principal came
up and she could smell the same thing. She brought the kid down and went
through her inquiries. I guess the Vice Principal was well within her rights to
do this. And then the next thing I knew, the mother was in the school, this was
the next day when the mother was in the school because the daughter was
really belligerent about this whole thing and the mother came into the school
to try to, I think, prevent her daughter from getting suspended or whatever.
The mother sat down and the mother looked as untamed as the daughter. She
looked physically untamed - over made-up - trying to make herself look young
and everything. At any rate, the Vice Principal spoke to her and she said this
is what she did and this is what we found. The mother got belligerent and said:
“Do you know what has been going on in our house lately?” What kind of an
insane question is that. How the hell does she (the VP) know what has been
going on in (their) house lately? “Do you know the stress she has been under?”
I mean this is not leadership, this is not modeling, I don’t think. Right?
The kid showed no respect for the mother. She walked out on the
mother and the mother was saying “Come on!” and the girl just kept walking
away from her mother. It wasn’t like the mother got any great respect from
her either. You know, you must see these things yourself going on all the time.
It’s just no big deal.
Interviewer: That’s a good example though.
HSET: Well, here is what I see is a primary source (of the problem) for most
kids. Modeling is either non-existent or negative. We are talking two-thirds of
the population in this school. I would say that modeling is non-existent or
negative. Now you take two-thirds of those kids and take it down to about 30
- 40 %, but I am very certain about the 30% figure, they just don’t have it.
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Parents are either single and overwhelmed with their children or there is just
too much work and responsibility for them to supervise their kids. They don’t
know how to set standards. Jay, I have said this time and time again, parents
today more than ever need to get, and I don’t know at what level of
intervention this ought to set in, but they need to be educated. The parents
need to be educated about what (they need to) know about today’s young
people, what to know about the climate out there and how to deal with it.
You wonder what kind of parents these kids are going to make.
Interviewer: Well that’s the big worry.
HSET: Some of these kids might do what I did which I considered I didn’t have
a very good father or a model, and I decided you know that my life was not
going to be like his, and I haven’t been like him. Very thankfully I haven’t been
like him. Some kids just might go that route and say when I have kids I am
going to do it right. But I think, by and large, that’s going to be the exception
and not the rule. You know my sense, my sense is that a lot of these kids are
going to go off and get married and repeat the cycle. It is just going to keep
going. They are going to have kids and they are not going to be good parents
for their own kids.
I hope that I am totally wrong about that and I know this sounds like
you know that I mean I feel like I am off base when I say things like that, but
it is just a sense I get.
Interviewer: Finally, let’s say it seems intuitively correct that a sense of
shame would prohibit some of these certain behaviors from ever occurring. Do
you think that this sensitivity is less of an internal issue for children today?
HSET: Yeah, I do. I think that it is less of an issue today. But, it’s primarily
because of the lack of training in that area (for) their parents. They just
haven’t had the training and from the teachers of this school, and from adults
in general.
In short I think what we have done, as a society, and maybe this is a
Western civilization feature, I don’t know, but I really do think that we have as
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adults - we really deserted our kids. I think we have deserted our kids. And
here we are, you know, trying to find ways to bring them around. That’s what
your whole experiment or inquiry is all about. To find ways to bring them
around, but we all know what we have to do. We all sense what we have to do
as adults (is that) it has to be a concerted effort and (on) many fronts. I am
not sure, Jay, Fm just not sure. The fact that people like you are looking into
this thing I think is hopeful-a sign of hope. I really mean that. It certainly is
worrisome.
Interviewer: What’s happened to this higher purpose? I mean did that - do you
think that alot of students of yours are evaluating their life, or will evaluate
their life, in monetary terms as in physical acquisitions?
HSET: I think.
Interviewer: More so now than when you were teaching 10 years ago?

HSET: Maybe not 10 years ago, but when I first started. I started at a pretty
tough time. I started right at the beginning of the Vietnam War. We were just
getting into the Vietnam War and the whole 60’s revolution was about to
break wide open. Yeah, I just think it’s “Get what you can while you can”, and
in the best way you can and in the quickest way you can.
You know it is just like all the writers and artists have been trying to tell
us, the 20th century writers have been trying to tell us. The spiritual world is
really fading. It’s fading. And what you do, you know what it causes. Joseph
Conrad, This Side of Darkness, answers a lot of those questions. With his
famous hollow at the core. The search for power and the search for position, a
lack of conviction, people who have conviction but do not act on those
convictions, or people who are staying clear away from convictions because
they know what a conviction could mean. It could mean commitment in some
way for them - moral commitment, other kinds of commitments. And I really
think that that has been just generating and generating and then we go
through a couple of wars and I am sure from there you know a certain kind of
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what I call a survival sort of mentality set in.
Over this century - it has been a tough century. It has just been a very,
very tough century. And, you and I are products of it. The psychological age
has really come upon us now and it is very interesting the new spiritual gurus
are the psychologists and psychiatrists. You know what I am saying - that
they have become now the people that we look to, and, Jay, it is funny when
you look into the lives of these people who are leading us in the psychiatric
area, the psychological area. Many times their lives are in disarray too. They
don’t practice what they preach either. They will tell you how to raise your
children, but not in their house. It is unbelievable. God, it is like, What the
hell? A marriage counselor who has been divorced twice. What the hell does
that tell you? She has been there! Oh good.
But do you see what we do? We have become such great manipulators
today we can justify almost everything. We can take someone who is guilty
and we can make that person innocent. We can take ourselves who are guilty
and make ourselves innocent. There are so many vast definitions in language
now in that respect. We sort of bought into that. Someone once said that the
reason why language was “invented” so that we could protect the truth from
getting out.
Interviewer: That’s interesting because if you do see alot of excuses, and alot
of skepticism, and not a commitment then there’s little or no room for shame.
I mean shame in the sense having these aspirations and falling short and
feeling responsible.
HSET: Well, that’s the key, feeling responsible. I think that is where the
shame really comes in. You know you had something and now you let it go and
now you have to sort of feel the impact of that.
And you have to feel it in a community sense. As I sit here and say
that, you know, this nagging thing hits me about “Who cares about the
community, who cares about what anybody thinks”? But when you think
about it we have to be concerned about the community because the
community is what protects us ultimately. As much as it condemns us, it
protects us too. We have to protect the community. That s what we are
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talking about here, this whole thing ultimately. We’re not just talking about
kids that don’t feel shame, we’re talking about the whole structure of the
society, where it is going.
The kids seem to want all the rights but none of the responsibilities. It
goes back to 1968 at the Chicago Convention, you know, as long as we are
protesting and so on and so forth, they couldn’t understand it when they were
getting beat over the head with the clubs. They didn’t understand that in
reality, you know, if you do this, and you break laws, then you get beat, you get
clubbed. It is all part of it. But I think you are right, I don’t know what we
have done. Maybe society has developed more institutions to protect people
from feeling their responsibility.
I am very much in favor of welfare. I think that people who need welfare
ought to get welfare. But when it becomes a cushion, a generational lifestyle,
then I think we have got to take a closer look at what the hell we are talking
about here. Because what we are probably doing there is taking the individual
away from his responsibility, her responsibility, and encouraging this kind of
non-personhood. Which is okay by some people -live and die. Yeah. That’s
just the way they look at life. This is good.
Okay, I am sure that most of what I have said is superficial but I’ll be
interested to see if it will be confirmed in some of the other stuff that you find
there.
Interviewer: Oh no. Thanks very much. You had great ideas. Any last
thoughts?
HSET: You know for education it is clear in my mind what we need to do. We
need to involve parents. We need to bring them into the schools literally, into
the schools. We need to educate the parents. We need to provide places for
their education, time for their education. We need to bring the employers into
our schools so that they can see what kids are giving up in order to get. We
need to have more facilities and more teachers into the profession so that we
can get the arts in there. You know, make them a very visible part of what we
do. We don’t need all these damn charter schools and all these other schools
that are sort of splintering you know, because that’s not going to solve our
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problems I think either. I think that most kids are going to come to your
public schools.
I really think that those are the kinds of things that are going to have to
happen and I am going to tell you that politicians are going to have to stop
bull-shitting the public. They are going to start having to tell the public the
way it is and that if you want to have good healthy kids, and you want a good
educational system, you, Mr. & Mrs. Parent, you are responsible for it. Not
with your taxes and not with your complaints, but with the way you bring up
your kid. That’s it basically.
Interviewer: Thanks again, thanks very much.
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